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SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION: 
This dissertation studies the way that Britain's intelligence services changed priorlues 
from the Second World War to the early Cold War. It stretches from the point when the 
Soviet Union entered the Second World War as Britain's ally in 1941, to the moment a 
decade later in 1951, when the Cold War had set in and Moscow was the bitter enemy of 
the west. Using recently declassified Security Service (MIS) records, it examines how 
Britain's intelligence services met the massive transition from World War to Cold War. 
It reveals a variety of subjects previously undocumented in the secondary historical 
literature, such as MIS's concerns after the Second World War with terrorism emanating 
from the Middle East. ~he dissertation is an attempt to rescue intelligence from 
historical obscurity and place it in its justified position: as a central component in the 
process of political decision-making in Britain. As well as offering new historical 
insights, it provides useful lessons for governments and intelligence agencies at the start 
of the twenty-first century. The dissertation shows that many of the issues facing 
intelligence agencies at the start of the twenty-first century were, in fact, faced by the 
British intelligence community half a century ago. 
'Weare quite impartial; we keep an eye on all people', 
Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary 
(February 1941) 
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NOTE ON STYLE & REFERENCES 
In this ·dissertation, footnote references are given in the following manner: in the first 
instance a full archival reference is written (for example, NA KV 1/1 'German 
espionage'), followed by a serial number and the documentation itself (for example, 's.l a: 
MIS to Mr. Smith, Home Office, (25 Dec., 1945')). Once a file has been quoted it is 
repeated thereafter in shortened form, without the full title, but still giving details of the 
documentation (for example, NA KV1/l, s.la: MIS to Mr. Smith, Home Office, (25 
Dec., 1945)). As a general rule, the often-changing wartime military ranks of MIS 
officers are not given. Whenever they can be determined, individuals' full names are 
given and not simply their initials, but this has not always been possible-especially for 
MIS officers on whom it is often difficult to establish precise details. When an individual 
received a title-such as a Knighthood-after the time period of the dissertation, that 
honour is placed in (brackets). Numbers over 100 are written in numerals and, in order 
to avoid the complication of capitalising words at an almost exponential rate, the 
dissertation follows a general rule of only capitalising words when absolutely necessary; 
'communist' is not capitalised, but a specific title, such as 'British Communist Party', is. 
The nomenclature of intelligence agencies can often present difficulties for 
commentators, most obviously with the KGB's frequently changing name (which never, 
however, changed the KGB's function) . For a matter of consistency and simplicity, in 
this dissertation the name of The Security Service is shortened to its more common title, 
'MIS', and The Secret Intelligence Service is shortened to 'SIS'. The reader will notice in 
the dissertation that MIS is often described with the possessive pronoun 'their', instead 
of 'its'. Although grammatically awkward, if not incorrect, this is a deliberate attempt to 
move beyond a one-dimensional description of 'MIS', and is used to insinuate that 
different MIS Divisions often had divergent opinions and requirements-as we shall 
discover. Finally, following the example of intelligence records themselves, in the 
dissertation agents' names and intelligence operations are written in CAPITALS. 
12 
Introduction 
13 
This dissertation studies the 'missing dimension' of the history of governments in 
the twentieth century: secret intelligence. At the beginning of the twenty-first century we 
find ourselves in a perplexing situation ~egarding secret intelligence. It has become one 
of the most widely discussed subjects in the contemporary world, generating almost daily 
discussions in newspapers, radio and television reports. Not a day passes, it seems, 
without the media discussing the use and abuse of secret intelligence. The start of the 
twenty-first century has witnessed the first war in history to be launched specifically on 
the basis of (erroneous) intelligence.' At the time of writing this dissertation, a 
spectacular terrorist attack involving the bombing of transatlantic aircraft, we are told 
leading to mass-murder on an 'unimaginable scale', appears to have been thwarted in 
Britain.2 Yet despite a burgeoning popular interest in-and concern with-intelligence, 
it is conspicuously missing from most of the historical literature. Even the most recently 
written histories of Britain in the twentieth century fail to discuss intelligence in a 
significant way.3 
When historical studies do mention intelligence, they usually do so punctuated 
with a semi-colon; as a side thought. Certainly most histories of the Second World War 
now acknowledge the vital role performed by intelligence in the Allied war-effort, 
normally mentioning British and Allied codebreakers at Bletchley Park.4 Inexplicably, 
however, Britain's foray into intelligence is usually depicted in the historical literature as a 
1 For Britain's official report on intelligence preceding the war in Iraq, see: Lord Butler of 
Brockwell, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destrllction, (London, 2004). 
2 'Foiled transatlantic bomb plot', The Times, London: (10 Aug., 2006) . 
3 The classic work describing the 'missing dimension' is Christopher Andrew and David Dilks 
(eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, 
(London, 1984). Recent works which overlook intelligence include Peter Clarke's otherwise 
outstanding, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000, new ed.: (London, 2004). 
4 General histories of the Second World War which recognise the importance of intelligence 
include: Max Hastings, The Second World War.· a World in Flames, (London, 2004); I.C Dear and 
M.RD. Foot (eds.), Oxford Companion to the Secolld World War, new ed.: (Oxford, 2005); a useful 
overall treatment is given by Ralph Bennett, Behind the Battle: Intelligence alld the War lvith Germa'!Y, 
1939-1945, (London, 1999). 
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wartune aberration, an 'un-gentlemanly', but necessary, wartime expediency measure. 
For example, Sir Martin Gilbert's magisterial official biography of Churchill, which he 
admirably took over from Randolph Churchill and which stretches to over ten volumes 
in total, discusses Churchill's interest in intelligence during the Second World War. 
However, it is almost silent on intelligence during Churchill's second administration after 
1952. Even the most rudimentary guess work of a secondary school history student 
would recognise that this must be inaccurate: we are supposed to believe that during his 
second administration, Churchill for some reason became disinterested in intelligence.s 
This dissertation is an attempt to rescue intelligence from historical obscurity, and place 
it in its justified position: as a central component in the process of political decision-
making in Britain. Intelligence was a normal function of government in Britain half a 
century ago, just as it is today.6 
Based on recently declassified Security Service (MIS) files, mostly released within 
the last three years, this dissertation explores the way that Britain's intelligence services 
met the transition from the Second World War to the early Cold War. It stretches from 
the moment when the Soviet Union entered the war as Britain's ally in 1941 to the point 
a decade later in 1951, when the Cold War had set in and the Soviet Union was the bitter 
enemy of the west. It examines the way that MIS, and so far as we can tell Britain's other 
intelligence services, responded to this massive shift in national security priorities, away 
from the Axis Powers and towards the Cold War conflict with Moscow. One of the 
S Christopher Andrew, 'Churchill and intelligence', Intelligence and National Securi!}, 3 no. 3, (1988), 
pp. 181-93; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 8 vols. plus companion vols.: (London, 1966-
1988). 
6 Pioneering studies of intelligence history include Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: the Making of 
the British Intelligence Communi!}, (London, 1985); Nicholas Hiley, 'The failure of British counter-
espionage against Germany, 1907-1914', Historical Journal, 28, no. 4, (1985), pp. 835-862; Ernest 
R. May (ed.) , KnOJving One's Enemies. Intelligence Assessment bifore the Two World WarJ, (princeton, 
1984); Wesley K. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nail Germa,!), 1933-1939, 
(Ithaca, 1986); Adda Bozeman (ed.), Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essqys, (New York, 
1992); Keith Nelson and B.J.C. McKercher (eds.), Go Spy the Lmd' Militat)1 Intelligence in History, 
(Westport Conn., 1992). 
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recurring themes addressed throughout the dissertation is that Britain's intelligence 
services were forced to balance long-term threats with short-term emergencies. As well 
as providing a specific discussion about how MIS adjusted from World War to Cold War, 
the dissertation will situate MIS in the wider context of the British intelligence 
community, and outline the intelligence assessments that Britain's intelligence services 
collectively provided the government with as the Cold War developed. Ultimately, this 
study will show that as the Cold War escalated, intelligence and security matters 
influenced a number of key political decisions in Britain-from domestic security 
procedures in government departments, to British decolonisation. 
The following dissertation offers a substantial revision of the existing 
historiography of the early Cold War. Using MIS records, the transition from World War 
to Cold War begins to look significandy different from all previous interpretations. As 
we shall see in chapters one and two, MIS took a hard-line approach against the Soviet 
Union throughout the war and attempted to do all that they could to investigate Soviet 
activities-even when London was allied to Moscow after June 1941. For Britain's 
secret services, however, the transition from World War to Cold War was not a simple, 
straightforward process. Chapter three reveals that in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, MIS was actually more concerned about the threat of Zionist terrorism than they 
were the looming threat of the Soviet Union. This was because, hitherto undisclosed, 
Zionist terrorism posed the most urgent threat to British post-war national security. As 
hostilities in Europe ended in 1945, MIS received reliable reports from their sources in 
the Middle East that Zionist terrorist groups were planning to send terrorist 'cells' to 
mainland Britain in order to launch attacks. As one MIS report from the Middle East 
16 
warned, Victory in Europe (VE-Day) would be a D-Day for Zionist terrorists.7 We shall 
discuss the counter-terrorist policies which MIS devised to meet these threats-all of 
which were · secret, and almost none of which has left evidence in the public domain. 
MIS records considerably revise our understanding of the history of the early Cold War: 
for the entire duration of the Cold War, Britain's intelligence agencies were 
predominandy concerned with counter-espionage, but in the crucial transition period 
from World War to Cold War, MIS was also concerned with counter-terrorism.8 
The threat of Zionist terrorism interrupted and distracted MIS's transition from 
World War to Cold War. This made MIS's already weak position regarding the Soviet 
Union in 1945 even worse. At the outset of the Cold War, MIS and the rest of the 
British intelligence community knew astonishingly litde about their 'new' enemy. In 
these circumstances, as we shall see in chapter four, a key method for Britain's 
intelligence services to gather intelligence in the early Cold War lay with interrogations. 
London established a series of secret interrogation centres, both in Britain and abroad, in 
which Soviet defectors were interrogated. As the Cold War set in, interrogations 
provided British and other western intelligence agencies with valuable political, military 
and scientific intelligence. However, as we shall see, at one secret British interrogation 
centre in occupied Germany a scandal erupted in 1947, when it emerged that several 
prisoners had been horrifically"abused by British interrogation officials. In the wake of 
the scandal, and in a manner which has striking implications for governments at the start 
of the twenty-first century, the British government implemented oversight mechanisms 
for its interrogation centres in occupied Germany. In 1948 the British government 
7 National Archives, London [henceforth NA] CO 733/457/14 'Palestine terrorist organisations: 
capture of Yacov Meridor, IZL (Irgun Zvai Leurni) leader': Guy Liddell to Christopher 
Eastwood, Colonial Office, (19 April, 1945). 
8 Calder Walton, 'British intelligence, the Mandate of Palestine and threats to national security 
itnrnediately after the Second World War', Intelligence and National Securiry, (forthcoming). 
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judged that it was possible to safeguard prisoners' rights while at the same time extracting 
useful intelligence from them. 
The onset of the Cold War was met in Britain with a series of counter-espionage 
'intelligence failures'. In the late 1940s and early 1950s it emerged that Soviet agents had 
penetrated a wide range of British government departments, some of which had access 
to the most closely guarded contemporary information-atomic research. In 1951 
Britain's intelligence services discovered that they themselves had been penetrated by 
Soviet agents, the now-notorious 'Cambridge spies'. Unlike all previous studies, 
however, chapter five of this dissertation uses intelligence records themselves to 
understand why these security failures occurred, and then it discusses the counter-
measures which the British intelligence community developed in their wake. The .. 
dissertation moves beyond simply labelling espionage scandals 'intelligence failures', and 
instead attempts to understand why such failures arose. As we shall see, in response to 
successive security failures in Britain in the early Cold War, MIS helped the government 
construct an entirely new security apparatus. Begun in 1947, but transformed in the 
wake of espionage scandals in the early 1950s, MIS helped the government develop new 
vetting procedures for departments with access to secret information. Britain's new 
vetting procedures, introduced in 1952, transformed the nature of work in Whitehall 
departments-for the rest of the twentieth century. 
The Cold War was not merely a domestic threat for the British intelligence 
community. It was a threat that Britain's intelligence services met across the empire and 
commonwealth. As the Cold War escalated, Britain was faced with a series of violent 
end of empire struggles across the globe-from Malaya to West Africa. Following the 
outbreak of the communist-inspired insurgency in Malaya in 1948, many government 
officials in London feared that Moscow would attempt to subvert decolonisation 
movements in Africa. As London was presented with the question of decolonisation in 
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Africa, MIS provided government departments with a series of intelligence assessments 
on whether the leaders of 'national liberation' movements in West Africa and East Africa 
were ideologically committed communists. Chapter six shows that, contraty to what we 
might sceptically assume, MIS e~erted a 'calming' influence on fears in Whitehall 
regarding communist involvement in African decolonisation movements. Although it is 
hardly discussed in the existing historical literature, MIS played a significant role in 
London's response to 'national liberation' movements in West Africa and East Africa. 
This dissertation concludes by arguing that intelligence is the missing dimension of the 
history of British decolonisation. 
1. Historiography 
As the world's second oldest profession, intelligence has by now attracted a large 
body of literature. Britain is commonly thought to have had historically the most 
successful secret services in the world, stretching back to Elizabethan times if not 
before.9 However 'intelligence' in the sense we understand it, relying on bureaucracy and 
a differentiation between secret and non-secret government information, was specifically 
a twentieth century creation. to The First World War was the watershed event which, in 
many ways, created the modern national security state. During the First World War 
governments across Europe were forced to consider national security problems on an 
9 For example, see: Stephen Budiansky, HerMcyesry's Spy: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the 
Birth of Modern Espionage, (London, 2005); Nelson and McKercher (eds.), Go Spy the Land: Military 
Intelligence in History. 
10 Carlo Ginzburg, 'Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: clues and the scientific method', History 
Workshop, 9, (1980), pp. 5-36. For general comments on the development of modern national 
security bureaucracies, albeit in authoritarian states, see: Marc Raeff, 'The well ordered police 
state and the development of modernity in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Europe: an 
attempt at a comparative approach', American Historical ReviellJ, 80, no. 5, (1975), pp. 1221-43. 
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unprecedented scale-and Britain · was no exception to this pan-European rule. 11 
Although this is now well established and discussed in numerous studies, until recently all 
attempts to study the history of British intelligence were undermined by a recurring 
problem: a chronic lack of official documentation. A cloud of secrecy hung over 
Britain's intelligence agencies for most of the twentieth century, making it extraordinarily 
difficult for outside observers to study their activities. For most of the century, 
transparency and openness-to say nothing of parliamentary oversight-were anathema 
to Britain's intelligence services. The problem facing historians was confounded by the 
fact that British politicians often refused to discuss matters related to national security in 
their memoirs. In his book The Governance of England published in 1976, Sir Harold 
Wilson's chapter on 'The Prime Minister and national security' was barely one page 
I 12 ong. 
The British government did not officially recogruse the existence of its 
intelligence services until the early 1990s. Before then, with little official documentation 
to work with, 'intelligence history' was forced to take on a parochial, somewhat eccentric 
role.13 Before the 1990s, historians who attempted to study Britain's intelligence services 
were placed in the extraordinary position of researching a subject which did not officially 
exist, and publishing material on which could lead to libellous legal proceedings-not a 
hurdle which most academics encounter during their careers. Even trusted 'insiders' 
11 Peter Holquist, (('Information is the Alpha and the Omega of our work": Bolshevik 
surveillance in its pan-European context',Journal of Modern History, 69, no. 3, (1997), pp. 415--450. 
For general comments on the First World War and the establishment of 'modernity', see the 
classic work by Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, (New York, 1975) [much of which 
has been overturned by J.M. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: the Great War in European 
Cultural History, (Cambridge, 1995)]; also see: Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: the Great War atld the 
Birth of the Modern Age, (Boston, 1989). 
12 Quoted from Christopher Andrew, 'Introduction', in Andrew and Dilks (eds.), The Missitlg 
Dimetlsiotl. Governmetlts and Intelligence Commutlities itl the Twentieth Cetltury, p. 2; Harold Wilson, The 
governatlce of Etlgland, (London, 1976). 
~3 The fIrst issue of Intelligence atld National S ecutiry in 1986 took on a somewhat apologetic tone for 
its ambitions-to study intelligence history. 
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found it difficult to disclose the activities of the British intelligence community. 14 The 
wartime chairman of MIS's 'Double Cross System', (Sir) John Masterman, himself an 
historian, Provost of Worcester College, Oxford, and Vice Chancellor of Oxford 
University-whose other attributes included being one of the best spin-bowlers in 
contemporary English cricket-was forced to publish his now-classic account of The 
Double-Cross System in 1972 in the United States, due to resistance from Britain's 
intelligence services. 15 Masterman unsuccessfully argued with Whitehall departments, 
which ironically included several of his former Oxford students, that publishing his 
account of MIS's wartime accomplishments, which he wrote as an in-house MIS history 
in 1945 and not retrospectively, would allow the distorted history of the Second World 
War to be corrected. At the time, however, there were considerable vested interests for 
Britain's intelligence services in not letting wartime secrets into the public domain. 
Conduits of secrecy in Whitehall feared that Masterman's book would lead scholars to 
discover the ULTRA secret, and one of the problems of disclosing the ULTRA secret 
was that in the 1970s several commonwealth countries were still using ENIGMA 
machines for their diplomatic communications. Disclosure of the ULTRA secret would 
beg the obvious question that if Britain's codebreakers had successfully broken the 
wartime ENIGMA code, they were probably still capable of decrypting ENIGMA 
traffic-which of course they were, and did. When the ULTRA secret was indeed 
disclosed by Frederick Winterbotham following the publication of Masterman's book, it 
was sanctioned by the British intelligence community partly as a means of countering 
Soviet propaganda clarning that Moscow had been responsible for winning the Second 
14 Some of the best fictional espionage literature, however, was written by authors who had 
previously served in the British intelligence community. See: Graham Greene, Our Man ill Havalla, 
~ondon, 1958); John Le Carre, The Spy who came .il/from the Cold, (London, 1964). 
, J~hn C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System til the War of 1939 to 1945, (New Haven, 1972); 
ObItuary: Sir John Masterman', The Times, London: (7 June, 1977). 
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W 16 World ar. Britain's intelligence agencies apparently allowed the historical record to be 
set straight when it suited them. 
It was partly in response to the damage done to the reputation of Britain's 
intelligence servlces by the 'Cambridge Five' that they commissioned two historians, 
Professor M.R.D. Foot and Sir F.H. Hinsley, to write official histories of British 
intelligence operations during the Second World War. Foot's account of Britain's 
wartime sabotage organisation in France, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), first 
published in 1966, remains a classic to this day, producing several subsequent editions 
and translations into different languages. 17 'Harry' Hinsley's monumental British 
Intelligence dU1ing the Second World War, published in four volumes between 1979 and 1990, 
set the standard to which all subsequent intelligence history is compared, and remains 
unquestionably the most useful historical account of Britain's intelligence agencies during 
the war. 18 Although both official histories are indispensable for any analysis of Britain's 
wartime intelligence operations, and they played an essential role in developing 
intelligence history as an academic discipline, at the time historians were still faced with 
the same problem: irrespective of official histories, there were still almost no British 
intelligence records in the public domain for scholars to study. In these circumstances, 
historians studying Britain's intelligence services were forced to rely on oral testimonies 
and to pull together scraps of information from different archives, especially from 
personal collections of papers. At best, the scholarly use of scarce evidence made 
16 Frederick Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, (London, 1975); Richard J. Aldrich, 'Policing the 
past: official history, secrecy and British intelligence since 1945', English Historical Review, 119, 
(2004), pp. 922-953. . 
17 M.R.D. Foot, S.O.E. in France: an Account oj the British Special Operations Executive, 1940-1944, 
(London, 1966); M.R.D. Foot, SOE in the Low Countries, (London, 2001); M.R.D. Foot, Foreign 
Fields: the Story oj an SOE Operative, (London, 2002). 
18 F.B. Hinsley (et a~, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 4 vols.: (London, 1979-1990); the 
fifth volume in the series was written by Sir Michael Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World 
War, vol. V: Strategic Deception, (London, 1992). 
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intelligence historians take on a mantle not dissimilar to medieval historians. 19 At worst, 
it made intelligence history extremely anecdotal. One of the problems of relying on oral 
testimonies,as some historians realised, but others failed to, was that often those former 
intelligence officers who were willing to disclose information had agendas of their own.20 
The overall result was that until the 1990s, Britain's intelligence agencies held a unique 
position in the components of the British government: unlike any other government 
department, they were not open to inspection and criticism by outside observers. 
This unsatisfactory and historiographically one-sided situation was overturned in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the easing of Whitehall secrecy restrictions, and the 
gradual declassification of British intelligence records. 21 In the early 1990s historians 
began to use British intelligence records to produce path-breaking new research, some of 
the best of which was written by Professors Christopher Andrew, Peter Hennessy and 
Richard Aldrich.22 However, the situation was made even better for historians with the 
declassification of MIS records in the late 1990s. Declassified MIS records now provide 
researchers with unprecedented insights into the inner-workings of the British 
intelligence community in the first half of the twentieth century. In many instances, MIS 
records cause us to rewrite established chapters of modern British history. Following the 
19 See: Andrew, S emt Service. The Making of the British Intelligence Community. The parallel to medieval 
history is made not without justification: one former Director-General of MI5, Sir Stephen 
Lander, was a medieval historian by training. See: Stephen Lander, 'The diocese of Chichester, 
1508-1558: Episcopal reform under Robert Sherburne and its aftermath', (ph.D. dissertation, 
Cambridge University, 1974). 
20 Nigel West's otherwise valuable studies were undermined by the fact that much of his 
information came from a retired MI5 officer, Arthur Martin, who was convinced of the 
conspiracy theory that Sir Roger Hollis, Director-General of MI5, was a Soviet agent. See: Nigel 
West, MI5: British Security Seroice Operations 1909-1945, (London, 1981); Nigel West, A Matter of 
Trust: MI5 1945-72, (London, 1982); Peter Wright, Spycatcher. The CandidAutobiograpry of a Senior 
Intelligence Officer, (Victoria, 1987). 
21 Gill Bennett, 'Declassification and release policies of the UK's intelligence agencies', Intelligence 
~nd National Security, 17, no. 1, (2002), pp. 21-32; Peter Gill, 'Reasserting control: recent changes 
tn the oversight of the UK intelligence community', Intelligence and National Security, 11, no. 2, 
~1996), pp. 313-331; Wesley K. Wark, 'In Never Never Land? The British archives on 
tntelligence', HistoricalJournal, 35, no. 1, (1992), pp. 195-203. 
22 Richard Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strate'!!y and the Cold War, 1945-51, (London, 1991); 
Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951, (London, 1993). 
23 
Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government in 1992, and with gaining momentum since 
1998, the Security Service has begun to declassify records on the grounds that they 
represent an archive of historical value and MIS, like any other government department, 
cannot claim ownership of the past.23 MIS records allow historians, for the first time, to 
critically study the 'missing dimension' of twentieth century British history.24 The 
situation for researchers today is made even more favourable through the introduction of 
Britain's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in January 2005, by which government 
records can be requested. The situation is further brightened by the fact that MIS files 
have been declassified in conjunction with records from other government departments, 
such as the Foreign Office and Colonial Office. This has the benefit of placing MIS and 
Britain's other intelligence agencies within the wider context of government-where they 
belong. In ways previously unimaginable, researchers can now see how MIS 
communicated with other government departments. The following dissertation has 
benefited from FOIA and the cross-departmental declassification of intelligence records. 
In 2006, with fourteen releases of MIS records to date, there are currendy over 
3,000 MIS files in the public domain at the National Archives (the renamed Public 
Record Office) in London.25 MIS records, released on a rolling roughly fifty year rule of 
declassification, presendy stretch from MIS's official establishment in 1909 to the early 
Cold War in mid-19S0s. Carrying the National Archives' serial reference 'KV,/6 MIS 
records are divided into 'personal files' (pF-Series)/7 on individuals whom MIS 
23 Angus Wood, 'Construction of parliamentary accountability for the British intelligence 
community, 1971-2002', (M.Phil. dissertation, Cambridge University, 2003). 
24 Stephen Lander, 'British intelligence in the twentieth century', Intelligence and National Security, 
17, no. 1, (2002), pp. 7-20. 
25 Releases are usually accompanied by a degree of media interest, with newspaper reports 
normally focusing on the more sensational stories in MIS fUes. 
26 'KV'is thought to stand for 'Kell Volume' after the first Director-General of MIS, Sir Vernon 
Kell. 
27 KV 2 series; KV1 series are post-war section histories compiled after the First World War. 
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investigated; 'subject files' (SF-Series);28 'policy files' (pOL-F Series);29 'organisation files' 
(OF_Series);30 and 'list files' (L-Series)31-all of which relate to the internal mechanics of 
MIS's operations. Some of the most recendy declassified records are now even available 
to researchers on-line, through the National Archives' website.32 MIS records provide 
outstanding research opportunities not just for intelligence historians, but for military 
historians, political historians, historians of international relations, social historians and 
biographers. The MIS ftles on people whom the Service investigated often contain 
unique material, such as intercepted communications, unavailable in any other archive. 
Some of the most useful records on which this dissertation draws are the 'section 
histories' compiled by each department within MIS at the end of the Second World War, 
which were written, like Masterman's study, in order to identify 'lessons learned from the 
past'. The in-house history of MIS compiled by John Curry in 1945, which itself drew on 
these 'section histories' and was declassified in 1999, has proved an outstanding resource 
for this dissertation.33 Similarly, the diary of MIS's arguably most successful 
contemporary counter-espionage officer, Guy Liddell, which he carefully dictated to his 
secretary at the end of almost every working day, has been an extremely useful source. 
Liddell's diary offers a 'real-time' commentary on the changing threats to British national 
security during the Second World War.34 In sharp contrast to the situation even less than 
a decade ago, the happy problem currendy facing intelligence historians is that there is 
almost too much declassified MIS material with which to work. 
28 KV 3 Series. 
29 KV 4 Series. 
30 KV 5 Series. 
31 KV 6 Series. 
32 www. na tionalarchives .gov.uk 
33 John C. Curry, The Securiry Seroice, 1908-1945. The Official H istory, with an introduction by 
Christopher Andrew: (London, 1999). 
34 NA KV4/185-196 'Liddell diaries'; the Liddell diaries have now been edited and published by 
Nigel West, The G I!y Liddell Diaties, 2 vols.: (London, 2005). 
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II. Methodology 
Like any historical record, declassified MIS files are subject to a number of 
limitations and need to be used with a degree of caution. The recent outpouring of 
intelligence records, in Britain and elsewhere, has led some researchers to be less careful 
and probing than perhaps they should be.35 Secret archives are undoubtedly alluring and 
exciting, though as with every other historical archive MIS records need to be read 
critically. As a secret bureaucracy, MIS's records combine both the best and the worst 
aspects of bureaucracy (in the sense derived from Max Weber) and secrecy (in the sense 
implied by Edward ShillS).36 One of the most seductive aspects of MIS records from half 
a century ago is that they were written by intelligence officers without the intention of 
ever being declassified. As a result, MIS records often contain frank opinions of officers 
in ways which, given the now existing constitutional framework of Britain's intelligence 
services, and the possibility that intelligence records could be used as evidence in court, 
presumably do not characterise British intelligence reports today.3? But herein also lies a 
problem apparently facing researchers: we rely on Britain's secret agencies to declassify 
their own records and consequently, some observers have recently argued, intelligence 
records are 'carefully packaged versions of the past'.38 On first impression this argument 
seems logical enough. A close inspection of declassified MIS records, however, 
disproves the idea that there is a 'historical conspiracy' on the part of Britain's 
35 David Reynolds, From World War to Cold War.· Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History if the 
1940s, (London, 2006), p. 336. 
36 Wolfgang Mommsen, The Age if Bureaucrary. Perspectives on the Political Sociology if Max Weber, 
(Oxford, 1974); Edward A. Shils, The TOlment if Secrery: the Background and Consequences if American 
Security Pmctices, (New York, 1956); Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity. 
Bureaucrary and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Dqy, (Cambridge, 1990). 
37 Guidelines for new recruits to Whitehall departments (clearly intended for intelligence services) 
can be found in The Judge over YourShouldet; (London, 1987 and 1994). 
38 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand Britain, Amelica and Cold War Secret Intelligence, (London, 
2001), pp. 1-16. 
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intelligence services. Every MIS file contains a list of serial numbers, and if a document 
has been removed in the process of declassification, it would be apparent to anyone 
reading the file. Furthermore, it is perfectly obvious when 'redactions' have been 
made-in other words, information withheld-as the relevant pages are photocopied 
and stamped. Finally, if there were a conspiracy on the part of the British intelligence 
community about declassifying records, presumably they would not have released so 
many files which make them look as bad as they do: as we shall see, Britain's intelligence 
agencies entered the Second World War knowing next to nothing about their enemies, 
the Axis Powers, and then emerged from the war knowing as little about their 'new' Cold 
War enemy, the Soviet Union. If this is a 'carefully packaged' version of the past, it is a 
poor package. 
Although declassified MIS records have limitations, nevertheless they are 
goldmines of information and offer unprecedented insights into the historical activities 
of the British intelligence community. Even when redactions have been made, a keen 
observer can sometimes piece together what information has been withheld by record 
reviewers. This can be done by examining marginal notes within the files, in which MIS 
officers noted for a file to be cross-referenced or 'put-away' (P / A), but it can also be 
achieved by comparing MIS files with records declassified from other departments. 
Problematically though, the contents of some MIS files have been destroyed during in-
house 'clear-outs' within MIS over the years. But even when this is the case, the situation 
for researchers is not irremediable: the 'Minute Sheets' attached to the front of each file 
invariably remain intact, and they allow us to trace MIS's operations and discussions 
between MIS's desk-officers, even when the actual content of those files has been 
destroyed. Minute Sheets are valuable sources of information, for they show internal 
discussions within MIS. 
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Using MIS records in these ways, it is possible for researchers to produce highly 
original work and swifdy move to the cutting-edge of research. Declassified MIS records 
allow students to expand the work done by M.RD. Foot and F.H. Hinsely's official 
histories, which were written before the declassification of MIS records was even a 
possibility. Presumably MIS's official historian, Professor Christopher Andrew, is acutely 
aware that records he has access to, likewise, will be eventually declassified for other 
scholars to examine. One of the most appealing aspects of MIS records is that they even 
allow researchers to overturn established opinions within intelligence history. Recendy 
declassified MIS files are currendy causing scholars to rethink, for example, such 
established truths as the division of responsibilities between foreign and domestic 
intelligence in Britain during the First World War.39 
Before turning to the substance of this dissertation, some words of explanation 
are in order regarding what it reasonably can and cannot do. On the one hand, the 
following dissertation seeks to offer a substantial revision of Britain's transition from 
World War to Cold War, revealing subjects hitherto undocumented in the existing 
historical literature-especially MIS's concerns with counter-terrorism after the Second 
World War, and MIS's involvement in British decolonisation in Africa. This dissertation 
is based on extensive archival research at the National Archives in London, which has 
been supplemented by the necessary secondary literature, especially memoirs. The Times 
on-line digital archive has proved an important resource, for it allows MIS's activities to 
be cross-checked against contemporary information in the public domain. Indeed, some 
39 The current research of Dr. Peter Martland (Cambridge University) is overturning traditional 
interpretations of the division of intelligence responsibilities during the First World War and in 
its aftermath; also see the forthcoming PhD. dissertation on British military intelligence during 
the First World War by Mr. Kieran West (pembroke College, Cambridge). The standard literature 
on British intelligence at the outbreak of the First World War is Hiley, 'The failure of British 
espionage against Germany', which has been supplemented by Hiley's recent essay, 'Entering the 
lists: MIS's great spy round-up of August 1914', Intelligence and National SeCllriry, 21, no. 1, (2006), 
Pp· 46-76. 
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of the best intelligence history contains as many references to intelligence material as 
non~intelligence material, thereby placing the activities of secret services in their broader 
historical fnimework. 4o While this dissertation makes extensive use of 'primary' sources, 
secondary historical studies will inevitably play less of an important role because the 
nature of MIS records means that they often revise the existing historical literature. But 
while this dissertation can offer substantial new interpretations, it cannot hope to be 
comprehensive. Due to what intelligence records are currently available, it will inevitably 
be one-sided. Although Britain's intelligence agencies have finally emerged from the 
cold, the picture available to historians is still far from complete. The term used in this 
dissertation's title, 'British intelligence', is an abstract phrase which belies the often fierce 
differentiation between the three main components of the British intelligence 
community: the Security Service (MIS), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), and 
the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). This dissertation is only able 
discuss British security intelligence, namely the activities of MIS: counter-espionage, 
counter-sabotage and counter-subversion. Unfortunately almost no records have so far 
been declassified from the archives of Britain's foreign intelligence gathering service, SIS. 
Similarly, this dissertation cannot hope to do justice to the crucial role performed by 
Britain's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) service, GC&CS. During the Cold War, 
GCHQ-the post-war name given to GC&CS-was the largest and most costly of all 
Britain's intelligence services, but little is currently known about its activities.41 
Even though this study unfortunately will be restricted by a lack of 
documentation from GCHQ and SIS, this hurdle can be partly sidestepped by turning to 
records of the Joint Intelligence Committee GIC), the 'high-table' of the British 
40 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and 
the West, (London, 1999). 
41 Richard Aldrich, 'GCHQ and sigint during the early Cold War, 1945-1970', Intelligence and 
National Security, 16, no. 1, (2001), pp. 67-96. 
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intelligence community. Then as today, the JIC functioned as the apex of the British 
intelligence community and issued consensus, inter-Service reports on threats to British 
national security. Clearly, however,]IC reports can only ever provide an overview, and 
not specific details of respective intelligence services. In many ways, the activities of SIS 
are the 'missing dimension' within the missing dimension of history. While the 
accomplishments of Bletchley Park are now commonly discussed in historical literature, 
nearly all the wartime and post-war activities of SIS, by contrast, remain a mystery. Some 
SIS records are certainly found in MIS files, but these only occur when SIS discussed 
matters with MIS-crucially we cannot judge what information SIS withheld-and they 
do not reveal in-house discussions within SIS. The declassification of SIS records would 
provide historians with extraordinary research possibilities. There are signs of an 
increasing sense of transparency within SIS, which bodes well for future researchers. 42 
The appointment of Professor Keith Jeffery as the first official historian of SIS in 2005, 
commissioned to write the first forty years of the Service's history, suggests that the 
blanket of secrecy might finally be lifting over SIS's headquarters at Vauxhall CrosS.43 
However, the fundamentally different nature of foreign intelligence gathering, 
predominantly based on human sources (HUMINT), means that in order to uphold their 
promise never to expose an agent's name, SIS needs to be guarded about what records 
they can release to the public domain. A compromise solution acceptable to SIS and to 
the historical profession presumably would be to release records which reveal the nature 
of SIS operations and even agents' codenames-which judging from MIS records are 
often more striking than agents' real names-but which do not reveal any information 
42 SIS opened their own website in 2005, a step which many observers heralded as breaking a 
final taboo regarding SIS's publicity: www.sis.gov.uk.Thepublicimageofl\.1I5 and SIS, 
particularly their openness in recruiting policies and advertising, is being currently examined by 
Ms. Victoria Thompson (St. John's College, Cambridge) in a forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation. 
43 Keith Jeffery, 'The history of SIS, 1909-1949', paper presented at Cambridge University 
Intelligence Seminar, (5 May, 2006); Michael Evans, 'MI6 secrets come out of the cold', The 
Times, London: (7 Dec., 2005). 
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that could endanger agents. Such a compromise solution would allow historians to study 
the mechanics of SIS's operations and to judge the dividends-political and otherwise-
they provided, but at the same time would not endanger SIS's current activities. The 
declassification of SIS records would also help to 'normalise' their activities as a function 
of government and, usefully for SIS and the government, would indicate to the public 
what can be reasonably expected from a foreign intelligence gathering service. Dispelling 
conspiracy theories certainly seems to have been at least part of MIS's motivation for 
declassifying their records.44 
Due to word-limit restrictions, this dissertation will have to leave aside subjects 
which have already been well-researched. Despite the inherent appeal of studying SOE, 
whose memorable remit from Churchill in 1940 was to 'set Europe ablaze', unfortunately 
this dissertation does not have space to discuss its activities-which have been 
extensively examined by the doyen of intelligence history, M.RD. Foot. Similarly, this 
study cannot dwell on subjects which have been, and currendy are being, exhaustively 
researched by others, especially scholars at the Cambridge University Intelligence 
Seminar-arguably the most active academic intelligence seminar in the world.45 The 
national security threats posed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, will 
only be discussed briefly in this dissertation on account that they have been experdy 
researched by others. 46 Naturally the following dissertation will draw on such studies 
when necessary, but its general strategy will be to avoid repeating others' research, and 
instead use MIS records to break new ground. The book hopefully arising from this 
44 MIS's website has a section of 'frequently asked questions', dealing with subjects such as 'Did 
MIS murder Diana, Princess of Wales?', and 'Do MIS officers have a license to kill?'. Needless to 
say, the answers to both are in the negative: www.miS.gov.uk (accessed 10 Aug., 2006). 
45 Emily Wilson, 'The war in the dark: the Security Service and the Abwehr, 1940-1944', (ph.D. 
dissertation, Cambridge University, 2003); Paula Mohs, 'British intelligence and the Arab revolt in 
the Hejaz, 1914--1917', (phD. dissertation, Cambridge University, 2004). 
46 Paul McMahon, 'British intelligence and the Irish 'Fifth Column", (phD. dissertation, 
Cambridge University, 2003); Eunan O'Halpin, MI5 and Ireland 1939-1945: the Official History, 
(London, 2003). 
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dissertation will include the range of subjects which cannot be discussed here. Future 
rese~rch will draw on archival sources which have not been exploited for this 
dissertation, such as the Churchill Archives at Churchill College, Cambridge. Archival 
sources at the Rhodes House Library, Oxford, will also provide useful material to 
supplement the dissertation's research into MIS and decolonisation. In many ways, the 
following dissertation is intended to be the first step in a much larger project resulting in 
a book. 
At the time of writing this dissertation, intelligence history has become one of the 
most rapidly developing sub-fields of historical research.47 At least four international 
journals are currendy devoted to studying intelligence history.48 Just as the in the 1960s 
and 1970s historians recognised that that there were such fields as social history and 
gender history, so historians today are finally recognising that intelligence history is a field 
of research in its own right. In Britain, Europe and North America major universities are 
establishing national security programmes, usually staffed with retired intelligence 
officials, and a central component of these programmes is to study intelligence history. 
Government and non-government 'think tanks', such as the RAND corporation, are 
likewise beginning to study intelligence history in earnest. Intelligence history, however, 
is not merely the preserve of observers outside of intelligence communities. Intelligence 
services across the world are themselves currendy devoting resources to 'understanding 
47 Useful recent works include Peter Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Poliry 
Making, 1933-1939, (Oxford, 2000); Anthony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in 
Asia, 1914-1941, (Basingstoke, 2002); Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan: 
Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Smice, (Cambridge, 2000). 
48 Intelligence and National Securiry; Journal of Intelligence History; International Journal of Intelligmce and 
Counter-intelligence; Intelligence QuarterlY; to which list should be added the Journal of Strategic Studies, 
and the influential periodical, Jane's Intelligence Review. Journals specialising in general modern 
history, such as the Historical Journal, also now often catry articles on intelligence history, as do 
specialised military journals such as Small Wars and Insullencies. 
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the past'.49 The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September, 2001, and the 
resulting 'war on terror' undeniably mark a watershed in the history of national security, 
profou"ndlychanging governments acr~ss the globe. The trans-national, amorphous 
terrorist threat currently facing governments throughout the world is without historical 
parallel. But contrary to what some proponents of the so-called 'war on terror' might 
claim, the events of 9/11 did not change the world in such a profound way so as to 
render history somehow irrelevant. In fact, as intelligence historians and intelligence 
agencies themselves are both discovering, the past can provide useful lessons for the 
challenges of the present. The following dissertation shows that several of the most 
controversial national security practices currently being deployed in the so-called 'war on 
terror' are not, in fact, new to the twenty-first century. National security practices such 
as 'rendition' and detention without trial occurred during the Second World War and in 
the early stages of the twentieth century's longest lasting ideological struggle, the Cold 
War. 
Although the following dissertation is an historical study, it also seeks to provide 
a practical benefit for current discussions on national security. At moments of crisis 
throughout the twentieth century, Britain's intelligence services responded to apparently 
insurmountable national security threats by learning lessons from history. The same has 
to be true for intelligence communities today. 50 One of the best ways to prevent 
'intelligence failures' occurring in the future is to learn from failures in the past. An old 
dictum states that no one ever makes new mistakes; one simply repeats old mistakes. 
The more one studies intelligence history, the more so this appears to be the case. It is, 
49 The CIA's Centre for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) is currently one of the most sophisticated 
projects by an intelligence agency to 'learn lessons from the past'. See: 
www.cia.gov/csilindex.html, (accessed 10 Aug., 2006). 
50 James Olson, 'The ten commandments of counterintelligence. Fourth commandment: know 
YOut history', in Robert George and Robert Klein (eds.), Intelligence and the National Security 
Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges, (New York, 2005), pp. 251-58. 
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of course, the practice of bad history to describe events anachronistically and to impose 
today's issues on the past. This dissertation is cautious of describing events in a 
'presentist' manner. However, declassified MIS records reveal that many of the same 
issues facing intelligence agencies today were, in fact, faced half a century ago. This is 
particularly pertinent given the on-going discussions in United States about establishing 
an American 'MIS,.51 The following dissertation discusses a range of subjects which are 
similar, if not identical, to those currently facing governments in the so-called 'war on 
terror': how intelligence agencies balance long-term threats with short-term emergencies; 
how they manage limited resources between different and often divergent requirements; 
how they detect 'internal enemies' in a country, who disguise themselves and 
consequently are difficult to trace; how intelligence services attempt to understand the 
'mindset' of authoritarian regimes; the permissibility of secret intelligence as evidence in 
court; the interrogation of prisoners in secret interrogation facilities abroad and 
allegations of torture during such interrogations; the 'rendition' of captured agents 
between countries for interrogation; the way intelligence agencies share classified 
information passing between countries; and not least, the threat of terrorism emanating 
from the Middle East. Understanding the way intelligence services dealt with such issues 
half a century ago provides practical benefits for governments today. 
III. British intelligence at the outbreak of the Second World War 
The unprecedented successes gained by Britain's intelligence services during the 
Second World War are remarkable when it is appreciated how little they knew about their 
51 Richard A. Posner, Uncertain Shield: the U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform, (New York 
and London, 2006); Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: the Constitution in a Time of National 
Emergenry, (New York and Oxford, 2006). 
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enemies, the Axis Powers, at the start of the war. British intelligence as a whole entered 
the Second World War in an astonishingly weak position. Before 1939 neither SIS nor 
MIS knew the name of either the German espionage service, the Abwehr, or the name of 
its head, Admiral Canaris.52 Before the war MIS had enjoyed a useful source in the 
person of Wolfgang zu Putlitz at the German embassy in London, but their pre-war 
counter-espionage resources were nevertheless small in scale.53 In September 1938 MIS's 
counter-espionage section, B-Division, had just two officers, while MIS's total staff 
consisted of merely thirty officers. 54 As late as December 1938 the counter-espionage 
section of SIS, Section V, had only two officers.55 The Venlo incident in November 
1939, in which the SIS station in the Netherlands was oven un and humiliated by the 
Gestapo, symbolised the overall lack of preparation and bungling efforts by the British 
intelligence community to meet the German threat. 56 In short, in the years before the 
Second World War, Britain's intelligence services failed to enter into the mindset of the 
Axis Powers.57 This led to catastrophic failures and notorious overreactions in the early 
stages of the war. (Sir) Dick White, a future Director-General of MIS and Chief of 
SIS-and the only person ever to hold both positions-recalled that when MIS entered 
the war, the Service did so: 
52 F.H. Hinsley (et a~, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: Securi!y and Counter-
Intelligence, (London, 1990), pp. 11-12; Curry, The Sectlri!y Service, pp. 22-25. 
53 Bob de Graaff, 'The stranded Baron and the upstart at the crossroads: Wolfgang zu Putlitz and 
Qtto John', Intelligence and National Sectlri!y, 6, no. 4, (1991), pp. 669-700; Wolfgang zu Putlitz, The 
Put/itz Dossier, (London, 1957). 
54 See: NA KV 4/19 'Report on the operations of A.D.A. in connection with the administrative 
services of the Security Service during the war 1939-1945', s.6a: 'MIS officers'. 
55 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: Securi!y and Counter-Intelligence, p. 10. 
56 Christopher Andrew, 'Secret intelligence and British foreign policy', in Christopher Andrew 
and Jeremy Noakes (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations, 1900-1945, (Exeter, 1987), p. 26; S. 
Payne Best, The Venlo Incident, (London, 1950). 
57 See the research by Mr. Paul Winter, 'Attempts by British intelligence to understand the 
mindset of Adolf Hitler's High Command', (forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge 
University). 
... without any real documentation on the subject we were 
supposed to tackle. We had a very vague idea of how the 
German system worked, what its objectives were in time of 
war. 58 
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White's bleak recollections were confirmed by MIS's in-house historian, John Curry, 
whose history of MIS was written in 1945 as a no-nonsense account designed to identify 
the Service's failures in the past, and hence is a useful source for historians today. Curry 
described MIS's failures on the outbreak of war: 
In 1939 we had no adequate knowledge of the German 
organisations which it was the function of the Security 
Service to guard against either in this wider field of the "Fifth 
Column" or in the narrower one of military espionage and 
purely material sabotage. We had in fact no definite 
knowledge whether there was any organised connection 
between the German Secret Service and Nazi sympathisers in 
this country, whether of British or alien nationality.59 
The British intelligence community's lack of knowledge regarding the intentions 
and capabilities of the Axis Powers brought MIS to near total collapse in the summer of 
1940 and led, ultimately, to one of MIS's most controversial decisions in the entire 
twentieth century: the mass-internment of 'enemy aliens' in June 1940. Following the 
precedent of the First World War, upon the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 
Britain was placed under extraordinary 'Defence Regulations' (DR). These allowed for 
blanket security measures throughout Britain, such as mail interception, press censorship, 
travel restrictions, the introduction of identity cards, and, when deemed necessary for 
national security, the detention of British and non-British (alien) nationals.GO By the end 
58 NA KV 4/170 'D.G. White's lecture notes regarding counterespionage investigations and 
organisation of RSS and GC&CS', s.la: Mr. Dick White's lecture for new Regional Security 
Laison Officers [RSLOs], (9 Jan., 1943); Curry, The Sectlriry Seroice, p. 163. 
59 Curry, The Sectlriry Seroice, p. 148. 
60 NA KV4/84 'Notes on powers and duties of the Security Service in war, 1939-1945 under the 
Defence Regulations, the Aliens Order and other wartime emergency legislation'; KV4/145-6 
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of June 1940, through the Defence Regulations, over 27,000 'enemy aliens' had been 
interned in Britain on MIS's recommendations.61 Together with the detention of 'enemy 
nationals' during the First World War, the mass-internment of 'enemy aliens' in June 
1940 ranks as arguably one of the most dramatic examples in British history of political 
decisions taken on the basis of national security recommendations. Essentially mass-
internment in 1940 was the result of MIS's failure, or perhaps more accurately inability, 
to understand the German threat.62 
As several historians have pointed out, the mass-internment of British and 
'enemy aliens' in 1940 was a lamentable chapter in the history of civil liberties in Britain.63 
Some of those interned tragically perished when their boat, the Arandora Star, on which 
they were being deported to Canada, was torpedoed and sank off the south coast of 
Ireland.64 But uncomfortable as it is, MIS's recommendations concerning potential 'Fifth 
Column' saboteurs in Britain were logical given the urgent wartime circumstances, and 
considering what information was available to MIS at the time. Although MIS's 
'Policy relating to the restriction of movements of British suspects under DR 18a'; KV4/255-6 
'Policy regarding detention of suspect British subjects and non-enemy aliens under Defence 
Regulation 18B'. 
61 NA KV 4/85 'The Enemy Alien population in the UK by Mr. Aiken-Sneath', Guly, 1943), pp. 
27-8,36. 
62 For mass-internment in Britain during the First World War, see: Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in 
our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War, (Oxford, 1991). Notably, the internment of 
'enemy aliens' was common to all belligerent countries during the war, see: Eric Lohr, 'Enemy 
alien politics within the Russian empire during World War 1', (ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1999); Jean Spiropulos, Ausweisung und Internierung Jeindlicher Staatsangehiiriger, (Leipzig, 
1922); Jean-Claude Farcy, Les camps de concentration franrais de la premiere guerre mondiale, (paris, 1995); 
Gerhard Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homifront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920, (St. 
Lucia, Queensland, 1989); Jorg Nagler, 'Victims of the Home Front: aliens in the United States 
during the First World War', in Panikos Panayi (ed.), Minorities in Wartime. National and Racial 
Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 
191-215. 
63 Peter and Leni Gillman, 'Collar the Lot:· HOJII Britain Interned and Expelled its Wartime Rifugees, 
(London, 1980); Neil Stammers, Civil Libefties in Britain during the 2"d World Waf: A PoliticaIStu4J, 
(London, 1957). 
64 "Arandora Star' sunk by U-Boat', The Times, London: (4 July, 1940); NA KV4/337 'Policy on 
transfer of internees to camps in Canada, including subsequent enquiry about those lost on SS 
Arandora Star'. 
37 
assessments were proved to be erroneous, nevertheless they are understandable.65 'Fifth 
Column' warfare was the most plausible explanation for otherwise implausible events-
Hitler's six week long Blitzkrieg through Europe between May and June 1940, 
representing victories unprecedented in military history. The Dutch gave up after just 
five days of fighting; the Belgians after seventeen; at the end of May 1940 the entire 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was thrown off the Continent; and by mid-June 1940, 
Britain's greatest ally in Europe, France, had surrendered. To explain Germany's 
extraordinary conquests on the Continent, MIS and Britain's other intelligence services 
assumed that advancing Nazi forces had been assisted by 'Fifth Column', sabotage 
warfare.66 
Given the assumption that Germany had exploited 'Fifth Column' warfare on the 
Continent, it was logical for MIS to assume that a German 'Fifth Column' existed in 
Britain, similarly organised and likewise willing to assist with a Nazi invasion.67 MIS's 
assessments of the 'Fifth Column' in Britain were not based on speculation, but rather on 
reliable reports from the Continent. From at least February 1940 onwards, reports from 
Polish, Belgian and Dutch security forces stated that German agents had entered Britain 
disguised as refugees.68 With the German army poised for an invasion of Britain in June 
1940, MIS was obliged take these reports seriously. From our perspective, with hindsight 
knowing the outcome of the 'Battle of Britain', it is easy to forget how imminent the 
threat of invasion appeared to be in the summer of 1940. Between May and June 1940, 
reports from the JIC considered a German invasion of Britain not as a possibility, but 
65 See the research of Ms. Jennifer Grant, 'British intelligence and the internment of British 
fascists during the Second World War', (forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University). 
66 Wilson, 'The war in the dark: the Security Service and the Abwehr', pp. 13-27, 74--94. 
67 NA CAB 81/96 JIC 40 (47), 'Fifth column activities in the UK', (2 May, 1940). 
68 Curry, The Secuti!J Service, pp. 162-3; NA KV4/185 Liddell diaries (18 May, 1940). 
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rather as inevitable.69 Reading those JIC reports one can still feel the sense of alarm and 
panic surrounding what, at the time, seemed would be Britain's un-finest hour. JIC 
reports stated that a German invasion of Britain was imminent, either as an airborne or 
sea attack; that German forces were capable of using smoke screens and large calibre 
guns to shell the south coast of England from France; and that entire towns on the south 
coast of England would probably have to be evacuated, and their populations relocated 
to the North of England.70 One JIC report sombrely considered the JIC's own 
evacuation from London during the impending invasion.71 By the end of June the 
invasion panic reached fever-pitch-quite literally. In an astonishing report sent to the 
JIC, the Director-General of MIS, Sir Vernon Kell, warned that Germany might be 
planning to infect Rhesus monkeys with Yellow Fever and deploy them as bacteriological 
agents during an invasion. Kell's warning was based on the fact that Germany had 
imported an extraordinarily large number of monkeys before the war (it is unclear from 
where Kell derived his information on German monkeys). Although the JIC considered 
Kell's warning a low priority overall, the report succincdy illustrates how frenzied the 
invasion panic had become by the early summer of 1940.72 
When assessing the 'Fifth Column' threat in Britain, MIS had to assume the 
worst possible scenario. In times of national emergencies, then and now, security 
services in liberal democracies are invariably compelled to err on the side of caution 
when presented with threats on which they lack positive intelligence. MIS's predicament 
69 NA CAB 81/97 JIC (40) 73 'Invasion of the United Kingdom', (17 May, 1940); Ibid., JIC (40) 
101, 'Summary of likely forms and scales of attack that Germany could bring to bear on the 
British Isles in the near future', (5 June, 1940); Ibid., JIC (40) 108, 'Telephone conversations in the 
~nited Kingdom in foreign languages', (7 June, 1940); Ibid., JIC (40) 134, 'Use of smoke in an 
llwasion of Great Britain', (21 June, 1940). 
70 NA CAB 81/97 JIC (40) 136 (note by secretary), 'Coastal evacuation', (22June, 1940). 
~1 NA CAB 81/87 Doint Intelligence Subcommittee], JIC (40) 69 'Arrangements of JIC business 
tn event of evacuation', (6 June 1940). 
72 NA CAB 81/97 JIC (40) 141 (note by secretary) 'Yellow fever. Possible uses of Rhesus 
monkeys by the Germans to prepare a vaccine, or in connection with offensive measures', (26 
June, 1940). 
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in the summer of 1940 was that they did not know what German espionage activities 
they. had failed to detect. The meagre evidence available to MIS about German 
capabilities was not encouraging: the German agent SNOW, who was recruited to SIS 
before the war and who subsequently became the Jons ct origo of MIS's 'Double Cross 
System', to use Masterman's words, indicated that Germany ran an effective espionage 
network in Britain.73 Before the war, the Abwehr had instructed SNOW to recruit a 
dissident Welsh nationalist, codenamed G.W., to conduct sabotage operations during a 
German invasion of Britain.74 Based on the example of SNOW, MIS assumed that other 
undetected German agents existed in Britain, similarly organised by the Abwehr and 
equally set on 'Fifth Column' sabotage, especially by exploiting dissident nationalities in 
Britain.75 To further complicate the situation, the 'Fifth Column' potentially included not 
just German agents and Nazi sympathisers in Britain, but also the IRA-who had 
launched a bombing campaign in mainland Britain in January 1939-and, due to Berlin's 
pre-war alliance with Moscow, Soviet agents and British communists as well.76 MIS saw 
their duty as neutralising this potentially enormous 'Fifth Column'. MIS even monitored 
the activities of the 'Peace Pledge Union', unsure and suspicious about how far pacifist 
activities in Britain might stretch to actively sabotaging Britain's war-effort. 77 
MIS's predicament at the outset of the war was exacerbated by the fact that their 
pre-war arrangements for dealing with a 'Fifth Column' had been overturned by other 
government departments. In the pre-war years, the Deputy Director-General of MIS, Sir 
Eric Holt-Wilson, had made arrangements with the Home Office for 'preventative 
security' measures to be taken in the event of war. These measures, outlined in the War 
73 Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 43. 
74 NA KV 2/444-53 'Selected papers from the Snow case'. 
75 Masterman, The Double-Cross System, pp. 36-43. 
76 For the IRA campaign in Britain, see: Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: 
Seclltiry and Counter-Intelligence, pp. 16-17; McMahon, 'British intelligence and the Irish 'Fifth 
Column', 1939-1945'. 
77 Curry, The Secllriry Service, pp. 59,86, 150, 160-64. 
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Book, involved the detention of 'enemy aliens' and British nationals who posed a threat, 
such as the British Union of Fascists (BUF).78 Upon the outbreak of the war, however, 
the Home Office replaced existing internment plans with a system of ad hoc 'Tribunals', 
which were honourable from the point of view of civil liberties-the Home Secretary's 
intention-but whose semi-judicial proceedings distracted MIS from active counter-
espionage enquiries.79 Based on lessons from SNOW, and believing that the 'Tribunal' 
system had diverted them from counter-espionage investigations, MIS assumed that they 
had failed to detect Axis agents arriving in Britain. It was unthinkable that the Abwehr, 
in the best tradition of Prussian militarism, would not be running an efficient espionage 
and sabotage network in Britain. As the military situation on the Continent deteriorated 
and the threat of a German invasion of Britain heightened, MIS's assessments of the 
'Fifth Column' in Britain radicalised. With Britain fighting for its survival in May 1940, 
MIS recommended the detention of 'enemy' British nationals, such as Sir Oswald Mosley 
and leaders of the BUF, and the mass-internment of 'enemy aliens,.80 
What MIS did not know at the time, nor could not know, was that they had not 
failed to detect any German espionage activities in Britain. In reality, contrary to what 
MIS assumed, SNOW was the main German agent whom the Abwehr ran in Britain 
between the outbreak of the war and the autumn of 1940. The astounding inadequacy of 
Abwehr operations in Britain only became apparent to MIS after the autumn of 1940, 
with the capture of successive agents arriving in Britain and the development of ISOS-
ENIGMA.8! As the invasion crisis subsided in late 1940, MIS came to realise that their 
78 NA KV4/131 'Duties of MIS on mobilisation as laid down in the War Book 1939'; Curry, The 
Security Seroice, pp. 155, 163; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War; vol. N: Security and 
Counter-Intelligence, ch. 1. 
79 NA KV4/185 'Liddell diaries', (30 Aug., 1939); Curry, The Security Seroice, p. 150. 
80 NA KV 4/85 'The enemy alien population in the UK', Guly, 1943), p. 36; KV2/884-897 'Sir 
Oswald Mosley'; Peter Martland, Lord HaJJI HaJJI: the English Voice of Naif GerlJlaf!}, (London, 
2003). 
8! Wilson, 'The war in the dark: the Security Service and the Abwehr', pp. 120-128. 
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assessment of a 'Fifth Column' in Britain had been plausible, but faulty. In effect, MIS 
had been 'searching in the dark for something which did not exist'.82 Contrary to all 
indications and expectations, the Abwehr had failed to orchestrate an espionage and 
sabotage network in Britain. Looking back on the invasion crisis at war's end, MIS 
admitted that their assessment of the 'Fifth Column' had been erroneous. 83 But in their 
defence, MIS warned that if a German invasion of Britain had occurred, the situation 
may well have been substantially different: 'It must never be forgotten, though, that 
many of the persons interned, besides many not interned, might have behaved very 
differently if ever a German invasion had become a reality,.84 From a purely pragmatic 
point of view of national security, MIS's recommendations ensured that by the late 
summer of 1940, 'practically every potentially dangerous person, whether British or 
foreign, had been swept into the net'.8S Most of the British general public, however, did 
not see MIS's security recommendations in these terms. To this day, mass-internment in 
Britain in 1940, much like the wartime internment of Japanese Americans, continues to 
be denounced by many observers as draconian and unjustified.86 Indeed, public criticism 
at the time was not lost on MIS. As we shall see, MIS's misjudgement of the 'Fifth 
Column' threat-ultimately leading to mass-internment-had consequences stretching 
well into the post-war period, as MIS attempted to avoid similar security overreactions. 
82 Curry, The Security Seroice, p. 156. 
83 Ibid., p. 163. 
84 NA KV4/87 'Short review by Sir David Petrie of the activities of the Security Service, 1939-
1944', s.2a: Sir David Petrie to Sir Anthony Eden, (26 June, 1944), p. 2. 
85 Ibid. 
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Like MIS's misjudgement of the 'Fifth Column' threat, London's broader failure 
to comprehend the mindset of the Nazi leadership is equally understandable. Entering 
into the mindset of authoritarian regimes, on which it is difficult to obtain objective 
information, represents one of the most formidable challenges for intelligence agencies in 
any government. This was notoriously the case with intelligence gathering on Nazi 
Germany. In fact, the process of decision-making among the leadership of the Third 
Reich has subsequently become one of the most contested subjects in modern 
historiography-and that is with records available to historians, which of course they 
were not to Britain's intelligence services at the time.87 Although some of London's 
failures before the war and in its early stages are thus understandable, Britain's 
intelligence services nevertheless were responsible for a significant failure in the pre-war 
years, which is difficult to comprehend: they failed to learn lessons from the First World 
War. In the years before the Second World War, MIS failed to learn the lessons from the 
First World War and make adequate in-house preparations for the outbreak of hostilities. 
MIS made no significant increase in staff numbers in time for officers to be adequately 
trained. B-Division subsequently explained that insufficient funding had been 
responsible for inadequate staff increases in the pre-war years, though this does not 
explain why MIS did not campaign for greater funds from the government as war in 
Europe loomed.88 
. MIS's failure to learn lessons from the First World War explains much of the 
Service's misjudgement during the 'Fifth Column' crisis in 1940. MIS's Divisions failed 
to brace themselves for the public hysteria that almost inevitably would surround an 
invasion crisis. In 1939 MIS faced broadly similar circumstances to those of 1914. As in 
the First World War, the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 brought with it 'spy scares' 
87 Ian Kershaw, Na:d Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, (London, 1985). 
88 Curry, The Securi!y Seroice, pp. 145-6. 
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throughout Britain, and MIS was bombarded with letters of denunciation from the 
public naming 'enemy' activities. These ranged from the plausible, such as reports on the 
activities of foreign nationals in Britain, to the outright ludicrous, such as 'suspicious' 
pigeon activities and 'enemy light-signalling'. All of these reports, however, had to be 
checked by MIS's desk officers-a Herculean task, to use Curry's phrase.89 In the second 
quarter of 1940 MIS received on average 8,200 requests per week from other 
government departments to check background credentials on individuals.90 Reports on 
'enemy light signalling' alone reached the height of five feet when stacked together in 
MIS's office.91 Such reports, fanned by alarmist propaganda in the press and broadcasts 
from Germany by William Joyce ('Lord Haw Haw'), proved too much for MIS's 
bureaucracy to handle.92 In the summer of 1940, precisely when it was needed most, 
MIS's machinery broke down: 'In brief, by the time of the fall of France the organisation 
of the Security Service as a whole can only be described as chaotic,.93 MIS's Registry, 
which effectively functioned as the Service's nerve-centre, was unable to cope with the 
avalanche of information and by the end of June 1940, had all but collapsed. The 
government blamed MIS's leadership personally for the catastrophic mishandling of the 
invasion crisis-a failure made all the more striking considering that MIS's leadership 
was the same as during the First World War. In June 1940 Churchill dismissed MIS's 
first Director-General, Sir Vernon Kell, and his Deputy, Sir Eric Holt-Wilson, resigned. 
Churchill's dismissal of Kell was not insignificant: as head of MIS from 1909 to 1940, 
Kell was officially the longest-ever serving head of any Whitehall department.94 
~9 Ibid., p. 160. For an amusing account of Anthony Blunt's first day in MIS and the absurd 
mvestigations that he was asked to make, see: NA KV4/186 'Liddell Dairies', (22June, 1940). 
90 Curry, The Security Service, p. 155-6. 
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Following MIS's effective collapse in 1940, the Service was reorganised and, as is 
now well documented, with the rest of the British intelligence community, went on to 
enjoy unparalleled successes during the war. In December 1940 Sir David Petrie was 
pulled out of retirement in Egypt, where he was enjoying a quiet life of archaeology and 
exploration, and as he put it, was asked to investigate the 'overlaps and underlaps' of 
MIS.95 Petrie became Director-General of MIS for the rest of the war and under his 
leadership, MIS's administration was overhauled and streamlined. MIS learned lessons 
from the crisis of 1940 and implemented several measures to avoid repeating similar 
mistakes. The Registry was mechanised by Reginald Horrocks, who came to MIS with 
experience in business administration. Horrocks introduced the Hollerith punch-card 
system to MIS's Registry, which allowed officers to 'look up' records more rapidly.96 
MIS also established a system of Regional Security Liaison Officers (RSLOs) throughout 
Britain, which acted as a 'filtering' mechanism and ensured that only the most important 
information was passed on to MIS's headquarters.97 The secret to Britain's intelligence 
successes during the Second World War, however, lay with SIGINT. In December 1940 
GC&CS broke the first ENIGMA code, and by 1943 Allied codebreakers were reading 
on average 3,000 Getman communications per day.98 Assisted by these unprecedented 
accomplishments in SIGINT, MIS was able to track down every German agent arriving 
in Britain during the war, and managed to turn many of them into double-agents. This 
made possible MIS's now-legendary Double Cross System.99 Looking back on MIS's 
95 NA KV 4/88 'Director-General's report on the Security Service', (Feb., 1941); Sir David 
Petrie, The Nile, (Cairo and London, 1961); and posthumously, Sir David Petrie, Peoples of the 
Desert, (Cairo and London, 1964). 
96 NA KV 4/88 'Director-General's report', (Feb., 1941), p. 16; KV4/21 'Report on the 
Operations of the Registry during the war 1939-1945. 
97 NA KV 4/20 'Report on the Security Service's regional organisation', (1945). 
98 Hinsley, 'British intelligence in the Second World War', in Andrew and Noakes (eds.), Intelligence 
and International Relations, p. 210. 
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wartime successes, and the Double Cross System in particular, Petrie explained: 'The full 
story can perhaps never be told but if it could be, it could perhaps gain acceptance as 
trUth on the grounds that it seems stran:ger than fiction' .lOo In many ways it still seems 
stranger than fiction, but thankfully the full story has finally been told. We now know 
that during the war, to use John Masterman's words, Britain 'activelY ran and controlled the 
Getman espionage {)lstem in this country'. 101 
100 NA KV 4/87, s.2a: Sir David Petrie to Sir Anthony Eden (26 June, 1944), p. 7. 
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The Second World War was the event that arguably established the British 
intelligence community. During the war, Britain's intelligence services were obliged to 
collaborate in unprecedented ways, and, furthermore, in Winston Churchill Britain 
gained a political leader who was prepared to accept the fruits of intelligence in w~ys that 
previously no British politician had.! During the war, Britain's intelligence services 
achieved unprecedented successes over their enemies, the Axis Powers. The intelligence 
that Britain's secret services gathered on -their wartime enemies was, quite simply, the 
most comprehensive in the history of warfare. The official historian of British 
intelligence during the Second World War, F.H. Hinsley, who began his career as a 
cryptanalyst at GC&CS, estimated that SIGINT was so useful to the Allies that it may 
have shortened the war by up to two years.2 It remains a provoking counter-factual to 
imagine what course the war might have taken if the Allies had lacked the benefits of 
SIGINT. Without SIGINT, it seems likely that the Allies would have chosen to end the 
war by dropping an atomic weapon on Berlin, as they did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
August 1945. The consequences of doing so for post-war Europe, politically, 
economically, and military-to saying nothing of socially-can barely be imagined.3 
During the Second World War, MIS managed to detect, dismantle and control all 
German espionage activities in Britain. MIS's wartime counter-espionage operations 
were assisted by, and also contributed to, the Allied SIGINT effort. In the autumn of 
1940, several German agents arriving in Britain, all of whom were interrogated by MIS 
and some of whom were 'turned' into double agents, were captured with wireless sets. 
These sets considerably assisted GC&CS's decrypting efforts. After ENIGMA traffic 
! Christopher Andrew, 'Churchill and intelligence', Intelligence and National Secllri(y, 3, no. 3, (1988), 
pp.181-193. 
2 F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (eds.), Codebreakers. The Inside Story ojBletchlry Park, (Oxford, 1993), 
pp.l-13. 
3 For Churchill's rad1calising plans at the war's end to use a nuclear weapon on the Soviet Union, 
see: Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 59. 
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came on-line in December 1940, MIS was thereafter often able to pin-point Axis agents 
arriving in Britain. MIS's double-agents played crucial and often dramatic roles in Allied 
military viCtories, both in Europe and in extra-European theatres.4 MIS's Double Cross 
System played an important role in the successful Allied invasion of Europe on 6 June 
1944, operation OVERLORD, accompanied by one of the most successful deception 
campaigns in history, operation FORTITUDE. As is now well documented, one of 
MIS's double-agents, GARBO, convinced the German High Command that the Allied 
landings would come not to Normandy, but instead to the Pas de Calais. Based on 
GARBO's disinformation, Hider diverted the crack l SI SS Panzer Division and the 1161h 
Panzer Division to the Pas de Calais, thus giving the Allies the vital chance to establish a 
bridgehead. For the whole of July and August 1944, the Wehrmacht kept two armoured 
divisions and nineteen infantry divisions at the Pas de Calais, awaiting an invasion force 
that would never come. MIS's double-agents were so successful that at least two of them 
were awarded the Iron Cross by Hider. GARBO became the only person during the war 
to receive both an MBE and an Iron Cross.5 
The unparalleled successes enjoyed by Britain's intelligence services against the 
Axis Powers lay in sharp contrast to their overwhelming failure to monitor the wartime 
Soviet threat. If MIS's greatest success during the war was their total defeat of German 
espionage in Britain, MIS's greatest wartime failure was their inadequate surveillance of 
Soviet espionage. MIS's failure to monitor wartime Soviet espionage was revealed after 
the war, for all to see: the 'atom spies' Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs had been 
4 The extra-European dimension of the Double Cross System has been largely ignored in the 
secondary literature, and is valuable subject of further research: Michael Howard, British Intelligence 
in the Second World War, vol. V: Strategic Deception, (London, 1992), pp. xi, 37, 208-9; NA 
KV2/1282-1285 'Kiss'; NA KV4/197 'Organisation and functions of SIME special section, 
1942-45', s.3a: Douglas Roberts, 'Report on Cheese', (19 Feb., 1943); KV3/250 'Selected papers 
from Gibraltar double cross agents' Files'. 
5 Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Dqy Deception Campaign, (London, 1999); Juan Pujol with Nigel 
West, Garbo, (London, 1985); Tomas Harris, Garbo: The Spy who Saved D-Dqy, with an introduction 
by Mark Seaman: (London, 2000). 
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through MIS vetting during the war, and had been 'cleared'. At the same time, MIS and 
SIS failed to detect the 'Cambridge Five', the notorious high-level Soviet agents who 
during the war infiltrated Britain's intelligence services themselves. The penetration of 
the 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge Five' meant that the Allies' most closely guarded 
wartime secrets, atomic research and the ULTRA secret, were handed over to the 
During the Second World War, the resources of the British intelligence 
community were naturally devoted to defeating the most urgent threat to national 
security-Adolf Hider's Germany. But before the war, the traditional concern of 
Britain's secret services had always been the Soviet Union. Given the fact that the 
Second World War was the event during which Soviet agents successfully penetrated 
Britain's intelligence services, it therefore seems crucial to ask: what measures did MIS 
and the rest of the British intelligence community take against Soviet activities during the 
war, if any? Were Britain's 'intelligence failures' regarding the Soviet Union due to 
negligence? Did MIS and Britain's other intelligence services simply 'forget' the wartime 
Soviet threat? Perhaps there was a kind of wartime 'intelligence amnesia', by which pre-
war priorities were 'forgotten' in place of more immediate concerns? On one level at 
least, this seems to have been so. Reports from the ]IC, the apex of the British 
intelligence community, were conspicuously silent on the Soviet Union at the end of the 
war-in fact, until as late as March 1946.7 A combination of negligence and 'amnesia' 
certainly would seem, at first sight, to explain the notorious failures of British intelligence 
6 Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels: the British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB A rchives, 
(London, 1998). 
7 NA CAB 81/132 JIC (46) 1 (0) (Final), 'Russia's strategic interests and intentions', (1 March, 
1946). Also see: Alex Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee and British intelligence 
assessment, 1945-1956', (phD. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1999), pp. 15, 23; Peter 
Hennessy, The Secret State. Whitehall and the Cold War, (London, 2002), pp. 2-3; Percy Craddock, 
Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee saw the World, (London, 2002), pp. 25-49. 
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as a whole to monitor the wartime Soviet peril. During the war MIS, SIS and GC&CS 
failed to detect Soviet spies in their midst. 
It was not the case, however, that the British intelligence community simply 
'forgot' the wartime Soviet threat. Britain's secret servIces were fully aware of the 
continued wartime Soviet danger, and were acutely aware of their failure to monitor it. 
At several points throughout the war, senior officers in MIS and SIS warned that their 
lack of attention to Soviet espionage would have disastrous consequences after the war. 
In 1942 MIS's counter-espionage expert and wartime head of B-Division, Guy Liddell, 
noted in his diary: 
There is no doubt that the Russians are far better in the 
matter of espionage than any country in the world. I am 
perfecdy certain that they are well-bedded down here and 
that we should be making more active enquiries. They will 
be a great source of trouble for us when the war is over.8 
Liddell's despondent forecast was not unique. In 1943 the Chief of SIS, Sir Stewart 
Menzies, complained to the Foreign Office that his Service had been penetrated by 
communists. 9 Sir David Petrie echoed these concerns in June 1944. In an overall report 
sent to the Foreign Office on MIS's wartime accomplishments, Petrie warned that MIS 
had shown inadequate attention to wartime Soviet espionage: 'Communist-inspired 
espionage and penetration of Government services remains an active cause of anxiety'. 10 
MIS records substantially revise our understanding of Britain's failure to monitor 
the wartime Soviet danger. They reveal that MIS's failures-and, so far as we can tell, 
those of SIS and GC&CS-were not wholly failures of their own making. In fact, MIS 
did their best to investigate Soviet espionage throughout the war. Far from neglecting it, 
8 NA I(V4/190 'Liddell diaries', (27 Oct., 1942). 
9 Churchill College, Cambridge, Archives: Cadogan Diary, (13 Aug., 1943). 
10 NA I(V 4/87, s.2a: Sir David Petrie to Anthony Eden, (26 June, 1944), p. 4. 
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MIS persistently took a hard-line approach against the Soviet Union. MIS's 
investigations into Soviet esplOnage, however, were fundamentally undermined by 
wartime restrictions imposed by the British Foreign Office. The best way for MIS to 
have discovered the extent of Soviet espionage would have been to penetrate the Soviet 
embassy and Trade Delegation in London, both of which contained Soviet intelligence 
officers under diplomatic or official cover, then seek to recruit agents in both locations 
and bug their premises. MIS had used both of these techniques with success before the 
war. But when the Soviet Union entered the war as Britain's ally on 22 June 1941, the 
Foreign Office scrupulously upheld its commitment to its new wartime ally. The Foreign 
Office thenceforth prohibited MIS from employing their usual techniques against the 
Soviet Union-despite the fact that it did not forbid the penetration of some neutral 
embassies and legations in London. Nevertheless, an examination of MIS's 'policy files' 
on wartime communism reveals something hitherto unacknowledged in the historical 
literature: after 22 June 1941, MIS attempted to circumvent the restrictions on them by 
monitoring domestic communism. In fact, after Britain's alliance with Moscow, MIS 
actually enhanced their surveillance of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). 
But despite MIS's best efforts, they were unable to detect more than a few cases of high-
level Soviet penetration. The Foreign Office restrictions imposed on MIS essentially 
frustrated any serious investigation into wartime Soviet espionage. The commitment by 
the Foreign Office to Moscow was honourable, but it was certainly not mutually upheld. 
After the war, the disclosure of the 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge Five' showed that 
Moscow had been devoting its energies not just to spying on its wartime enemies, the 
Axis Powers, but also to spying on its wartime Allies-Britain and the United States.ll 
11 Christopher Andrew and Calder Walton, 'The Gouzenko case and British secret intelligence', 
in J.L. Black and Martin Rudner (eds.), The Gotlzenk o A ffair. Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War 
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I. British intelligence and the pre-war Soviet threat 
In many ways, Britain's neglect of wartime Soviet esplonage was remarkable 
given the fact that before the war, the traditional priorities for British intelligence services 
had always been communism and the Soviet Union. The official in-house history of 
MIS, written at the end of the war, explained MIS's long-standing concern with 
communism: 'From the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917 onwards it has been 
recognised that the fact that the Communist Party seized power in Russia in October of 
that year posed a problem for MIS'.12 After the First World War, MIS's responsibilities 
had been restricted to investigating 'subversive activities' in the Armed Forces, which 
effectively meant Bolshevism and communism. 13 MIS acquired more responsibilities for 
investigating communism in 1931, when they took over from the Special Branch 
surveillance of 'civilian revolutionary movements'. This meant that from 1931 MIS had 
overall responsibility for investigating communism, both in the military and in the civilian 
realms. 14 MIS's traditional concern with communism was reinforced by the fact that 
many of the Service's leading officers had begun their careers in the empire, where Russia 
and then the Soviet Union were the main priorities. IS Sir David Petrie had selved as a 
colonial intelligence officer in India and while stationed there, published a study on the 
Soviet threat. Petrie warned that the Soviet Union posed a double-jeopardy for Britain's 
national security: not only was it a threat through the spread of subversive Bolshevism, 
Counter-Espionage, (London and Toronto, 2006), pp. 38-56, which is based on a commemorative 
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13 Victor Madeira, 'Moscow's interwar inftltration of British intelligence, 1919-1929', Historical 
Journal, 46, no. 4, (2003), pp. 915-933. 
14 Curry, The Security Service, pp. 48, 82; NA KV 2/1655-54 'British Socialist Party'. 
IS For connections between the imperial intelligence and domestic security practices within 
Europe, see: Calder Walton, 'Colonial rule and occupation policies: German colonial rule in 
Southwest Africa and German occupation policies in the East during the First World War', 
(M.Phil. dissertation, Cambridge University, 2003). 
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but the So~iet Union was also an imperial danger for Britain. The Soviet Union had 
become an empire in all but name and, like its tsarist predecessor, posed a security threat 
th B ·· h . 16 for e nbs emplte. 
In practical terms, London had been engaged in a low-level 'cold war' against the 
Soviet Union since 1917. Within a broader historical framework, we can see that the 
Second World War interrupted a much longer-term conflict with Moscow. When viewed 
from this perspective, the onset of the Cold War after 1945 was not an aberration for the 
priorities of the British intelligence community. Instead, the onset of the Cold War after 
1945 was a return to pre-war concerns. If there was an aberration, it was actually the 
wartime shift by Britain's secret services away from the Soviet Union.17 In fact, the pre-
war priority shown by Britain's intelligence services to the Soviet danger was so great 
that, arguably, it had distracted them from the growing Nazi threat. Before the Second 
World War, the attention shown by Britain's intelligence agencies to communism had 
caused them, ironically, to misunderstand the fascist threat. When MIS and SIS 
jnvestigated the fascist threat before the war, they used the Soviet threat as a 'model'. In 
their pre-war attempts to understand German espionage, the counter-espionage section 
of SIS, Section V, turned to the example of the Communist International 
(COMINTERN).18 MIS likewise used the Soviet 'paradigm' to understand fascism, 
erroneously concluding that British fascists were orchestrated from Berlin and Rome in 
the same way that the British Communist Party was controlled from Moscow.19 
Although this explanation was logical, MIS's analysis was based on a misunderstanding of 
16 Sir David Petrie, Communism in India, 1924-1927, (Calcutta, 1927). For circulation of Petrie's 
book, see: NA KV4/266 'Policy regarding communists- general', s.9a: Desmond Morton to Sir 
David Petrie, (6 Feb., 1942), forwarding a copy of Petrie's book. 
17 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 22-25. 
18 Tony Blishen, paper presented at the Cambridge University Intelligence Seminar, (21 Jan., 
2005). Also see: Robert Cecil, 'Five of Six at war: Section V of MI6', Intelligence and National 
Security, 9, no. 2, (1994), pp. 345-353. 
19 Curry, The Security Seroice, pp. 48, 146-148. 
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the nature of fascism in Britain, which above all was 'British', and was not 'international' 
as . the COMINTERN model suggested. MIS's misconception of the fascist threat in 
Britain explains much of the Service's over-reaction during the 'Fifth-Column' crisis in 
1940, as they sought to neutralise British fascists supposedly taking instructions from the 
Continent.20 
Immediately before the Second World War, MIS enjoyed some successes in 
Soviet counter-espionage. In early 1938 MIS successfully broke a Soviet network centred 
at the Woolwich Arsenal. Its ring-leader, Percy Glading, who worked as a mechanic at 
the Arsenal, was successfully prosecuted and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for 
breaking the Official Secrets Act.21 As a member of the CPGB, Glading had been of 
interest to MIS since the mid-1920s.22 In 1938, however, information came to MIS that 
Glading had been passing over to Soviet authorities technical plans obtained from the 
Arsenal: 'Glading, as a rule, had them photographed and returned the same evening so 
that they could be replaced the next day without being missed'.23 The successful 
prosecution of Glading was the result of long-term agent penetration by MIS in the 
CPGB. The MIS agent, known as 'Miss X' in trial, who we now know to have been a 
certain Olga Grey, was run by MIS's agent-running section, B.S.b, also known as 'M 
Section' after its head, Maxwell Knight.24 Knight was arguably one of the most talented 
contemporary agent-handlers in MIS. He was also a keen naturalist, who after the war 
became the presenter of a popular children's television programme, 'Uncle Max,.25 M-
Section's successful penetration of the CPGB took nearly six years of careful cultivation 
20 Wilson, 'The war in the dark', pp. 13-27. 
21 'Secrets case', The Times, London: (4 Feb., 1938); 'Official secrets act', The Times, London: (15 
March, 1938). For the Official Secrets Act, see: David Hooper, Official Secrets: the Use and Abuse oj 
the Act, (London, 1987). 
22 NA KV 2/1020 'Percy Glading', s.la: Home Office Warrant imposed on Percy Glading, (22 
July, 1925). 
23 Curry, The Securi!)' Seroice, pp.l08, 361-62. 
24 For 'Miss X', see: 'Official secrets case', The Times, London: (8 Feb., 1938). 
2S Anthony Masters, The ManllJho was M: the Ltje ojMaxJlJell Knight, (Oxford, 1984). 
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before the war-Grey first entered the CPGB in 1932. In Knight's words, the case 
exemplified 'the value of a really long-term policy with regard to agents'.26 Rising up 
through the ranks of the CPGB, Grey managed to become a secretary in its headquarters, 
and eventually obtained, 'the enviable position where an agent becomes a piece of 
furniture, so to speak: that is, when persons visiting an office do not consciously notice 
whether the agent is there or not'.27 Grey provided MIS with a range of information on 
how the Party operated. Her knowledge of CPGB radio codes also helped GC&CS to 
break COMINTERN radio traffic in Europe, a source codenamed MASK.28 
The pattern of Soviet espionage that MIS discovered in the Glading case-
involving a complex network of agents and sub-agents-was confirmed in 1939 when 
the Soviet NKVD 'illegal' resident in the Netherlands, General Walter Krvitsky, defected 
to the west. In early 1940 Krivitsky was interviewed in London by MIS's experts in 
Soviet espionage, Jane Archer and Guy Liddell, and SIS's counter-espionage expert, 
Valentine Vivian. Krivitsky provided MIS and SIS with a wealth of information on 
Soviet espionage, both in Britain and Europe. With hindsight, we can see that 
Krivitsky's evidence contained clues to the most notorious contemporary Soviet 
networks in Britain. Among Krivitsky's information was the name of a certain 'Dr. 
Alfred Deutsch', whom Krivitsky stated had 'a large circle of acquaintances here, 
particularly in University circles'.29 This was a reference to Arnold Deutsch, recruiter of 
two of the five 'Cambridge spies'. Krivitsky stated that he was aware of a Soviet agent 
working in the Committee of Imperial Defence, which almost certainly was a reference 
to Donald Maclean. Krititsky also warned of another Soviet agent whom he described as 
'aristocratic' and a 'University man', who may have gone to 'Eton and Oxford'. Krivitsky 
26 NA KV 4/227 'History of the operations of M.S. (agents) during the war 1939-1945', p. 32. 
27 Ibid., p. 35; KV2/1022 'Percy Glading', s.235b: B Division note [name illegible], (24 Jan., 1938). 
28 Nigel West, MASK- MI5's Penetration if the Communist Parry if Great Britain, (London, 2005) . 
29 NA KV 2/804 'Walter J. Krivitsky', s.la: Jane Archer's notes, (23 Jan., 1940). 
------------------------......... 
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even mentioned that he believed the agent's name 'began with p,.30 A further interview 
of Krivitsky by Jane Archer produced 'a tantalizing scrap of information about a young 
English journalist whom Soviet Intelligence had sent to Spain during the Civil War'. All 
of these references were instantly recognised by Kim Philby, but no one else, as 
references to himself.3! 
The information which Krivitsky provided, then, brought British intelligence 
tantalisingly close to the 'Cambridge Five'. In fact, we can now see that in their 
investigations into Soviet espionage before the war, MIS had already come 
extraordinarily close the Cambridge network. In the early 1930s, MIS-and Jane Archer 
in particular-investigated the activities of the Russian physicist and future Nobel Prize 
Winner, Pyotr Kapitza, who was a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.32 Although 
they could not prove it, MIS felt certain that Kapitza was a Soviet agent, and that he was 
passing the findings of his research back to Moscow. MIS received valuable information 
on Kapitza from another Fellow of Trinity, and from one of Kapitza's colleagues in the 
Cavendish Laboratory, who seems to have been jealous of Kapitza's close friendship 
with the head of the Cavendish, Sir Ernest Rutherford.33 These sources informed MIS 
that within the university, Kapitza was closely associated with the communist Lecturer in 
economics, Maurice Dobb.34 If MIS had followed up every clue, as later they did, they 
30 Ibid., s.29a: Jane Archer, 'Report', (3 Feb., 1940). 
3! H.A.R. 'Kim' Philby, My Silent War. The Autobiograpl?J oj a Spy, new paperback ed.: (London, 
2002), p. 105. 
32 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, (New Haven, 1994), pp. 
12, 13; David Schoenberg, 'Kapitza: fact and fiction', Intelligence and National Security, 3, no. 4, 
(1988), pp. 49-61. 
33 NA I<V2/777 'Pyotr Kapitza', s.18bc: Chief Constable, Cambridgeshire, to Police 
COmmissioner, New Scotland Yard, (12 Feb., 1926); Ibid., s.81a: 'Source V.S.O., Peter Kapitza', 
(22 June, 1934). For the role of the Cavendish Laboratory in nuclear physics, see: Brian Cathcart, 
The FlY in the Cathedral.' HOJII a small Group oj Cambridge Scientists JIIon the International Race to Split the 
Atom, (London, 2004). 
34 NA I<V2/777, s.42a: MIS report, 'Pyotr Kapitza', (17 Sept., 1930); I<V2/17s8 'Maurice Dobb', 
s.12a: Extract, (19 Sept., 1930). 
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would have discovered that Dobb had been Philby's tutor at Trinity.35 On his last day at 
Trinity in 1933, Philby had asked Dobb for advice on how best to serve the communist 
cause; Dobb pointed him in the direction of a legitimate communist organisation in 
Paris, and from there Philby easily moved to the underground COMINTERN world in 
Vienna.36 Despite these clues, it would be unrealistic to suppose that either MIS or SIS 
could have pursued every lead-their limited resources prevented them from doing so. 
The in-house history of MIS written by John Curry, himself an expert on Soviet counter-
espionage/7 noted that both Jane Archer and Guy Liddell were prevented from pursuing 
Soviet investigations because of the more urgent demands of German espionage.38 Even 
though it is unrealistic, it is provocative to speculate how different the entire history of 
Cold War intelligence would have been if either MIS or SIS had followed up the 
information which Krivitsky's defection, and earlier investigations into Kapitza, had 
produced.39 
MIS and SIS failed, then, to pursue Krivitsky's evidence regarding the 
'Cambridge Five'. However, the information which Krivitsky provided did lead to some 
successes in Soviet counter-espionage. At his first interview in late 1939, Krivitsky 
revealed that a Soviet agent was working in the cipher department of the Foreign Office, 
John Herbert King.4O It transpired that between 1935 and 1936, King had supplied 
Moscow with copies of telegrams received from several British embassies abroad. This 
revelation was alarming because, even before the King case, security at British embassies 
35 NA KV2/1759, s.117b: Extract from interview of H.A.R. Philby by W.J. Skardon, (28 Dec., 
1951). 
36 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story if Its Foreign Operations from 
Lenin to Gorbachev, (London, 1991), pp. 155-61; Philip Knightley, Phzlqy: The life and Views if the 
KGB Mastmy, (London, 1988), pp. 29-38. 
37 Curry, The Security Seroice, p. 358; NA KV4/191 'Liddell diaries', (20 April, 1943). 
38 Curry, The Security Seroice, p. 192. 
39 A similar counter-factual might be made about the revelation after the ARCOS raid in 1927 
that GC&CS was reading Soviet traffic, which caused Soviet cryptanalysts to change their codes. 
40 D . Cameron Watt, 'Francis [sic] Herbert King: a Soviet Source in the Foreign Office', Intelligence 
and National Security, 3, no. 4, (1988), pp. 62-82. 
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had been a headache for London. In 1937 a significant security breach occurred at the 
British embassy in Rome, when one of the embassy's domestic servants sold confidential 
documents to Soviet officials.41 Following King's confession in October 1939, he was 
successfully prosecuted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. 42 MIS's subsequent 
enquiries revealed that when King was stationed at the British embassy in Geneva, his 
Soviet controller had been a Dutch artist, Hans Christian Pieck. King's second Soviet 
controller in London had been 'Paul Hardt', also known as 'Peterson'. Significantly 'Paul 
Hardt' also had been Percy Glading's controller. 43 A connection existed therefore 
between the Glading and King networks. In these cases at least, MIS established that a 
single Soviet controller ('Paul Hardt') could run more than one network. The similarities 
between the apparatus used in these cases, furthermore, suggested that Soviet espionage 
networks worked along the same lines, both in peace and war. Overall the Glading and 
King cases, supplemented by Krivitsky's information, revealed to MIS that on the eve of 
the Second World War, Soviet espionage in Britain was resourceful and well-organised, 
and that Moscow was seeking to obtain 'the official secrets of this country,.44 But 
unknown to MIS at the time, their enquiries into 'Paul Hardt' had once again brought 
them remarkably close to the 'Cambridge spies'. Paul Hardt's real name was Theodor 
Maly and before the war, Maly had been one of the controllers of the 'Cambridge Five,.45 
41 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB and the West, pp. 64-71. 
42 'Old Bailey October session', The Times, London: (16 Oct., 1939); NA KV 2/816 'John Herbert 
King', s.360a: Valentine Vivian, 'Leakage from the communications department, Foreign Office', 
(30 Oct., 1939); KV 2/804 'Walter J. Krivitsky', s.9a: M.S. Mallet, SIS Washington, to MIS, (4 
Sept., 1939); NA KV4/18S 'Liddell diaries', (18 Oct., 1939). 
43 NA KV 2/1008-09 'Paul Hardt'; KV 2/809-814 'Hans Christian Pieck'; Richard C. Thurlow, 
'Soviet spies and British counter-intelligence in the 1930s: espionage in the Woolwich Arsenal 
and the Foreign Office communications department', Intelligence and National Security, 19, no. 4, 
(2004), pp. 610-633. 
44 Curry, The Security Seroice, p. 189. 
45 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB and the West, p. 83. 
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II. British Intelligence and the wartime Soviet threat 
The outbreak of the Second World War found the Soviet Union allied to Nazi 
Germany. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 meant that, at least on paper, Berlin and 
Moscow were cooperating. From MIS's perspective this meant that the CPGB, taking 
instructions from Moscow, was now a security threat in its own right. MIS's fear was 
that Nazi and Soviet intelligence services were collaborating, and that information 
passing from the CPGB to Moscow could find its way to Berlin. MIS's enquiries into the 
Communist MP William Gallagher, for instance, showed that confidential information he 
had obtained as an MP was being passed on to Moscow, and from there it seemed to be 
moving on to Berlin.46 In fact MIS's concerns over Nazi-Soviet intelligence collaboration 
were confirmed by Krivitsky, who warned that Germany was making use of the Soviet 
diplomatic bag.47 The Soviet Union thus posed a threat to Britain's national security not 
in the traditional, pre-war sense, but rather because at the start of the war Moscow was 
allied to Berlin. 
The outbreak of the Second World War threw the CPGB into a state of turmoil. 
At first, the CPGB supported Britain's war against Nazi Germany as a laudable 'war 
against fascism'. However, Moscow soon forced the Party to reverse its position. 
Moscow's alliance with Berlin dictated that no Communist Party, anywhere, could 
support the war.48 Based on these new instructions from the Centre, the leading Marxist 
theoretician in the CPGB, Rajane Palme Dutt, developed what he termed the theory of 
'revolutionary defeatism': through strikes and sabotage, British communists should work 
46 NA KV 2/1753 'William Gallagher', s.159b: Note on William Gallagher, (6 Dec., 1939). 
47 Curry, The 5 ecuri!J 5 eroice, p. 190; Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. IV: 5 ecuri!J and Counter-Intelligence, 
p. 38. 
48 NA KV 4/87, s.2a: Sir David Petrie, (26 June, 1944), p. 2. 
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for Britain's 'defeat in the war,49 Not all members of the Party, however, agreed with this 
theory, or with Moscow's new instructions, In fact the Secretary-General of the CPGB, 
Harry Pollitt, was so incensed by Moscow's opposition to the war with Germany that he 
il ' d 50 temporar y reslgne . Clearly there was no coherent policy among the Party's 
leadership. Nevertheless, from September 1939 the Party's official line was that it stood 
obediendy with Moscow, in opposition to Britain's war with Germany. MIS, however, 
feared still worse: B-Division reasoned that if circumstances dictated, the Party's 
opposition to the war could translate into open support of the German war-effort. 
During the 'invasion crisis' of 1940, MIS reasoned that the CPGB might assist with a 
German invasion. British communists were thus regarded by MIS as a 'Fifth-Column' in 
the same manner as British fascists. MIS's rationale was not that Moscow and Berlin's 
motivations were identical, but rather that Moscow would support a German invasion of 
Britain for pragmatic reasons: a Nazi dictatorship in Britain would probably spark a 
communist revolution. The irony of the situation was not lost on MIS-a thin 
distinction existed between allies and enemies.S1 
Faced with the threat of British communists as a 'Fifth Column', MIS drew up 
plans to neutralise the CPGB, if need be, during a German invasion.52 On the one hand, 
in May 1940 MIS already had plans for the mass-internment of communists on which to 
draw. Before the war, Sir Eric Holt-Wilson had devised plans with the Home Office for 
the internment of communists. In fact, the plans that Holt-Wilson devised between 1935 
and 1936, which he presented to the government within the context of the War Book, 
49 Curry, The Securiry Service, p. 189; KV 2/1807 'Rajane Palme Dutt'. 
50 NA KV 2/1038 'Harry Pollitt', s.406a: Sir Vernon Kell to Brigadier Wood, RCMP Ottawa, (7 
Jan., 1940). For John Campbell's concurrent resignation, see: KV 2/1186 John Campbell'. 
51 NA KV 4/186 'Liddell diaries', (16 Aug., 1940); KV 4/265 'Policy on control of communists-
general', s.34b: Roger Hollis, 'Communism and the position of the Communist Party', (29 April, 
1941). 
52 NA KV4/186 'Liddell diaries', (18 March, 1940); Ibid., (8 May, 1940); Ibid., (16 Aug., 1940); KV 
4/265, s.20a: Class A Circular, Roger Hollis, (9 Feb., 1941). 
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focused entirely on communists as potential internees rather than fascists. 53 On the 
other hand, the requirements of Britain's war-effort in May 1940 meant that, from a 
purely pragmatic point of view of workers' morale, it would be inadvisable to intern all 
British Communist Party members. MIS therefore advised the government that Party 
membership should not, in itself, be grounds for internment. 54 Short of mass-
internment, MIS devised another plan to deal with the CPGB, 'in the event of an attempt 
to organise widespread resistance'. The key to MIS's plan was the centralised nature of 
the Party itself: MIS reasoned that a direct blow to the Party's headquarters, meaning the 
arrest of key leaders, would paralyse it. Consequently, MIS compiled the names of thirty-
nine leaders, 'who were listed for detention on lines calculated to paralyse the Party'. 
These detentions 'were intended to coincide with the search of selected Party premises'. 
MIS put these names to the Home Office, which then circulated them to respective 
Chief Constabularies. As Curry explained: 'It was arranged that on receipt of a telegram 
"Put Complain into Effect" the necessary action should be taken by the police,.55 
After the outbreak of the war, MIS's hard-line stance against the Soviet threat 
was not exceptional within Whitehall. Other government departments, both intelligence 
and non-intelligence, shared this approach. In the secondary historical literature on the 
Second World War, it is often overlooked how close Britain actually came to war with 
the Soviet Union between 1939 and 1941. Britain nearly went to war with the Soviet 
Union when the Red Army invaded Finland in November 1939 (the 'Winter War,) .56 In 
fact, we now know that in the Spring of 1940 Britain was planning an awesome air-strike 
on the Soviet Union, Operation PIKE. This top-secret plan, drafted by the Chiefs of 
53 NA KV4/131 'Duties of MIS on mobilisation as laid down in the War Book 1939 and 
arrangements for procuring and training of staff prior to the 1939 war'; Curry, The Security Service, 
pp. 149, 151. 
54 Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. IV: Security and Counter-Intelligence, p. 57. 
55 Curry, The Security Service, p. 188. 
56 William R. Trotter, The Winter War.· the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, (London, 2002). 
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Staff between March and April 1940, involved a devastating bombing raid on Soviet 
oilfields in the Caucasus. The aim of Operation PIKE was to bring Germany's greatest 
ally, the Soviet Union, to its knees. At this stage, London regarded a war with the Soviet 
Union as almost inevitable.57 
The Second World War, however, was transformed on 22 June 1941 by Nazi 
Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union, operation BARBAROSSA.58 Hitler's 
Bfit;delieg on the Soviet Union caused previous diplomatic alliances to be swept away, and 
Moscow entered the war as London's ally. On the day of the German invasion, 
Churchill, despite his long-standing personal distrust of Bolshevism, broadcast that 
Britain stood firmly with the Soviet Union. Churchill's pragmatic determination to have 
Moscow as a wartime ally, as the lesser of two evils, was summarised in his comment: 'If 
Hitler invaded Hell I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the 
House of Commons,.59 For his part, Stalin responded to operation BARBAROSSA by 
instructing the CPGB to perform one final political somersault: following the Soviet 
Union's entry into the war, the CPGB reversed its policy once more, and threw itself 
wholeheartedly behind the British war-effort.60 The transformed political landscape, 
however, placed Britain's intelligence agencies in an awkward position. The Foreign 
Office stringently upheld its new obligations to Moscow, and from 22 June 1941 forbade 
any investigations by British intelligence into Soviet activities.61 Allies, apparently, do not 
spy on allies. Nevertheless, immediately after the Soviet Union's entry into the war, Sir 
57 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 25; Patrick R. Osborn, Operation Pike. Britain versus the Soviet Union, 
1939-1941, (Westport and London, 2000); Martin Kitchen, British Poliry towards the Soviet Union 
during the Second World Waf; (Basingstoke, 1986), pp. 22-28, 274. 
58 F.B. Hinsley, 'British intelligence and Barbarossa', in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds.), 
Barbarossa; the Axis and the Allies, (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 43-75. 
59 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled British Poliry and World P01ver in the 20'" Century, 2nd ed.: 
(London, 2000), p. 142. 
60 Curry, The Securi(y Seroice, p. 349. 
61 For instance, see: F.B. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, abr. ed.: (London, 
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David Petrie held a meeting with Churchill's security advisers in the Privy Council (9 July 
1941). The main topic for discussion was MIS's policy towards the Soviet threat. At the 
meeting, Petrie drew a distinction between what he termed 'the duty of the Security 
Service and the general policy of the government'. Petrie then explained what MIS's 
policy would be after June 1941: 'to maintain the existing policy towards the Communist 
Party and to keep the activities of the Party under the closest review'.62 MIS clearly 
understood that their obligations to national security lay outside of Britain's diplomatic 
alliance with the Soviet Union. 
A large historiographical debate exists over the nature of Britain's wartime 
alliance with the Soviet Union.63 But from MIS's perspective, we can now see that the 
alliance was never more than a marriage of convenience and mistrust. Immediately after 
the Soviet Union entered the war, MIS significandy established an entirely new 
department, F-Division, to investigate 'subversive activities'. The establishment of F-
Division on 4 July 1941 was the clearest indication of MIS's overall mistrust over the 
Anglo-Soviet alliance. Although F-Division was responsible for monitoring the 
continued fascist threat in Britain, it was predominandy concerned with communism and 
the Soviet threat-as its post-war history revealed.64 Under the leadership of (Sir) Roger 
Hollis, a future Director-General of MIS, F-Division worked on the assumption that 
although the CPGB supported the war, its long-term policy of revolution was 
62 NA KV 4/253 'Policy regarding official recognition of the Communist Party, Communist 
Party-inspired organisations, and demonstrations, 1939-1945', s.71a: Sir David Petrie to Sir John 
Anderson, (11 June, 1942); Ibid., Sir David Petrie to Lord Swinton, Security Executive, (11 June, 
1942). 
63 For example, see: Martin Folly, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45, (Basingstoke, 
2000); David Reynolds (et al eds.), Allies at War.' the Soviet, Amen'can and British Experience, 1939-
1945, (London, 1994); Victor Rothwell, War Aims in the Second World War:' the War Aims of the 
Mcyor Belligerents, (Edinburgh, 2005). 
64 NA KV 4/54 'Report on the operations of F-Division in connection with subversive activities 
during the War 1939-1945', p. 1. 
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unchanged.65 At its high-water mark in 1943, F-Division had twenty-four officers on its 
staff. 66 F.2.a, under Michael Serpell and David Clarke, was responsible for investigating 
the CPGB; F.2.b, under Milicent Bagot, investigated the COMINTERN; F.2.c, under 
Hugh Shillito and John Marriott, studied Soviet espionage; while F-MA was responsible 
for examining communist penetration in the Armed Forces.67 The in-house history of F-
Division compiled at the end of the war described the problems they faced: 
It was clear from the evidence available to the Section that 
there was still a long-term danger to be feared from the 
Communist Party in spite of their apparendy super-patriotic 
line, but it was not always easy to sell this idea to 
Government Departments, particularly those which were 
profiting from the cessation of both Communist obstruction 
and offers of positive help. Much, therefore, rested upon the 
power of individual members of the section to convince our 
opposite numbers in Government Departments that our 
views were soundly based on knowledge and experience and 
were not merely the reactionary outpourings of people who 
had stuck to one job for so long that their opinions had 
become ossified.68 
Thus, running contrary to Britain's diplomatic alignments after June 1941, F-
Division attempted to investigate the Soviet threat in Britain. From the outset, however, 
F-Division's investigations were fundamentally undermined by the Foreign Office 
constraints imposed on it. The internal history of F.2.c-significandy just four pages 
long-explained that the Foreign Office restrictions reduced its investigations 'to the 
65 Curry, The Sectllity Service, p. 350. 
66 NA KV 4/54, p. 2. 
67 NA KV4/56: 'Report on the operations of F.2.a in connection with communism, Trotskyism 
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1945'; Curry, The Sectl1ity Service, p. 350. 
68 NA KV 4/54, p. 3. 
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barest minimum'.69 Given these impediments, MIS attempted to investigate Soviet 
espionage in other ways. In March 1943 Liddell noted in his diary: 
I had a talk this mornmg with Hollis about Soviet 
espionage. There is no doubt to my mind that it is going 
on and sooner or later we shall be expected to know all 
about it. On the other hand if we take action and get found 
out there will be an appalling stink. 70 
Short of creating 'an appalling stink' and investigating Soviet activities themselves, MIS 
pursued the only avenue still available to them: F-Division attempted to investigate 
Soviet espionage in Britain by monitoring the CPGB. Using domestic communism to 
detect Soviet espionage was never going to be sufficient-most Soviet agents 
purposefully distanced themselves from the Party-but it was the best that MIS could do. 
Before the war the Glading case had shown that Soviet agents were indeed sometimes 
connected to the CPGB.71 
Using MIS records, we can now see that after 22 June 1941 MIS actually 
increased surveillance of the CPGB. The internal history of F-Division described that its 
investigations into the Party were revolutionised by 'new and very secret sources of 
information', which 'provided a considerable mass of information of a highly secret 
nature'. These sources allowed the Party to be studied 'at the centre rather than the 
circumference,.72 Unfortunately the declassified F-Division history does not reveal the 
nature of those 'secret sources'. An examination of various 'personal files' of Party 
leaders, however, reveals that the 'secret sources' were undoubtedly microphones 
(bugging equipment). In 1942 F-Division successfully installed eavesdropping 
69 NA KV 4/228, p. 3. 
70 NA KV 4/191 'Liddell diaries', (16 March, 1943). 
71 NA KV2/1020, s.7a: Metropolitan Police Office, New Scotland Yard, to Sir Vernon Kell, (18 
July, 1925). 
72 NA KV 4/54, p. 3. 
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equipment, termed 'mechanical means', or 'special facilities', in the headquarters of the 
CPGBon King Street, in London. 73 Hidden in the walls of the Party's headquarters, and 
codenamed source TABLE, microphones provided MIS with so much information that 
F-Division was 'frequendy placed in the embarrassing position of knowing very much 
more about a case than could be revealed'. Microphones furnished MIS with 'a 
knowledge of the organisational set-up and policy of the movements studied which 
would certainly be alarming, and probably instructive, to the leaders of those movements 
themselves'.74 
Source TABLE was not the only way in which MIS enhanced surveillance of the 
CPGB after June 1941. The centre piece of all MIS investigations were Home Office 
Warrants (HOWs), which allowed for mail interception and telephone tapping. 
Immediately before the Soviet Union's entry into the war, MIS had over 900 HOWs 
imposed on addresses in Britain for mail interception, along with fort-eight telephone-
checks.75 Ironically, the mass-internment of 'enemy aliens' meant that in April 1941, MIS 
had more HOWs imposed on 'Communism' than either on 'Nazism' or 'Fascism,.76 
According to Hollis, MIS increased the number of HOWs imposed on 'Communism' 
after June 1941. Although we do not know the precise number, Hollis noted in 1945 
that at least 75% of all the information coming to MIS on communism originated from 
HOWs.77 As well as increased mail interception and telephone tapping, after June 1941 
MIS also expanded their 'observation' of Party leaders. MIS's 'observation' unit, B.6, 
73 Described as 'mechanical means' by Curry, The Securiry Service, p. 364; NA KV2/1181: 'Robert 
Stewart', passim; KV 2/1041 'Harry Pollitt', s.568ab: 'History sheet Harry Pollitt', (23 Jan., 1946); 
KV2/ 1754 'William Gallagher', extract from source 'Table', (16 Aug., 1949); Michael Smith, The 
Spying Game. The Secret History oJBritish Espionage, paperback ed.: (London, 2003), p. 88. 
74 NA KV 4/54, p. 3; NA KV 4/190 'Liddell diaries', (27 Oct., 1942). 
75 NA KV4/222 'Policy and procedure for the imposition of HOWs for the interception of mail 
and telephone communications in the UK by the Security Service, 1939-1945', s.28a: Memo (2 
April,1941). 
76 Ibid. 
77 NA KV4/267, Minute 178a: Roger Hollis, (31 Jan., 1945). 
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then run by Hugh Hunter, was staffed with specially-trained 'watchers,.78 Placing an 
individual, organisation, or location under 'observation' was highly resource-intensive for 
MIS-as it is today. Nevertheless, at least three leading members of the CPGB, Robert 
'Robby' Robson, John Campbell and Rajane Palme Dutt, were placed under B.6 
'observation' for the first time after June 1941.79 MIS thus used the wartime 
environment to enhance surveillance of the CPGB. 
After June 1941, F-Division enjoyed some successes in Soviet counter-espionage. 
In April 1942 F.2.c uncovered a Soviet network lun by the former Party member, Oliver 
Green. After his arrest in Birmingham for forging petrol-coupons, Green's house in 
London was searched by the Special Branch, which 'led to the discovery of photographs 
of certain War Office documents,.80 Green, who was then serving fifteen months 
imprisonment for his forgery of petrol-coupons, was subsequently interrogated in prison 
by Hugh Shillito of F-Division. Although Green stated 'frankly from the start that he 
did not intend to incriminate any of his associates', he seemed to give Shillito a tour 
d'horizon of his espionage network, without names.8! The breakthrough in the case for F-
Division, however, came after Green's release from prison in early 1943, when he visited 
the headquarters of the CPGB. In a conversation with Robert 'Robby' Robson, Green 
admitted that he had told 'stories' to the 'War Office' upon his arrest. Green then told 
Robson, in confidence, the names of his sub-agents, including one in the Army (Alan 
Osborne) and one in the Merchant Navy 0ack Reid). Green's entire conversation was 
78 NA KV4/127 'Security Service organisation from 1918 to 1939', s.4b: 'Security Service key to 
revised divisions and section numbers', (Sept., 1937). 
79 NA KV2/1177 'Robert Robson', s.143e: Wendy Ogilvie to Hugh Hunter, (1 June, 1942); 
I(V2/1188 John Campbell', s.193a: Wendy Ogilvie to Hugh Hunter, (17 Jan., 1942); KV2/1807 
'Rajane Palme Dutt', s. 118a: Wendy Ogilvie to Hugh Hunter, (1 May, 1942). 
80 Curry, The Secun!y Service, p. 350; NA KV 4/190 'Liddell diaries', (11 Aug., 1942). 
81 NA KV2/2203, s.69a: 'Note of interview with Oliver Charles Green at Brixton Prison on 11 
Aug., 1942'. 
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picked up by MIS's microphones.82 MIS imposed HOWs on Green's accomplices and 
placed them under B.6 'observation'. Although these measures failed to produce 
evidence sufficient to prosecute, MIS kept track of Green's accomplices for the rest of 
the war, and after it, placing them on the Special Branch 'stop-list' at British ports.83 
The Green case provided F-Division with a further insight into the nature of 
Soviet espionage in Britain. But equally, it illustrated the problems of investigating the 
threat. Green's network conformed to the model provided by Krivitsky: although Green 
had been a Party member, coming to MIS's attention in 1935 as such,84 when he became 
a Soviet agent, he 'cut right away from the Party and has had nothing to do with it from 
that day'.85 Green's interrogation also confirmed Krivitsky's information that Soviet 
intelligence used the Russian Trade Delegation in Britain as cover. MIS, however, was 
prevented from investigating the Trade Delegation by the Foreign Office.86 
Retrospectively, the most intriguing part of Green's interrogation statement was the 
warning he issued: Green stated that 'Russian Intelligence had an agent in the Security 
Service'. According to Green, Soviet recruits were told that, 'if British Intelligence had 
any suspicion about them as Soviet agents, the Centre would come to know very 
quickly,.87 On face value, Green's warning appears to have been a reference to the 
'Cambridge spy', Anthony Blunt. However, it seems highly unlikely that Green would 
have known about such a well-placed agent-even if he had, presumably he would not 
82 NA KV2/2206, s.4a: 'K.S. [King Street] microphone conversation between Green and 
Robson', (7 Oct., 1943). 
83 NA KV2/2203, s.10a: 'The present state of the Green Case', (19 Oct., 1942); KV2/2233 'Alan 
Osbourne', s.17a: M. Johnstone to H.J. Cleeve, (29 Nov. , 1942); NA KV2/2235, s.183a: W.J. 
Skardon 'Alan Ernest Osborne', (18 March, 1953); KV2/2236 'Alonzo Elliott', s.20a: Home 
Office Warrant on Alonzo Elliott, (4 Feb., 1942); KV2/2205, s.265z: 'Typewritten copy of 
statement made after caution by Alan Ernest Osborn to c.A.G. Simkins', (15 Dec., 1952). 
84 NA KV2/2203, s.2a: Chief Constabulary Birmingham to MI5, (2 Dec., 1935). 
85 NA KV2/2204, s.125a: 'Oliver Green', (30 Oct., 1942), p. 2; Curry, The Sec/ltiry Service, p. 351. 
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have given the 'War Office' such a lead. Furthermore, F-Division had good reasons for 
discounting Green's warning, for after his recorded conversation with Robson, Green's 
interrogation statements were known to be less than truthful. Green's warning that there 
was a 'Soviet spy' in MIS therefore may have been, for all F-Division knew, one of the 
'stories' that he admitted to telling his 'War Office' interrogator. 
In July 1943 F-Division's investigations also led to the successful prosecution of 
a leading member of the CPGB, Douglas Springhall. As a founding member of the 
Party, Springhall had been of interest to MIS since 1920. MIS's interest in Springhall 
increased when he became the National Organiser of the Party in 1940. On account of 
his prominent position within the Party, and a trip he was known to have made to the 
Soviet Union in 1939, F-Division advised against Springhall's call-up for national service 
in 1940.88 Then, in June 1943, MIS received information that a 'serious leakage of 
information' had occurred in the Air Ministry involving Springhall, which concerned 
'some of the very latest and secret sources of information,.89 It transpired that Springhall 
had cultivated a secretary working in the Air Ministry, Olive Sheehan, and obtained from 
her classified information pertaining to a new anti-radar device, codenamed WINDOW, 
which involved the scattering of reflective metals during air-raids to distract search-
lights. 90 Sheehan's flatmate, Norah Bond, had witnessed Sheehan passing information to 
Springhall in envelopes; Bond informed her boyfriend, an RAF officer, who duly 
steamed opened the envelopes, revealing details of WINDOW. The RAF officer 
subsequently informed the Air Ministry, at which point MIS was brought into the 
investigation. In his trial, which was held in camera due to the secret nature of 
WINDOW, Springhall resorted to a defence that MIS would repeatedly encounter when 
88 NA KV 2/1596 'Douglas Springhall', s.235x: 'Note on the case of Douglas Frank Springhall', 
(18 Nov., 1941). 
89 Ibid., s.271 be: 'Leakage of information from the Air Ministry', (16 June, 1943). 
90 NA KV4/192 'Liddell diaries', (28 July, 1943). Also see: Richard Overy, Wiry the Allies Won, 
(London, 1995), pp. 119-20. WINDOW is now termed 'chaff. 
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dealing with wartime Soviet espionage: that the Soviet Union was Britain's wartime ally, 
and he was therefore merely passing over 'information which would be useful to our 
ally'. As Liddell noted wryly in his diary, the law was 'unfortunately somewhat 
inadequate in the case of a man who is spying on behalf of an ally,.91 Nonetheless, 
Springhall's defence was not upheld. He was found guilty of breaking the Official 
Secrets Act and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.92 
Springhall's diary led to the discovery of further agents. Scrutinising the diary's 
entries, F-Division discovered that Springhall ran a sub-agent in the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), Desmond Uren, who passed over the entire 'organisational lay-out of 
SOE,.93 Uren was tried under courts-martial in November 1943 and sentenced to seven 
years'imprisonment.94 Springhall's diary also led to a sub-agent in SIS, Ray Milne. As a 
secretary in Section V of SIS, counter-espionage, Milne was 'right in the middle of ISOS 
[German SIGIN1] and everything else', and she passed over to Springhall information 
on the German intelligence services.95 Checking their records, MIS discovered that they 
had vetted Milne for work in SIS but nothing substantial had been found against her. 
Milne was immediately interrogated by Roger Hollis and his opposite number in SIS, the 
tempestuous Felix Cowgill. In her interrogation, Milne admitted that she had a divided 
loyalty between Britain and the Soviet Union. But Milne soon fell back on the same 
defence that Springhall had used: passing information over to Moscow was merely giving 
information to an ally. Looking at these cases, and how far Moscow's hidden hand 
91 NA KV4/192 'Liddell diaries', (17 June, 1943). 
92 NA KV2/1s96, s.272b: Court proceedings against Douglas Frank Springhall, 'Preliminary 
observations by MIS', (21 June, 1943); KV 4/192 'Liddell diaries', (29 July, 1943). 
93 NA KV2/1s97 'Douglas Springhall', s.388a: 'The Springhall case', (March, 1950); Curry, The 
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94 NA KV4/192 'Liddell diaries', (1 Nov., 1943); KV2/1s98 'Douglas Springhall', s.28a: Memo, 
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appeared to stretch, in September 1943 Liddell concluded: 'Penetration of the Services by 
the c.P. is becoming rather serious,.96 
The Springhall case was important for MIS because it involved a Soviet agent 
using the Party for espionage. As a rule, it was always accepted that Soviet agents 'cut 
themselves off from the Party when they undertook the work'. But Springhall, who was 
the Party's National Organiser, took the 'unusual step of using the Party apparatus for 
espionage'.97 In fact Springhall's activities caused a storm among the Party's leadership. 
As F-Division noted, 'Pollitt and Gallagher are clearly anxious to clean the Party of such 
activities,.98 Indeed, Springhall was immediately expelled from the Party. F-Division, 
however, remained unconvinced by the Party's claims to oppose Soviet espionage: 'the 
Soviet authorities have from time to time obtained information from most of the leading 
members of the Communist Party who have shown various degrees of willingness to do 
this work,.99 Percy Glading had been a Party member, after all. IOO On the one hand, the 
Glading and Springhall cases showed that MIS's strategy to investigate Soviet espionage 
through CPGB was not totally futile. On the other hand, MIS's approach was never 
going to be sufficient to detect the majority of Soviet agents. F-Division was acutely 
aware that their investigations were insufficient to detect Soviet espionage. 101 
In many ways, F-Division was fighting a war in the dark. In fact the nature of F-
Division's investigations revealed how weak their position was. Even those 
investigations which resulted in successful prosecutions-the Green and Springhall 
cases-were not the result of F-Division's own enquiries. Although F-Division's 
investigative work was exemplary once evidence against the agents emerged, the cases 
96 Ibid., (29 Sept., 1943). 
97 NA KV2/1596, s.300a: David Clarke, 'The case ofD.F. Springhall', (25 Aug., 1943), pp. 1,6. 
98 Ibid., p. 6. 
99 Ibid., p. 7. 
100 NA KV2/1021, s.7a: Metropolitan Police Office, New Scotland Yard, to Sir Vernon Kell, (18 
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had occurred fortuitously: Green was detected after his unrelated arrest for forging 
petrol-coupons, while Springhall may have 'escaped detection but for a piece of 
negligence on his part'.102 Furthermore,' we can see that a qualitative shift occurred in 
MIS's investigations into wartime Soviet espionage-and that shift cannot simply be 
explained by Foreign Office impediments. Immediately before the war, Glading had 
been brought to trial by careful, long-term agent penetration in the CPGB. But during 
the war, MIS failed to cultivate agents in the Party in a similar manner. Maxwell Knight, 
for one, warned that this would pose serious problems for British security after the 
war. 103 However, it is unrealistic to suppose that MIS could have shown similar attention 
to long-term agent penetration in the CPGB during the war as they had done before the 
war. Successful agent cultivation took years, and MIS only had limited resources. The 
Service was, of course, faced with the more urgent demands of German espionage, and, 
furthermore, investigating threats running contrary to diplomatic alliances was inevitably 
going to be an awkward endeavour. As always, MIS had to find a balance between 
immediate threats to national security and long-term priorities. 
MIS took the Springhall case seriously. F-Division was so concerned about its 
implications that in October 1943, they conducted an overall threat-analysis of 
communist penetration in government circles. This, in itself, is a striking illustration of 
the priority assigned by MIS to the wartime Soviet threat. F-Division's threat-analysis 
was alarming, to say the least. After a series of 'lengthy and intricate investigations', F.2.a 
discovered that fifty-seven known members of the Party were working in government 
departments, with 'access to secret information and in some cases to information of the 
102 Ibid., p. 363. 
103 NA KV4/227: 'History oEM.S.', pp. 4, 41. 
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highest secrecy,.104 The F-Division officer who conducted the investigation, David 
Clarke, set out his unhappy conclusions in October 1943: 
The whole experience of the Security Service shows that 
members of the Communist Party place their loyalty to the 
Party above their loyalty to their Service and that their 
signature of the Official Secrets Act always carries a mental 
reservation in favour of the Party. The fact that the 
Communist Party is at present supporting the war would 
not prevent them from using any secret information in their 
possession irresponsibly and without regard to the true 
interests of the country. Unauthorised disclosure to any 
quarter is a recognised danger. Disclosure to the 
Communist Party has special additional dangers of its 
105 own. 
The fifty-seven Party members whom F-Division identified had gained access to 
secret information not because MIS's vetting procedures were insufficient, but because 
government departments had not adhered to MIS guidelines. 106 Many of their names had 
never been submitted to MIS, while others were transferred to secret work after they had 
been vetted, but MIS had not been informed of their transfer. 10? In total, MIS's list 
included twenty-three Party members working in the Ministry of Supply, eighteen in the 
Army, eight in 'the Universities', and three were even employed on the TUBE ALLOYS 
project, Britain's top-secret atomic research programme. lOB Given post-war revelations 
of Soviet espionage, these discoveries are breathtaking. Critically we could argue that 
104 NA KV4/251 'Communists already employed on secret work in government departments', 
s.3a: David Clarke, 'Communists engaged on secret work', (21 Oct., 1943); Curry, The Secutiry 
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MIS's threat-analysis in October 1943 was a failure because it failed to identify either the 
'atom spies' or the 'Cambridge Five'. But the 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge Five' had 
all broken contact with the Party, and c~nsequendy were more difficult to trace. MIS's 
threat analysis can only be regarded as a 'missed opportunity' when seen with the benefit 
of hindsight. Far from being a failure, it is striking that by October 1943 MIS was 
already concerned about those quarters that after the war proved to be notorious sources 
of Soviet penetration. The declassified records do not reveal the fate of those fifty-seven 
Party members identified by MIS, but it seems likely that they were either transferred to 
non-secret work or dismissed. 
In light of their threat-analysis, MIS took an even harder approach towards the 
CPGB. MIS argued that the Springhall case would allow the government to legitimately, 
and publicly, take action against the Party.109 From MIS's perspective, the official 
dissolution of the COMINTERN by Stalin in May 1943 made no practical difference to 
the Party's activities, and it continued to receive its orders direcdy from Moscow: 
'Whether the instructions come by courier or through the embassy makes no 
difference,.11O Given the continued existence of the COMINTERN in all but name, and 
given the Party's now established connections with Soviet espionage, MIS's list of fifty-
seven communists was passed to Churchill himself for consideration. MIS's covering 
note warned Churchill that in the circumstances, 'any member of the Party should be 
regarded as a potential agent'. MIS also warned Churchill of the formidable nature of 
Soviet agents: 'These agents differ fundamentally from the very poor type employed by 
the Germans who belong to the dregs of civilisation. Communist agents are intelligent 
109 NA KV4/251, s.3a: Clarke, 'Communists', (21 Oct., 1943), p. 2. 
110 NA KV4/190 'Liddell Dairies', (7 Oct., 1943); KV4/191 'Liddell Dairies', (31 May, 1943); 
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and are inspired by altruistic, idealistic motives. Their first duty is to the Soviet'. II I 
Again, these warnings are remarkable considering post-war revelations. 
III. MIS and wartime vetting procedures 
Following the Springhall case, MIS urged the government to introduce uniform 
procedures for vetting individuals employed on secret work. IIZ Based on MIS's 
recommendations, Churchill established a secret Panel to investigate cases of communist 
penetration in government circles. ll3 But, unfortunately, Churchill's Panel faced a 
fundamental problem from the outset: MIS found it difficult to cooperate with the 
Panel-and had good reasons for doing so. MIS feared, probably correcciy, that the 
Panel was not up to the task of investigating communist penetration. In a letter to Sir 
Alexander Maxwell at the Home Office, Sir David Petrie explained his scepticism 
towards Churchill's Panel: from Petrie's perspective, MIS and the Home Office had 
'more up-to-date information about Communism than any other quarter', and were 
therefore better placed to judge 'what action is required than an ad hoc Panel, whose 
members are not supplied with continuous knowledge of this movement, especially on 
its secret side'.114 Petrie feared that the Panel would not accept MIS's recommendations 
on good faith, but instead would force MIS to expose their secret sources. For their part, 
the government was reluctant to introduce measures during the war that could result in 
the dismissal of communists on the grounds of their political beliefs. I 15 On one level, 
111 NA KV4/251, sAa: Duff Cooper to Churchill, copied to Roger Hollis, (26 Oct., 1943). 
lIZ Ibid. , s.3a: David Clarke, 'Communists', (21 Oct., 1943), p. 3; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the 
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Churchill's l)anel was thus a step in the direction towards uniform vetting procedures, 
and shows that both MIS and the government were concerned about communist 
penetration as early as 1943. On another level, the failings of the Panel represent a 
recurring predicament for governments and intelligence agencies throughout the 
twentieth century: MIS urged the government to take action on a security issue, but a 
compromise solution, acceptable both to the government and from a security 
perspective, was unable to be found. MIS had so little faith in the Panel that they only 
ever submitted a single case to it. 116 
The problems which beset Churchill's Panel were symptomatic of broader 
problems surrounding the question of vetting. MIS's wartime vetting procedures have 
subsequently attracted a degree of notoriety, for not only did the Service allow Soviet 
agents into other government departments, but MIS even allowed agents into their own 
ranks. MIS's failures in wartime vetting were often certainly the result of the Service's 
own errors. But as we can now see, they were also the result of difficulties and 
contradictions surrounding the process of vetting itself. Then, as now, vetting 
performed an essential role in national security. Counter-espionage and vetting were two 
sides of the same coin: vetting was the 'passive' corollary to 'active' counter-espionage 
investigations. During the war MIS relied on 'negative vetting', by which names were 
'looked up' in the Central Registry for 'traces'. The process of 'negative vetting' was 
arduous and time-consuming for officers. C-Division, responsible for vetting, had a 
wartime staff of just ten officers (under the leadership of H.I. Allen), and by 1944 was 
vetting on average over 4,000 individuals per week.117 In March 1944 the Central 
116 Hinsley, Btitish Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: Security and Counter-Intelligence, p. 288. 
117 NA KV4/166 'C-Division: organisation and duties', Minute 2a: ].0. Alien, (3 Feb., 1945) 
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Registry contained 1,750,000 card-indexes on which such names had to be 'looked Up'.118 
To make a laborious process even more difficult, MIS faced a recurring dilemma when it 
came to vetting: a tension existed between MIS's investigative work and the Service's 
vetting requirements. ll9 MIS's breakdown in 1940 largely occurred because officers 
required records for two separate purposes at the same time: to pursue investigations and 
to perform background checks. 120 The process of vetting, however, posed more than just 
a tension for MIS-it actually posed a contradiction. For vetting to be effective, it 
required the Registry to be as up-to-date as possible. 'If the Registry is bad, nothing else 
can be good', warned Petrie. 121 But any substantial increase in the level of vetting risked 
diverting MIS's limited resources away from those positive investigations on which the 
Registry was itself dependant. MIS thus faced a circular contradiction between vetting, 
the Registry and investigations-all of which either complemented each other, or 
potentially stood to undermine each other. Liddell summarised the problems of vetting 
in 1942: 
... much of the information in our files has never been 
substantiated in one way or another. If we were to attempt 
to do anything of the kind we should have to have about 
twenty times the number of staff and immobilise all 
records.122 
Faced with these contradictions, and reluctant to defer the question of vetting to 
an external Panel as Churchill suggested, MIS's wartime vetting procedures were arguably 
never going to be sufficient. In practice, vetting often came down to little more than 
educated guess-work, based on what evidence existed in the Registry. The practical 
118 NA KV 4/21 'Report on the operations of the Registry during the war 1939-1945', s.la: Roger 
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problems which MIS experienced with vetting were confounded by the urgent needs of 
the war-effort. MIS was frequendy forced to judge between an individual's immediate 
use in the war-effort, on the one hand, and possible security concerns posed by that 
individual, on the other. The war-effort, of course, demanded that Britain employed 'the 
best possible brains'. But unfortunately it was the case that many of the academics 
conducting research for the government, especially in universities, had communist 
affiliations. MIS thus had to decide whether their views posed an overall security 
concern. To have excluded all those with communist affiliations would have been 
catastrophic for the Allied war-effort. 123 In fact, Liddell complained in 1942 that 'a 
number of people are kept permanendy out of Government employment who might be 
doing useful work' .124 
MIS's dilemma during the war was that sometimes the only person who could 
perform a specialised job, also posed a security risk. In at least one case, that of the 
chemical-physicist Dr. Engelbert Broda, the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research 'felt that his immediate value as a scientist outweighed his potential danger as a 
Communist,.125 When Broda's case was first submitted to MIS in 1939, B-Division and 
C-Division advised against his employment on secret work on account of his communist 
affiliations. 126 Broda was typical of the large number of pre-war central European 
refugees who arrived in Britain with ideological aspirations potentially adverse to 
Britain's national interest, and whom MIS had to assess. 127 Perhaps typically, however, 
once Broda was employed he was able transfer into secret work without MIS being 
123 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Detemnce. Britain and Atomic EnetgY, 1945-1952, vol. II: 
(London, 1974), p. 140. 
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informed. 12S ' In fact Broda's case encapsulates the considerable problems that MIS faced 
with. wartime vetting. In 1943 MIS was asked to re-vet Broda for top-secret work, but at 
the time of his vetting those who studied the case-C-Division and F-Division-were 
left uninformed as to the nature of his work. 129 In fact, they were vetting Broda for the 
TUBE ALLOYS project-Britain's top-secret nuclear research programme. From our 
perspective at the start of the twenty-first century, with the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons an unfortunately common subject, it is easy to forget the intense secrecy that 
surrounded the world's first atomic projects. The level of secrecy surrounding the 
TUBE ALLOYS project begs the question: how was MIS supposed to draw up 
employment guidelines for a research programme that was so secret that its existence was 
only known to a handful of people?130 Even at the end of the war when the Allied 
atomic bomb had been dropped, the JIC was still unsure about how atomic secrets 
should be circulated. 131 When seen from this perspective, MIS's vetting of wartime 
nuclear physicists suddenly becomes more complicated. As we shall see in the case of 
the 'atom spy', Klaus Fuchs, a brilliant scientist was known by MIS to be emphatically 
'anti-Nazi', but the extent to which he was 'pro-communist' was impossible to judge. 
The task facing MIS was to detect individuals who, in Dick White's phrase, were 'double 
. 'd . th 132 patnots urmg e war. 
MIS thus faced an array of difficulties when it came to wartime vetting. The 
fundamental problem, however, was that 'negative vetting' was insufficient to detect 
espionage. 'Negative vetting' relied on information existing in MIS's Registry; but lack of 
evidence was not proof of trustworthiness, it merely indicated that MIS had 'nothing 
recorded against' ('NRA') . When performing wartime background checks, MIS did not 
128 NA KV2/2350, Minute 197a: Roger Hollis, (7 July, 1943). 
129 NA KV2/2350, Minute 198a: Roger Hollis, (13 July, 1943). 
130 NA KV2/2350 Minute 188a: Millicent Bagot, (19 May, 1943). 
131 NA CAB 81/130 JIC (45) 272 (0) 'Intelligence on atomic energy', (12 Sept., 1945). 
132 Miranda Carter, Antho'!)' Blunt. His Lives, (London, 2001), p. 275. 
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make positi~e recommendations, but simply stated whether they were in a position to 
make an adverse recommendation. Wartime vetting did not involve any 'positive' 
enquiries. Ultimately, the insufficiencies of 'negative vetting' led Britain's intelligence 
services to accept Soviet agents into their own ranks. Illustrative of MIS's misinformed 
recruitment policies is the fact that in 1940, they asked the young Jennifer Fischer 
Williams (later Hart) to recommend suitable graduates for employment. MIS was 
unaware that until the previous year, Williams had been a secret member of the CPGB 
and that the NKVD had attempted to recruit her.133 
The 'Cambridge Five' represent all that was wrong with MIS and SIS's wartime 
vetting procedures: corners were cut, background checks involved no 'positive' enquiries, 
the needs of the war-effort were allowed to override security concerns, and the services 
relied on antiquated recruitment policies. The 'Cambridge spy' Anthony Blunt joined 
MIS amid the chaos of the invasion crisis in June 1940 and was made responsible for B-
Division's penetration of neutral embassies in London. 134 While Blunt's initial entry into 
MIS amid the chaos of 1940 is comparatively understandable, he remained undetected, 
and with hindsight some of MIS's subsequent vetting policies involving Blunt took on an 
air of comedy. When C-Division was asked to vet a German emigre and academic 
Marxist art-historian, Francis Klingender, they passed his file to none other than Blunt, 
who knew Klingender personally and professionally. Blunt stated that he thought 
Klingender was unlikely to do anything disloyal to Britain's national interest. Indeed, 
Blunt wrote that reading Klingender's file, and especially his academic credentials, he was 
surprised that his own name had not attracted security attention. 135 Similar agonising 
oversights were shown towards Kim Philby in SIS. When Philby joined SIS, the Service 
133 Andrew, Secret Service, p. 460. 
134 NA KV2/186 'Liddell diaries', (7 June, 1940); Curry, The Secuti!J Service, pp. 259-60. 
135 NA I<:V2/2155 'Francis Klingender', Minute 85a: Anthony Blunt, (7 Nov., 1942). 
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was apparently more concerned about the security risks posed by his father, Harry St. 
John Philby, an outspoken critic of British policies in the Middle East, than they were 
him. Ironically, the position of 'young Philby' in SIS-an 'able' and 'charming' man in 
the opinion of Valentine Vivian and others in SIS-was the reason why the government 
did not take harder measures against his father.136 The astonishing inadequacy of vetting 
measures taken against the 'Cambridge Five' meant that in 1943, Moscow ironically 
concluded that they were double-agents. For Stalin it was unthinkable that Britain's 
intelligence services would have allowed university graduates with communist 
connections into their midst. 137 
The 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge Five' were certainly MIS's greatest wartime 
failures. However, to expect MIS to have detected them-all of whom had pUlposefully 
distanced themselves from the Party-is to expect MIS to have done something which 
no other government department, ever, can be expected to do: that is, to be correct in 
every case. As ever, MIS's successful counter-measures passed by unacknowledged, 
while the Service's failures were quick to receive public censure. 138 Despite their later 
notoriety, those who subsequently became known as the 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge 
Five' were, at the time, not dissimilar to other individuals vetted by MIS. All of them had 
traceable communist connections in their backgrounds, but MIS lacked positive evidence 
that they were committed communists. Blunt recalled that he once looked himself up in 
the Registry and found just two traces, one linking his name to Maurice Dobb, and the 
other stating that he had visited the Soviet Union before the war.139 When considering 
MIS's failures in wartime vetting, an overall sense of proportion is useful. The 
'Cambridge spies' owe their notoriety not to the fact that they were unique, but because 
136 NA KV2/1118 'H. St. John Philby', s.57b: Valentine Vivian to Guy Liddell, (24 Sept., 1940). 
137 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. 1: The KGB in the West, pp. 156-60. 
138 NA KV4/188 'Liddell diaries', (17 Feb., 1942); KV4/192 'Liddell dairies', (7 Sept., 1943). 
139 Carter, Anthof!Y Blunt, p. 245. 
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they were the most successful of many wartime Soviet agents in Britain. In reality, the 
'Cambridge Five' and the 'atom spies' were just a few cases among an enormous total 
number of individuals who passed through MIS vetting. Between the outbreak of 
hostilities and July 1944, F-Division vetted 6,842 cases of possible communist 
penetration in the Armed Forces alone. 140 
Vetting was an unenviable task for MIS. It made the Service few friends and 
many enemies. Criticised when their vetting procedures were proved to be insufficient, 
MIS was equally criticised when their vetting process appeared too strict. This was 
clearly seen in the case of the communist barrister and journalist, Arthur Reade. In 1928 
Reade had come to MIS's attention for distributing communist pamphlets to the Army 
with no less than Douglas Springhall. 141 But by the outbreak of the war, Reade claimed 
to be 'cured' of communism, and produced some noteworthy references to support 
hirn.142 MIS, however, persistently advised against Reade's employment in government 
departments with access to secret information. In total MIS warned other government 
departments against employing Reade on ten separate occasions. After the war Reade 
launched a vociferous campaign against 'the government' (MIS), complaining that he had 
been 'persecuted'. An MP friend of Reade's even wrote to the Under-Secretary of State 
in his defence: 'It is clearly ridiculous that the political activities of his teens and early 
twenties could now, twenty-five years later, be used to prejudice my correspondent's 
opportunities for employment in official or other work,.143 Reviewing the case after the 
war, the Director of B-Division, Dick White, concluded: 'It is clear that our obstinacy in 
140 NA KV4/55 'Report on the operations ofF-MA', s. Appendix B: 'Number of cases dealt with 
since outbreak of the war to the end of July 1944'. Also see: KV4/168 'Policy and procedure 
regarding investigation of subversive activities in H.M. Forces by Security Service 1942-1943'. 
141 NA KV2/1540 'Arthur Reade', s.15b: 'The printing and distributing of illegal pamphlets 
calculated to suborn the discipline of H.M. Forces', (1 Feb., 1928). 
142 NA KV2/1540, s.36a: Hugh Stannard, Royal Institute for International Affairs, to Sir Vernon 
Kell, (11 Oct., 1939). 
143 NA KV2/1540, s.81a: Francis Noel-Baker, MP, to Kenneth Younger, (30 July, 1948). 
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this case must have gained us a bad reputation ill some quarters,.I44 When vetting 
individuals for secret work, MIS was thus placed in a lose-lose situation. MIS was 
criticised from all sides, both for their failures and for their perceived excesses. 
By now there is a large historiography concerned with the failures of the British 
intelligence community to identify the 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge Five'.145 Years 
after their disclosure, a group of disruptive conspiracy-theorists, centred around the 
renegade former MIS officer Peter Wright and the journalist Chapman Pincher, 
produced the thesis that Roger Hollis was himself a Soviet agent, the missing 'Fifth Man'. 
Throughout his time in MIS, Roger Hollis supposedly subverted investigations into 
Soviet esplonage, including the 'atom spies' and the 'Cambridge Five'.146 Such an 
interpretation certainly makes for entertaining reading. However, Roger Hollis was 
definitely not a Soviet agent: there is no evidence ill KGB archives to support this 
conspiracy-theory. 147 Instead, using MIS records, we can now see that Hollis persistendy 
took a hard-line approach against the Soviet Union throughout the war. After the 
German attack on the Soviet Union, Hollis circulated a memorandum to the Home 
Office, Scodand Yard and other Whitehall departments, warning of the continued threat 
posed by Soviet-communism. In Sir David Petrie's words, Hollis' brief was a warning, 
'lest we forget'. According to Hollis, despite Britain's alliance with the Soviet Union, the 
144 NA KV2/1540, Minute 83a: D.G. White, (16 Aug., 1948). 
145 Among others, see: Genrikh Borovik, The Philf?y Files: the Secret Ufe of the KGB Masterspy-KGB 
Archives Revealed, (London, 1994); Yuri Maclin, My Five Cambridge Friends, (London, 1994); West 
and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies, (London, 1980). 
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long-term goals of Moscow were unchanged. The Soviet Union still aimed for 
worldwide Revolution-the leopard had not changed its spotS. 148 
Hollis' hard-line approach against communism during the war significandy led 
him into confrontations within MIS. Throughout the war, Hollis argued that it was 
necessary to card-index as many members of dle CPGB as possible. Experience showed 
MIS that Moscow often chose lowly members of the Party with 'clear records' for 
espionage. 149 By 1944, Hollis' attempts to card as many Party members as possible were 
leading to cries of exasperation from the Registry staff, who called his demands 
'excessive'. 150 In the end, Sir David Petrie had to intercede between Hollis and the 
Registry staff. After a 'long and frank discussion' with Hollis and Horrocks, the head of 
the Registry, Petrie summarised the overall problem: unfortunately it was the case that 
every member of the CPGB had the potential to be a highly important Soviet agent, but 
MIS lacked the manpower to card them all. Petrie, therefore, advised separating the 
'wheat from the chaff, and suggested using methods similar those which he had used in 
India, 'in the matter of revolutionary terrorists, and Communists'. To avoid the Registry 
becoming 'cluttered up with an infinity of cards of people of minor importance', Petrie 
advised using the Police to filter out less important cases. 151 Petrie's advice to use 
methods 'from India' nicely illustrates the imperial connection which existed in the 
British intelligence community in the first half of the twentieth century. The point, 
however, is that Hollis' hard-line approach against communism-an 'excessive' 
148 NA KV4/266, s.7a: Sir David Petrie to Sir Alexander Maxwell, Home Office, (6 July, 1942), 
forwarding memorandum by Roger Hollis, 'The revolutionary programme of the communists'; 
Sheila Kerr, 'Roger Hollis and the dangers of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942', Intelligence and 
NationalSecuriry, 5, no. 3, (1990), pp. 148-57. 
149 NA KV 4/267, Minute 145a: Roger Hollis, (24 Dec., 1942). 
150 Ibid., Minute 172a: Reginald Horrocks, (17 Dec., 1944); Ibid., Minute 174a: Roger Hollis, (3 
Jan., 1945). For a parallel argument on carding, see: KV 4/168 'Policy and procedure regarding 
investigation of subversive activities in H.M. Forces by Security Service', s.12a: Roger Fulford to 
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approach, in the words of the Registry-was clearly not the workings of a Soviet agent. 
Presumably there were easier ways to subvert MIS's Soviet counter-espionage 
investigations than taking a firm stance against Moscow. Hollis was one of the few 
people in the British intelligence community who not only identified the Soviet Union as 
the 'next' enemy, but actually undertook measures to detect Soviet espionage during the 
152 war. 
MIS was not the only branch of the British intelligence community which after 
22 June 1941 took a firm stance against the Soviet Union. As Professor Richard Aldrich 
and Dr. Julian Lewis have shown, other Whitehall intelligence departments remained 
equally suspicious of the 'old enemy', Russia. The War Office intelligence division 
responsible for the Soviet Union, MI3c, was notoriously 'anti-Russian' throughout the 
war.153 From early on in the war, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan 
Brooke, identified the Soviet Union as the 'next' enemy. Brooke's distrust of Russia 
caused him grave doubts over London's wartime alliance with Moscow. During the war 
Brooke even undertook measures to prepare for post-war hostilities with the Soviet 
Union. On Brooke's recommendation, the Chiefs of Staff established a special 
department in August 1943, the Post Hostilities Planning Staff (PHP), to deal with what 
they considered to be the inevitable confrontation with Moscow. By July 1944 the PHP 
was even discussing the possibility of rearming Germany to fight the Soviet Union. 154 
Together with the War Office and the Chiefs of Staff, SIS also took a hard-line approach 
against the wartime Soviet threat. As with all SIS operations, unfortunately almost no 
records are currently available concerning their wartime operations. However, MIS 
records state that some of SIS's 'most secret activities' were wartime operations 
152 Conspiracy theorists, however, would presumably point out that Philby had demanded a large 
Section IX in SIS (see below). 
153 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 39. 
154 Julian Lewis, Changing Direction. British Military Planningjor Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-1947, 
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conducted against the Soviet Union. 155 In May 1943 SIS established their own Soviet 
counter-intelligence department, Section IX.156 But as we shall see in the next chapter, 
Section IX was compromised when Kim Philby became its head in late 1944.157 
III. British intelligence and wartime Soviet SIGINT 
According to the official history of British intelligence during the Second World 
War, all British SIGINT efforts against the Soviet Union ceased on 22 June 1941.158 
Certainly this claim was the case on a theoretical level, but it seems to have been 
somewhat an exaggeration of what took place in practice. Although the Foreign Office 
imposed a ban on Soviet SIGINT in June 1941, some British code-breakers continued to 
work on Soviet traffic thereafter. In fact the official history, whose author F.H. Hinsley 
was himself a wartime SIGINT analyst, hints at continued British efforts. The history 
admits that from October 1942, in order to assist with the war-effort on the Eastern 
Front, GC&CS was again reading the Russian meteorological cipher. 159 But at this point, 
London was relatively well informed about Soviet troop-deployment on the Eastern 
Front-without Moscow volunteering that information. This suggests, as Martin 
Kitchen has noted, that GC&CS was listening to rather more than the Soviet weather 
reports. 160 Crucially, the Foreign Office ban on Soviet SIGINT did not extend to 
COMINTERN radio messages sent between Moscow and Eastern Europe. These 
messages, codenamed MASK and known as the ISCOTT traffic, were decrypted at 
ISS NA KV4/224 'Relations between erCI and the Soviet security authorities, 1944--1945', 
Minute 3a: D.G. White, (2 June, 1944). 
156 Curry, The Security Service, p. 358. 
157 Robert Cecil, 'The Cambridge Comintern', in Andrew and Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension. 
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GC&CS throughout the war, as they had been before the war.161 The Foreign Office ban 
on Soviet SIGINT, furthermore, left another valuable loop-hole open for British 
codebreakers: GC&CS was legitimately allowed to use German ENIGMA traffic to 
'scoop' intelligence on the Soviet Union. From 1943, at least, British codebreakers were 
compiling German communications on the Soviet Union and forwarding these 
intercepts, among others, to Roger Hollis and Guy Liddell in MIS.162 Indeed, the day 
after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Guy Liddell, describing the 
problems of the Foreign Office ban on SIGINT, noted that Finnish codebreakers were 
reading Soviet ciphers and passing this information over to their German allies, which in 
turn was intercepted by Bletchley Park. 163 Clearly there were subtle ways around the 
Foreign Office ban on Soviet SIGINT. Allies, it seems, will always find ways to spy on 
allies. 
During the Second World War, British intelligence used the German war-effort 
to gather information on the Soviet Union. As we shall see in following chapters, this 
strategy expanded in scope dramatically after the war. Although British codebreakers 
successfully 'scooped' German SIGINT on the Soviet Union, GC&CS nevertheless did 
not experience any significant wartime success against Soviet codes themselves: the use 
of one-time-pads made Soviet ciphers theoretically impossible to break. The greatest 
weapon that Britain held against the Axis Powers, Bletchley Park and ULTRA, had no 
Soviet equivalent during the war. It was not until after the war when, through the 
careless use of one-time-pads by Soviet cryptanalysts, American codebreakers 
successfully broke a series of high-grade Soviet diplomatic communications. As we shall 
161 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 38; West, MASK: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great 
Britain. 
162 NA HW 171-73 'Decrypts of communist international (COMINTERN) messages, 1934-
1945'; HW 17/53-66 'Iscott'. 
163 NA KV4/188 'Liddell diaries', (23 June, 1941). For parallel OSS operations conducted against 
Soviet intelligence through Finnish intelligence, see: Matthew M. Aid, "Stella Polaris': secret code 
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see in subsequent chapters, these decrypts, codenamed VENONA, ultimately led to the 
identification of Klaus Fuchs in 1949 (agent CHARLES) and Donald Maclean in 1951 
(agent HOMER). The post-war revelations provided by VENONA testify to the use 
that London and Washington could have made of wartime Soviet SIGINT. 164 
Lacking significant success against Soviet codes themselves, London also faced 
another practical problem when it came to wartime SIGINT: cooperation with the Soviet 
Union. Soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Britain had to decide 
whether ULTRA should be passed over to Moscow and, if so, how. In June 1941 
London judged that Soviet security standards were insufficient to guard the ULTRA 
secret. Within days of the German invasion, a team of British representatives was 
therefore despatched to Moscow to improve security standards. The '30 Military 
Mission' was led by General Noel Mason-MacFarlane, 'Mason-Mac', who previously had 
been in charge of intelligence for the British Expeditionary Force.165 The 30 Military 
Mission rapidly improved Soviet security standards and by 1941, officially began passing 
limited ULTRA over to Moscow, most of which concerned the German Order of Batde. 
Britain thus began to share secrets with Stalin. 166 Whitehall's stipulation, however, was 
that ULTRA should be handed over to Moscow in disguised form. Describing ULTRA 
as 'information from a most secret source' was standard procedure for GC&CS, but in 
the case of the Soviet Union, disguising ULTRA was probably also a reflection of 
London's distrust of its wartime ally.167 Unknown to British intelligence at the time, their 
attempts to disguise ULTRA were compromised by the 'Cambridge Five', who between 
164 Christopher Andrew, 'The Venona secret', in K.G. Robertson (ed.), rP'at; Resistance and 
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them provided Moscow with a full-description of Britain's most closely-guarded wartime 
secret. John Cairncross spent a year as a Soviet agent at Bletchley Park 168 During the 
war, British and Soviet intelligence services were thus forced to cooperate with each 
other, but their cooperation does not appear to have extended beyond what was purely 
necessary. MIS records show that below the surface of collaboration, lay traditional 
enmities and a fundamental miStrust. 169 London and Moscow's wartime intelligence 
cooperation was driven by pragmatic realism, but besmirched by mutual dist.1Ust. 
IV. Horizon Scanning 
At the end of the war, it was not the domestic realm in Britain that most clearly 
revealed to Britain's intelligence services the nature of the Soviet threat. Rather, it was an 
external theatre: occupied Iraq and Persia. From 1940 onwards, Iraq and Persia were 
occupied by both British and Soviet forces, leading to close, and in fact unique, wartime 
cooperation.170 The Tehran Conference of the 'Big Three' in November 1943 
symbolised the overall political cooperation which, at least outwardly, existed between 
the Allies. But hitherto unacknowledged in the historical literature, the occupation of 
Iraq and Persia also led to close cooperation between British and Soviet intelligence. 
From late 1944, British and Soviet authorities in Iraq and Persia even ran a Double Cross 
agent together, agent KISS. A Persian national recruited by the Abwehr in pre-war 
Hamburg, KISS was run from the inter-Service British intelligence outfit based in 
168 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in the West, pp. 127, 156. 
169 NA KV4/244 'Policy regarding employment of communists by SIS and SOE for use as 
agents, 1941', s.14a: Roger Hollis, (18 Feb., 1943). 
170 See: Adam Shelley, 'British intelligence and the Middle East, 1939-1946', (M.Phil. dissertation, 
Cambridge University, 2006), which will be forthcoming as a Ph.D. dissertation. 
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Baghdad, Combined Intelligence Service Iraq (CICI) .17I KISS was one of only two 
Double Cross agents run by British and Soviet intelligence together during the entire 
war.172 KISS was successfully run from December 1944 to March 1945, when the case 
abrupdy, but significandy, collapsed.173 At this stage Moscow and London had become 
so suspicious of each other that further collaboration in the case was made impossible.174 
In fact MIS records reveal that British intelligence officials in Iraq remained distrustful of 
their Soviet partners throughout the period of their 'cooperation'. Far from using the 
KISS case to collaborate with Soviet intelligence, British intelligence officers were 
actually using the case to spy their Soviet counterparts. MIS representatives in Baghdad 
and Tehran used the KISS case to gather as much information as they could about Soviet 
intelligence, forwarding such reports on to F-Division in London. 175 Doubdess Moscow 
was using the KJSS case for the same purpose-in many ways symbolising the overall 
wartime intelligence relationship between London and Moscow. 
Occupied Iraq and Persia brought British intelligence closer to Soviet intelligence 
than in any other wartime theatre. In doing so, Iraq and Persia revealed to London the 
true nature of the Soviet threat. As the war was ending, the head of CICI, H.K. 
Dawson-Shepherd, scanned the horizon and warned that Moscow's ambitions in the 
171 NA CAB 81/88 JIC 41 (257), 'Formation of a Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq [CIC!]', (16 
Sept. , 1941); KV 4/223 'Intelligence organisation in Persia and Iraq', s.la: 'Charter for the 
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Middle East, and in Iraq particularly, were nothing short of imperialistic. As Moscow 
was .seeking to do in other theatres, it was attempting to exploit the fragile political 
situation in Iraq to further its own ends. As Dawson-Shepherd explained, the perilous 
security situation in Iraq made for easy exploitation: 
There are few countries that at the best of times present 
more security problems than Iraq. It has tribal and 
minority problems; the problem of the Kurds, the 
Armenians, and the Assyrians. It has its religious problem 
arising from the schism between Shia'as and Sunnis. 176 
Dawson-Shepherd warned that if Britain withdrew from Iraq, the Soviet Union 
would soon move into the vacuum. Despite the unenviable security problems 
surrounding an occupation of Iraq, he warned that it was imperative for British imperial 
security to maintain a presence there for as long as possible-either officially or 
unofficially. By the end of the war, left-wing organisations in Iraq were already known to 
be sponsored by Moscow. Post-war enquiries by SIS, MIS and RAF intelligence revealed 
that such organisations included a 'bombastically nationalist Ba'ath al Qawmi' Party, and 
another group called the 'National Liberation Party', which published a pamphlet called 
EI Qa'idah ('the Base').177 But even if Britain formally withdrew from Iraq, there were 
several ways for London to maintain unofficial influence there, as Dawson-Shepherd 
suggested. Iraqi police forces could be trained in Britain, British security advisers could 
be contracted to Baghdad, and the British Council could be used to maintain cultural 
links between Britain and Iraq. 178 As we shall see, many of the same issues that British 
intelligence faced in wartime Iraq reappeared when Britain was faced with the question of 
decolonisation in Africa in the late 1940s. More immediately than this, the experiences 
176 NA KV 4/223, s.68a: H.K. Dawson-Shepherd, erCI Baghdad, (14 July, 1945). 
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of British intelligence ill Iraq were of considerable interest to British authorities in 
occupied Germany, who, as the war ended, were faced with protracted collaboration with 
Moscow.179 
By the end of the war, MIS was acutely aware of their failure to monitor the 
wartime Soviet threat, both in Britain and abroad. In response to an F-Division 
memorandum warning of the continued Soviet danger, in December 1944 Petrie noted: 
'I have long been a complete convert to the view that the role of F. Division will 
appreciate in importance after the war,.180 In fact, as the war was ending, F-Division was 
so concerned about the Soviet threat that in July 1945 they conducted another overall 
threat-analysis of communists employed in government departments on secret work. 
The results of F-Division's investigation-conducted by John Marriott, a leading figure 
in the Double Cross System-were similarly disturbing to their investigation in 1943. 
The most alarming example of communist penetration discovered by F-Division was the 
Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, which had eighty-four known Party 
members on its staff with access to secret information. 181 Following F-Division's 
discoveries, in August 1945 Petrie compiled a long memorandum on 'the shape of things 
to come'. Looking out at war-torn Europe, Petrie predicted that international 
communism and the Soviet Union were set to become the 'next' enemy: 
. .. I am not thinking in terms of those who believe in the 
doctrines of Marx and Engels. I would almost be more 
afraid of those who are largely ignorant or totally ignorant 
of them, whose Communism is a blind belief that the 
present system is so bad that the only way to begin to put it 
right is to smash it all to pieces, as was done in Russia. I am 
convinced beyond all doubt as to the reality of the risk or 
179 NA KV4/223, s.2a: Extract from letter from E.K. Wood, crcr Baghdad, to Alex Kellar, MI5 
London, (17 June, 1944); KV4/225, s.34a: Alan Roger, DSO Tehran, 'Cooperation with Russian 
security', (30 Aug., 1945). 
180 NA KV4/267, s.173a: Extract of minute from Sir David Petrie to Roger Hollis, (19 Dec., 
1944). 
181 NA KV4/251, Minute 45a:John Marriott, (12July, 1945). 
even danger. Apart from speculation, opinion or belief, we 
now have had practical illustration of what Communism 
has done in several Eastern European countries where it 
has been able to get .its head. In the recent words of the 
Foreign Secretary, the result is simply to replace one form 
of totalitarianism by another, and all totalitarianism is based 
on violence.182 
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. Petrie's predictions were pessimistic, but accurate. In the middle of August 1945 
Petrie met with the Chief of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies, to discuss the overall problem of 
communists employed on secret work. 183 For advice on the looming Soviet threat, Petrie 
increasingly turned to F-Division-and to Roger Hollis in particular. On the morning of 
5 September 1945, Petrie held a meeting with Hollis in which they discussed, at length, 
the 'leakage of information through members of the Communist Party'. 184 Their meeting 
was more significant than either Petrie or Hollis could possibly have realised. Later that 
same day a cipher clerk in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko, defected to the 
west and brought with him dramatic evidence of wartime Soviet espionage. Gouzenko's 
evidence was both alarming and far-reaching. It confirmed MIS's worst wartime fears 
and predictions. The Cold War had begun. 
182 NA KV4/267, Minute 189a: Sir David Petrie, (29 Aug., 1945). 
183 NA KV4/251 s.54a: Sir David Petrie to Sir Stewart Menzies, (17 Aug., 1945). 
184 Ibid., Minute 52a: Roger Hollis, (5 Sept., 1945). 
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At the end of the Second World War, the British intelligence community was 
understandably still concerned with the predominant threat of the Axis Powers. As the 
Third Reich collapsed, Britain's secret ag~ncies devoted their resources to tracking down, 
capturing and interrogating the Nazi leadership. GC&CS provided Allied forces 
advancing towards Berlin with SIGINT on the location of Hitler's right-hand men.! The 
capture of the Nazi leadership-often culminating in dramatic arrests-first and 
foremost served a pragmatic military purpose for the Allies: to dismantle the Nazi war 
machine. In the summer of 1945 the presumption in London and Washington was that 
Germany would organise post-war resistance networks to wage guerrilla campaigns 
against the Allies. One of the Allies' greatest fears was that the German nuclear project 
was secretly well advanced. In the event, the Allies' fears were proved incorrect. The 
resistance networks organised by the SS, the WEREWOLVES, were far less effectual 
than expected.2 MIS's observation of captured German scientists likewise confirmed that 
German nuclear research was less advanced than feared. 3 In short, the fascist threat in 
Europe died out much more quickly than Allied intelligence agencies predicted.4 
British intelligence played an important role in dismantling the Nazi war 
juggernaut. As well as providing operational intelligence, Britain's intelligence services 
also helped to bring Nazi criminals to justice. Himmler infamously avoided trial for war 
crimes at Nuremberg by committing suicide, with a cyanide capsule hidden in a false 
tooth, while in British custody-before he had been properly interrogated.s The SIS 
! NA HW 5/767 'Movements of German leadership', (30 April, 1945) 
2 NA CAB 81/125 JIC (44) 388 (Final), 'Estimate of conditions in Germany following collapse', 
(6 Sept., 1944); CAB 81/128]IC (45) 97 (0) (Final), 'Prolongation of Nazi resistance after loss of 
Berlin and northern Germany', (24 March, 1945). . 
3 Operation Epsilon: the Farm Hall Transcripts, with an introduction by Sir Charles Frank: (Bristol 
and Philadelphia, 1993) 
4 NA CAB 81/131 JIC (45) 283 'Suppression of National-Socialist-paramilitary organisations', 
(24 Sept., 1945). 
S [Robert Stephens], Camp 020: MI5 and the Naif Spies, with an introduction by Oliver Hoare: 
(London, 2000), pp. 72, 114. 
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report into the overall fate of the Nazi leadership, written by Hugh Trevor-Roper, and 
which subsequently became the standard history of Hitler's last days, described the 
difficulties of hunting-down Nazi leaders in war-ravaged Europe.6 As so often appears 
to be the case when authoritarian regimes collapse, former members of the regime 
displayed an uncanny ability to disappear and elude justice. Hitler's 'espionage chief, 
Bernhard Schellenberg, was only captured in June 1945 after a prolonged pursuit through 
north-west Europe.7 Schellenberg's subsequent interrogation provided the Allies with 
useful intelligence on Abwehr networks abroad, the detection of which was important in 
order to bring Nazi accomplices to justice. Like Himmler himself, several Nazi leaders 
were captured accidentally. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who succeeded Heydrich as the head 
of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), and who played a leading role in the 'Final 
Solution', was arrested in May 1945 in the Austrian mountains, where he was discovered 
disguised as a huntsman.8 Though unacknowledged in the secondary literature, 
Kaltenbrunner was secretly brought to MIS's wartime interrogation centre in Britain, 
Camp 020.9 During the war Axis agents had been brought from different parts of the 
British empire to Camp 020 for interrogation-in effect, a form of 'rendition'. Between 
1942 and 1943, several Axis agents identified through ENIGMA traffic were arrested by 
British colonial authorities, and transferred to Camp 020 for interrogation. B-Division 
and MIS's legal advisers went to extraordinary lengths to overcome the legal problems of 
arresting and transferring foreign nationals to Britain. 10 The culmination of this process 
6 NA CAB 81/130 JIC (45) 216 'Political intelligence report, SHAEF' [Supreme Headquarters of 
the Allied Expeditionary Force], (7 July, 1945); Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Last Dcrys of Hitler, 
(London, 1956). 
7 NA KV2/295 'Bernard Schellenberg', s.68a: SHAEF to War Room, London, (2 Aug., 1945). 
8 NA KV2/271 'Ernst Kaltenbrunner', s.65a: U.S. 12 Army Group to War Room, London, 
through OSS, (13 June, 1945). 
9 NA KV 2/272 'Ernst Kaltenbrunner', s.74a: Robert Stephens to Helenus Milmo, (18 June, 
1945); Richard Overy, Interrogations. The Naif Elite in Allied Hands, 1945, (London, 2001). 
10 [Stephens], Camp 020: MI5 and the Naif Spies, pp. 48, 203-206; NA KV2/1722 'Osmar 
Helmuth'; KV2/1211 'Joaquin Baticon'; KV2/2112 'Oscar Liehr'; KV2/1460 'Jaun Cavatorta 
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was the arrest and transfer of Nazi leaders like Kaltenbrunner to Camp 020 at the end of 
the war. . Although in August 1945 Kaltenbrunner left the camp 'unbroken', as his 
interrogators complained, his Camp 020 interrogation played a role in his subsequent trial 
and execution at Nuremberg. ll 
As the British intelligence community was working for the defeat of the Axis 
Powers, events in Canada alerted them to the 'next' enemy, the Soviet Union. On 5 
September 1945, Igor Gouzenko defected to the west and brought with him top-secret 
documents revealing that during the war a labyrinthine Soviet espionage network had 
been operating in Canada. Gouzenko revealed that during the war Soviet agents had 
successfully penetrated a range of Canadian government departments-some of which 
had access to the most closely guarded wartime information. The most alarming 
evidence produced by Gouzenko involved atomic research. Gouzenko revealed that 
Soviet agents had obtained, 'documentary materials of the atomic bomb: the 
technological process, drawings, calculations'.12 Nearly a month to the day after the 
world's first atomic bomb had been dropped, western intelligence agencies were thus 
faced with evidence that atomic secrets had been passed to Moscow. The Kremlin had 
obtained the plans of the most destructive weapon invented in the history of mankind. 13 
The most enduring icon of the Gouzenko case is the Monty Pythonesque image 
of Igor Gouzenko giving evidence to the Canadian Royal Commission in 1946 with a 
paper bag over his head. That image also aptly symbolises the clumsiness and lack of 
Sinckeu'; KV2/1456 'Juan Gomez Lecube'; KV2/2109 'Ackes Blay-Pigrau'; KV2/1716 'Joaquim 
Ruiz'; Calder Walton and Sarah Miller, 'The role of legal advisers in the Security Service (MI5) ', 
paper delivered at Cambridge University Intelligence Seminar, (19 May, 2006), which will be 
forthcoming as a journal publication. 
11 NA 1<012/272, s.124a: Helenus Milmo, 'Note on meeting with war crimes commission', (11 
Aug., 1945). 
12 NA 1<012/1427, 'Igor Gouzenko', s.105a: Miscellaneous notes taken from Grant's safe, 
telegram from Moscow to Ottawa, (22 Aug., 1945) 
13 Anckew and Walton, 'The Gouzenko case and British secret intelligence', in Black and Rudner 
(eds.), The Gouzenko Affair. Canada and the Beginnings if Cold War Counter-Espionage. 
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preparation in London and Ottawa at the end of the war when confronted with evidence 
of Soviet espionage in the west. The spectacle of Igor Gouzenko peering out at the free 
world from behind the safety of a paper bag would be a moment of derision, were it not 
for the nature of his evidence. Despite the best efforts of F-Division and other 
foresighted departments, British intelligence as a whole emerged from the war totally 
unprepared to meet the Soviet threat. The one hundred and nine top-secret documents 
which Gouzenko smuggled from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa sent shockwaves through 
western capitals. From the outset, those working on the Gouzenko case realised that the 
cipher clerk's evidence represented more than just a local security issue, simply confined 
to Canada: 
... normal security precautions and practices cannot be 
applied in this case without regard to high political and 
diplomatic issues which are involved. Indeed political and 
diplomatic considerations must be paramount. Police 
policy must therefore conform to policy setded at the top 
level by political heads of the three Governments. 14 
Gouzenko's evidence had a profound impact on international relations. 
Described as the 'man who started the Cold War', the Gouzenko case was the first step 
in what became the massive realignment of western intelligence priorities away from the 
Axis Powers, towards the Soviet Union. Gouzenko's evidence was a key episode in the 
transition from World War to Cold War. 15 On one level, Gouzenko's revelations had a 
straightforward impact on the relationship between western powers and the Soviet 
Union. But as we shall see, Gouzenko's evidence also affected the relationship between 
14 NA KV2/1424 'Igor Gouzenko', s.34a: CXG telegram 388, Malcohn Macdonald to Alexander 
Cadogan, (27 Sept., 1945). 
15 Amy Knight, HOIIJ the Cold War Began: the Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies, (New 
York, 2006); J. L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars. Espionage in Canada from Gouzenko to 
Glasnost, (Toronto, 1990), pp. 47-75. 
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western powers themselves. Soviet espionage threatened to create an intelligence schism 
between Washington and London. 
I. British intelligence and the defection of Igor Gouzenko 
Gouzenko's journey from obscure Soviet cipher clerk to celebrated Cold War 
icon was not straightforward. In fact, with hindsight, his defection was almost a comedy 
of errors. Walking out of the embassy in Ottawa on 5 September with over one hundred 
documents stuffed under his shirt, Gouzenko had to hold in his stomach, for otherwise, 
as his wife later recalled, 'he would have looked pregnant'.16 But defecting proved to be 
more difficult than Gouzenko had predicted. Having been turned away from the Ottawa 
Journal, which thought he was drunk, and then given a cold shoulder at the Canadian 
Ministry of Justice, Gouzenko and his wife finally took refuge in a friend's house, and 
watched in dismay as a team of Soviet NKVD hatchet-men ransacked their neighbouring 
apartment. It was nearly midnight on 6 September-a nail-biting twenty-four hours after 
he first attempted to defect-when local Canadian police officers finally arrived and took 
Gouzenko and his wife into custody. 17 
Despite Gouzenko's abortive first attempts to defect, he was thereafter placed 
under the full protection of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). It did not take 
long for RCMP interrogators to establish that the cipher clerk's evidence was of epic 
proportions. 18 Gouzenko produced a series of top-secret telegrams sent between 
Moscow (codenamed the DIRECTOR) and the military attache to the Soviet embassy in 
Ottawa, Nicholai Zabotin (codenamed GRANT). Gouzenko, who took these telegrams 
16 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin A rchive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 180. 
17 Ibid. 
18 NA KV2/1419 'Igor Gouzenko', s.28y: [R.H. Hollis], 'The Canadian espionage case' [8 Oct., 
1946], p. 1. 
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from Zabotin's safe, revealed that Zabotin had organised an elaborate espionage network 
in Canada during the war. Under his control, Soviet agents had obtained a wide range of 
secret information-political, economic and scientific-passing between Ottawa, London 
and Washington. They had acquired the results of ground-breaking research in science 
and technology (S&1) , and infiltrated several government departments in Ottawa, 
including the Canadian Department of External Affairs, the Department of National 
Defence, the National Research Council, the Canadian Houses of Parliament, and the 
Office of the British High Commissioner.19 In short, Gouzenko's evidence revealed a 
Soviet espionage network of shocking proportions. 
Gouzenko insisted that the Canadian network was not unique. He warned that 
parallel Soviet networks were operating in other western countries, similarly well 
organised and likewise obtaining top-secret information. Gouzenko warned his 
interrogators that, 'the Soviet government operates local espionage groups in various 
countries under the legal protection of the diplomatic roof'.20 The initial alarm caused by 
Gouzenko's evidence in western capitals was magnified by his insistence that Moscow 
was actively preparing for war with the west: 'To meet this war the Soviet government is 
creating in democratic countries, including Canada, a Fifth-Column, in the organisation 
of which even diplomatic representatives take part'.21 Gouzenko insisted that World War 
Three was 'continually referred to in Embassy circles'. Moscow's demand for atomic and 
military intelligence was, Gouzenko claimed, proof of this obsession-although the 
cipher clerk was uncertain how far the war preparations derived from Soviet 
19 NA KV2/1420 'Igor Gouzenko', s.6a: CXG telegram 278, SIS station New York to CSS 
London, (12 Sept., 1945). 
20 NA KV2/1428 'Igor Gouzenko', RCMP report, 'Soviet espionage in Canada', (10 Sept., 1945), 
p.l0. 
21 NA KV2/1419, s.13a: 'Igor Gouzenko', p. 3; Robert Bothwell andJ.L. Granatstein (eds.), The 
GOllzenko Transcripts. The Evidence Presented to the Kellock-Taschereall Royal Commission of 1946, 
(Ottawa, 1982), pp. 125-26. 
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aggressiveness, or from fear of western aggression.22 Faced with these revelations, the 
Canadian Prime Minister, William Mackenzie King, himself travelled to Washington to 
brief President Truman on the case (30 September), and then on to Britain to meet with 
the new Prime Minister, Clement Atdee.23 
Gouzenko was a first-class prize for the Allied governments. Not only did he 
identify approximately twenty individuals direcdy involved with the Canadian network, 
but as a cipher clerk he almost certainly provided Allied codebreakers with useful 
information on Soviet codes. Although litde evidence is presendy available, it seems that 
a representative from GC&CS travelled to Ottawa to interview Gouzenko after his 
defection.24 Gouzenko's value for western intelligence agencies-termed the 'CORBY 
case' because the Canadian minister for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, first hid 
Gouzenko's documents not in his safe, but in a case of Corby's Whisky- was that he 
came straight from the lion's mouth. As a 'true believer' from an early age, he had joined 
the Soviet youth movement (Komsommol) in Moscow, and then graduated into Soviet 
GRU military intelligence. In 1943 he was posted to the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, 
where he served direcdy under Zabotin. But over the next two years Gouzenko 
gradually became disillusioned with the Soviet regime. The myth-image of the world's 
first worker-peasant state was shattered for Gouzenko when he was confronted with 
reality of life in the west.25 The specific catalyst for his defection, however, was a security 
lapse at the embassy in which he was implicated. When several classified papers were 
discovered in the embassy unattended, Gouzenko feared that he would be recalled to 
22 NA KV2/1421 'Igor Gouzenko', s.28a: SIS station New York to CSS London, copied to MIS, 
(24 Sept., 1945). 
23 Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars. Espionage in Canada, pp. 60, 66; Gordon Brook-Shepherd, 
The Storm Birds. Soviet Post-War Defectors, (London, 1988), pp. 3-4. 
24 Author's interview with Dan Mulvenna, RCMP, (12 April, 2005). 
25 Igor Gouzenko, This Ivas My Choice, (London, 1948), passim. 
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Moscow in disgrace, where he feared that he would be 'liquidated,.26 Preferring life in the 
west, and at great personal risk, Gouzenko decided to defect. Perhaps un surprisingly, 
following his defection, Gouzenko became public enemy number one for Moscow. The 
paper bag that he wore at the Canadian Royal Commission in 1946, though farcical, was 
actually for his safety. Gouzenko and his family were resettled by the RCMP and given 
new identities, but for the rest of Gouzenko's life the KGB tried intermittently, but 
unsuccessfully, to track him down. As late as 1975 a KGB officer stationed in Ottawa 
sought to cultivate a Progressive Conservative MP in the hope of establishing 
Gouzenko's identity and location. When this attempt failed, the KGB went so far as to 
search for 'compromising materials' on the Conservative MP and prepared 'active 
measures' to discredit him.27 
As soon as the Gouzenko case broke, the RCMP sought advice from London on 
how best to proceed. MIS had enjoyed a close working relationship with the RCMP 
throughout the war. The MIS liaison officer stationed in Montreal during the war, Cyril 
Mills-son of the famous circus owner Bertram Mills, and one of the first handlers of 
MIS's most valuable Double Cross agent, GARBO-had even shared the ULTRA secret 
with his RCMP colleagues.28 The fact that Gouzenko defected in a commonwealth 
capital rather than on foreign territory meant that MIS, rather than SIS, had the lead role 
in responding to it. Contrary to what is sometimes popularly understood, MIS was not 
simply a 'domestic' security intelligence service, merely operating within mainland Britain. 
Rather MIS was imperial in nature, functioning across the British empire. Since the First 
World War, MIS had prided themselves on their imperial responsibilities of defending 
26 NA KV2/1419 'Igor Gouzenko', s.13a: 'Igor Gouzenko', (n.d.), p. 1. 
27 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin A rchive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 181. 
28 NA KV4/206 'Visit of Mr. Denham to USA to investigate need for permanent Security Service 
representative in western hemisphere, having direct liaison with the FBI', s.Sb: Cyril Mills, MIS 
liaison officer in Canada, to Guy Liddell, London, (18 Feb., 1943), p. 3. 
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the entire British realm against espionage, subversion and sabotage. As the Deputy 
Director-General of MIS, Sir Eric Holt-Wilson, declared in 1934: 
Our Security Service is more than national; it is Imperial. 
We have official agencies cooperating with us, under the 
direct instructions of the Dominions and Colonial Offices 
and the supervision of local Governors, and their chiefs of 
police, for enforcing security laws in every British 
Community overseas. 
These all act under our guidance for security duties. It is 
our duty to advise them, when necessary, on all security 
measures necessary for defence and civil purposes; and to 
exchange information regarding the movement within the 
Empire of individuals who are lili:ely to be hostile to its 
interests from a security point of view.29 
Although there had been an attempt during the Second World War to redefine 
the intelligence parameters of MIS and SIS in North America, with the possibility of MIS 
establishing a permanent presence in the United States, in the end nothing had come of 
these proposals.30 Britain's intelligence concerns in the United States remained the 
responsibility of SIS, while those in Canada fell under MIS's jurisdiction. In practical 
terms, MIS and SIS had developed a close working relationship during the war, 
symbolised by the establishment of SIS's 'circulating' counter-espionage department, 
Section V, which shared intelligence with MIS's B-Division.31 During the war MIS and 
SIS were summarised as, 'two arms separated for geographical reasons but working 
together in the closest liaison at home, .32 Thus, as far as London was concerned, the 
Gouzenko defection was unequivocally MIS's responsibility. Like all their investigations, 
MIS's role in the Gouzenko case was secret and unpublicised. But on 17 September 
29 Andrew, Secret Service, p. 363. 
30 NA KV4/206 'Visit of Mr. G.c. Denham to USA to investigate need for permanent Security 
Service representative in western hemisphere, having direct liaison with the FBI', Qune 1943). 
31 NA KV4/20S 'MI6 organisation and functions and arrangements for liaison with the Security 
Service-general', s.4a: 'Director-General's circular', (27 June, 1940); KV4/120 'Proposals for the 
union of Section V, SIS, and B-Division Security Service (1942)'. 
32 NA KV 4/206, s.70c: G.c. Denham to Sir David Petrie, (8 July, 1943), p. 3. 
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Roger Hollis 'travelled to liase with the RCMP in Ottawa, where he was treated 'as one of 
their own investigating team'.33 Although Hollis' presence was shrouded in secrecy, he 
was present during the questioning of ~itnesses and was allowed to examine all the 
evidence gathered by the RCMP.34 Hollis even made contact with William Mackenzie 
King. In fact, when King arrived in England for discussions with Attlee on 7 October, 
he was met personally by Hollis on board the Queen Mary. 35 
Although London's investigation into the Gouzenko case was led by MIS, the 
rest of the British intelligence community equally played their part. Four d~ys after 
Gouzenko's defection, an experienced SIS officer, Peter Dwyer, travelled from New 
York to Ottawa. At the time, Dwyer was working from the offices of British Security 
Co-ordination (BSC), the inter-Service British intelligence liaison outfit established in 
New York and Washington during the war. Dwyer played a leading role in the 
Gouzenko investigation, both in Ottawa and Washington.36 Indeed, all of Gouzenko's 
evidence was relayed to London through cryptographically secure SIS channels in New 
York (in the form ofCX telegrams), because Gouzenko's evidence showed that the usual 
route of sending messages through the British High Commissioner's Office in Ottawa 
was compromised. It was not just MIS and SIS, however, which played a role in the 
Gouzenko investigation. GC&CS also assisted with the case. Decrypts of French 
diplomatic telegrams revealed that the post-war French provisional government in Paris 
was taking a close interest in the case, which was significant because, for the first time in 
French history, the provisional government contained communist ministers. Doubtless 
33 NA PREM 8/1280 'Fuchs case': Sir Percy Sillitoe to S.P. Osmond, Prime Minister's Office, (5 
May, 1950). 
34 Ibid., [Canadian] Memorandum, secret [unsigned], (25 March, 1950). 
35 H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies, p. 49; author's interview with Dr. Adrian Hollis, 
Oxford, (22 March, 2005). 
36 Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars. Espionage in Canada, p. 58; William Stephenson, British 
S eCl/rit! Coordination. The Secret History oj British Intelligence in the Americas 1940-1945, (London, 
1998). 
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fearing that ' communist ministers ill Paris would pass classified information on to 
Moscow, MIS insisted that no intelligence on the case should be given to the French.37 
Gouzenko's evidence revealed a Soviet espionage network that, both in its nature 
and scope, was easily recognisable to MIS. During the war Zabotin had used two leading 
members of the Canadian Communist Party, Sam Carr (a communist MP) and Fred Rose 
(the National Organiser of the Canadian Party), as 'talent spotters' for recruits. In 
Gouzenko's evidence, 'no one else was more repeatedly or prominently mentioned, 
either under their names or cover-names, than Fred Rose and Sam Carr'.38 Zabotin's 
network, however, was not run through the Party. As soon agents were recruited, nearly 
all of them dropped contact with communist organisations. Zabotin, who likewise 
distanced himself from the Party, instead ran his network from the Soviet embassy, 
employing in total seventeen members of embassy's staff as 'cut-outs,.39 In reality, most 
of the embassy's staff were high-ranking officers in the Soviet military, with their titles 
bearing little resemblance to their true importance. Zabotin's chauffeur, for instance, 
was actually a Captain in the Red Army.40 The tactic of distancing agents from the 
Party-thus minimising traceable security checks-allowed Zabotin's agents to penetrate 
an astonishing range of departments. The Department of External Affairs was infiltrated 
by Emma Woikin (codenamed NORA), who handed over intelligence on British, 
American and Canadian foreign policies.41 Through his position as an MP, Fred Rose 
37 NA KV2/1422, s.161a: CXG telegram 593 CSS London to SIS station New York, (25 March, 
1946); Ibid., s.105a: c.P. Hope, MIS liaison officer Paris, to Edward Cussen [MIS legal adviser], 
(27 Feb., 1946); Ibid., s.l11a: Roger Hollis to Edward Cussen [MIS legal adviser], (6 March 1946). 
38 NA KV2/1429 'Igor Gouzenko': 'Report of the Canadian Royal Commission on Soviet 
espionage in Canada', (27 June, 1946), p. 111. 
39 NA KV2/1422 'Igor Gouzenko', 'Documents relating to the proceedings of the Royal 
Commission (1946) ', p. 2. 
40 NA KV2/1420, s.18a: 'The Corby case', (5 Oct., 1945), p. 5; KV2/1419, s.28y: 'The Canadian 
espionage case', p. 2. 
41 NA KV2/1422, 'Documents relating to the proceedings of the Royal Commission', p. 13. 
106 
(codenamed DE BOISE) passed over information on Canadian domestic politicS.42 
Through Kathleen Wilsher (codenamed ELLIE), who worked in the Registry of the 
British High Commission in Ottawa, Zabotin obtained information on British and 
Canadian economic policies.43 Zabotin's agents also gained access to a wide range of 
secret scientific and technological research. Durnford Smith (codenamed BADEAU), 
who worked at the top-secret National Research Council, obtained pioneering research 
on electrical-engineering, micro-wave transmitters and photo-flash bombs.44 Through 
Gordon Lunan (codenamed BACK), a Captain in the Canadian Army, and Israel 
Halperin (codenamed BACON), a mathematician in the Canadian Army research 
department, Zabotin obtained new research on artillery and ballistics.45 
Western intelligence agencies had several causes for concern when presented 
with these revelations. The first was the nature of Soviet agents themselves. Unlike 
wartime German recruits, Soviet agents were ideologically committed and, it seemed, 
were generally not motivated either by money or blackmail. When Zabotin's agents were 
approached, significandy not a single one had refused to undertake clandestine work.
46 
Zabotin's strategy for agent-recruitment was straightforward, as Gouzenko explained: 
playing on their ideological sympathies, Zabotin urged his agents that they were merely 
passing information over to a wartime ally. As we have seen, this was a defence that MIS 
frequendy encountered when dealing with wartime Soviet espionage. However, 
Gouzenko's evidence revealed a threat fundamentally different from anything that MIS 
had uncovered during the war. As F-Division noted, the conspiratorial techniques 
employed in Canada were actually identical to those first developed by the Bolsheviks in 
42 NA KV2/1015 'Fred Rosenberg'. 
43 NA KV2/1420, s.7a: CXG telegram 279, SIS station New York to CSS London, (12 Sept., 
1945); Ibid., s.18a: 'The Corby case', (5 Oct., 1945), p. 13. 
44 NA KV2/1422, 'Documents of the Royal Commission (1946)" p. 13. 
45 Ibid.; Bothwell and Granatstein (eds.), The Gouzenko Tranmipts, pp. 312-321. 
46 NA KV2/1422, 'Documents of the Royal Commission (1946)', p. 2. 
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Russia, before the Revolution. Soviet authorities were essentially applying to western 
democracies those techniques which they had used to overthrow the tsarist regime. 47 
Not only did western intelligence agencies now face a profoundly different, ideologically-
based enemy, but they also faced a pragmatic difficulty when dealing with the Canadian 
network. Gouzenko's evidence only pertained to Soviet GRU Military Intelligence, and 
not to NKVD networks, or those run by the Red Army or Red Navy-all of which 
Gouzenko insisted were still operating. Doubdess the other branches of Soviet 
intelligence would delight themselves in reporting to the Centre the incompetence of the 
GRU, which meant that the window for catching Zabotin's agents was small. The only 
cause for optimism in this otherwise bleak landscape was that Zabotin would probably 
try to minimise the damage done by Gouzenko's defection. In fact, Zabotin did a 
remarkably good job of covering-up the defection: he was only recalled to Moscow in 
December 1945. Zabotin's fate remains unclear. He either jumped overboard from the 
ship on his return journey, or died of 'heart failure' when he arrived in Moscow.48 
In September 1945 there was probably just one intelligence officer on either side 
of the Adantic with both the experience and the expertise required to interrogate Soviet 
defectors. This was Jane Archer (nee Kathleen Sissmore). Having begun her MIS career 
in 1916 as a Registry typist and clerk, Archer worked her way up through the ranks, and 
in 1928 became Controller of the Registry. In her spare time Archer trained as a 
barrister, gaining First Class examination results, and was called to the Bar in 1922.49 
Thereafter she became the exception to MIS's otherwise military and male culture, and 
became the Service's first female desk-officer, dealing with the CPGB and Soviet 
47 NA KV2/1419, s.28y: 'The Canadian espionage case', p. 2. 
48 Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars. Espionage in Canada, p. 61. 
49 'Bar Examination', The Times, London: (27 April, 1922). 
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espionage. 50 . As we have seen, Archer's interviews of Walter Krivitsky were models of 
their .kind-. -the first truly professional interrogations of a Soviet intelligence officer on 
either side of the Atlantic. As one of her colleagues later recalled, Archer was 
undoubtedly one of the most able wartime officers in MIS, 'tough-minded and rough-
tongued,.51 In fact, Archer's rough tongue eventually ended her MIS career. In late 1940 
she was sacked after denouncing the incompetence of the nearly-senile Deputy Director-
General, A.W.A. 'Jasper' Harker-himself replaced a few months later. Archer then 
moved on to SIS, where she became head of the Irish Section. In 1944, however, she 
was posted to the newly-established Section IX, dealing with communist and Soviet 
counter-intelligence. 
Unluckily for British intelligence, but luckily for Soviet espionage, Archer's boss 
in Section IX was none other than Kim Philby. By a process of skilfully outmanoeuvring 
his rivals within SIS, such as Felix Cowgill, in 1944 Philby managed to get himself 
appointed as the head of Section IX. With bitter irony and devastating consequences, 
the remit of the new section was, 'to study past records of Soviet and Communist 
activity', and to coordinate the 'collection and interpretation of information concerning 
Soviet and communist espionage and subversion in all parts of the world outside of 
British territory'. As one of Philby's SIS colleagues later acknowledged, his remarkable 
success in becoming the head of Section IX, 'ensured that the whole post-war effort to 
counter Communist espionage would become known in the Kremlin. The history of 
espionage records few, if any, comparable masterstrokes,.52 
50 Notably, however, another MIS female desk-officer, Milicent Bagot, also rose to prominence in 
the pre-wars years investigating Soviet espionage. See: 'Obituary: Milicent Bagot', The Times, 
London: (3 June, 2006). 
51 Philby, My Silent War, p. 105. 
52 Cecil, 'The Cambridge Comintem', in Andrew and Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension. 
Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, p. 179; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The 
Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 166. 
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One of Philby's first priorities in Section IX was to neutralise the potential threat 
posed by Jane Archer. As he noted in his memoirs, 'Jane would have made a very bad 
enemy'. Philby was acutely aware of his traceable communist affiliations, and was 
terrified of Archer's formidable investigative abilities. Philby therefore diverted her 
energtes in Section IX to analysing the large amount of intercepted radio traffic on 
communist activities in Eastern Europe (source MASK), thus ensuring that she had no 
involvement in the Gouzenko case, where her exceptional skills would have been far 
more productively used.53 We now know that when news of Gouzenko's defection 
reached London, Philby's initial response was one of personal alarm that the cipher clerk 
. might have some incriminating evidence against him. Soviet archives reveal that after 
Gouzenko's defection, Philby had an anxious meeting with his Soviet controller, Boris 
Krotenschield (codenamed KRECHIN), who reported to Moscow: 
STANLEY [philby) was a bit agitated ... I tried to calm him 
down. STANLEY said that in connection with this he may 
have information of extreme urgency to pass on to us. 
Therefore STANLEY asks for another meeting in a few 
days. I refused a meeting but I did allow him to pass on 
urgent and important information through HICKS 
[Burgess).54 
In September 1945 Philby not only had to deal with the Gouzenko defection and 
the continued threat of Jane Archer, but was also faced with the defection of a leading 
NKGB officer stationed in Turkey, Konstantin Dmitrievich Volkov. The day before 
Gouzenko first attempted to defect in Ottawa (4 September), Volkov walked into the 
British Consulate in Istanbul and, in return for political asylum for himself and his wife 
and a payment of £50,000, offered important information which he had obtained while 
working on the British desk in the Centre. Volkov's information included details of two 
53 Philby, My Silent War, pp. 105-6. 
54 Genrikh Borovik, The Philf?y Files, p. 239. 
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Soviet agents in the Foreign Office (doubtless Burgess and Maclean) and seven 'inside 
the British intelligence system', including one 'fulfilling the function of head of a section 
of British counter-espionage in London'. Almost certainly this was a reference to Philby 
himself.55 When the news of Volkov's threatened defection reached London on 19 
September, Philby immediately warned the Centre.56 The British investigation into the 
Volkov defection normally would have been handled by Security Intelligence Middle 
East (SIME), the MIS umbrella organisation operating throughout the Middle East. But 
at that precise moment the head of SIME, Douglas Roberts, happened to be in London, 
and luckily for Philby, Roberts was terrified of flying. Using this as a pretext for his own 
involvement in the case, Philby gained authorisation from the Chief of SIS, Sir Stewart 
Menzies, to fly to Turkey and deal personally with Volkov's defection. Due to travel 
delays, Philby did not arrive in Istanbul until 26 September, but in the meantime Moscow 
had despatched a team of NKGB hatchet-men to Istanbul. By the time Philby arrived, 
they had done their job: Volkov and his wife, both heavily sedated and on stretchers, 
were put onboard a Soviet aircraft bound for Moscow. Under brutal interrogation in 
Moscow before his execution, Volkov admitted that he had planned to reveal the names 
of no fewer than 314 Soviet agents-probably including Philby.57 As Philby later 
recalled, the Volkov case 'proved to be a very narrow squeak indeed,.58 With slightly less 
luck in Ottawa earlier in September 1945, Gouzenko would have been unable to defect. 
With slightly more luck in Istanbul, Volkov would have succeeded in unmasking Philby, 
and disrupting Soviet intelligence operations on a much larger scale than Gouzenko was 
able to do. 59 
55 Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds. Soviet Post-War Defectors, pp. 40-53. 
56 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 182. 
57 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations, pp. 305-7. 
58 Philby, My Silent War, p. 118. 
59 Andrew and Walton, 'The Gouzenko case and British secret intelligence', in Black and Rudner 
(eds.), The Gouzenko Affair. Canada and the beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage. 
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Having neutralised the threat of Volkov, Philby was able to concentrate on 
limiting the damage done to Soviet intelligence by Gouzenko. As the head of Section IX 
in SIS, Philby had a legitimate interest in the Gouzenko case. But with hindsight, it is 
clear what Philby's tactics really were: he attempted to direct the Gouzenko case and then 
sabotage it. MIS records reveal that from the beginning of the investigation, Philby 
attempted to dominate the entire British handling of the case. Eventually Philby's 
attempts to take over the case led to protests from MIS, especially from Roger Hollis. 
On 19 February 1946 Philby prepared a draft memorandum on the Gouzenko defection, 
which he claimed Sir Stewart Menzies wanted to be circulated to the Service Directors of 
Intelligence. Philby's attempt to sideline MIS in the case was met with a stern rebuttal 
from Hollis: 
I feel that the question of circulating this document from 
your Office [SIS] to the Directors of Intelligence is a matter 
of some embarrassment. The case took place in Canada 
and has ramifications in this country and in both Canada 
and here the security responsibility rests on our Office and 
not on yours. The close cooperation which we have had 
over this case has, of course, given you just as much 
information as we have about it and as you know, we have 
welcomed this. But when it comes to putting out such a 
paper to the Directors of Intelligence, it may, I am afraid, 
give the impression that the responsible department is 
yours and not M.I.S. 60 
Hollis suggested sending a covering letter to the Directors making it clear that 
MIS, not SIS, was 'the department responsible for dealing with counter-espionage in the 
Empire', and that MIS had approved the circular. Hollis also noted a number of 
misleading statements in Philby's draft, which he politely termed 'small inaccuracies'. 
Philby had failed to give the Service Directors a clear indication of what kind of 
information Soviet GRU Military Intelligence collected in Canada. Hollis generously, but 
60 NA KV2/1421, s.64a: H.A.R. Philby, SIS, to R.H. Hollis, MIS, (19 Feb., 1946). 
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mistakenly, assumed that Philby's failure had been motivated by a desire to protect the 
security of the case: 'Perhaps you hedged on this', he told Philby, 'so as to avoid giving 
the Directors of Intelligence too much detailed information'. Other doubtless deliberate 
inaccuracies in Philby's draft included his failure to mention that senior members of the 
Canadian Communist Party had acted as talent spotters for Soviet intelligence-a 
revelation which might have caused the Service Directors to investigate, even closer, the 
wartime role of British communists in the Armed Forces.61 
Short of taking over the entire Gouzenko investigation, Philby set about 
manipulating it from the inside. As head of Section IX, he was in a ftne position to do 
so. All information on the case from North America, including Hollis' own reports from 
Ottawa, passed through SIS channels, and thus Philby's hands. Philby was also 
responsible for co-ordinating the entire British handling of the case with the FBI. On at 
least one occasion, an agent identifted by Gouzenko was able to escape from America, 
probably to the Soviet Union, despite being under active surveillance by the FBI. 
Although this must remain speculative in the absence of confIrmation from still-closed 
KGB archives, Philby's machinations may well have prompted the agent's escape.
62 
As 
we shall see below, Philby's hidden hand in the investigation certainly stretched far. 
Philby nearly prevented the successful prosecution of the single most important agent 
whom Gouzenko revealed, agent ALEC. 
61 Ibid., s.6Sa: R.H. Hollis, MIS, to H .A.R. Philby, SIS, (19 Feb., 1946). 
62 NA KV2/163S 'Ignacy Samuel Witczak', s.18a: CXG telegram 963, SIS station New York to 
CSS London, (S Jan., 1946). 
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II. British intelligence and the case of Alan Nunn May 
MIS's investigation into the Gouzenko case proceeded in several directions. One 
of MIS's first tasks was to check the names of Zabotin's agents against their own records, 
which produced some noteworthy results. 63 Gouzenko revealed that the communist MP 
highly involved with the network, Fred Rose, had helped to obtain a forged Canadian 
passport for another Soviet agent, Willy Brandes. A 'look-up' in MIS's Registry revealed 
that Brandes had been one of Percy Gladllg's controllers at the Woolwich Arsenal in 
1938. Brandes had eluded MIS in that year-escaping on the same Canadian passport-
and evidently resumed his clandestine activities when he returned to Canada. MIS 
informed the RCMP of their discovery, who placed Brandes under surveillance.64 As 
well as cross-checking names, MIS also monitored Zabotin's agents when they travelled 
to Britain. This was the case with Gordon Lunan (codenamed BACK) who in January 
1946 came to London with the Canadian wartime Information Department to attend the 
first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Despite an HOW on his address 
and B-Division 'surveillance' imposed on him, MIS discovered nothing of security 
interest against Lunan. He was allowed to return peacefully to Canada in the hope that 
he could be caught there.65 Like their surveillance of Lunan, MIS also monitored Sergei 
Koudriavstev (codenamed LEON), whom Gouzenko identified as the First Secretary to 
the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, and who, in 1944, moved to the same position in London. 
MIS did their best to monitor Koudriavstev during his residency at the Soviet embassy in 
London-subsequently discovering that during the war, he had been involved with the 
63 NA KV2/1420, s.11a: CXG telegram 302, 'List of station agents so far uncovered, with cover 
name, location and position where possible', SIS station New York to CSS London, (13 Sept., 
1945). 
64 NA KV2/1420, s.18a: 'The Corby case', (5 Oct., 1945), p. 14; KV2/1004--7 Willy and Mary 
Brandes'. 
65 NA KV2/1571, 'Grace Marsh', s.18a: John Marriott to Leonard Burt, Special Branch, (20 
March, 1946); Gordon Lunan, The Making of a Spy. A PoliticaIOc!Jssf!Y, (Montreal, 1995), p. 23. 
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execution o{ German POWS.66 However, Koudriavstev's diplomatic cover, which he 
held until he left Britain in October 1946, made it difficult for MIS to effectively monitor 
his activities.67 
MIS's main involvement in the Gouzenko case, however, lay with single most 
important agent in the network, codenamed ALEC. A nuclear physicist working in the 
top-secret National Research Council in Ottawa, ALEC was 'in a position to pass the 
most valuable information to Moscow'. Gouzenko's documentary evidence showed that 
ALEC handed over a wide range of research on science and technology, including the 
technical details of new radar-devices, armaments and radio-transmitters. Gouzenko's 
evidence, however, also revealed much worse: it showed that ALEC had passed over to 
one of Zabotin's deputies, 'a platinum with 162 micrograms of Uranium-233 in the form 
of an acid, contained in a thin lamina'.68 U-233 was the essential component needed for 
building an atomic bomb. Needless to say, this revelation had far-reaching consequences 
and implications. In the short-term, Gouzenko's evidence led to a dramatic investigation 
to find agent ALEC, while in the longer-term it had a profound impact on international 
relations. At the end of the war Britain's chief scientific adviser, Sir Henry Tizard, had 
compiled a report on the development of new kinds of weapons and their implications 
for future forms of warfare. Although Tizard wrote his report before the Allied atomic 
weapons were dropped, he hinted at future 'weapons of mass destruction,.69 Gouzenko's 
evidence showed that Moscow had obtained the secrets needed for building such 
66 NA KVZ/1650, 'Sergei Koudriavtsev', s.31a: SIS report [name withheld], (9 June, 1948); Ibid. , 
s.31b: Intelligence department BAOR [British Army on the Rhine], (Z5 June, 1948). 
67 NA KVZ/1650, s.4a: John Marriott, 'Sergei Koudriavstev', (Z Oct. , 1945). 
68 NA KVZ/14Z0, s.18: 'The Corby case', (5 Oct., 1945), App'x II: telegrams from Ottawa to 
Moscow, (9 July, 1945). 
69 NA CAB 80/94/116: Sir Henry Tizard, 'Future developments in weapons of war', Oune 1945). 
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weapons. It is not an exaggeration to say that Gouzenko's disclosure of Soviet atomic 
espionage had reverberations throughout the second half of the twentieth century. 70 
Gouzenko's evidence gave intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic an 
extraordinary opportunity to catch agent ALEC. Gouzenko's smuggled telegrams 
showed that in mid-September 1945, ALEC was due to travel from Canada to Britain in 
order to take up a research position at Kings College, London. Even more fortuitously, 
in early October ALEC was scheduled to have a series of meetings with his Soviet 
controller in London. Gouzenko's documentation gave a complete summary of those 
meetings: where and when they were due to be held (8 October at 8pm outside the 
British Museum), and what ALEC's recognition sign was (to carry a copy of The Times 
under his left arm).71 This information was a godsend for MIS. Sir David Petrie 
personally took the decision that MIS would attempt to catch ALEC in the act of 
meeting his Soviet controller. B-Division discussed the possibility of sending in an agent 
provocateU1; possibly agent 'U.3S', who was Jona 'Klop' Ustinov, father of Peter UstinoV.72 
But in the end MIS decided against using an agent provocateur, preferring to catch ALEC 
without the possibility of claims of 'entrapment'. Apprehending ALEC red-handed 
would constitute evidence permissible in a court of law and, almost certainly, MIS's legal 
advisers felt, would result in his successful prosecution.73 But as Guy Liddell warned, 
MIS and other western intelligence agencies should not fool themselves as to the 
consequences of arresting ALEC. The diplomatic fall-out from his prosecution would 
70 Knight, How the Cold War Began: the Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies. 
71 NA KV2/1420, s.5a: CXG telegram 273, SIS station New York to CSS, London, (11 Sept., 
1945); KV2/1427 'Igor Gouzenko', telegram no. 244 Grant to the Director, (22 Aug., 1945). 
72 For Ustinov, see: Curry, The Securiry Service, pp. 116-24; Graaff, 'The Stranded Baron and the 
Upstart at the Crossroads'; Nadia Ustinov, Klop and the Ustinov FamilY, (London, 1973), p. 191. 
73 NA KV2/1419, s.7a: 'Memorandum', (24 Sept., 1945). 
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be enormous: 'Do the British, Canadian and US Governments want to have a show-
down with Russia or not?,74 
A process of simple elimination revealed that ALEC was the British physicist, 
Dr. Alan Nunn May.75 No one else fitted the description given in Gouzenko's evidence. 
MIS felt confident that May (whom they codenamed PRIMROSE) would proceed with 
his scheduled meeting on 8 October, not least because Zabotin seemed to be successfully 
covering up Gouzenko's defection.76 With nearly a month before the scheduled meeting 
in London, MIS and the RCMP launched a joint operation to monitor May's activities 
and gather all the information they could on his background. When May flew from 
Canada to Britain on 15 September-on schedule-he was accompanied by an 
undercover RCMP officer, and when they duly arrived in Britain, May was tailed by B-
Division 'watchers,.77 MIS imposed HOWs on his hotel in London and his office in 
King's College, London. As a precautionary measure, they also imposed an HOW on 
May's last known address in England, in Cambridge.78 At the same time, MIS began to 
compile biographical information on the scientist. They discovered that by all accounts, 
May was a brilliant physicist. He received his PhD. in Theoretical Physics from 
Cambridge University in 1935-one of his examiners had been Sir Ernest Rutherford 
himself. After six years of outstanding research at the Cavendish Laboratory, in 1942 
May joined Britain's secret nuclear research programme, the TUBE ALLOYS project, 
and was chosen to be one of the small number of scientists sent to Canada to conduct 
research. Canada's natural uranium deposits, and the heavy water plant at Chalk River, 
74 NA KV 2/2209 'Alan Nunn May', s.46a: Guy Liddell, (19 Sept., 1945). 
75 For the standard account (written with IvfI5's assistance), see: Alan Moorehead, The Traitors. The 
Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo, and Nunn Mqy, (London, 1952), pp. 19-32. 
76 NA KV 2/2209 'Alan Nunn May', s.17a: CXG telegram 311 SIS station New York to CSS 
London, (25 Oct., 1945). 
77 NA KV 2/2209, s.7a: CXG telegram 289 SIS station New York to CSS London, (12 Sept., 
1945). 
78NA KV 2/2209, Minute 42a: John Marriott, (18 Sept., 1945); Ibid., s.36a: Home Office Warrant, 
(18 Sept., 1945). 
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near Ottawa, provided extraordinary opportunities for atomic research. May's work on 
the project had been exemplary and the head of the mission, Sir John Cockcroft, 
personally recommended him for further research upon his return to Britain.79 
May had been through MIS vetting for his research in Canada, but he had been 
found 'No Trace' in the Registry. MIS lacked evidence that he was a communist, or even 
a communist sympathiser.80 Once again, May's case showed how difficult it was for MIS 
to detect Soviet agents who purposefully distanced themselves from the Party. It 
furthermore demonstrated the insufficiency of 'negative vetting'. If MIS had followed up 
every lead, as later they did, they would have discovered that May had some faint, but 
nonetheless traceable, communist affiliations before the war.81 Unknown to MIS until 
the 19S0s, during his time at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, May had been a contemporary of 
the 'Cambridge spy', Donald Maclean.82 At the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, 
May had also worked closely with Engelbert Broda, whose communist affiliations MIS 
had been suspicious of, and whose vetting had been problematic. After the war Broda's 
marriage collapsed and his wife, Hildegarde, subsequently remarried none other than 
May. MIS later concluded that during their research on the TUBE ALLOYS project at 
the Cavendish Laboratory, Broda might have been responsible for introducing May to 
Soviet intelligence.83 In many ways, the Cavendish Laboratory seems to have been a nest 
of wartime Soviet intelligence activities. 
MIS's wartime failure to detect Alan Nunn May had widespread consequences 
after the war, both politically and for intelligence. As we shall see in following chapters, 
May'S disclosure was one of the main events which forced the British government to 
79 NA KV2/1419, s.7a: John Marriott, 'Memorandum', (24 Sept., 1945), p. 1. 
80 NA KV2/1419, s.2b: John Marriott, 'The May case', (14 Oct., 1945), p. 3. 
81 NA KV 2/2209, s.1w: 'Extract from M/2 report and two documents from M/2 regarding IPC 
World Boycott Conference', (12 Feb., 1938), extracted on 29 Aug., 1954. 
82 Andrew Boyle, The Climate qfTreason. Five Spies lvho Spiedfor Russia, (London, 1979), p. 250. 
83 NA KV2/2354 'Engelbert Broda', s.495b: H. Phillimore, (14 Oct., 1953). 
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overhaul its vetting procedures for those employed on secret work. When it came to 
safeguarding atomic secrets, the May case undermined Washington's confidence in 
British security.84 From the outset of the ~ase, MIS recognised the tensions that it stood 
to cause between London and Washington. One of the first messages that MIS received 
when the case broke was, significantly, a warning from the British High Commissioner in 
Canada, Malcolm Macdonald: 
.. .if these leakages on further investigation prove as 
serious as they appear at the moment then H.M.G. [His 
Majesty's Government] will be liable to criticism by 
United States Government.8S 
London's desire to avoid 'criticism' by Washington over security standards runs 
like a thread throughout Anglo-American relations, if not even broader international 
relations, in the early Cold War. Put crudely, London's predicament was that just as it 
needed Washington's support to find a post-war economic settlement, so Britain also 
needed American support in atomic research. 86 Washington made it clear, however, that 
it would withhold such support until London enhanced security standards. In August 
1946 a security-conscious US Congress passed the McMahon Act, which terminated 
American cooperation on atomic research with all foreign powers, including America's 
former wartime partners in atomic research, Britain and Canada.87 It was not the case, 
however, that after the war Britain was somehow relegated to the role of a minor world 
power, scrambling for American support. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that 
Britain remained a major world power throughout the 1940s, with London embarking on 
84 NA KV 2/2215 'Alan Nunn May', Minute 473a: John Marriott, (11 Feb., 1947). 
8S NA KV2/1425, s.2z: CXG telegram, SIS station New York to CSS London, (10 Sept. , 1945). 
86 NA CAB 81/131 JIC (45) 311 (0) 'Intelligence on atomic energy', (6 Nov., 1945). 
87 NA AB 16/202 'Comparison of UK and US Atomic Energy Acts, 1946'; FO 371/93198-
93204 'Proposed co-operation between US and UK on development of atomic energy'. 
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its own atomic project in 1947 witho~t American support.88 Instead, the point is that 
during the Second World War, Britain and America had developed a unique intelligence 
relationship, which performed a central ra'le -in what Churchill subsequently popularised 
as the 'special relationship,.89 During the war Britain and America pooled their resources 
and shared intelligence on a greater scale than any two independent nations had ever 
done. However, in the years after the Second World War, Churchill undoubtedly had a 
pragmatic motivation for retrospectively stressing the wartime 'special relationship,.90 In 
reality, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, at the outset of the Cold War the 'special 
relationship' between the British and American intelligence communities was often less 
'special', if that is to mean 'close', than commonly acknowledged. 
MIS's investigation into Alan Nunn May was the joint responsibility B-Division 
and F-Division. Together with the Special Branch, they studied the meeting point in 
London (outside the British Museum) before the scheduled meeting, and even 
requisitioned the top-floor of a public house on the corner of Tottenham Court Road 
and Great Russell Street, offering a full view of the Museum.91 But on the scheduled 
date, 8 October, neither Alan Nunn May nor his controller appeared. The entire 
operation was a failure and MIS and the Special Branch were left agonising over May's 
non-appearance.92 In the wake of their disappointment, some MIS officers began to 
contemplate interrogating the scientist in the hope of securing a confession. F-Division, 
however, was pessimistic about this strategy. On 30 October John Marriott wrote to 
Roger Hollis, then in Ottawa: 
88 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 153-4; David Reynolds, 'Great Britain', in David Reynolds 
(ed.), The 01igiflS of the Cold War ifl Europe. Ifltematioflal Perspectives, (New Haven and London, 1994), 
p.80. 
89 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War, pp. 320-321 
90 Cf. David Reynolds, III Commafld of History: Churchill Fightiflg afld Winfliflg the Secofld World War, 
paperback ed.: (London, 2005), pp. 160-63. 
91 NA KV 2/2210 'Alan Nunn May', s.125a: John Marriott, (4 Oct., 1945). 
92 NA KV 2/2210, s.141a: Hugh Hunter to John Marriott, (8 Oct., 1945). 
We do not think we have enough material to give 
interrogators a reasonable chance of breaking him. His 
behaviour is such as to convince us that he must have 
been warned by Russians of possible compromise. 
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Marriott's message to Hollis was passed through Philby in SIS.93 Suddenly MIS's 
failures, and the mysteries surrounding the investigation, begin to make sense. When 
May arrived in Britain, Philby did all that he could to help his Cambridge contemporary 
and fellow Soviet agent. Almost certainly, Philby warned Moscow that it was unsafe to 
proceed with the scheduled rendezvous in London. After May failed to appear at the 
meeting, Philby reported to his Soviet controller, doubdess with relief, on 18 November: 
According to MIS, May has not put a foot wrong from the 
time he arrived in England. He did not establish any 
suspicious contacts. He does not show any signs of being 
afraid or worried and continues to work quite normally on 
his academic research. Bearing this in mind, MIS came to 
the conclusion that May is a tough customer who will not 
break down under questioning until he is confronted with 
fresh and convincing evidence.94 
No 'fresh and convincing evidence', however, was available. MIS's legal adviser, Edward 
Cussen, later acknowledged that Gouzenko's evidence did not provide grounds for a 
conviction. Then, as now, secret intelligence was impermissible in British courts: 
Colonel Cussen said that it was not likely that any evidence 
against Primrose [Nunn May] obtained in Canada would be 
admissible without the calling of a Russian official, since it 
was contained in telegrams exchanged between Ottawa and 
Moscow ... If Corby [Gouzenko] were called at Bow Street 
himself, he would not be able to identify Primrose whom 
he had never seen.95 
93 NA KV 2/1224 'Alan Nunn May', s.213x: John Marriott to Roger Hollis, transmitted by 
H.A.R. Philby, (30 Oct., 1945). 
94 West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 238. 
95 NA KV2/1422, s.86a: T.E. Bromley, Foreign Office, 'Corby Case', (1 March, 1946). 
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Lacking evidence that was permissible in court, MIS was forced to leave the 
scientist at liberty. May, of course, was unaware that his activities were being closely 
monitored by MIS.96 MIS's entire investigation into May, however, was transformed on 
4 February 1946, when the American journalist Drew Pearson broadcast details of 
Gouzenko's defection on his weekly radio programme.97 The Gouzenko case became a 
media sensation overnight, on both sides of the Adantic. The following day the 
Canadian government appointed a Royal Commission under two Supreme Court Justices 
(K_ellock and Taschereau) to investigate the case. What hitherto had been a secret 
investigation suddenly became a public enquiry, albeit with evidence held in camera. 
Although the Royal Commission first refrained from naming the 'foreign power' behind 
the network, the media soon revealed details of the spy-ring, and published the names of 
those Soviet embassy officials implicated.98 With the public disclosure of the Gouzenko 
case, MIS decided that they had a reasonable chance of gaining a confession from May. 
Beginning on 1S February, MIS's ace interrogator, William 'Jim' Skardon, therefore 
conducted a series of interviews with the scientist. Following a dramatic search of his 
office at King College, London, on 20 February, May finally broke. In an interview at 
the War Office with Skardon and Commander Burt of the Special Branch, he confessed 
his involvement in Soviet atomic espionage.99 
Skardon's interrogation technique was straightforward: he bluffed. Skardon let 
May believe that MIS's evidence against him was overwhelming. In fact, Philby's 
warning to the Centre-that MIS lacked sufficient evidence for a conviction-could 
96 NA I<:'"v' 2/2212 'Alan Nunn May', s.180a: Hugh Hunter to John Marriott, (18 Oct., 1945); 
KV2/2213 'Alan Nunn May', s.278a: Hugh Hunter to John Marriott, (8 Feb., 1946). 
97 For the theory that the FBI gave Drew Pearson details of Gouzenko's defection, see: Amy 
Knight, 'Soviet intelligence and the Gouzenko case', in Black and Rudner (eds.), The Gouzenko 
/lffai1: Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage. 
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have prevented May's prosecution if he had not made a self-incriminating confession. In 
reality, Philby came dramatically close to preventing the prosecution of the first 'atom 
spy'. In the event, on 1 May 1946 May was successfully prosecuted and sentenced to ten 
years' imprisonment for breaking the Official Secrets Act. 100 In his confession May 
explained his motives for passing over top-secret information to the Soviet Union. Like 
other wartime Soviet agents, his justification was that Britain and the Soviet Union were 
wartime allies .101 May admitted that he had received $500 and a bottle of whiskey for his 
information, but the money had been for 'expenses' and the whiskey, he claimed, a 'gift' . 
Like other Soviet recruits, May's motivation was not money-from Moscow's 
perspective, though, it was undoubtedly the best spent $500 and bottle of whiskey in all 
Soviet history. May's motives were more sophisticated than either monetary reward or 
passing information over to a wartime ally. May reasoned that by handing over atomic 
secrets to Moscow, he could prevent a monopoly of the world's atomic research. When 
information on the Allied atomic bomb (the MANHA ITAN project) was officially 
released at the end of the war,102 May claimed that he had given up his espionage 
activities because such a monopoly had been avoided. The scientist may have been 
telling the truth in his confession, but the non-appearance of his Soviet controller at the 
scheduled meeting in London suggests that Philby warned Moscow, even if May had 
given up espionage voluntarily.103 
With hindsight, we can see that May's successful prosecution placed Philby in a 
perilous position. Philby was fully aware that MIS would attempt to extract further 
information from the scientist in prison. In November 1946 MIS indeed tried to have a 
further interview with May, but luckily for Philby, he kept silent. May was so outraged 
100 'Atomic secrets charge', The Times, London: (20 March, 1946). 
101 Hyde, The A tom Bomb Spies, pp. 55-6. 
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by Skardon's bluff-and his self-incriminating confession-that he refused to have 
anything further to do with the 'War Office'. Following MIS's failed interrogation, 
Philby wrote a deeply sarcastic letter to Hollis: 
I am sorry to hear that your first attempt at MAY ended in 
failure. But I note that you are moderately optimistic about 
the prospects of getting more out of him in the future. We 
will naturally be very interested in anything you may 
obtain. 104 
MIS never obtained anything further from May. After his release from prison in 
late 1952, MIS kept the scientist under close observation, but their enquiries revealed 
nothing of security interest. !OS In fact, after May's release from prison, MIS did what they 
could to help the scientist find re-employment, needless to say in non-secret 
departments. Their attempts, however, were unsuccessful. May was so notorious that 
neither government departments nor British universities would employ him. Eventually 
he found a research position at the University of Ghana, only returning to Britain in the 
1970s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Alan Nunn May was reaccepted into his 
old College, Trinity Hall, and died in Cambridge in 2003.106 
In the aftermath of the Gouzenko investigation, MIS was accused of missing 
important clues which could have led to other Soviet agents. Retrospectively, the clues 
connecting the Canadian network to other Soviet agents are certainly striking. The 
address book of Israel Halperin, whom Gouzenko identified as an agent in the Canadian 
Army research department, contained the name of no less than 'Klaus Fuchs'. When the 
Fuchs case broke in 1950, it was alleged that Fuchs' name had even appeared with the 
104 NA KV 2/2215, s.456a: H .A.R. Philby to R.H. Hollis, (10 Dec., 1946). 
105 NA KV 2/2218 'Alan Nunn May', s.647a: D.G. \X-'hite, (21 Nov., 1952); Ibid., s.657c: Home 
Office Warrant, (31 Dec., 1952). 
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Russian word nash next to it, meaning 'ours,.107 However, as the post-war Director-
General of MIS explained to the Prime Minister, this was emphatically not the case: 
although Halperin's address book contained Fuchs' name, it was not prefixed with the 
Russian word nash.108 In fact, as the post-war Director-General explained, it was 
unrealistic to expect MIS to have cross-checked every entry in Halperin's address book. 
There was no reason for MIS to do so: Halperin was acquitted by the Royal Commission 
of all charges-one of the few defendants to be acquitted-and as a mathematician, he 
had a perfecdy legitimate right to have the name of an eminent scientist in his address 
book. While MIS's oversight of the clue connecting Halperin to Fuchs was 
understandable, Gouzenko's evidence contained another clue which confused, and at 
times tormented, MIS for over thirty years. Gouzenko revealed that there were two 
Soviet agents codenamed ELLI. One was quickly identified as Kay Wilsher, but the 
identity of the second, and more important, ELLI remained a mystery. Gouzenko 
believed that ELLI worked in Britain in 'Five of M.I.', which presumably meant MIS 
itself. 109 This led to several conspiracy theories and false accusations. 1 10 The true identity 
of ELLI was finally disclosed in the 1980s when the KGB double-agent Oleg Gordievsky 
defected to the west and revealed ELLI to have been Leo Long, whom Anthony Blunt 
ran as a sub-agent in military intelligence. Long, like Blunt, was run by the KGB-thus 
explaining why Gouzenko, whose information pertained to the GRU, had only 
fragmentary information. Nonetheless, with hindsight we can see that there were 
indications pointing to Long's identity. Soviet controllers often chose codenames for 
their agents containing clues to their identities. Thus Anthony Blunt's unimaginative 
codename was TONY, Guy Burgess' was MAD CHEN (which, meaning 'young girl', was 
107 Robert C. Williams, Klaus Fuchs. Atom Spy, (Cambridge Ma. and London, 1987), p. 146. 
108 NA PREM 8/1279: Sillitoe to Prime Minister, (16 March, 1950). 
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almost certainly an !tOlliC reference to his homosexuality), while the codename of 
Philby's 'talent spotter' for the KGB, Edith Tudor-Hart, was no less than EDITH. III 
The codename ELLI, on the other hand, can be translated from Russian as the plural of 
the Roman letter 'L'. 'LL' were the initials of Leo Long. 1l2 
MIS's principal involvement in the Gouzenko case thus lay with the investigation 
into Alan Nunn May and his successful prosecution. The Gouzenko case, however, was 
truly an international investigation, and led to security investigations on both sides of the 
Adantic. In Canada itself, the Royal Commission, sitting in forty-four sessions and 
calling forty-eight witnesses, brought charges against a total of thirteen individuals. All 
the main agents in the network-Fred Rose, Sam Carr, Emma Woikin and Kay 
Wilsher-were eventually prosecuted for breaking the Official Secrets Act.11 3 
Gouzenko's evidence also led to investigations in the United States. In conjunction with 
information provided by the NKVD defectors Elizabeth Bendey and Whittaker 
Chambers, the FBI used Gouzenko's evidence to re-open their investigations into Alger 
Hiss in the State Department and Harry Dexter White in the Treasury Department. 
Although the FBI's now (in)famous investigations are beyond the scope of this study, 
suffice it to say that in 1950 Hiss was eventually convicted of perjury and sentenced to 
fi ' .. 114 ve years unprlsonment. 
III Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB and the West, pp. 76-80; NA 
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III. British intelligence, the Rote Kapelle and Rote Drei 
It was not just the defection of Igor Gouzenko which at the end of the war 
alerted British intelligence to the nature and scale of Soviet espionage. As the war was 
ending, Britain's intelligence agencies used the German war-effort to gather information 
on Soviet intelligence, and this produced information as alarming as Gouzenko's 
evidence. At the same time as hunting down the Nazi leadership in order to gather 
information on the German intelligence services, the Allies began a concerted effort to 
interrogate Nazi experts on the Soviet Union. The capture of Hitler's most important 
counter-intelligence officer, Horst Kopkow, was an outstanding opportunity to do so. 
Kopkow had been Hitler's counter-sabotage expert, investigating the attempted 
assassination of the Fuhrer in July 1944, and was also responsible for German 
intelligence (Abwehr) investigations into Soviet networks in Europe. After Kopkow's 
capture in June 1945 he made a series of voluntary statements, describing-much to his 
interrogators' pleasure-that approximately ninety-percent of his work had concerned 
the Soviet Union. IIS The priority shown by Kopkow and the Abwehr to the Soviet 
Union derived from straightforward military necessity, but also from the Third Reich's 
conspiratorial racial obsession with 'Judeo-Bolshevism'. Kopkow unashamedly 
volunteered information to the Allies in the hope of avoiding Nuremberg. Despite his 
involvement in war crimes, including the execution of Soviet POWs and British female 
SOE agents, Kopkow's tactic worked: it has recently been shown that in return for 
information, SIS almost certainly helped to fake Kopkow's death after the war, to 
relocate him, and give him a new identity. Much like America's protection of Klaus 
Barbie, the notorious 'butcher of Lyons', Kopkow's information was thought too 
11 5 NA KV2/1500 'Horst Kopkow', s.10a: 'Field interrogation of Horst Kopkow', Neumunster, 
(7 June, 1945). 
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valuable not' to be used. 116 Britain and America embarked on their post-war counter-
intelligence effort at least partly tainted by German war crimes. 117 Kopkow is thought to 
have died under an alias in Switzerland rn: 1996. 118 
In June 1945 Kopkow produced a sixty-page field interrogation report on the 
Abwehr's investigation into the wartime Soviet GRU espionage networks in Europe, the 
Rote Kape/le and Rote Drei. Kopkow, who dictated the report to his former secretary who 
was also captured, revealed that between 1942 and 1943 the Abwehr detected and 
dismantled the Rote Kape/le network and even 'turned' some of its agents. The network 
was termed the Rote Kape/le by the Abwehr because it resembled an 'orchestra' in its 
conduct: the 'musicians' were the radio operators and the 'music' the coded messages 
sent between agents and Moscow. The 'conductor' of the orchestra, a Polish Jew termed 
the Grand Chef by his Soviet colleagues, Leopold Trepper, was arrested by the Abwehr in 
December 1942 in occupied Paris, as he sat in a dentist's chair."9 In total the Rote Kapelle 
involved 117 Soviet agents: forty-eight in Germany, thirty-five in France, seventeen in 
Belgium and seventeen in Switzerland.120 The structure of the Rote Kape/le was similar to 
the Canadian network and, once again, was easily recognisable to MIS. Like the 
Canadian network, it was organised through legal and illegal residencies which took their 
instructions from Moscow (likewise codenamed the DIRECTOR). MIS's investigation 
into the Rote Kape/le, which was led by John Gwyer, was a slow and arduous process, 
involving the cross-referencing of captured German records. Gwyer's investigation was 
116 Tom Bower, Klaus Barbie: Butcher of Lyons, (London, 1985). 
117 For Reinhard Gehlen, see: E.H. Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century, (London, 1972). 
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considerably assisted by the arrest of Kopkow's fellow Abwehr officers, and some of the 
main figures in the 'orchestra' itself, such as the Petit Chef, Victor Sokolov. 121 
Kopkow also gave valuable information on the wartime Soviet GRU network run 
in Switzerland, the Rote Drei-so-termed by the Abwehr because of its three main radio 
transmitters. The Rote Drei, which lay outside the Abwehr's reach until it was shut down 
by the Swiss police in 1943, again conformed to the model of other Soviet networks. At 
the end of the war, the main agents in the Rote Drei were either already known to MIS or 
else would become well known to them in the early Cold War. One of the leading 
figures in the Rote Drei, Ursula Kuczynski (codenamed SONYA, known as 'red Sonya') 
had been the subject of close MIS attention even before Kopkow described her activities 
in 1945. 122 As we shall see, Kuczynski later became the controller of Klaus Fuchs-
despite a dramatically close interrogation by MIS in 1947.123 The radio-operator of the 
Rote Drei, Alexander Foote, a British citizen of Irish descent, was unknown to MIS when 
Kopkow described his activities in 1945. In 1947, however, Foote would defect to 
Britain after a disillusioning stay in Moscow, and subsequently became a key asset for 
MIS in the early Cold War. In 1949 Foote wrote a book with MIS's assistance on the 
Soviet threat, Handbook for Spies. 124 
MIS's main interest in the Rote Drei, however, lay with the linchpin of the 
network, the Hungarian Jew, Alexander Rado. By the summer of 1945 Rado was already 
known to Britain's intelligence services because earlier that year, he had attempted to 
defect to British authorities in the Middle East. In January 1945 Rado had come 
temporarily into British custody in Cairo when he took himself off a Russian plane (also 
121 NA KV2/2068 'Victor Sokolov'; KV2/2070 'Marguerita Barcza'; KV2/1503 'Rudolf Richter'; 
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carrying his Soviet colleagues Leopold Trepper and Alexander Foote) travelling between 
Paris and Moscow. Rado feared that he would be 'liquidated' when he arrived in 
Moscow. 125 Rado's abortive defection in Cairo has been the subject of historical 
speculation ever Slnce. Some have suggested that MIS let his defection pass by 
unawares. 126 In fact, using MIS records, we can now see that F-Division recognised 
Rado's importance from the outset, but at that point it was diplomatically impossible for 
the Foreign Office to grant him asylum. 127 Like the defection of the Soviet diplomat 
Victor Kravchenko in Washington in 1944, which became nothing more than an 
embarrassment for the American government, it was impossible for Britain to accept 
Rado while allied to Soviet Union. 128 Rado's attempted defection occurred in the hiatus 
between world conflicts, at the end of the Second World War, but before the Cold War 
had set in properly. In his abortive defection in Cairo, Rado appears to have played both 
sides off against each other, unsuccessfully hoping to make himself attractive enough to 
British officials not to be released to Soviet authorities, but not so attractive as to warrant 
prolonged interrogation by British intelligence.129 
Almost certainly, however, there was another reason why Rado's defection was 
an abortive affair: he did not trust British intelligence. After his initial interrogation by 
British intelligence officials in January 1945, Rado made several suicide attempts. 130 
Although this interpretation cannot be proved conclusively, it seems likely that Rado 
knew that Britain's intelligence services were penetrated, and that he risked being 
compromised. Certainly this would explain his abortive half-defection. Perhaps it is 
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therefore ~nsU1prising to discover that SIS's enquiries into Rado were led by Philby. 
One report on Rado by F-Division suggestively complained that Section IX, 'do not 
appear to have interested themselves v~ry much in the case'.131 Philby's real agenda was 
revealed in SIS's bungling efforts to interrogate Rado's wife in Paris in March 1945. 
Section IX rejected MIS's advice for moderation and, conveniently for Philby, pushed 
her too far. As John Gwyer noted: 'I'm afraid Section IX have made a mess of it and 
now it is no use for us to talk to Mme. Rado,.132 This, of course, suited Philby well. The 
odds were thus hopelessly stacked against Rado's successful defection: hampered by 
diplomatic impracticalities, and probably also by Philby's machinations, he slipped 
through British hands. In June 1945 Rado travelled from Cairo on to Moscow, where he 
avoided execution, but was imprisoned until the mid-19 50s. 133 
The Canadian network, the Rotc Kapellc and Rotc Drci all revealed the nature of 
Soviet espionage, but in doing so they also illustrated how little western intelligence 
agencies knew about the Soviet threat. The end of the Second World War represented a 
shift from intelligence 'feast' regarding the Axis Powers to intelligence 'famine' regarding 
the Soviet Union. 134 At the end of the war the greatest secret held by the Allies over the 
Axis Powers, SIGINT, was lacking with regard to the Soviet Union. British HUMINT 
capabilities were little better: SIS lacked a single well-placed agent in Moscow-the fact 
that the 'Cambridge Five' were undetected is evidence enough of this. In fact, with the 
exception of a well-pl~ced agent in the GRU in the 1950s, Pyotr Popov, both SIS and the 
CIA appear to have lacked a valuable agent in Moscow until Oleg Penkovsky in the early 
1960s. 135 At the end of the war MIS was also without a well-placed agent in the CPGB-
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Maxwell Knight's warning not to neglect the CPGB proved to be foresighted. In an 
attempt to 'learn from past mistakes', MIS compiled section histories at the end of the , 
war hoping that, among other subjects, the shift from peace to war in 1939 could provide 
useful lessons for the shift from war to peace in 1945. John Curry, who used these 
section ~stories to compile the now-declassified in-house history of MIS, was pessimistic 
about MIS's post-war future. He predicted that after the war, MIS faced one of the 
'most difficult periods in its history'.136 As a Soviet counter-intelligence expert, Curry's 
opinion certainly carried weight. The wartime Soviet espionage networks which MIS had 
detected-through F-Division's efforts in Britain, through defections, and interrogations 
abroad-were the tip of a potentially enormous iceberg. In fact Curry's forecast for the 
post-war landscape was astonishingly bleak: in 1946 he warned that MIS was in the same 
position regarding the Soviet Union as the Service had been in the summer of 1940 
regarding the Axis Powers. Given MIS's near total bankruptcy of intelligence on the 
Axis Powers in 1940 which we have discussed, this is an astonishing statement for Curry 
to have made. MIS had come full-circle and by 1945, in Curry's words: 'we have little 
positive knowledge of the basic structure of the organisation which we have to 
counter'. 137 
It was not just MIS which did not know their 'new' enemy. At the end of the war 
the JIC itself was conspicuously silent on the Soviet Union. The JIC, the 'high-table' of 
the British intelligence community, sounded the klaxon over the Soviet threat in 
December 1944, but then remained silent on it until March 1946. 138 Precisely when we 
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would expect the JIe to be addressing the 'next' enemy, they fell silent on the Soviet 
threat. As. we have already suggested, the British intelligence community thus seems to 
have shown at least an outward degree' of 'amnesia' regarding the Soviet threat. As 
several studies have now shown, however, the JIC's 'amnesia' towards the Soviet Union 
was not caused by incompetence: it was a failure of intelligence collection, not a failure of 
intelligence assessment by the JIC 139 Britain's failure of intelligence collection on the 
Soviet Union was itself due to the near-impossible nature of gathering objective and 
reliable intelligence on 'police states' like Soviet Russia-as Britain, of course, 
experienced before the war with regard to the Third Reich. Both JIe reports on the 
Soviet Union in December 1944 and September 1946 stated frankly that they lacked any 
significant intelligence on the Soviet Union. The JIe summarised this warning in their 
assessment of the Soviet Union in March 1946: 
Any study of Russian's strategic interests and intentions 
must be speculative, as we have litde evidence to show 
what view Russia herself takes of her strategic interest, or 
what policy she intends to pursue. We have practically no 
direct intelligence, of a detailed factual or statistical nature, 
on conditions in the different parts of the Soviet Union, 
and none at all on the intentions, immediate or ultimate, of 
the Russian leaders ... Our present appreciation is based, 
therefore, on the limited evidence we have, and deductions 
made from such indications of policy as Russia has given, 
and on reasonable conjecture concerning the Soviet 
appreciation of their own situation. 14O 
As Britain's all-source intelligence-analysis body, this was a remarkable admission on the 
part of the JIC At the end of the war, the British intelligence community as a whole 
intentions', (1 March, 1946); CAB 81/133 JIC (46) 70 (0) Final, 'The spread of communism 
throughout the world and the extent of its direction from Moscow', (23 Sept., 1946). 
139 Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee', pp. 13-15; Craddock, KnoJl) Your Enemy, pp. 25-49; 
Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 5, 17,31-32. 
140 NA CAB 81/132 JIC (46) 1 (0) (Final), 'Russia's strategic interests and intentions', (1 March, 
1946), p. 1. 
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knew next to' nothing about their 'new' enemy, Indicative of their desperate situation is 
the fact that the JIC's assessment of the Soviet Union in March 1946 and a subsequent 
JIC report on the 'Organisation of Soviet'Intelligence Services' were themselves probably 
drafted with the help of Kim Philby in SIS,141 
Britain's counter-intelligence effort against the Soviet Union would be a gradual 
process, based in the first instance on careful record-keeping and cross-referencing. The 
Allied occupation of large parts of Europe produced enormous quantities of information 
on communism, both past and present. MIS's Central Registry was swamped by a flood 
of information on communism from the British Zone in Germany, to deal with which 
the Registry requested between ten and fifteen extra (female) clerical staff. By 1946 the 
Registry contained approximately 250,000 card-indexes on communists and communist-
sympathisers. 142 At the end of the war MIS and SIS established new sections to study 
captured German records. This was a difficult and time-consuming task for officers. 
The captured Abwehr records on Henry Robinson, one of the leading figures in the Rote 
Kapelle arrested by the Abwehr in 1943 and subsequendy executed, for example stretched 
to twenty-three volumes in total. It took MIS's B-Division, in their own words, 'years' to 
make a full study of Robinson's papers. 143 For Britain's intelligence agencies, lacking 
positive intelligence on the Soviet Union, the re-alignment from war to Cold War was a 
slow progression. 
From MIS's perspective the transition from World War to Cold War was not a 
simple, straightforward process. In fact, recendy declassified MIS records substantially 
revise our understanding of the British intelligence community's transition from war to 
Cold War. Using these files, we can now see that the most immediate threat to post-war 
141 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 110 (0) (Final), 'Organisation of Soviet intelligence services', (19 
Dec., 1946). 
142 NA KV4/267, Minute 204a: Harold Potter, (22 Nov., 1946). 
143 NA KV3/139 'Henry Robinson', s.18a: Michael Serpell to Richard Thistlethwaite, 
Washington, (20 Feb.,,1948). 
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British national security was not, in fact, the Soviet Union. Instead it was the threat of 
Zionist terrorism. In the years immediately after the Second World War, MIS not only 
had to attempt to reprioritise intelligence requirements towards the Cold War conflict 
with the Soviet Union, but also had to deal with the threat of terrorism emanating from 
the Middle East. As we shall see in the next chapter, the threat of Zionist terrorism 
interrupted and distracted MIS's reorientation towards the Soviet Union. When seen 
from MIS's perspective, suddenly the onset of the Cold War begins to look substantially 
different from existing historical interpretations. 
Chapter Three: 
'The Red Light is Definitely Showing': 
British intelligence and the threat of Zionist terrorism. 
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Despite MIS's unprecedented successes during the Second World War, the 
Service emerged from the war in a weak position. As usual, MIS's successes remained 
secret while their misjudgements and fallures were quick to receive public criticism. At 
the end of the war MIS was placed in an awkward position: they were associated not with 
triumphs like the Double Cross System, but instead with claustrophobic wartime security 
measures, the temporary curtailment of civil liberties and perhaps most notoriously, 
mass-internment. The transformation of the political landscape in Britain with the 
election of the Labour government ill the summer of 1945 also had awkward 
implications for MIS. Like the rest of the British intelligence community, MIS 
traditionally experienced an uneasy relationship with the Labour Party. The 'Zinoviev 
affair' from the mid-1920s cast a long shadow over their relationship: in 1924 Britain's 
first Labour government had been defeated amid the scandal of the 'Zinoviev letter', 
which purported to show that a direct link existed between the Moscow, the CPGB and 
even the Labour Party. Many Labour supporters claimed that the Zinoviev letter was a 
forgery orchestrated by 'British intelligence' and the Conservative Party-an accusation 
which the most recent study has disproved, showing that the letter was probably forged 
by Russian emigres in Latvia.! The historic unease between the Labour Party and 
Britain's intelligence services was exacerbated by Churchill's infamous 'Gestapo Speech' 
during the general election campaign of June 1945. Churchill warned that if elected, the 
Labour Party would: 
. . . have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt 
very humanely administered in the first instance. And this 
would nip opinion in the bud: it would stop criticism as it 
reared its head and it would gather all the power to the 
supreme party and the party leaders, rising like stately 
! Gill Bennett, /1 Most Extraordinary and Mysterious Incident:· the Zinoviev Letter of 1924, (London, 
1999). 
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pinnacles about their vast bureaucracies of Civil Servants, 
no longer servants and no longer civil.2 
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Churchill essentially warned that a so~ialist Labour government would be forced to 
create a 'secret police', not unlike in totalitarian states. After the Labour Party's landslide 
election victory in July 1945, Atdee's government naturally desired to prove Churchill's 
warning incorrect. In effect, this meant keeping a tight control of MIS and Britain's 
other secret services. 
MIS, in fact, nearly failed to survive the transition from war to peace. At the end 
of the war there were serious discussions within Whitehall about disbanding MIS 
altogether. Sir Findlater Stewf\rt and other members of the Security Executive had to 
fight hard for MIS's corner, circulating a brief around Whitehall on why it was necessary 
for MIS to remain in existence.3 In the event, MIS fared better than SOE and SIS's 
American counterpart, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was dissolved by 
President Truman at the war's end. Although MIS managed to survive, they nevertheless 
faced the perennial problem encountered by all security and intelligence agencies in times 
of peace: staff-cuts and funding-reductions. 4 By 1946 MIS's staff was reduced to fewer 
than 100 officers which, although it was more than pre-war levels of thirty six officers in 
1939, was a substantial reduction from the Service's wartime peak of 332 officers in 
January 1943.5 Most of the academics and 'outsiders' who joined MIS during the war 
returned to their pre-war careers, depriving MIS of some of the 'amateur brilliance' 
2 Peter Hennessy, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951, (London, 1992), p. 82; Aldrich, The Hidden 
Hand, p. 94. 
3 NA KV 4/89 'Report on the duties of the Security Service in connection with defensive security 
and leakage of information prepared for Sir Findlater Stewart in 1945'. 
4 NA CAB 81/130 JIC (45) 271 (Final), 'Manpower requirements for post war intelligence 
requirements', (16 Sept., 1945). 
5 NA KV4/19 'Report on the operations of A.D.A, in connection with the administrative 
services of the Security Service during the war 1939-1945', s.6a: 'MIS officers'; KV4/158, s.13a: 
'A short note on the Security Service and its responsibilities', (Oct., 1946), p. 3. 
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which had ~haracterised the Service's wartime ranks.6 The transition from war to peace 
also . brought with it a curtailment of MIS's wartime powers. In this unenviable 
situation-facing staff-cuts, funding-reductions and an awkward political climate-MIS 
became a demoralised Service. Atdee's appointment of an 'outsider', Sir Percy Sillitoe, as 
the post-war Director-General was regarded by many officers in MIS, whether intended 
or not, as a vote of no confidence. MIS would have preferred the appointment of an 
'insider', and Sillitoe, who joined the Service with the public image of a famed policeman, 
was not seen as an ideal choice for intelligence work. Sillitoe did not always enjoy a 
cordial relationship with MIS's staff, the 'intellectual types' whom he distrusted, and even 
Sillitoe's otherwise sympathetic biographer concedes that his time as Director-General 
was not a success.? In this uneasy climate, some of the leading figures in MIS, 
overworked but unappreciated within Whitehall, considered resigning. Arguably the 
principal character behind the Double Cross System, T.A. 'Tar' Robertson, became so 
disillusioned that he took early retirement in 1947, choosing to leave behind the secret 
world and instead became a sheep farmer in Gloucestershire.8 
In the post-war environment, MIS faced the worst possible combination of 
events: though they had fewer resources, they were burdened with greater 
responsibilities. Britain emerged from the war with more territory under its control than 
at any point ever before. Britain's imperial 'overstretch', as it has been termed, had 
straightforward implications for MIS: as an imperial Service, at the end of the war MIS 
had obligations stretching from Newfoundland to Hong Kong. 9 They had security 
liaison obligations in occupied Germany and several other wartime theatres now under 
6 Wilson, 'The war in the dark', p. 120. 
? A.W. Cockerill, Sir Perry Sillitoe, (London, 1975), pp. 176-8. 
8 NA KV 4/162 'Organisation and function of B-Division 1941-1953', s.74a: 'A-Division 
Circular', (24 July, 1948); private information. 
9 NA KV4/18 'Report on the operation of Overseas Control in connection with the 
establishment of DSO's in the British colonies & liaison with the security authorities in the 
Dominions during the war of 1939-1945'. 
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British conttol. lO Between May and August 1946, MIS also officially took over 
responsibility for Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), which during the war had 
operated as a semi-independent MIS umbrella organisation throughout the Middle East. 11 
When Sillitoe was appointed as Director-General in May 1946-the month that Alan 
Nunn May was prosecuted at the Old Bailey-MIS was thus in a weak overall position, 
and was forced to deal with the most urgent threat to hand. With increased obligations 
in the Middle East, the most immediate post-war threat for MIS was not the Soviet 
Union, as we may have expected, nor within the spectrum of unrest in the Middle East 
was it even Arab terrorism, which had been a pressing security threat before the war.12 
Instead the most urgent threat to British national security immediately after the Second 
World War was Zionist terrorism. 13 
The priority shown by MIS to Zionist terrorism was due to operational reasons, 
resulting from greater obligations but restricted powers, but more importantly was due to 
the urgent nature of the threat itself. MIS records reveal, for the first time, the full extent 
to which Zionist terrorism posed a threat to British national security in the years after the 
war. At the end of the war MIS received reports from SIME warning that 'Victory in 
Europe may be regarded as D-Day by the Irgun Zwi Leumi and the Stern Group, the 
two terrorist organisations in Palestine'.14 We can now see that SIME's warnings were 
accurate: VE-Day was indeed a D-Day for Zionist terrorists in the Middle East. A large 
10 NA FO 1049/1088 'Use of Germans: vetting policy'; FO 936/525 <Vetting: general policy'. 
II NA KV4/234 'Intelligence organisation in the Middle East (SIME)', s.55a: Security Intelligence 
Middle East, (11 June, 1946); Ibid., s.57a:]IC (46) 51 'Security Intelligence Middle East', (23 Aug. , 
1946); Shelley, 'British intelligence in the Middle East, 1939-1946'. 
12 For Arab terrorism before the war, see: Charles Smith, 'Two revolts in Palestine. An 
examination of the British response to Arab and Jewish rebellion, 1936 to 1948', (ph.D. 
dissertation, Cambridge University, 1990); For the Mufti of Jerusalem, see: NA KV2/2084-2092 
'Haj Amin el Husseini'. 
13 Walton, 'British intelligence, the Mandate of Palestine and threats to national security 
immediately after the Second World War'. 
14 NA CO 733/457/14 'Palestine terrorist organisations: capture of Yacov Meridor, IZL (Irgun 
Zvai Leumi) leader': Guy Liddell to Christopher Eastwood, Colonial Office, (19 April, 1945). 
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body of literature currendy exists on Jewish-related terrorism in the British Mandate of 
Palestine. 15 But hitherto undisclosed is the fact that Zionist terrorists were planning to 
extend their 'war' against the British from Palestine to mainland Britain. In the sununer 
of 1946 information from reliable MIS sources in the Middle East revealed that the Irgun 
and the Stern Gang were planning to send five terrorist 'cells' to London, 'to work on 
IRA lines'. To use their own words, the terrorists planned to 'beat the dog in his own 
kennel'.16 This information came from reliable agents who were in contact with the 
terrorist organisations, from MIS's liaison contacts with Jewish-Zionist groups in the 
Middle East, and from the interrogation of captured members of the terrorist 
organisations themselves. 17 These sources warned that Zionist terrorists were targeting 
for assassination prominent politicians closely associated with British policies in the 
Middle East, including the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and even the Prime Minister 
himself, Clement Atdee.18 In 1946 MIS informed both Atdee and Bevin that that they 
were known to be assassination targets for the Stern Gang. 19 
Given the nature of Zionist terrorism during the war, MIS was obliged to take 
these warnings seriously. In November 1944 the Stern Gang had assassinated the British 
Minister of State in the Middle East, Lord Moyne, and on several occasions they had 
attempted to murder the British High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Harold 
15 Bruce R. Hoffman, Jewish terrorist activities and the British government in Palestine, 1939-
1947', (D.Phil. dissertation, Oxford University, 1985); J. Bowyer Bell, Tenvr out oj Zion. Irgun Zvai 
Leumi, Lehi and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949, (London and New York, 1977); David A. 
Charters, The British A rmy and Jewish Insurgenry in Palestine, 1945-4-7, (Basingstoke, 1989); David A. 
Charters, 'British intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1945-47', Intelligence and National Security, 
6, no. 1, (1991), pp. 115-40; Joseph Heller, The Stern Gang. Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-49, 
(London, 1995). In fiction, see: Linda Grant, When I lived in Modern Times, (London, 2000). 
16 NA KV5/30 'Stern Group', s.111z: Alex Kellar to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, (16 Aug., 
1946); Ibid., James Robertson to Leonard Burt, Special Branch, (26 Aug., 1946). 
17 NA CO 733/457/13 'Terrorist outrages. Extension to the United Kingdom', s.4: Sir David 
Petrie to Sir Alexander Maxwell, Home Office, (2April, 1945); NA KV5/29 'Stern Group', s.36a: 
'Extract from A.J. Kellar's report on his trip to the Middle East', (Feb., 1945). 
18 NA FO 371/52584 'Activities of the Stern Group': James Robertson to Trafford Smith, 
Colonial Office, (5 Feb., 1946). . 
19 Ibid., Sir Hugh Garter to Sir Alexander Maxwell, Home Office, (19 Feb., 1946). 
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MacMichael.20 In the aftermath of the war there was a sharp escalation of Jewish related 
violence in the Mandate, as incidents against the British were followed by bloody 
reprisal. 21 On 22 July 1946 the Irgun Zvai Leumi bombed the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem, detonating SOOlbs of explosives which they smuggled into the hotel in milk 
churns. The explosion sheared off the entire south wing of the hotel, which housed 
British government offices and personnel, killing ninety-one people in total-including 
Jews.22 One of the most chilling images of the King David Hotel bombing is a photo of 
a typewriter sitting amid the rubble, with two young hands severed above the wrists, 
fingers still on the keys.23 MIS records do not support Menachem Begin's subsequent 
claim that the Irgun issued a clear warning of the bombing: if there had been an 
unambiguous warning, there is certainly no trace of it in MIS records, where we would 
expect it to have been copied from the Palestine police (CID). Sir John Shaw, who 
worked for the Colonial Office and who, as we shall see, became an important MIS 
officer in the late 1940s, was in the King David Hotel when it was bombed, and denied 
that the Irgun issued a warning.24 The horrific scale of the attack is put into perspective 
when it is appreciated that in the entire twentieth century, only fourteen terrorist attacks 
killed more than 100 people, which places the King David Hotel bombing near that 
threshold.25 As well as serving as a deadly symbolic attack on Britain's rule in Palestine, 
the bombing was also a direct blow to British intelligence: both MIS and SIS had offices 
in the King David Hotel. 
20 Michael J. Cohen, 'The Moyne assassination, November 1944: a political assessment', Middle 
Eastern Studies, 15, no. 3 (1979), pp. 358-73. 
21 NA CO 733/456/10 'Palestine: Jewish terrorism (1946),. 
22 Thurston Clarke, By Blood and Fire. The A ttack on the King David Hotel, (London, 1981), p. 252. 
23 See: letters to the Editor, marking the sixtieth anniversary of the King David Hotel bombing, 
in The Times, London: (24 July, 2006). 
24 NA KV2/2252 'Menachem Begin', Minute 131: John Shaw, (5 Aug., 1953). 
25 Bruce Hoffman, 'The war on terror: a prognosis for the future', paper delivered at Cambridge 
University Intelligence Seminar, (10 March, 2006). 
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Given the nature and scale of the King David Hotel atrocity, MIS was 
understandably alarmed when in its wake they received information that the Irgun and 
Stern Gang Were planning to launch terrorist attacks in Britain itself. MIS did not wish 
to circulate alarmist information throughout Whitehall nor 'cry wolf, but the intelligence 
they received from the Middle East was trustworthy and logical. As MIS explained to the 
Special Branch and Colonial Office, 'there is no doubt whatever of the desperate 
character of the members of these organisations and the possibility of political 
assassinations in this country, similar to the murder of Lord Moyne, cannot be 
excluded'.26 Precedents for the assassination of politicians in Britain resulting from 
imperial grievances included that of Sir William Curzon-Wyllie (1909) and Sir Michael 
O'Dwyer (1940)-both assassinated by Indian revolutionaries in 'revenge' murders for 
British colonial violence. At the end of August 1946 Sillitoe briefed the Prime Minister 
on the extension of Zionist terrorism to mainland Britain, warning that the assassination 
of 'selected V.I.P.'s' in Britain had to be considered a possibility.27 Sillitoe further 
outlined the threat in a closed lecture to the Special Branch in September 1946: 
Reports that the IRGUN ZV AI LEUMI or STERN Group 
may attempt the assassination of a prominent British figure 
outside the Middle East have in fact been growing in 
number since the beginning of this year and culminated a 
few days ago in a report that the IRGUN and STERN, in 
the event of the death sentence of the 18 STERN Group 
members now in custody in Palestine [for the bombing of 
the King David Hotel], intended jointly to set up 
representative "cells" in London ... Should such plans for 
extending their activities abroad be realised by the IRGUN 
and STERN, we might be faced with a real danger of 
26 NA KV5/29 'Stern Group', s.43a: P.R. Barry to MIll [name illegible], (23 April, 1945); Ibid., 
s.113a: James Robertson to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, (27 Aug., 1946). 
27 NA KV3/41 'Appreciations of the security problems arising from Jewish terrorism, Jewish 
illegal immigration, and Arab activities', s.la: 'Notes for the Director-General's meeting with the 
Prime Minister', (28 Aug., 1946). 
assassinations or the sabotage of important buildings in this 
country, and particularly in London.28 
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MIS's fears regarding the extension of Zionist terrorism to areas outside of 
Palestine were proved correct. At the end of October 1946, following the bombing of 
the Kind David Hotel, the Irgun bombed the British embassy in Rome.29 The Irgun 
followed this attack in late 1946 and early 1947 with a series of sabotage operations 
conducted against British military transportation routes in occupied Germany.30 Then, in 
April 1947, an Irgun bomb consisting of twenty-four sticks of explosives was found in 
the Colonial Office in London. The only reason why the bomb failed to detonate was 
because its timer broke.31 The head of the Special Branch, Leonard Burt, later estimated 
that if the bomb had gone off it may have caused damage on comparable scale to the 
King David Hote1.32 At the same time, several prominent British politicians and public 
figures, some of whom were wholly unconnected to Palestine, received telephone and 
letter death threats from the Stern Gang at their homes and offices in Britain.33 Finally, 
in June 1947, the Stern Gang launched a letter bomb campaign in Britain, targeting every 
prominent member of the Cabinet. None of the twenty-one letter bombs, which were 
posted from Italy, got through to their targets but when they were inspected by ballistics 
experts at the Home Office, all the bombs were found to be potentially lethal. The Stern 
Gang launched a subsequent letter bomb assault in Britain in 1948.34 
28 NA KV3/41, s.2a: Alex Kellar notes for Sir Percy Sillitoe, 'Present trends in Zionism', (2 Sept. , 
1946), p. 7. 
29 NA FO 371/67796 'Italy': E. Irdell, British embassy Rome, (23 Jan., 1947). 
30 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture on Zionist subversive activities', (16 March, 
1948), p. 8. 
31 'Terrorist bomb in Whitehall', The Times, London: (17 April 1946). 
32 Burt, Commander Butt if Scotland Yard, pp. 126-7. 
33 NA CO 537/1723 'Terrorist outrages: extension to UK'. 
34 NA EF 5/12 'Outrages 1947-1948: letter bombs', H.E. Watts, Chief Inspector of Explosives, 
(24 June, 1947); 'Letter bombs from Turin', The Times, London: (7 June, 1947). 
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MIS records on Zionist terrorism substantially revise our understanding of the 
history of the early Cold War. For the entire duration of the Cold War, MIS and other 
western intelligence agencies would be overwhelmingly concerned with Soviet counter-
espionage and counter-intelligence. By contrast, we can now see that immediately after 
the Second World War, MIS's most pressing concern lay with counter-terrorism. When 
seen with the hindsight of the Cold War, the priority shown by MIS to Zionist terrorism 
seems extraordinary: the idea that the Irgun and Stern Gang presented a more urgent 
threat to British national security than Stalin's Soviet Union appears a fantastic 
misjudgement on MIS's part. The nature of the warnings that MIS received about 
Zionist terrorism, however, meant that the Service had to rate them as a priority over 
identifiable long-term threats. As we shall see, MIS's information came from reliable 
human sources in the Middle East and almost certainly from intercepted secret Zionist 
communications (SIGIN1). Far from being a misjudgement, MIS's priority shown to 
Zionist terrorism was perfecdy logical: dealing with immediate issues to hand is what all 
people do, in all walks of life, every day, and there is no reason why MIS could have 
behaved differendy. Of course it was not the case that MIS simply 'forgot' about the 
threat of Soviet espionage and domestic communism. B-Division and F-Division 
continued with their enquiries. But without any positive information on the Soviet 
Union and in an awkward post-war environment, MIS naturally had to deal with the 
most pressing task. MIS, furthermore, was not the only branch of the British intelligence 
community which rated Zionist terrorism as a priority at the end of the war. As we have 
already seen, the JIC was silent on the Soviet threat between December 1944 and March 
1946. But at this precise juncture, the JIC showed repeated concern about Palestine and 
the threat posed by Zionist terrorism-both within and outside of the Mandate. In the 
summer of 1946, when the JIC could see no peaceful solution to the question of 
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Palestine, it ~ppeared to Britain's intelligence services that Zionist terrorism could itself 
be a long-term threat.35 
This chapter will examine MIS'~ investigations into Zionist terrorism. As we 
shall see, MIS used the full repertoire of techniques at their disposal to assess and 
counter the threat of Zionist terrorism. These techniques included 'personnel security' 
measures to prevent terrorists entering Britain, the surveillance of Zionist groups in 
Britain, the neutralisation of their subversive propaganda-which involved radical 
preachers in North London-and the establishlnent of intelligence liaison contacts in 
Britain and the Middle East. MIS was also involved with assessing the security threat 
posed by Jewish 'illegal' immigration to Palestine. These were difficult and politically 
sensitive subjects for MIS to assess, but the nature of the terrorist threat required that 
they were assessed. Before Sir David Petrie retired as the wartime Director-General of 
MIS in May 1946, he made an assessment of the threat posed by Zionist terrorism and 
issued a stark warning: 'the red light is definitely showing,.36 The phrase which Petrie 
used is significant on several levels. On the one hand, it illustrates the urgency of the 
terrorist threat. On the other hand, Petrie's phrase is noteworthy because it is 
astonishingly similar to that which the CIA used to describe the threat of Islamist 
terrorism before September 11, 200t,37 In fact, as we shall see, there are some striking 
parallels between the terrorist threat which MIS faced half a century ago and the terrorist 
35 NA CAB 81/129 ]IC (45) 151 (0) 'The possibility of major Arab disturbances in Palestine', (2 
May, 1945); CAB 81/130 JIC (45) 221 (0) 'Probable reactions in other Middle Eastern states to 
disturbances in Palestine', (13 July, 1945); Ibid, JIC (45) 227 (0), 'Military repercussions in the 
Middle East to the alternative courses of action in Palestine, when the immigration quota is 
exhausted', (22 July, 1945); Ibid, JIC (45) 228 (0) (Revised Final), 'Middle East policy', (31 July, 
1945); Ibid, JIC (45) 257 (0) 'Threat from saboteurs and hostile persons to the safety of RAF 
equipment and personnel in the Middle East', (20 Aug., 1945); Ibid,JIC (45) 275 (0) 'Middle East 
policy', (13 Sept., 1945). 
36 NA KV5/4 'United Zionist 'Revisionist' youth organisation', Minute 24a: Sir David Petrie, (30 
March, 1946). 
37 See: George Tenet's testimonial before the '9/11 commission' in Final Report rif the National 
Commission on the TerroristAttacks upon the United States, (Washington DC, 2003), p. 259. 
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threat which MIS and other intelligence agencies are currently facing at the start of the 
twenty-first century. Not for the last time, in the years after the Second World War 
international terrorism threatened to explode outwards from the Middle East and strike 
in western Europe. Britain's attempts to deal with Zionist terrorism essentially 
represented an empire's 'war on terror'. 
I. The nature of Zionist terrorism 
In Britain's expenence, terrorism ill the Middle East was a form of drastic 
rebellion. This had been the case immediately before the Second World War, when Arab 
populations in the Mandate of Palestine had rebelled against the British government, 
which was responsible for governing the Mandate through the League of Nations. The 
'Arab Revolt' (1936 to 1939) had been caused largely by the prospect of Jewish mass-
immigration to Palestine. Faced with the threat of civil war in Palestine and with war in 
Europe looming, in 1939 the British government had instigated a highly controversial 
quota-system, which limited the number of Jewish immigrants to the Mandate to 1,500 
per month.38 Although at the time the British government could not have foreseen the 
consequences of these restrictions, the quota-system effectively left countless Jews in 
Europe to fall victim to the genocidal Nazi war machine. The British government 
accepted Jewish refugees into Britain itself, but as several observers have maintained, 
London's restrictions on immigration to Palestine prevented Jews in Europe escaping 
Nazi persecution, and ultimately extermination.39 
38 Michael J. Cohen, 'Appeasement in the Middle East: the British White Paper on Palestine, May 
1939', The Historical Journal, 16, no. 3, (1973), pp. 571-596; Michael J. Cohen, 'The British White 
Paper on Palestine, May 1939. Part II: The testing of a policy, 1942-1945', The Historical Journal, 
19, no. 3, (1976), pp. 727-58. 
39 Michael J. Cohen (ed.), The Rise of Israel. The Holocaust and Illegal Immigration, 1939-1947, 
(London, 1987). 
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The 'Second World War revolutionised the question of Palestine. The 
unprecedented violence inflicted upon Jews in Europe transformed the Zionist 
movement-the worldwide political movement to establish an independent Jewish state 
in Palestine. For a minority of 'Revisionist' Zionists the failings of the British 
govemment regarding Jews legitimised, in their opinion, the use of violence against the 
British. In fact, after the Second World War, Zionist extremists seem to have drawn the 
logical conclusion from the precedent of the pre-war 'Arab Revolt': a recourse to political 
violence could effectively change Britain's policies towards the Mandate. The aims of the 
pre-war 'Arab Revolt' and the Jewish insurgency in Palestine a decade later were broadly 
similar: both revolts aimed to change Britain's policies towards the Mandate, or render 
British rule there utterly untenable.4O 
As with most topics in the modem history of the Middle East, the subject of 
Zionist terrorism is highly controversial, not just for Israelis today but for any 
sympathetic non-Israeli observer as well. Many of the policies pursued by the British in 
Palestine were controversial at the time and remain so today. After the unparalleled 
violence of the Second World War, Jewish communities throughout Europe had 
arguably the most justifiable right in the history of mankind to create for themselves an 
independent national home. After the Second World War, many of those Jews who had 
managed to survive the Nazi onslaught-and many of whom subsequently faced Stalin's 
Soviet Union-desired to flee Europe and settle in Palestine. Fearing further anti-Semitic 
violence within Europe, they had a moral right, and through the Balfour Declaration 
(1917) arguably a legal right, to establish a national home for themselves in Palestine.41 
40 Smith, 'Two revolts in Palestine'. 
41 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace. Creating the Modem Middle East, 1914-1922, (London, 
1989); Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle. The Struggle betlveen the British, the Jews and the Arabs, 
1935-48, (London, 1979). 
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In their rule in Palestine after the Second World War, the British government was 
placed in an almost impossible position. While other countries were free after the war to 
make generous promises to Jews regarding Palestine, Britain alone had to deal with the 
f th . 42 consequences 0 ose protnlses. In their administration of Palestine, British 
authorities were confronted with broadly irreconcilable demands: Jewish mass-
immigration to the Mandate on the one hand, but substantial Arab opposition to those 
plans on the other. Throughout the Second World War, SIGINT revealed to London 
the extent to which Arab states across the Middle East were bitterly opposed to Jewish 
mass-immigration to Palestine. Based on SIGINT and the experience of the 'Arab 
Revolt' before the war, London feared that if unrestricted Jewish immigration to 
Palestine were permitted, a civil war would erupt between Jews and Arabs.43 After the 
Second World War, the task facing Britain was thus to find a settlement in Palestine that 
would be both acceptable to Jews after the Holocaust, but at the same time not 
unacceptable to Arabs. Perhaps the situation in the Mandate after the war was best 
summarised by Sir Alan Cunningham, the final British High Commissioner in Palestine, 
who described the struggle as: 
A bitter contest between Jews and Arabs, each fearing 
domination by the other, in which the Mandatory 
government, standing between, has been continually 
denounced, first by one community and then by the other, 
as showing favour to the other side.44 
British policies in the final years of the Mandate are extremely contentious topics. 
Many observers have argued that after the Second World War, Jews had a unique right to 
42 Alan Bullock, The Life and Times rifErnest Bevin, vol. III: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, (London, 
1983), p. 170. 
43 Decrypts can be found in NA HW 12/277 and HW 12/288-90. 
44 Alan Cunningham, 'Palestine-the last days of the Mandate', International Affairs, 24, no. 4, 
(1948), p. 490. . 
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create a national homeland for themselves in Palestine, by any means possible. This 
dissertation certainly does not seek to enter into the debate on the legitimisation of 
violence in 'national-liberation' movements.45 Instead, it will follow the nature of 
investigations set by MIS. As today, MIS was neither a political nor a diplomatic 
organisation; MIS had no executive power and no political agenda. As a Service, MIS 
was responsible not to the government, but rather to the 'realm', and they investigated 
national security threats irrespective of their political persuasion. As Sir Percy Sillitoe 
explained in his memoirs, when he became Director-General: 
Among the points that were called especially to my 
attention was the ruling that the work of M.I.S is 
unconnected with political matters, and that it must never 
be thought or suggested that the politics of those who seek 
to subvert our realm or institutions have a bearing on 
M.I.S's activities to frustrate their efforts. It must be borne 
in mind that the function of M.I.S is a purely defensive one; 
it is charged solely with detecting activities liable to 
undermine the national security of this country; the creed, 
politics; or nationalities of those responsible for such 
activities is immaterial.46 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, MIS was obliged to investigate those 
Zionist extremists who posed a threat to British national security. But in doing so, MIS 
was always careful to distinguish between the minority of Jews and Zionists who posed a 
genuine threat, and the vast majority who were of no security concern whatsoever. 
MIS's interest lay only with those who actively turned to subversion and terrorism. MIS 
used the term 'Zionist terrorism' rather than 'Jewish terrorism' because their 
investigations spread to non-Jewish groups, such as Greek and South American shipping 
companies, who were involved with terrorism. Crucially, not all Jews were Zionists and 
45 The classic account of which is Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, (London, 1965). 
46 Percy Sillitoe, Cloak lpithout Dagger, (London, 1955), p. xvi. 
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not all Zionists were Jews. Furthermore, MIS did not use 'Zionist terrorism' as an 
inclusive term, implying that the ideology of Zionism was somehow inherently 'terrorist'. 
Presumably MIS's investigations into Zionist terrorism ran along parallel lines to their 
investigations into Irish republican terrorism, whose terrorist platform lay with an 
ideological commitment to-or opportunistic involvement with-'republicanism', which 
by no means was limited to Irish nationals. Sillitoe explained MIS's overall concerns with 
Zionist terrorism in a lecture to the Special Branch in March 1948: 
M.I.S are not of course concerned with the actlV1tles of 
Jews as such. Nor does M.I.S. devote time to studying 
Zionist activities as a whole, except where these are 
definitely of a subversive nature or prejudicial to the 
defence plans of the British Empire. There is nothing illegal 
in Zionism as a political creed. It only comes within our 
province when some of the activities of its extremist 
supporters qualify beyond doubt to be described as secret, 
subversive or illegal, and thus a danger to the security of the 
Empire and of this country.47 
Throughout their history, MIS investigated groups and individuals who posed a 
prima jacie threat to British national security, but they also investigated groups which, 
although they did not pose an ostensible threat, included members who posed-or 
evidence suggested could pose-a national security threat.48 In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, MIS did not investigate Jewish activities because they were Jewish-
MIS investigated them because Zionist terrorism posed a threat to British national 
security. From the outset, MIS conducted their investigations on the understanding that 
the overwhelming majority of Jews in Britain and the Jewish community in Palestine (the 
47 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), p. 1. 
48 This was true for the Peace Pledge Union on the outbreak of the Second World War, see: 
Curry, The Sectlrity Seroice, pp. 59,86, 150, 160-64. 
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Yishuv) were' opposed to Zionist terrorism. 49 MIS was thus not somehow 'anti-Semitic' 
because they investigated Jewish affairs and the Zionist movement. In fact, some of 
those working in the British intelligence ~ommunity had done all they could to help Jews 
escape from pre-war Nazi Germany.50 MIS was no more 'anti-Semitic' because they 
investigated Zionism terrorism half a century ago than MIS is 'anti-Islamic' today 
because they investigate the current security threats surrounding Islamist terrorism. 51 
A discussion of British intelligence and Zionist terrorism raises another 
immediate, and fundamentally important, question: the language used by MIS to describe 
Zionist extremists. In MIS reports, those Zionist extremists waging a 'war' against the 
British were described as 'terrorists', their activities as 'terrorism' and the immigration of 
Jewish refugees to Palestine outside the quota-system imposed by British authorities as 
'illegal immigration'. These terms are clearly controversial and offensive to many 
observers. Retrospectively, members of the Irgun and Stern Gang-like members of the 
IRA in Ireland, the FLN in Algeria or the EOKA in Cyprus-steadfastly denied, and still 
deny, that they were ever 'terrorists,.52 Instead they styled themselves as 'resistance 
fighters' and 'patriots,.53 Perhaps inevitably, though, the terminology of terrorism is 
49 For a broader military discussion, see: Bruce Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy in 
Palestine, 1939-1947, (London, 1983), p. lEE. 
50 Michael Smith, Folry: The Spy who Saved 10,000 Jews, (London, 1999). Also see the collection of 
documents, compiled by Gill Bennett, relating to Foley's triumphs, available through the FCO 
website: \V\V\v.fco.gov.uk (accessed 15 June, 2006). 
51 The Security Service today uses the term 'Islamist' terrorism in recognition of the fact that 
Muslims who advocate, and turn to, terrorism are bastardising Islamic teachings and values. See: 
\V\V\v.miS.gov.uk (accessed 15 June, 2006). 
52 Martha C. Hutchinson, Revolutionary Tenvrism: the FIN in Algeria, 1954-1962, (Stanford Ca., 
1974); J. Bowyer Bell, 'Contemporary revolutionary organizations', International Organization: 
Transnational Relations and World Politics, 25, no. 3, (1971), pp. 503-518. 
53 In July 2006 a group of right-wing Israelis, including Benyamin Netanyahu, attended a 
commemoration organised by the 'Menachem Begin Heritage Centre' for the sixtieth anniversary 
of the bombing of the King David Hotel, which they described as an act of 'freedom fighting'. A 
plaque commemorating the attack attracted an official response from the British ambassador in 
Tel Aviv, who argued that it was offensive to commemorate an act of terrorism. See: 'British 
anger at terror celebration', The Times, London: (20 July, 2006). For orthodox refutations of 
'terrorism', see: Menachem Begin, The Revolt, English trans.: (London, 1951), pp. 59-60; Yitzhak 
Shamir, Summing Up. An Autobiograpry, (London, 1994), pp. 32-50. 
152 
bound to be' controversial and problematic for subsequent commentators. Although it is 
a cliched adage by now, nevertheless it holds true: one man's 'freedom-fighter' is another 
man's 'terrotist'.54 In the case of Zionis't terrorism, terminology is acutely controversial 
because several leading politicians of the future state of Israel were involved in terrorist 
campaigns. The future Prime Minister of Israel, the great pillar of Israeli politics and 
eventual Nobel Peace Prize winner, Menachem Begin, was labelled as a 'terrorist' by 
British security agencies, as was another future Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir.55 
British authorities in Palestine also imprisoned and denounced as 'terrorists' at least one 
future Israeli Supreme Court Judge (Meir Shamgar) and future Israeli Minister of Justice 
(Shamuel Tamir).56 
Despite its potential controversy, terminology poses less of a problem when it 
comes to Zionist terrorism than it does with other cases of terrorism. Contrary to what 
they subsequendy claimed, at the time Zionist paramilitaries such the Stern Gang 
described themselves as 'terrorists'. The term 'terrorism' was thus not being used by 
British security unjustifiably, nor is it being imposed here anachronistically. If the aim of 
terrorism is to instil 'terror' through random acts of violence then, as numerous studies 
have demonstrated, the Irgun and Stern Gang were clearly 'terrorist' organisations. 57 By 
any kind of international standard of diplomacy and warfare, the Irgun and Stern Gang 
were illegitimate military bodies: unlike the official, and moderate, 'Defence' Army of the 
Jewish Agency (Hagannah), they operated in a military theatre outside the accepted rules 
of engagement. If war is the extension of politics by other means, as Clausewitz argued, 
54 Michael Howard, 'What's in a name?', Foreign Affairs, 81, no. 1, aan.-Feb., 2002), pp. 8-13. 
55 NA KV2/2251-52 'Menachem Begin'. 
56 Michael Bar-Zohar, Yaacov Herzog. A Biograpf?y, English trans.: (London, 2005), p. 62. 
57 Matthew Carr, Unknouw Soldiers: H01v Tenvrism Transformed the Modern World, (London, 2006), pp. 
69, 190-91; Michael Walzer, Just and U'!iust Wars. A Moral A'lJ,ument lvith Historical Illustrations, 3rd 
ed.: (London and New York, 2000), pp. 176-96,197-201; Hoffman, Jewish terrorist activities 
and the British government in Palestine'; Heller, The Stern Gang, passim; Paul Wilkinson (ed.), 
British Perspectives on Tenvrism, (London, 1981), p. 18; Geulah Cohen, Woman of Violence. Memoirs of 
a Young Tenvrist, 1943-1948, (London, 1966). 
153 
then terrorism can be regarded as the extension of war by other means. The Irgun, 
which was led by Menachem Begin after the Second World War, was thought by British 
security forces to have between 5,obo and 6,000 members-now considered an 
exaggerated estimate-and specialised in the bombing of property and infrastructure. 58 
The Stern Gang, also known as the Lehi, was estimated by British security to have 
between 300 and 500 members, and specialised in assassinations. 59 In fact, the Stern 
Gang is thought to have been one of the last groups in the world to have publicly called 
itself a 'terrorist' organisation.60 
Indicative of the Irgun and Stern Gang's genuinely terrorist agenda is the fact 
that after the state of Israel was established in May 1948, the new Israeli government was 
itself forced to deal with their threat. Here the parallels with the Irish Free State and the 
IRA are striking. Before 1948 leading Zionist politicians such as David Ben-Gurion (the 
first Prime Minister of Israel) and Chaim Weizmann (the first President of Israel) had 
persistendy taken a hard-line approach against Zionist terrorism. They regarded the 
Irgun and Stern Gang as illegitimate and illega1.61 When Ben-Gurion became Israel's first 
Prime Minister, his firm stance against Zionist terrorism led to some dramatic 
confrontations. In a now-notorious incident, in June 1948 Ben-Gurion ordered Jewish 
troops to fire on a boat moored off the coast of Tel Aviv, the Altalena, bringing Jewish 
sympathisers and arms to the Irgun.62 Soon after this incident, on 17 September 1948, a 
splinter group of the Stern Gang assassinated Count Bernadotte, the UN peace mediator 
58 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 258; Charters, 'British intelligence', p. 125 
59 NA CAB 158/2JIC (47) 52 (0) (Final), 'Possible future of Palestine', (9 Sept., 1947); KV 3/67 
'Zionist activities', s.113a: Alex Kellar, notes for Sir Percy Sillitoe, 'Present trends in Zionism', (2 
Sept., 1946), pp. 6-7. 
60 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (London, 1998), p. 29. 
61 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error. The Autobiograpl?J of Chaim Weizmann, (London, 1949), pp. 
539,556-7; NA KV 2/196 'Liddell diaries', (19 Feb., 1945). 
62 'Fighting between Jews', The Times, London: (23 June, 1948). 
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in Palestine.63 At this point the fragile young Israeli state came closer to civil war than it 
would in its entire history. The new Israeli government was forced to introduce 
immediate emergency regulations to deai with Zionist terrorism. 64 In what is hardly the 
only ironic twist in the modern history of the Middle East, the Israeli government thus 
inherited many of the security problems which previously the British had faced in 
Palestine. In fact extremist Zionism continues to be a security threat for the Israeli 
government today. In 1995 Israel's ninth Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was 
assassinated by an ultra-nationalist Jewish-Zionist extremist. 65 In 2005 and 2006 Israel's 
withdrawals from the Gaza Strip likewise heightened Israeli security concerns over 
Zionist terrorism.66 
II. British intelligence and Zionist terrorism 
MIS was not the only branch of the British intelligence community which 
investigated the threat of Zionist terrorism. There is some evidence to suggest that SIS 
showed a similar concern to MIS regarding Zionist terrorism, though without further SIS 
documentation it is impossible to say whether they did so on the same scale.67 Perhaps 
significandy, a future distinguished Chief of SIS, Sir Maurice Oldfield, worked for SIME 
at the end of the war and was involved with investigations into Zionist terrorism. 68 
63 J. Bowyer Bell, 'Assassination in international politics: Lord Moyne, Count Bernadotte, and the 
Lehi', International Studies QuarterlY, 16, no. 1, (1972), pp. 59-82; Kati Marton, A Death in Jerusalem, 
(London, 1994). 
64 NA FO 371/68697 'Palestine (1948)', s.3: Jewish committee to liquidate dissident military 
groups'. 
65 Ehud Sprinzak, Brother against Brother. Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the 
Rabin Assassination, (N ew York and London, 1999). 
66 For example, see: David Eshel, 'Sharon, the settlers, and the threat of radical Jewish terrorism 
in Israel', Jane's International Securiry News, Ouly, 2003); Ami Pedahzur, The Israeli Response to Jewish 
Extremism and Violence: Defending Democra0', (Manchester, 2002). 
67 NA KV 4/197 'Organisation and function of SIME special section (1942-45),. 
68 Anthony Cavendish, Inside Intelligence, (London, 1990), pp. 15-78. 
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GC&CS also played an important role in British investigations into Zionist terrorism. 
British SIGINT outfits had been decrypting secret communications regarding the 
Mandate of Palestine since the 1920s, but by the end of the Second World War 
apparently this effort had dramatically expanded, and GC&CS was intercepting a wide 
range of secret Zionist communications.69 MIS records reveal that these sources, 
codenamed BUTTERCUP, FOG and CREAM, provided a crucial insight into the 
terrorist threat.70 Unfortunately the sources themselves have not yet been declassified, 
but a measure of their importance is revealed by Liddell's diary, which noted that 
intercepted Zionist communications were of 'considerable assistance' to MIS's counter-
. .. 71 
terronst enqU1t1es. 
Due to Palestine's strategic importance within the empue, MIS had always 
regarded it as a high overall priority. At the end of the war, MIS representation in 
Palestine took the form of a Defence Security Officer (DSO) permanently stationed in 
Jerusalem. As with MIS representation throughout the British empire, MIS's DSO in 
Palestine worked closely with local British civilian and military authorities, especially the 
Special Branch. As elsewhere throughout the Middle East, the DSO in Palestine 
reported both to MIS in London and to SIME headquarters in Cairo, which by 1946 had 
a total of seventy-six officers working for it across the Middle East.72 In 1945 and 1946 
the successive DSOs in Palestine were Henry Hunloke, a former Conservative MP for 
West Derbyshire, and Richard 'Dick' Thistlethwaite, who subsequently became an MIS 
69 NA HW 41/361-70: Cryptographic Reports issued by no. 2 Wireless Company, Sarafand, 
Palestine'. 
70 NA KVS/38 'Irgun Zvi Leumi', s.187b: 'IZL activities in Palestine', (31 July, 1947); KV3/41, 
s.2a: CREAM CX [number withheld] SIS [name withheld] to Dick White, MIS, (31 March, 1947). 
71 NA KV4/190 'Liddell diaries', (23 Sept., 1942). 
72 NA KV4/234, s.SSa: 'Security Intelligence Middle East', (11 June, 1946). 
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liaison offic~r in Washington DC73 As a highly-rated priority, perhaps it is not surprising 
that Palestine also received the attention of some of MIS's most important officers in 
London. Sir David Petrie himself had 'reorganised Palestine's security and intelligence 
apparatus before the war. 74 During the war 'Tar' Robertson personally travelled to the 
Middle East to help coordinate SIME Double Cross operations.75 The post-war Director 
of B-Division, Dick White, also made two trips to Palestine, one during the war and the 
second in 1946. During his latter trip, White was mentioned in several newspapers 
which, no doubt acting on a tip-off, had grown suspicious of the civilian 'mystery man' 
travelling by troop-ship to the Middle East.76 MIS's priority shown to Palestine, 
however, went further up the Service's ranks still. In fact it went to the highest level 
within MIS: during the height of the terrorist threat in the autumn of 1946, Sir Percy 
Sillitoe himself travelled to Palestine.77 Unfortunately little is currently available regarding 
Sillitoe's trip, but as we shall see in the final chapter of this dissertation, his trip to 
Palestine became one in a series of journeys which the Director-General made 
throughout the empire as Britain faced the question of decolonisation in the early Cold 
War. 
Unlike today, at the end of the Second World War MIS did not have a specific 
department dealing with terrorism. Instead terrorism was the joint responsibility of B-
Division and F-Division. MIS's in-house experts in the Middle East, and Zionist 
terrorism particularly, were Alex Kellar and his assistant James Robertson. Kellar, a 
73 For Henry Hunloke's election as an MP, see: 'West Derbyshire election', The Times, London: (1 
June, 1938), and for his resignation on account of 'duties in the Middle East', see: 'Two by-
elections', The Times, London: (26 Jan., 1944). 
74 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 258. 
75 NA KV4/234 'Intelligence organisation in the Middle East (SIME)', s.l a: T.A. Robertson's 
visit to Egypt', (20 March 1942-17 April 1942). 
76 NA KV 4/240 'Report by D.G. White on visit to the Middle East in 1943'; Tom Bower, The 
Perfect English Spy. Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935-90, (London, 1995), p. 82. 
77 Sillitoe, Cloak withollt Dagger, p. 191; NA KV4/234, s.64a: Sir Percy Sillitoe to General Paget, 
(12 Sept., 1946). 
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lawyer by trailling who held degrees from Edinburgh and Columbia universities, who was 
a friend of the novelist Francis King, and apparently had a penchant for wearing purple 
socks and ties, made several trips to the Middle East during the war and immediately 
after it.
78 
Under Kellar's leadership, other MIS officers in London who investigated 
Zionist terrorism were David Scherr, Pamela Stiebel, H.J. Seager and Herbert Loftus-
Brown. As we shall see, Kellar and Loftus-Brown became MIS's officers chiefly 
responsible for assessing decolonisation in Africa in the early Cold War. Kellar would go 
on to become the head of SIME in the 19s0s. 
MIS's investigations into Zionist terrorism were challenging and politically 
sensitive tasks. Illustrative of the sensitive investigations which MIS carried out were 
their enquiries into the world-famous author and Hungarian Jewish emigre, Arthur 
Koestler. By the end of the war Koestler had become arguably the most influential 
contemporary critic of 'totalitarian' Soviet and Nazi rule. 79 However, as Koestler publicly 
demonstrated in his book Thieves in the Night, he also supported Zionist terrorism. In 
Koestler's book the fictional protagonist, Joseph, turned from a quiet life of academia to 
violence-to terrorism-in Palestine because he believed that a nation state of pacifists 
could never survive.8o MIS's enquires into Koestler, which involved an HOW on his 
home address, revealed that although Koestler supported terrorism on an intellectual 
level, he posed no further security threat.8! As with their enquiries into Koestler, MIS 
was also obliged to make enquiries into the activities of Joel Brandt. A tireless 
humanitarian who worked in anti-Nazi resistance movements throughout Europe, 
Brandt had brokered the failed 'lorries for lives' deal in 1942, by which Jews were to be 
released by the Nazis in exchange for trucks. As MIS discovered, however, Brandt was 
78 Carter, Antho'!)' Blunt. His lives, p. 260. 
79 Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, (London, 1940). 
80 Arthur Koestler, Thieves in the Night. Chronicle of an Experiment, 0erusalem and London, 1946). 
8! NA KV 2/1273 'Arthur Koestler'. 
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also involved with the clandestine immigration of Jews to Palestine. Whatever the 
humanitarian, moral and justifiable basis of Brandt's actions, they had security 
implications in Palestine and Brandt thus · became of interest to MIS.82 These were some 
of the difficult, and often emotionally-charged, issues which MIS had to deal with when 
investigating Zionist terrorism. 
MIS's concern with Zionist terrorism centred on warnings from SIME in the 
summer and autumn of 1946 that the Stern Gang and Irgun were planning to deploy 
terrorist 'cells' in Britain. These warnings, which came to MIS via their DSOs in 
Jerusalem and Cairo, originated from trustworthy individuals associated with the Jewish 
Agency-the organisation that was officially responsible for representing Jewish 
concerns to the British government. The warnings also came from Palestine and 
Egyptian Special Branch agents in contact with the Irgun and Stern Gang.83 In the 
aftermath of the bombings of the King David Hotel and the British embassy in Rome, 
warnings from SIME reached astonishing levels. In December 1946 MIS received two 
hair-raising warnings from their DSO in Jerusalem. The first announced a nightmare 
situation for MIS: 
It is reported that a group of IZL [Irgun] agents are now in 
England. Their numbers are said to be between 8 and 10 
persons who originate not only from Palestine, but also 
from America and Europe.84 
This was followed by a second, even more extraordinary warning. In a report on 16 
December 1946 entided 'Jewish interest in Atomic Fission', the DSO argued that if the 
Soviet Union could obtain atomic information by exerting 'ideological pressure', there 
82 NA KV 2/132 'Joel Brandt'. 
83 NA KV3/41, s.la: 'Notes for the Director-General's meeting with the Prime Minister', (28 
Aug., 1946), p. 1. 
84 NA KVS/38, s.171z: Richard Thistlethwaite, DSO Palestine, to MIS London, (6 Dec., 1946). 
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was no reason why Jews, a number who were involved in the MANHATIAN project, 
could not do the same. The unwritten point of the report was not that the Irgun or 
Stern Gang could obtain a nuclear weap~n, which was clearly unrealistic, but rather that 
MIS and the British government should consider the full impact of an independent 
Jewish state in Palestine obtaining nuclear secrets. According to the report, the DSO was 
going to make enquiries into nuclear physicists at the Haifa Technical School, but 
unfortunately the available records reveal nothing further. The DSO's warning 
nevertheless offers a striking new perspective on the early history of Anglo-Israeli atomic 
cooperation and casts new light on MIS's concerns half a century ago about states in the 
Middle East obtaining nuclear capabilities.8s 
Zionist terrorism was a formidable threat for MIS. The Irgun and Stern Gang 
had broken the traditional Jewish doctrine of self-restraint (Havlagah) and considered 
themselves to be waging a 'war' against the British. From their perspective, the killing of 
British civilians, either in Palestine or elsewhere, was not 'murder'. The ideological 
commitment by the Stern Gang and Irgun to violence was a threat radicalised by their 
organisation: the Irgun and Stern Gang were organised 'vertically' according to a 'cell' 
structure. Members of one 'cell' were unknown to those in another 'cell' and extreme 
loyalty among members meant they were nearly impossible to penetrate.86 In Alex 
Kellar's words, 'these terrorists are hard nuts to crack, and it is by no means easy to get 
them to talk,.87 To complicate matters further for MIS, the Irgun and Stern Gang 
frequendy made use of false identities. Menachem Begin was known to travel under 
several aliases and in the wake of the King David Hotel, which he had helped to 
8S NA KV5/38, s.169b: Richard Thistlethwaite, DSO Palestine, to MI5 London, (16 Dec., 1946). 
By way of comparison, see: Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying 011 the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence 
from Naif Germaf!)' to Iran and North Korea, (New York and London, 2006). 
86 MI5 warnings of assassinations issued to the Foreign Office and Colonial Office can be found 
in NA FO 371/52584 'Activities of the Stern Group'. 
87 NA KV5/29, 'Stern Group', s.75a: Alex Kellar to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, (19 Feb., 
1946). 
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mastermind and ' for which he earned a£2,000 bounty on his head, Begin managed to 
elude the Palestine Special Branch.88 In November 1946, they informed MIS that Begin 
was understood to be travelling in disguise to Britain.89 In January 1947, the SIS station 
in Paris reported that the French Surete had spotted Begin in Paris.90 Then in February 
1947, MIS received a message from SIS that raised the alarm to new levels: SIS reported 
that they had obtained information that Begin, almost certainly in Paris, had undergone 
plastic surgery on his face-though as the SIS report dryly concluded, 'we have no 
description of the new face,.91 
With hindsight, the story of Begin's plastic surgery seems fantastic. By the end of 
the Second World War, however, plastic surgery was comparatively well developed and it 
was not unthinkable that Begin could have undergone such an operation.92 Several 
British newspapers picked up the story of Begin's possible plastic surgery. The News 
Chronicle ran a captivating headline, 'Palestine hunting a new face', sarcastically noting that 
although Begin may well have a new face, it was 'likely that the flat feet and bad teeth 
have remained,.93 Needless to say, SIS's warning regarding Begin's plastic surgery was 
proved to be inaccurate-he was merely wearing a disguise, and SIS was relying on 
outdated passport photographs. SIS's warning nevertheless touched on one of MIS's 
greatest fears regarding Zionist terrorism: the use of disguises by Zionist terrorists to 
smuggle themselves into Britain. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1946, the 
DSO in Palestine passed over repeated warnings that members of the Irgun and Stern 
Gang were aiming to plant themselves in the British Armed Forces and travel outside the 
88 Begin, The Revolt, p. 116. 
89 NA KV2/22S1 'Menachem Begin', s.30a: James Robertson to E.W. Jones, Special Branch 
[London], (30 Nov., 1946). 
90 NA KV2/22S1 , s. 37a: 'Extract from SIS report on the policy of Jewish terrorists in Palestine', 
(2 Jan., 1947). 
91 NA KV2/22S1, s.38a: SIS [name withheld] to H.J. Seager, MIS, (13 Feb., 1947). 
92 Jennifer Brown, The History oj Plastic Surgery: from A ncient India to Modern America, (New York and 
London, 1986). 
93 NA KV2/22S1, s.40a: cutting from News Chronicle, (18 March, 1947). 
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Middle East, possibly to Britain, under this cover. MIS was thus faced with the 
possibility that Irgun and Stern Gang members could arrive in Britain wearing British 
military uniforms.
94 
With bitter irony, so~e members of the Irgun had been trained by 
SOE and SIS during the war. 95 
III. MIS's counter-terrorist measures: 
(a) 'Personnel security' 
In response to these threats MIS implemented a range of counter-terrorist 
measures. Like all of MIS's activities, these counter-measures have left few traces in the 
historical literature-a hallmark of the 'secret world'. Despite their absence from the 
historical record, using MIS records, we can now see that as the terrorist threat 
heightened in 1946, MIS imposed a range of security counter-measures. First of all, MIS 
worked closely with the Special Branch to provide enhanced protection for prominent 
British politicians in London. The Special Branch enhanced their observation of 
Downing Street and the Royal palace.96 During Ernest Bevin's trip to Palestine in April 
1946 MIS worked closely with the Palestine Special Branch to ensure high levels of 
protection for the Foreign Secretary.97 At the same time MIS implemented a series of 
'personnel security' measures, the aims of which were to frustrate the legal entry of 
terrorists into Britain. To meet the threat of terrorists using the Armed Forces as a cover 
to enter Britain, MIS began to vet all Palestinian Jews serving in the British Armed 
Forces. MIS discovered that of 7,000 male Palestinian Jews serving in the Armed Forces 
94 NA CO 733/457/13, s.7: 'Policy regarding suspected Jewish terrorists in H.M. Forces', MI5 
[unnamed] report sent to J.M. Martin, Colonial Office, (21 Aug., 1945); CAB 81/93 JIC sub-
committee 'Probable reaction of Jewish personnel in His Majesty's Forces and Polish units to 
Jewish disturbances in Palestine', 13 meeting (20 Feb., 1945). 
95 NA CAB 158/1 JIC (47) 52 (0) 'Possible future of Palestine', (9 Sept., 1947), Aldrich, The 
H idden Hand, p. 257. 
96 NA CO 733/457/1, s.6: James Robertson, for Alex Kellar, to J.D. Bates, Colonial Office, (17 
July, 1945). 
97 NA FO 371/52584, Richard Thistlethwaite to P.S. Scrivener, Foreign Office, (8 April, 1946). 
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(principally in Egypt) there were forty servicemen with suspected terrorist connections. 
Of these forty suspects, twenty-five were discharged from the Armed Forces, while the 
remaining fifteen were posted to areas in the Middle East where they posed little security 
threat, and where they were kept under close observation.98 At the same time as these 
prophylactic measures, MIS also began to vet all visa applications of Jews in the Middle 
East for entry into Britain. This policy, in fact, had been imposed since the end of the 
Second World War. As Liddell noted in his diary in May 1945: 
Alex Kellar and I went over to see Albert Canning [Home 
Office] and handed him a memo on Zionist organisations 
in Palestine and the possibilities of an attempt by some 
terrorist to assassinate a prominent personage in this 
counuy. It seemed to us desirable that we should have the 
names of all Jewish seamen and civilians arriving here from 
the Middle East and if necessary we should obtain their 
particulars from the Middle East. There was notification 
regarding seamen but a time lag of a week or ten days 
existed and very often the man had left before we heard 
anything about it. We suggested that the ports should be 
asked to telephone direct to ourselves or Special Branch.99 
As the terrorist threat radicalised in 1946, the measures which Liddell described 
above were implemented. Immigration officers and Security Control Officers (SCOs) at 
all British ports were insuucted to telephone through to MIS the particulars of all Jews 
arriving from the Middle East for an immediate 'look up' in the Registry. If an individual 
was 'traced' in the Registry, the case was referred to the appropriate DSO in the Middle 
East, who could then make local enquiries. When appropriate, a combination of either 
an HOW or Special Branch surveillance was imposed on suspected individuals during 
98 NA CO 733/457/1, s.7: 'Policy regarding suspected Jewish terrorists in H.M. Forces', MI5 
report [unsigned] copied to J.M. Martin, Colonial Office, (21 Aug., 1945). 
99 NA KV2/196 'Liddell diaries', (15 May, 1945). 
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their time in Britain.loo In conjunction with these counter-measures, MIS worked closely 
with the Palestine Special Branch to compile an 'Index of Terrorists', which was 
distributed to all Special Branch and police officers at principal points of entry into 
B · . \01 rltaill. The Index contained photos, descriptions and the known affiliations of 
prominent terrorists. Today some of the 'mug shots' in the Index are regarded by former 
members of the Irgun and Stern Gang with pride. \02 
(b) MIS's surveillance of Zionist groups in Britain 
Zionist terrorism was an international threat, unrestricted by borders. In their 
investigations into the terrorist threat in Britain, MIS worked on the reasonable 
assumption that if Zionist terrorists travelled to Britain, it was likely that at some point 
they would make contact either with Zionist organisations or Zionist leaders in Britain. 
For this reason MIS began to monitor Zionist activities in Britain. To do so MIS used 
the full repertoire of mechanisms at their disposal. MIS's investigations were both 
conspicuously 'active', in which they gathered information themselves, and 'passive', in 
which they received information from other departments. As with other investigations, 
the centre-piece of MIS's own investigations were HOWs. After the Second World War 
MIS imposed HOWs on all the important Zionist organisations in Britain, such as the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Jewish Legion, the Jewish-Arab Legion, the Zionist 
Federation of Jewish Labour and the United Zionist 'Revisionist' Youth Organisation-
\00 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp. 13-14. 
101 NA KV3/41, s.la: 'Notes for the Director-General's meeting with the Prime Minister', (28 
Aug., 1946), p. 1. 
\02 A simple Internet search produces several hagiographical websites for the Irgun and Stem 
Gang. 
164 
all of which ~ere based in London. Hi3 Intercepting the communications of these groups 
and tapping their telephones, MIS was able to build up a cross-section of their activities. 
MIS also opened 'personal files' ('PFs') on Zionist leaders whom they suspected had 
terrorist connections.104 The leader of the 'Revisionist' Zionist movement in Britain , 
Abraham Abrahams, was a source of particular concern for MIS-though unfortunately 
Abraham's MIS file has not been declassified. lOS The World Zionist Conference held in , 
London in August 1945, provided MIS with useful information on personalities in the 
international Zionist movement.l06 MIS's intention was to detect any trace of terrorism, 
either imported from the Middle East or 'home-grown' in Britain. 
Through their enquiries MIS became increasingly concerned about the United 
Zionist 'Revisionist' Youth Organisation, or the 'Betar' as it was known, based in Stoke 
Newington, in North London. The Betar-an acronym of the organisation's title in 
Hebrew-was a radical Jewish youth organisation which sought to educate Jewish youths 
in every way necessary to build an independent Jewish state in Palestine. The Betar had a 
straightforward educational component by which Jewish youths (both boys and girls) 
were taught Hebrew and Arabic, the history of the Middle East and the geography and 
topography of Palestine. However, the Betar also had a more security-concerning cadet 
function, by which members were trained in drill, jujitsu and basic hand-to-hand combat. 
In their own words, the Betar was a combination of school and army, whose members 
were trained psychologically, morally and physically to 'go to Palestine in order to build, 
defend and fight for the Jewish state'. 107 Members were instructed to make emotional 
and physical sacrifices in order to create a Jewish state in Palestine, a goal for which they 
103 NA KV 2/1435 Jewish Agency for Palestine'; KV 5/10 Jewish-Arab league'; KV5/11 'The 
Jewish Legion'; KV5/4 'United Zionist 'Revisionist' youth movement'; KV5/16 'Hisraduth 
(Zionist federation of Jewish labour),. Others include: KV 5/14 'Middle East society'. 
104 NA KV2/1389-90 'Moshe Sneh'. 
lOS NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), p. 13. 
106 NA KV5/17-22 'World Jewish congress'. 
107 NA KV 5/4, s.115d: F.e. Derbyshire, 'The Betar organisation', (11 March, 1946). 
16S 
were told it ,,~as necessaty to fight in order to avoid further anti-Semitic violence within 
Europe. MIS's concern with the London youth organisation was accentuated by 
warnings from their DSO in Jerusalem that the equivalent Betar group in Palestine was 
closely connected to the Irgun, with a significant number of its members graduating into 
terrorism. MIS saw as a concerning development the fact that in 1946 the London youth 
group adopted the name 'Betar', apparently following the Palestine example. MIS's fear 
was that the London Betar would establish a similar relationship with the Irgun and 
would likewise become a recruiting-ground for terrorists. 108 
From MIS's perspective, the London Betar was involved with nothing short of 
ideological indoctrination. In fact several MIS reports drew parallels between the Betar 
and fascist youth organisations. 109 In the words of an MIS report on the Betar sent by Sir 
Percy Sillitoe to the Special Branch in April 1946, the group 'bears a striking resemblance 
both in general structure and character to the Hitler Youth-Movement'.llo Although this 
is clearly an extreme, not to say inherently offensive, comment, in fact it is not as 
outrageous as it first appears: recent scholarship has shown that some of the early leaders 
of the Irgun and Stern Gang were indeed influenced by fascist and communist ideologies 
in eastern Europe, from where many of the leaders originated. 111 Before the war, some 
German 'Revisionist' Zionists openly described themselves as 'Jewish fascists' who aimed 
to establish a 'Jewish fascist' state in Palestine. 112 At the end of 1940 the founder of the 
108 NA KV 5/4, Minute 20a: James Robertson, (29 March, 1946). 
109 NA KV5/33 'Hagana', s.35a: Henry Hunloke, DSO Palestine, to Alex Kellar, London, (4 
Aug., 1943); KV 5/4, s.1l5d: F.e. Derbyshire, 'The Betar organisation', (11 March, 1946). [There 
is some variety in how 'Hagana' is spelled; in the text the author has chosen to spell it 
'Hagannahl· 
110 NA KV5 / 4, s.115a: Sir Percy Sillitoe to E.W. Jones, Special Branch, (24 April, 1946). 
III Heller, The Stem Gang, pp. 20-21,291-99. 
112 For the horrific story of Jewish refugees in Danzig subjected to violence by Jewish 'black 
shirts' on their voyage to Palestine, see: NA FO 371/24085 'Situation of Jewish refugees in 
Danzig Ganuary 1939)" s.87: British Consul-General Danzig to Foreign Office, London, (13 
Feb., 1939); FO 371/23251 'Palestine', 'Palestine Labour Party's political summary (7 Sept., 
1939). The author would like to thank Mr. Peter Joy for drawing these records to his attention. 
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Stem Gang, Abraham Stem, even offered to cooperate with the Nazi leadership and 
form an alliance against Britain.ll3 For 'Revisionist' Zionists like Stern, who split from 
moderate Zionists, it was not Nazi Germany but rather Britain that was the main enemy 
of Jewish people. 
MIS's enquiries into the Betar revealed a group of extremists in North London 
delivering subversive lectures. Several radical Zionist preachers used a Jewish Club in 
Stoke Newington to deliver firebrand speeches against the British government, fusing 
religion with politics, typically labelling the British 'murders', 'tyrants' and 'Nazis'. Many 
of these lectures were attended by undercover Special Branch officers, whose reports 
were forwarded to MIS. MIS imposed HOWs on those individuals implicated, while the 
Special Branch kept their activities under as close surveillance as possible.114 It was not 
just radical speeches, however, that posed a subversive propagandistic threat: several 
leaders of the Betar published a periodical, The Jewish Struggle, that was decidedly 
subversive. The periodical advocated the use of terrorism against the British and 
reproduced known Irgun pamphlets from Palestine. I IS In December 1946 Alex Kellar 
and MIS's legal adviser, Bernard Hill, held a meeting with the Director of Public 
Prosecutions about the Jewish Struggle. MIS's fear was that the publication would act as a 
recruiting platform for future terrorists. Although they lacked sufficient evidence to 
prosecute, the Director of Public Prosecutions officially warned the editors of the Jewish 
Struggle that if they published further issues, they would be prosecuted. The pressure 
exerted on the editors apparendy worked: the publication was suspended in early 1947.
116 
113 Heller, The Stern Gang, pp. 85-89. 
114 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp.13-14. 
lIS NA CO 537/3933, 'Palestine: Jewish illegal organisations': Palestine CID to Colonial Office, 
(11 Oct., 1947). 
116 NA KV5/4, Minute 88a: Bernard A. Hill, (19 Nov., 1946); Ibid., Minute 90a: Herbert Loftus-
Brown, (12 Dec., 1946). 
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In this case at least, MIS thus managed to neutralise a source of subversive Zionist 
propaganda in Britain advocating terrorism. 
(c) MIS's liaison with moderate Zionist organisations 
As well as 'personnel security' measures and the surveillance of Zionist groups in 
Britain, MIS's counter-terrorist measures also involved establishing liaison contacts with 
moderate Zionist groups, both in Palestine and Britain. By the end of the Second World 
War, MIS had established useful contacts with Jewish Agency representatives in the 
Middle East. The DSO in Jerusalem received valuable information on Zionist terrorism 
from Teddy Kollek, a future noted mayor of Jerusalem, who was then working in the 
security department of the Jewish Agency. 117 Other Jewish Agency representatives who 
provided MIS with counter-terrorist information were a certain Zeev Sharif in Jerusalem, 
and a certain Eisenstatt in Cairo.II B SIS received important information on Zionist 
terrorism from Reuven Zaslani (later Shiloah), who went on to become the first Director 
of Mossad in 1951. 11 9 The fact that MIS and SIS were able to obtain counter-terrorist 
intelligence from moderates in the Jewish Agency reinforces the fact that Zionist 
terrorism was a minority activity, unsupported by the majority of Jews and Zionists. 
Then as now, Britain's intelligence agencies relied on religious and political moderates to 
provide information on radicals advocating violence. 
117 NA KV5/29, s.50a: 'Extract of a report on interview with Kollek', (18 Aug., 1945); 
KV2/2251, s.41a: SIS [name withheld] to H.J. Seager MIS, (1 April, 1947); 'Notes on a meeting 
between the Inspector General of Police and Teddy Kollek (Monday 18 June, 1945)', in Michael 
J. Cohen (ed.), The Rise oflsrae!. Jewish Resistance to British Rule in Palestine, (New York and London, 
1987), pp. 52-5. 
li B NA KV5/30, s.114a: James Robertson to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, (5 Sept., 1946); 
KV3/41, s.la: 'Notes for the Director-General's meeting with the Prime Minister', (28 Aug., 
1946), p. 1. 
119 NA KV5/31, s.157a: David Scherr, 'Information from Reuven Zaslani', (19 Feb., 1948); 
Haggai Eshed, Reuven Shiloah: the Man behind the Mossad. Secret diplomary in the creation of Israel, 
(London, 1997). 
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With useful liaison contacts already established in the Middle East, as the terrorist 
threat radicalised in late 1946 MIS decided to try to establish similar contact with the 
Jewish Agency in London. In many ways MIS hedged their bets: they sought 
information from the Jewish Agency, but they also continued to monitor the Agency's 
activities with an HOW.120 Presumably the HOW could establish whether the Jewish 
Agency was withholding information. At first MIS established informal contact with the 
Jewish Agency through one of their officers, Anthony Simkins, then a junior desk-officer 
in B-Division, who later became a Deputy Director-General, and who also assisted with 
Hinsley's official history of British Intelligence during the Second World Wm:121 Simkins had a 
well-placed friend in the Jewish Agency.122 Soon, however, this contact requested a more 
permanent arrangement, and MIS therefore decided that they should establish a 'cut-out' 
for the liaison relationship. Within B-Division there was some discussion of employing 
'I<lop' Ustinov (agent U.3S) for this task, but in the end he was not used because he was 
'too involved in other work for this purpose,.123 Although the name of MIS's eventual 
'cut-out' has not been declassified, we know that he was from the War Office (MI3), and 
that he served in Palestine. 124 The name of the Jewish Agency's contact likewise has not 
been declassified. In fact, judging from the records, there seems to have been several 
Jewish Agency contacts at different times. Marginal notes suggest that one of the 
contacts may have been Teddy Kollek himself.125 We can establish that Kollek was in 
London at the correct time, and he certainly moved in the appropriate circles-Arthur 
120 NA KV 2/1435, Jewish Agency for Palestine', Minute 86a: Alex Kellar, (30 April, 1945). 
121 F.H. Hinsley with c.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. IV: Securiry and 
Counter-Intelligence. 
122 NA KV 4/216 'Policy and procedure for contacting Jewish Agency intelligence 
representatives in London, 1946-1947', Minute 8a: T.A. Robertson, (19 Sept., 1946); Ibid., s.14b: 
c.A.G. Simkins, (3 Feb., 1947). 
123 Ibid., Minute 2a: Dick White, (2 Sept., 1946). 
124 Ibid., Minute 33a: James Robertson, (2 Aug., 1946). Incidentally, we can also tell that the 'cut-
out' had terrible hand-writing. 
125 Ibid., Minute 31a: James Robertson, (14 March, 1947). 
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Koestler dedicated Thieves in the Night to Kollek, among others.126 Whether or not one of 
the Jewish Agency's contacts was Kollek, the contact passed over to MIS valuable 
information regarding terrorists who had recently arrived in, or departed from, Palestine 
illegally. This information, which was unobtainable from other sources, was handed to 
MIS's representative at meetings held in some of London's finest restaurants. With MIS 
paying the bill, the Jewish Agency contact and the War Office 'cut-out' claimed that they 
needed settings that would encourage 'frank, friendly conversations'. One meeting was 
held over 'oysters, duck and petit pots de creme au chocolat', another over gin and 'rich 
red roast beef.127 
IV: MIS and international sponsors of Zionist terrorism 
In the course of their investigations, MIS came to suspect that Zionist terrorism 
was sponsored by foreign organisations and even foreign powers. In the United States 
the 'Bergson Group' and the 'Hebrew Committee for the Liberation of Palestine' were 
known to support the Irgun, while in broader terms, American public opinion regarding 
Palestine proved to be persistently problematic for British intelligence-as it was for the 
British government at large. 128 MIS did not always share a close relationship with the 
FBI when it came Zionist counter-terrorism, though notably American military 
intelligence (G-2) assisted with MIS's investigations into clandestine Jewish emigration 
from occupied Germany.129 In many ways, the relationship between Jewish Americans 
126 Teddy Kollek, For Jerusalem. A Life I?Y Ted4J Kollek, (London and Jerusalem, 1978), pp. 57-66. 
127 NA KV 4/216, s.29a: [Unnamed] 'cut-out' to James Robertson, (10 March, 1947); Ibid., s.30a: 
[Unnamed] 'cut-out' to James Robertson, (17 Sept., 1947) 
128 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp. 3, 19. Also see: FO 
371/68072 'Boycott of British goods in America in connection with Palestine'. 
129 NA KV 3/56 Jewish illegal immigration', s.69b: 'Report on tour of MIS liaison officer in 
France, Germany, Austria and Italy', (5 Sept.-8 Oct., 1946), p. 5; author's interview with Sir 
Alistair Horne, (14 Dec., 2004). 
170 
and the 'Palestine question' was similar to Irish Americans when it came to the 'Irish 
problem'. 130 In fact, when it came to Zionist terrorism, the Irish parallel was highly 
relevant. MIS appears to have been acutely concerned about connections between 
Zionist terrorism and the IRA, and once again their fears were justified. After all, an 
enemy's enemy can often be a friend. The IRA leader, Jewish member of the Irish 
parliament, 'Revisionist' Zionist and future mayor of Dublin, Robert Briscoe, was known 
by MIS to support the Irgun. In his memoirs, Briscoe recalled that he assisted the Irgun 
in every way he could. Briscoe, in whose own words 'would do business with Hitler if it 
was in Ireland's good', made several trips to Britain before the war and met with Irgun 
representatives. Briscoe described that he elected himself 'to a full Professorship with 
the Chair of Subversive Activities against England', and helped the Irgun to organise 
themselves on 'IRA lines,.131 As we have seen, the DSO's warnings from Palestine in the 
summer of 1946 contained a similar statement that the Irgun and Stern Gang were 
planning operations in Britain on 'IRA lines,.132 Although Robert Briscoe's MIS flle has 
not been declassified, we know that MIS kept his activities under close observation, both 
in Britain and, through their Dublin 'link', in Ireland. 133 
The connections between the IRA and Zionist terrorism went further than the 
person of Robert Briscoe. The chief Rabbi of Ireland, Isaac Herzog, was an open 
supporter of both Irish Republican and Zionist terrorism. After his emigration to 
Palestine in 1936, Isaac Herzog rose to arguably the most important position in the 
Jewish religious world, the chief Rabbi of Palestine. As chief Rabbi of Palestine, Herzog 
130 Paul McMahon, 'British intelligence and the IRA: the early years', paper presented at the 
Cambridge University Intelligence seminar, (3 March, 2006). 
131 Robert Briscoe, For the Life oj Me, (Dublin and London, 1959), pp. 262, 264, 295; Dermot 
Keogh, Jelvs in Twentieth Century Ireland Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, (Cork, 1998), pp. 
73-5. 
132 NA CO 733/457/13, s.4: Sir David Petrie to Sir Alexander Maxwell, Home Office, (2 April 
1945). 
133 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), p.14. 
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showed simiiar support to Zionist terrorism as he had in Ireland. One of Rabbi Herzog's 
sons, Yaacov Herzog-himself a future Rabbi and Israeli diplomat-served in the 
Hagannah and, through his connections,' introduced his father to members of the Irgun 
and Stern Gang. Rabbi Isaac Herzog gave these members moral support. 134 However, 
Rabbi Herzog's other son, Chaim Herzog, was a moderate who disapproved of his 
father's support of terrorism. Chaim Herzog, who served in the Hagannah before the 
war, joined British military intelligence during the war and was actually part of the 
intelligence corps on the D-Day landings. Together with Reuven Zislani, after 1948 
Chaim Herzog went on to help establish the Israeli intelligence community and 
eventually became President of Israel. In many ways, the Herzog family encapsulates the 
range of tensions that existed between moderates and extremists regarding terrorism, 
both in Ireland and Palestine. Chaim Herzog and Reuven Zislani also exemplify the 
connections that existed between the British intelligence community and the early Israeli 
. lli bli hm 135 lnte gence esta sent. 
It was not just American and Irish connections with Zionist terrorism which 
concerned the British intelligence community. Britain's intelligence services increasingly 
came to suspect that a connection existed between Zionist terrorism and the Soviet 
Union. This suspicion persisted up to the point when Britain withdrew from Palestine 
and the state of Israel was established in May 1948.136 MIS and SIS believed that several 
Zionist terrorists had first made their way to Palestine with the aid of Soviet authorities. 
Menachem Begin and Nathan Friedman-Yellin, a leader of the Stern Gang, were both of 
134 Bar-Zohar, Yaacov Herzog, p. 61, 63. 
135 Chaim Herzog, Living History. A Memoir, (London, 1997), pp. 46-53, 75. Also see: Jonathan 
Chavkin, 'The secret imperial hand: British influence in the emergence of the Israeli and 
Australian intelligence communities', (M.Phil. dissertation, Cambridge University, 2006), which 
will be forthcoming as a PhD. dissertation. 
136 NA CAB 158/3 JIC (48) 3 (0) Terms of reference, 'Short term intentions of the Soviet Union 
in Palestine', (10 Jan., 1948); CAB 158/4 JIC (48) 45 (0) Terms of reference, 'Communist 
influence in Palestine', (24 April, 1948). 
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Polish ongm, and MIS suspected that Soviet authorities had helped them 'escape' to 
Palestine during the war.137 MIS's suspicions seemed to be confirmed when several 
Zionist leaders advocated co-operation with the Soviet Union. The head of 'security' for 
the Jewish Agency in Palestine, Moshe Sneh, who was aware of if not actively involved 
with planning the bombing of the King David Hotel, openly looked towards the Soviet 
Union. 138 While MIS lacked positive evidence that the Soviet Union was involved in 
Zionist terrorism, all the facts pointed in that direction. By 1947 one of the Stern Gang's 
publications, ironically called Hamass, had become unmistakably supportive of the Soviet 
Union. 139 The connections between the Soviet Union and Zionist terrorism was one of 
the few areas which guaranteed MIS support from the FBI-and doubtless it served MIS 
well to emphasise such connections. As 'Tar' Robertson explained to the FBI liaison 
officer stationed at the American embassy in London in October 1947: 
MIS is at the moment studying available evidence 
concerning the Soviet attitude towards Jewish extremist and 
terrorist elements. While we have no conclusive 
information on the subject there are, as you say, increasing 
indications that the Stern Gang in particular are for the time 
being showing a pro-Soviet orientation. 140 
MIS's suspicions have been confirmed by subsequent research, which shows that 
on several occasions the Stern Gang appealed to Moscow for aid. 141 This, therefore, 
makes the involvement of Kim Philby in SIS's investigations into Zionist terrorism all 
137 NA KV5/31 , s.141a: H.J. Seager to H.E. Burley, Home Office, (6 Jan., 1947). 
138 NA KV 2/1390 'Moshe Sneh', s.191a: MIS dossier on Sneh for the CIA, (25 Aug., 1948). 
Other Zionist groups with Soviet affiliations included: KV5/12 Jewish anti-fascist committee'; 
KV 5/13 'Israelitsche Kulturgemeinde'. 
139 NA KV5/37, Minute 133a: James Robertson, (13 Sept., 1946); Ibid., Minute 134a: Sir Percy 
Sillitoe, (19 Sept., 1946). 
140 NA KV5/31, s.149a: T.A. Robertson to Winston M. Scott, American embassy London, (1 
Oct., 1947). 
141 Heller, The Stern Gang, pp. 145-7, 170-73. For Moshe Sneh and Soviet intelligence, see: 
Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The MitrokhilJ Archive, vol. II: The KGB and the World, 
(London, 2005), pp. 222, 225, 229-30. 
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the more interesting. As we have seen in relation to the Volkov defection, Philby's 
position as head of Section IX afforded him a legitimate interest in the Middle East-an 
interest which he probably also inherited from his father, the noted Arabist, Harry St. 
John Philby.142 During the war St. John Philby attempted to broker an unsuccessful deal 
for the partition of Palestine, the so-called 'Philby Plan,.143 Kim Philby's manipulative 
agenda in Zionist investigations, however, is difficult to determine. On 9 July 1946 SIS 
circulated a report throughout Whitehall warning of 'murderous action' which they 
understood the Irgun were planning against the British Legation in Beirut. Almost 
certainly this was an inaccurate warning of the King David Hotel bombing, which 
occurred two weeks later. Ominously with hindsight, it was Philby who circulated the 
report. 144 Philby, however, probably had less motivation for sabotaging British 
investigations into Zionist terrorism than he did with other subjects. When Philby was 
working on Zionist affairs for SIS-and the KGB-immediately after the Second World 
War, the Soviet Union's policy towards Palestine had not yet crystallised. Moscow 
initially supported the creation of the state of Israel, hoping that it would be a thorn in 
the side of the 'imperialist' west. Soviet policies were reversed when, in May 1948, 
America unambiguously supported the new Israeli state.145 By this time Philby was no 
longer working on Zionist matters for SIS, or presumably the KGB. Thus Philby's 
precise role must remain speculative. But Moscow certainly would have been interested 
to learn, through Philby, that London suspected Soviet involvement in Zionist terrorism. 
142 NA KV 2/1389 s.29a: H.A.R. Philby to James Robertson, (23 Aug., 1946), etc.; Philby, My 
Silent Waf; p. 131-32; Harry St. John Philby, A mbian Dqys, (London, 1948). 
143 NA FO 371/40139 'The 'Philby Plan' and other plans for the partition of Palestine'. 
144 NA KV4/36, s.108b: H.A.R. Philby to T.E. Bromley, Foreign Office, JD.S. Bates, Colonial 
Office, copied to Alex Kellar, MIS, (9 July, 1945). 
145 Yaaciv R'oi 'Soviet policy towards Jewish emigration: an overview', in Noah Lewin-Epstein, 
Yaacov Ro'i and Paul Ritterband (eds.), Russian Jews on three Continents: Migration and Resettlement, 
(London, 1997), pp. 51-56; Benjamin Pinkus and Jonathan Frankel, The Soviet Government and the 
JelPs, 1948-1967, (Cambridge, 1984); Eytan Bentsur and Boris L. Kolokolov (eds.), Documents on 
lsmeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, (London, 2000). For Stalin's anti-Semitic conspiracies, see: 
Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin's Last Crime. The Docto1J' Plot, (London, 2003). 
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V. Results of MIS's counter-terrorist measures and investigations 
There was no large-scale attack conducted by Zionist terrorists ill mainland 
Britain. It could be argued that this was a result of MIS's successful counter-terrorist 
measures: as always, the success of preventative security measures is measured by a 
counterfactual negative-what did not happen. It is entirely possible that MIS's counter-
measures prevented Irgun and Stern Gang 'cells' from entering Britain. Though this 
point remains debatable without further information, other evidence suggests that MIS 
and the Special Branch successfully prevented acts of Zionist terrorism from occurring in 
Britain. In 1947 MIS uncovered a group in North London whom they believed 'to have 
been planning terrorist outrages in this country'. The group centred on a Russian Jew, 
Leo Bella, and his main accomplice, Isaac Pressman, a British national who ran a 
chemical manufacturing firm in Stoke Newington. MIS detected this group through the 
HOW imposed on the United Zionist 'Revisionist' Youth Organisation. Based on 
intelligence from the HOW, in July 1947 the Special Branch raided Pressman's flat in 
North London, where they discovered twenty-seven hand grenades and a number of 
detonators in the garage, and a quantity of terrorist literature in the flat itself. The fact 
that MIS and the Special Branch's information was derived from an HOW, however, 
meant that it was inadmissible as evidence. In a manner which is all too familiar at the 
start of the twenty-first century, information from 'secret sources' was inadmissible in 
British courts. Although ultimately neither Bella nor Pressman were prosecuted, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions warned them that they risked prosecution-another 
member of the group, Eric Prinz, was threatened with deportation to Russia-and MIS 
and the Special Branch kept their activities under close observation.146 
146 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp. 13-19. 
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In the case of Leo Bella and Isaac Pressman, MIS and the Special Branch appear 
to have prevented a terrorist attack in Britain in the making. In terms of the broader 
terrorist threat within Britain, however~ MIS's investigations revealed that the most 
urgent threat did not come from Zionist groups within Britain themselves-nor from 
individuals even connected to those groups. Instead it came from individuals in Britain 
who, through ideological sympathy for the Zionist cause, recruited themselves to 
conduct terrorist outrages in Britain. HOWs revealed that several Zionist groups in 
Britain were communicating with known members of the Irgun and Stern Gang in 
Palestine.147 The same HOWs, however, revealed that while such groups had the 
intention to carry out an attack in Britain, none of them had the capability. Members of 
United Zionist 'Revisionist' Organisation, for example, romanticised their importance 
and exaggerated their ability to launch a terrorist campaign in Britain.148 Indicative of the 
gulf between terrorist intention and capability was the abortive plan in September 1947 
by a certain Rabbi Korff in Paris to launch none other than an air-raid on London, 
during which Stern Gang leaflets were to be dropped with high-incendiary explosives 
made from fire-extinguishers. The plan never got off the ground and the conspirators 
were arrested by the French police.149 The fact that Zionist groups in Britain (and 
France) lacked the ability to carry out an attack did not, however, negate their threat, as 
an internal MIS memorandum noted: 
Unfortunately the absence of evidence of any plan for more 
significant terrorist activities does not rule out the 
possibility that some attempt of violence may be made. The 
very fact of contact with Palestinian [sic] 
terrorists .... excludes any assurance that some act of 
147 NA KV5/4, Minute 19a:James Robertson, (29 March, 1946). 
148 NA KV5/4, s.57d: F.e. Derbyshire, 'Report on Betar', (26 July, 1946); KV 3/67, s.113a: 
'Present trends in Zionism', (2 Sept., 1946). 
149 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp. 11-12; 'Terrorists plans 
for London', The Times, London: (9 Sept., 1947). 
violence, such as an attempt at an assassination, may not be 
committed at any time without warning. 150 
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As Kellar explained, the problem posed by the United Zionist 'Revisionist' Organisation 
and the Betar was that, 'there is always the possibility that some unpredictable act of 
violence might be committed by one of their more hotheaded members'. 151 In fact, an 
'unpredictable act of violence' was precisely what occurred. In August 1948, a twenty-
three year-old Jewish grocer from Southgate London, Monte Harris, took it upon himself 
to plan an act of terrorism in Britain. Although Harris does not appear to have been 
acting upon the Irgun or Stern Gang's instructions-it is unclear whether Harris had ever 
even been to Palestine-he sympathised with their aims and decided to carry out an 
outrage in Britain on their behalf. When Harris' lock-up shop in Aldgate was raided by 
the Special Branch in August 1948, following a tip-off and three weeks' intensive 
surveillance, they found detonators, fuses and ingredients to make a substantial number 
of thermite incendiary explosives. In the Special Branch's opinion, there would have 
been 'a wave of incendiarism and sabotage in England' if Harris had not been caught. 152 
In October 1948 Harris was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment at London's central 
criminal court-a sentence which the Judge hoped would act as a deterrent against future 
acts of terrorism and political violence in Britain.153 
150 NA KV5/4, Minute 29a: Herbert Loftus-Brown, (25 July, 1946). 
151 NA KV3/41, s.2a: Alex Kellar notes for Sir Percy Sillitoe, 'Present trends in Zionism', (2 
Sept., 1946), p. 4. 
152 Burt, Commander Burt oj Scotland Yard, p. 129. It is unclear whether Harris' name should be 
spelled 'Monte' or 'Monty'. 
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VI: MIS and Jewish 'illegal' immigration to Palestine 
As well as counter-terrorist investigations, MIS was also involved with assessing 
the security repercussions posed by unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. The 
immigration of Jews above and beyond the quota-system established in 1939-limiting 
Jewish immigration to 1,500 per month-was termed 'illegal immigration' by the British 
government. Then as now, 'illegal immigration' was a term fraught with controversy. A 
fierce debate raged between Zionist politicians and the British government over the 
'legality' of Jewish immigration to Palestine. 154 MIS's involvement in this debate, 
however, only lay with those matters directly related to national security. It was not 
MIS's responsibility to comment on the moral issues surrounding Jewish immigration to 
Palestine. MIS's task regarding 'illegal immigration' was solely to assess, and advise on, 
the security repercussions that might be caused by unrestricted Jewish immigration to the 
Mandate. MIS's assessment was that, almost certainly, Jewish mass-immigration to 
Palestine would cause civil war between Jews and Arabs, as it had threatened to do 
before the Second World War during the 'Arab Revolt'.155 
Britain was not the only country which, in the ruins of post-war Europe, had to 
deal with mass-movement of populations to territories that were contested on religious, 
political and ethnic groundS. 156 However, the Second World War and the Holocaust 
made the question of Jewish immigration to Palestine unique. By August 1946 MIS 
estimated that as many as 350,000 war-torn Jewish refugees were scattered across Europe 
as Displaced Persons (DPs), most of whom seemed likely to set off to Palestine. MIS 
judged that while some might return to their countries of pre-war origin, others had no 
154 Cunningham, 'Palestine-the last days of the Mandate', p. 485. 
155 NA CO 733/394/1 'Palestine: illegal immigration', Minute 2: (19 Jan., 1939); CAB 81/130 JIC 
(0) 228 (0) (Revised Final), 'Middle East policy', (31 July, 1945). 
156 Robert M. Hayden, 'Schindler's fate: genocide, ethnic cleansing and population transfers', 
Slavic Review, 55, no. 4, (winter, 1996), pp. 727-48. 
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intention of returning, 'remembering that six million of their kin lost their lives in Europe 
during the war, and fearing fresh outbursts of anti-Semitism'.157 Even though MIS was 
limited to assessing the pragmatic security implications of Jewish immigration to 
Palestine, the urgent humanitarian aspects of the subject were inescapable: reports from 
SIME and British military authorities in Palestine revealed the desperate condition of 
Jewish refugees arriving in the Mandate. 158 In the aftermath of the war, America called 
for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine on humanitarian grounds. 159 
Despite the subject's monumental moral dimension, all the evidence available to MIS 
suggested that a mass-influx of Jews to the Mandate would cause an outburst of Arab 
violence, not only in Palestine but throughout the Middle East.16o 
From the summer of 1946, MIS set about investigating the nature and scale of 
Jewish immigration to Palestine. Working closely with SIME and British security 
authorities in Palestine, MIS established that clandestine Jewish immigration to Palestine 
was predominantly organised by the official Jewish 'Defence' Army (Hagannah). In 
some cases, MIS established that the United Nations Relief and Reconstitution Agency 
(UNRRA) and the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) were assisting with 
Jewish 'illegal' immigration. 161 British security investigations into potentially subversive 
humanitarian relief organisations thus are not new to the twenty-first century.162 Within 
Britain, MIS discovered that Zionist groups in London, Leeds and Bedford-describing 
157 NA KV 3/56 Jewish illegal immigration', s.131b: Jewish illegal immigration into Palestine', 
summary no. 2: (16 June-15 July, 1947),p.1. 
158 NA KV 3/56, s.2a: Colonial Office to General Sir Alan Cunningham, Palestine, (5 Aug., 
1946). 
159 NA CAB 733/463/6 'Agreement between Britain, America and Russia on establishment of 
Jewish state in Palestine'. For overviews see: Ritchie Oven dale, Britain, the United States and the end 
oj the Palestine Mandate, 1942-1948, (London, 1989); Michael J. Cohen (ed.) , The Rise oj IsraeL The 
Holocaust and Illegal Immigration, 1939-1947. 
160 NA KV3/56, Minute 4a: James Robertson, (7 Aug., 1946); Ibid., s.la: J.c. Robertson to T. 
Wikeley, Foreign Office, forwarding note Jewish illegal immigration from Europe to Palestine', 
(4 Aug., 1946), pp. 8-9. 
161 Ibid., s.69b: 'Report on tour of MIS liaison officer in France, Germany, Austria and Italy', p. 8. 
162 'Kashmir quake relief link to terror network', The Independent, London: (14 Aug., 2006). 
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themselves as 'agricultural relief organisations'-were helping Jewish refugees embark for 
Palestine. 163 MIS began to compile this and other information into a series of 'Illegal 
Immigration Summaries', composed by David Scherr in B-Division, which were 
circulated to interested departments in Whitehall, especially the Foreign Office and 
Colonial Office. From February 1947 the Cabinet established a standing committee to 
investigate Jewish 'illegal' immigration, which worked closely with MIS.164 MIS's 
concerns regarding Jewish immigration were heightened when their liaison contact in the 
Jewish Agency in London informed them that, of all the Jewish immigrants arriving in 
Palestine, seven to eight percent joined the Irgun. 165 A direct connection therefore 
existed between unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and Zionist terrorism. 
Britain's counter-terrorist efforts required that the question of 'illegal' immigration was 
resolved. On several occasions between 1946 and 1948 the)lC itself examined the issue 
of Jewish 'illegal' immigration and, based on information provided by MIS, in March 
1947 estimated that 35,000 Jews were strategically positioned throughout Europe, ready 
for immediate embarkation to Palestine. 166 
To deal with the security threats surrounding unrestricted Jewish immigration to 
Palestine, the British government devised several counter-measures. One strategy was to 
intercept those ships carrying Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Unfortunately this often 
had disastrous consequences. In July 1947 a ship carrying more than 4,000 Jewish 
refugees, the Exodus, was boarded by British troops off the Egyptian coast amid scenes 
of fierce fighting. 167 Controversially, British authorities transferred the passengers of the 
Exodus to three deportation ships, and sent many of them to the British Zone in 
163 NA KV 3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp. 21-22. 
164 NA CAB 104/275-279: 'Illegal immigration'; CAB 130/20 180 'Palestine-illegal immigration'. 
165 NA KV4/216, s.29a: [Unnamed] 'cut-out' to James Robertson, (10 March, 1947). 
166 NA CAB 158/1 JIC (47) 18 (0) (Revise) Jewish illegal immigration', (10 April, 1947); Ibid.,JIC 
(47) 31 (0) (Final), 'Organisation of illegal immigration', (24 July, 1947), pp. 7-8. 
167 'Refugee ship boarded', The Times, London: (19 July, 1947). 
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Germany. When eventually they arrived at the port in Hamburg, some of the passengers 
were so weak they had to be carried ashore. The Exodus affair soon came to symbolise 
the overall struggle for Jewish immigration to Palestine (A!!Jah Be~.168 An equally 
notorious counter-measure was Britain's policy of detaining Jewish refugees in Cyprus. 
British authorities established detention camps in Cyprus to house Jewish refugees while 
they waited to enter Palestine through the quota-system. Of the 1,500 Jewish immigrants 
allowed to enter the Mandate per month, half of the places were reserved for those 
detained in CypruS.169 As well as detaining refugees in Cyprus, British security officers in 
Palestine also deported suspected terrorists to camps in Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and as far 
away as Kenya.17o Such camps soon became a publicity nightmare for London. Stories 
circulated in the media that the British were the heirs to the Nazis, and like them, had 
established 'concentration camps' for Jews. 171 In fact, Britain's detention camps attracted 
revenge attacks: on account of Kenya's involvement in detaining terrorists, in their letter 
bomb campaign in Britain in 1947 the Stern Gang targeted the Governor of Kenya, Sir 
Philip Mitchell. Upon receiving the bomb at his home in Suffolk, Mitchell buried it in 
his garden and informed the police. l72 
To avoid controversial counter-measures such a's detention camps, MIS advised 
the government to concentrate their energies on stopping 'illegal' immigration 'at source', 
that is before ships had embarked for Palestine.173 To do so, the British government had 
168 Michael Marrus, The Umvanted European Refugees in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1985), pp. 
338-9. Also see the 1960 Hollywood [tIm, Exodus, starring Paul Newman. 
169 NA CO 733/490/3 'Detention of illegal immigrants in Cyprus'; CAB 104/270 'Palestine: 
strategic aspects': COS (46) 221 (0), 'Accommodation for illegal Jewish immigrants', (25 Aug., 
1946). 
170 NA FO 371/61902 'Arrangements for the accommodation in Kenya of Jewish suspect 
terrorists'; FO 1015/68 'Internment in Eritrea of Jewish detainees from Palestine'; Ya'acov 
Meridor, Long is the Road to Freedom, English trans.: (Johannesburg, 1955). 
171 'Cyprus camp conditions', The Times, London: (26 Nov., 1946). 
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to work closely with governments and security officials throughout Europe. The 
problem was that, as MIS noted, several European governments were proving less than 
co-operative with London over the question of Jewish immigration to Palestine.174 In 
September 1946 MIS therefore dispatched a liaison officer to France, Germany, Austria 
and Italy to investigate both Jewish 'illegal' immigration and Zionist terrorism on the 
Continent. Meeting with security officials in all these countries, the liaison officer 
emphasised the serious security implications posed by unrestricted Jewish immigration to 
Palestine.175 At the same time MIS advised the British government on those groups 
profiting from the human-trafficking of Jewish refugees to the Mandate. Working 
closely with SIS, MIS obtained evidence that Greek and Central American (especially 
Honduran and Panamanian) shipping companies were illegally chartering vessels to 
Jewish refugees.176 Armed with this information, the Foreign Office applied pressure on 
several governments to prevent suspect ships leaving their ports. As the JIC noted, by 
the summer of 1947 the government's counter-measures to stop immigration 'at source' 
appeared to be enjoying some success. In August 1947 spokesmen of the Hagannah 
publicly confirmed that Jewish 'illegal' immigration to Palestine was being frustrated by 
British counter-measures. 177 
Britain's policy of limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine was beset with 
controversy and resentment. Ultimately the Holocaust created a situation in which 
Zionist supporters judged it unacceptable for Britain to restrict Jewish immigration to 
Palestine. London's contentious immigration policies, however, were symptomatic of a 
174 NA KV 3/56, s.la: J.c. Robertson to T. Wikeley, Foreign Office, forwarding note 'Jewish 
illegal immigration from Europe to Palestine', (4 Aug., 1946). 
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much deeper problem that undermined British rule in Palestine: Britain was faced with a 
range of contradictory demands regarding the future of the Mandate-from Jews, Arabs 
and world leaders at large. Britain's controversial policies in Palestine were a result of 
these conflicting demands. In 1946 an Anglo-American committee of enquiry was 
appointed to find a settlement in Palestine, but the committee's results failed to find 
compromise. 178 By September 1947 the JI C was painting a gloomy picture for the future 
of the Mandate, concluding that any settlement would be unacceptable either to Jews or 
Arabs. 179 Britain found itself governing a situation that was becoming rapidly 
ungovernable. With 10,000 troops tied down in Palestine in 1947-representing one 
tenth of the military manpower in the entire empire-Palestine was a financial burden 
that London could not afford. British public opinion towards the Mandate was 
undermined by events such as the Irgun's brutal execution of two British sergeants near 
Nathanya in July 1947. The sergeants' bodies were found hanging from a tree in an 
orange grove, but they were booby-trapped and another officer was badly injured as they 
were recovered.180 In short, Britain's rule of Palestine had become a poisoned chalice. In 
September 1947 Britain decided to hand the entire matter of Palestine over to the United 
Nations, and on 14 May 1948, British authorities formally began to withdraw from the 
Mandate. But even as British officials were withdrawing, MIS's worst fears about 
security in Palestine came to be realised: spurred on by unrestricted Jewish immigration 
to Palestine, open warfare broke out between Jews and Arabs, violence was met with 
violence, and a massive humanitarian crisis ensued. The 1948 war between Jews and 
178 NA CAB 81/133 JIC (46) 45 (0) (Final), 'The Anglo-American committee of enquiry into 
Palestine and the condition of Jews in Europe', (1 May, 1946). 
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(47) 61 (0) (Terms of reference), 'Repercussions and implementation of the proposal for the 
partition of Palestine', (1 Nov., 1947); Ibid.,JIC (47) 60 (0) (Final), 'Threat of Arab intervention in 
Palestine', (18 Oct., 1947). 
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Arabs led to an enormous refugee crisis in Palestine. 181 In the words of Menachem 
Begin: 'The British officials prophesised that on their departure there would be war 
between Arabs and Jews. They guessed righdy,.182 
This chapter has oudined the extent to which Zionist terrorism posed a threat to 
British national security immediately after the Second World War. Although the subject 
is missing from the secondary historical literature, we can now see that Zionist terrorism 
posed an urgent threat to Britain's post-war national security. The 'red light' of the 
terrorist threat, to use Sir David Petrie's phrase, reached its peak in the aftermath of the 
bombing of the King David Hotel in July 1946. It might be assumed that as Britain 
approached the point of withdrawing from Palestine, the threat of Zionist terrorism 
would have decreased. This was not the case. As Sir Percy Sillitoe explained in a lecture 
to the Special Branch in March 1948, the continued presence of British troops in 
Palestine after hand-over to the United Nations-to assist with administration and 
logistics-guaranteed that the British would remain targets for terrorist attacks.183 Even 
as Britain withdrew from Palestine in May 1948, the Stern Gang launched another letter 
bomb attack in Britain-an attack which claimed their only letter bomb fatality in Britain. 
A bomb was sent to the family house (near Wolverhampstead) of a retired Palestine CID 
officer, Roy Farran, who had been tried and controversially acquitted of murdering a 
Jewish youth in Palestine. The letter bomb was opened by Farran's youngest brother 
who, utterly unconnected to Palestine, was killed in the explosion.184 This was a graphic 
181 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Rifugee Problem Revisited, new ed.: (Cambridge, 2004). 
182 Begin, The Revolt, p. 133. 
183 NA KV3/41, s.7a: 'Director-General's lecture', (16 March, 1948), pp. 3-4. 
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example of the continued terrorist threat up to the point of Britain's transfer of power in 
Palestine in May 1948, but it was not the only example. Even after Britain formally 
withdrew from Palestine, MIS received reliable intelligence that following the Stern 
Gang's assassination of the UN envoy in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, they were 
planning to send assassination squads to Paris to murder members of the UN General 
Assembly whom they considered to have 'sold out' for minimalist Zionist aspirations. 18S 
l8S NA KV5/32, s.203a: G.A. Carey-Foster to H. Ashley, British embassy Paris, (15 Oct., 1948); 
Ibid., s.206a: David Scherr to G.A. Carey-Foster, Foreign Office, (28 Oct., 1948). 
Chapter Four 
The Cold War sets in: 
British intelligence, protective security and Soviet counter-espionage. 
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The n;tional security threats of Zionist terrorism interrupted MIS's realignment 
towards the .Cold War. Lacking significant positive intelligence on the Soviet Union, as 
the Cold War set in a key priority for MIS lay with 'protective security'-essentially 
involving contingency planning for the outbreak of World War Three with the Soviet 
Union. 'Protective security' was a slow and arguably the least glamorous aspect of MIS's 
work in the early Cold War, but then as now, it performed an essential role in national 
security: the coordination of emergency services and the protection of essential 
infrastructure in times of national emergencies was a subject of paramount importance 
for security, both then as today. This chapter will examine the range of 'protective 
security' measures which MIS devised as the Cold War escalated. These included 
'physical security' measures (designed to guard Britain's infrastructure); 'preventative 
security' measures (concerning the communist and Soviet 'Fifth Column' threat); and 
'personnel security' measures (which involved vetting procedures). As we shall see, in 
1947 the British government was forced to construct an entirely new personnel security 
apparatus for vetting individuals employed on secret work. These new vetting 
procedures had a dramatic effect on the nature of work in the Civil Service, permanently 
changing employment policies in Whitehall, and effectively overturning what constituted 
loyalty to the British state. 
Having discussed these issues, this chapter then outlines the ways by which MIS 
and the rest of the British intelligence community gradually began to gather information 
on the Soviet Union. As the Cold War set in, MIS naturally continued with their wartime 
efforts to scrutinise domestic communism. But following the cessation of the wartime 
Foreign Office ban on Soviet investigations, MIS once again began to target Soviet 
diplomatic organisations in Britain, most importantly the Soviet embassy and the Soviet 
Trade Delegation. Soviet diplomatic organisations and their officials, however, proved 
notoriously difficult for MIS to monitor. In these circumstances, a key source of 
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information on the Soviet Union lay with interrogations, many of which, as we shall 
discover, were conducted at secret British interrogation centres in occupied Germany. 
The interrogation of Soviet defectors, political refugees and captured espionage agents 
provided British intelligence (and their allies) with information unobtainable from any 
other source. But, then as now, interrogations of prisoners for intelligence purposes in 
secret detention centres abroad was a highly controversial process. In a manner which is 
uncomfortably familiar at the start of the twentieth-first century, in 1947 a scandal broke 
out at a British interrogation centre in occupied Germany, located in a town near 
Hanover, called Bad Nenndorf. It emerged that in the winter of 1946 to 1947, several 
prisoners had been brutally abused by British interrogators at the camp at Bad Nenndorf, 
and in two cases the abuse was fatal. We shall discuss the scandal at Bad Nenndorf and 
analyse the measures which the British government undertook in its wake-all of which 
has striking parallels, and implications, for governments and intelligence agencies today. 
The Cold War was above all an intelligence war. Both in the west and the east, 
governments relied on intelligence assessments (of each other) in a manner that was 
unprecedented in the history of peacetime government. Both western and Soviet 
intelligence assessments were haunted, and guided, by the memory of the Second World 
War: armies, occupations, tyrants and slaughter. By 1948 the JIC began to discuss the 
now-fabled '175 Divisions' of the Soviet Army which they estimated, reasonably but 
probably inaccurately, could be mobilised by Moscow for war against the west.! As we 
shall see in the following chapters of this dissertation, security and intelligence 
assessments often translated into direct policy-making decisions in Britain in the early 
Cold War. Atdee's establishment of new vetting procedures in 1947 (Atdee's 'purge 
procedure') was a striking example of political decisions taken on the basis of security 
! Hennessy, Never A gain, pp. 249-50; Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. 22-23; NA CAB 158/4 ]IC 
(48) 104 (Final), 'Soviet intentions and capabilities in 1949 and 1956/7', (8 Nov., 1948). 
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recommendations and requirements. Given the role performed by intelligence 
throughout the Cold War, it is therefore remarkable how weak the position of the British 
intelligence community was regarding the ' Soviet Union at the outset of the conflict. To 
be fair to Britain's intelligence services, however, weakness in Soviet counter-intelligence 
occurred on both sides of the Adantic. The United States did not establish a peacetime 
foreign intelligence gathering service (the CIA) until 1947, and the CIA did not open a 
Moscow station until 19S3.2 While the paucity of Soviet counter-intelligence in the west 
at the start of the Cold War is remarkable, equally so is the relationship between the Cold 
War allies themselves. At the outset of the Cold War, those two countries that would be 
the closest allies for the entire duration of the conflict, Britain and America, were less 
cooperative than we might suppose. 
MIS's adjustment to the Cold War naturally followed the broader political events 
which led to the escalation of the conflict. In his 'iron curtain' speech in March 1946, 
Churchill famously warned western governments of the nature of Soviet imperialism. In 
many ways, however, the real hinge of Cold War history occurred in the year 1947. In 
1947 Britain began to relinquish power in imperial territories across the globe. Britain 
announced its withdrawal from Palestine and from its greatest imperial possession, India. 
But in 1947 Britain also pulled out of the communist guerrilla war being fought in 
Greece. London's withdrawal from Greece forced the pace of the Cold War: the United 
States was obliged to take over Britain's former responsibilities and buttress Greece and 
Turkey against Soviet aggressiveness. The onset of the Cold War was signified by a 
declaration of 'containment' with the Truman Doctrine (March 1947) and the Marshall 
Plan Qune 1947), and the (predictable) breakdown of the conference of Foreign 
Ministers in Moscow (December 1947). In September 1947 Stalin declared the 
2 Christopher Andrew, 'Anglo-American-Soviet intelligence relations', in Ann Lane and Howard 
Temperley (eds.), The Rise and Fall ojthe GrandA /fiance, 1941-1945, (Basingstoke, 1995), p. 130. 
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establishment 'of COMINFORM to replace the COMINTERN, though as we have seen 
the COMINTERN had continued to operate in all but name throughout the war. As is 
now well established, these events w'ere followed by the communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Air lift in 1948-all of which British and American 
intelligence agencies failed to predict.3 This succession of events heralded the onset of 
the Cold War, a global ideological struggle, which became something akin to a 'clash of 
civilisations'. The political climate of the escalating Cold War was symbolised in April 
1947 when the British government introduced conscription. With the exception of a few 
months in 1939, conscription in Britain was unprecedented in peacetime.4 
To meet the demands of the Cold War, MIS's senior management was 
reorganised and the Service's administrative apparatus reformed. One of the final tasks 
that Sir David Petrie undertook as Director-General was to reform MIS's administrative 
structure. In March 1946 F-Division's responsibilities were taken over by B-Division, 
counter-espionage. F-Division's most important officers-including Roger Hollis, 
Graham Mitchell and John Marriott-who had been investigating the Soviet threat 
throughout the war, were transferred to B-Division.5 Michael S erp ell, who worked at 
one point as Sir Percy Sillitoe's personal secretary, became an important B-Division 
counter-espionage officer in the early Cold War.6 Guy Liddell, the wartime head of B-
Division, was promoted to be the new Deputy Director-General while Liddell's protege, 
(Sir) Dick White, was appointed as the new head of B-Division. C-Division continued to 
be responsible for vetting, though it also took over the wartime responsibilities of D-
3 Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee', pp. 23, 88; David A. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashe~ 
and George Bailey (eds.), Battleground Berlin. CIA vs. KGB in the Cold Wat; (New Haven, 1997); AV1 
Shlaim, 'Britain, the Berlin blockade and the Cold War', International Affairs, 60, (1984), pp. 1-14. 
4 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 152. 
5 NA KV4/161 'Organisation and function of B-Division from 1941-1953', s.47x: Sir David 
Petrie, 'Notes on proposed reorganisation ofB-Division, (14 Feb., 1946), 
6 Cockerill, Sir Perry Sillitoe, p. 188. 
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Division, 'physical security', and E-Division, 'alien control'.? In the post-war years C-
Division therefore became responsible for 'protective security', the umbrella term 
encompassing personnel and physical security, security of government contracts, and 
travel control. C-Division remained under the leadership of H.I. Allen until July 1948, 
when Hollis was again transferred and took over its leadership.8 A leading officer in C-
Division in the early Cold War was (Sir) Martin Furnival-Jones, a City solicitor by 
training, a war-hero, and future Director-General. Many of the MIS officers mentioned 
here were later involved either with investigating (White, Furnival-Jones) or were falsely 
implicated in (Hollis, Mitchell) the hugely disruptive conspiracy theories promulgated by 
Peter Wright and Chapman Pincher in the 1980s, in search of the missing 'Fifth Man,.9 
Although it is not specifically discernable in MIS records, MIS's adjustment to 
the Cold War occurred against the backdrop of a domestic economic crisis in Britain. 
While there is no available document that states this directly, like every other department 
in Whitehall, MIS was affected by the post-war economic situation in Britain. Britain 
emerged from the Second World War with a total of £4.7 billion of debt, with the war 
wiping out twenty-eight percent of the country's wealth. Britain's war-effort had been 
supported by the American Lend-Lease programme, 'the most unsordid act in the history 
of any nation', as Churchill termed it, but at the end of hostilities in August 1945, in fact 
just eight days after the end of the war in the Far East, Washington abruptly cancelled 
Lend-Lease. Under John Maynard Keynes' guidance, Britain negotiated a post-war 
financing loan with the United States of $3.75 billion, but the agreement required sterling 
to be made freely convertible in to dollars, which caused a financial crisis in Britain when 
? NA KV4/37 'Report on the operations of D.l. in connection with security measures in 
factories contracting for Ministries of Supply, Food and Health, and liaison with the War Office 
and Ministry of Supply'; KV4/44 'Report on the operations of E-Division in connection with 
alien control'. 
8 NA KV4/166 'C-Division. Organisation and duties, 1942-1953', s.40a: 'A-Division Circular', 
(14 July, 1948). 
9 Wright, Spycatcher, Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery. 
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duly implemented in July 1947.10 Britain's financial obligations in occupied territories 
furthermore weighed heavily on the Treasury, under Hugh Dalton and then Sir Stafford 
Cripps. In 1946 British taxpayers paid for 70% of imported foodstuffs in the British 
occupied Zone in Germany.11 To help prevent famine in occupied Germany and Asia, 
bread rationing was introduced in Britain in the summer of 1946-which it had not been 
during the war. In the winter of 1946 to 1947 Britain also faced a domestic fuel crisis. 
The winter was one of the coldest on record and, as temperatures plummeted, essential 
transportation faltered, and Britain was struck with coal shortages and electricity 
blackouts. The winter was so cold that in January 1947 even Big Ben stopped 'bonging' 
when its mechanics froze solid. As several observers at the time commented, the very 
cogs of British society seemed to stop moving. 12 
In these beleaguered circumstances, Britain's intelligence agencies had to plan for 
'hot' war with the Soviet Union. Unlike every past conflict in the history of warfare, 
however, World War Three potentially involved the reciprocal use of nuclear weapons. 
Between 1946 and 1948 the JIC made a series of somewhat desperate attempts to 
forecast when Moscow might obtain nuclear capabilities. The JIC based their 
assessments on what negligible intelligence was available on the Soviet atomic project, 
what research Moscow could theoretically obtain from published sources, had definitely 
obtained from espionage agents like Alan Nunn May, and by way of comparison, how far 
advanced Britain's own atomic project was. In 1948 the JIC estimated that the Soviet 
Union might be capable of gaining nuclear capabilities by January 1951 at the earliest, 
and could have a stockpile of atomic weapons to use by January 1953.13 If war broke out 
10 Clarke, Hope and Glory, pp. 227-231; Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version: The Life oj Sir Stafford 
Cripps, 1889-1952, (London, 2002), p. 480. 
II Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 154. 
12 Hennessy, Never Again, p. 282; 'More snow in the south', The Times, London: (29 Jan., 1947). 
13 CAB 158/3 JIC (48) 35 (0) Terms of reference, 'Scale and nature of attack on the United 
Kingdom', (31 March, 1948); also see CAB 158/4 JIC (48) 26 (0) Final, 'Strategic intentions of 
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thereafter, Britain potentially would be faced, to use the lIC's own words, with 
annihilation . from Soviet 'weapons of mass destruction,.14 In the event, the lIC 
underestimated how advanced the Soviet nuclear programme was. The Soviet Union 
beat Britain's bid to obtain an atomic weapon, with availability of uranium rather than 
intelligence a determining factor, and tested its first weapon in August 1949-nearly a 
year and a half before the ]IC's prediction, and over three years before Britain detonated 
its first atomic weapon, in October 1952. 15 
I. Protective security: (a) physical and preventative security measures 
In the years immediately after the Second World War, the lIC's assessment of 
Soviet capabilities and intentions was that Moscow was unlikely to deliberately start a war 
before it had acquired nuclear capabilities. Until then, judged the lIC, Moscow was likely 
to pursue a policy of bringing 'security' to its borders which, while not provoking war, 
almost certainly would involve everything short of war. The danger, reasoned the lIC, 
lay in the fact that Moscow's defensive attempts to gain 'security' for its borders could be 
interpreted as acts of aggression by other countries, or Moscow itself could misjudge a 
situation-either of which could escalate to 'hot' war. By forecasting events which could 
develop into 'hot' war with the Soviet Union, the]IC was in no sense 'war mongering'. 
In fact, as the first study of the lIC in the early Cold War-written by Dr. Alex Craig-
has shown, at key 'flashpoints' like the Berlin crisis in 1948 the lIC exerted a 'calming' 
the Soviet Union', (12 June, 1948); Michael S. Goodman, 'British intelligence and the Soviet 
atomic bomb', The Journal oj Strategic Studies, 26, no. 2, (2003), pp. 120-151. 
14 NA CAB 158/3 JIC (48) 35 (0) (Final) 'Scale and nature of initial attack on the British Isles-
1957', (27 Aug., 1948), p. 4. 
15 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 223. The JIC had, however, predicted that uranium supplies 
would be a determining factor for the Soviet atomic project. 
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influence of restraint and moderation on Whitehall. 16 Indeed, the JIC's earliest Cold War 
assessments between 1944 and 1946 show a degree of 'optimism' concerning the 
possibility of London's future cooperation with Moscow. The JIC's early 'optimistic' 
assessments of the Soviet Union have significant implications for the origins of the Cold 
War, though inexplicably the historiography of the Cold War origins remains generally 
silent on the role of intelligence. 17 As Sir Percy Craddock has shown, the JIC's four main 
assessments of the Soviet Union between 1944 and 1948 represent an ideological 
transition from 'optimism', of cooperating with Moscow, to 'pessimism' as the true 
nature of the hostile, messianic Soviet regime revealed itself. 18 Despite the ]IC's early 
'hopeful' assessments, by 1948 'pessimism' had set in and the JIC was predicting that if 
war erupted with the Soviet Union, it would occur in apocalyptic terms. In 1948 the ]IC 
predicted that by 19S6 Moscow would be capable of deploying between 600 and 6S0 
heavy bombers from Soviet occupied territories, which could deliver between five and 
twenty-five atomic weapons, together with high altitude incendiaries and biological and 
chemical weapons (rabun and Anthrax) on Britain. 19 Faced with this kind of potential 
Doomsday scenario, MIS's role was to make contingency security arrangements for the 
outbreak of hostilities. MIS's contingency plans involved a range of 'preventative 
security' arrangements within Britain itself. But as the final chapter of this dissertation 
will show, MIS's contingency arrangements in fact stretched across the empire, as Britain 
faced the potential threat of Soviet subversion in decolonisation movements.
20 
16 Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee', pp. 90-93. 
17 For instance, John Lewis Gaddis' study, We Now KnOJv: Rethinking Cold War History, (London, 
1997), is conspicuously silent on SIGINT. 
18 Craddock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 25-49. 
19 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 95 (0) Final, 'Future scale of air strike against the United kingdom', 
(12 Nov., 1946). 
20 NA CAB 81/133 JIC (46) 70 (0) (Final), 'The spread of communism throughout the world and 
the extent of its direction from Moscow', (23 Sept., 1946); CAB 158/1 JIC (47) 12 (0) (Final 
Revised), 'Role of colonies in war', (8 April, 1947); CAB 158/2 JIC (47) 65 (0) (Final), 'Summary 
of principal factors affecting commonwealth security', (29 Oct., 1947). 
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In many ways, preventative secw:ity measw:es were MIS's 'public face' for the 
dw:ation of the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War MIS liased with other government 
departments and advised them on how they should best conduct themselves in the event 
of a national 'emergency'-a euphemism used for the outbreak of World War Three. An 
important aspect of MIS's contingency planning lay with 'physical security' measw:es. 
MIS had recognised the importance of physical secw:ity for Britain's overall national 
secw:ity since the time of the First World War.21 Physical secw:ity involved safeguarding 
Britain's essential infrastructure, including power-supplies, factories, munitions-depots, 
transport routes and port-border control. To safeguard infrastructw:e from enemy 
sabotage dming the looming war with the Soviet Union, MIS liased with departments as 
diverse as the War Office, the Ministries of Food and Health and various government-
contracting firms. MIS's responsibility was to allow the government and essential 
infrastructw:e to continue to function after the outbreak of hostilities-termed the 
'continuation of government'. MIS distributed advisory booklets and guidelines to every 
government department, outlining secw:ity procedw:es on a range of subjects from basic 
'house-keeping' topics such as guarding keys and safes in offices, through to arranging 
with the War Office zones to be established near essential infrastructure where the public 
would be forbidden access after the outbreak of war.22 The effectiveness of MIS's 
physical secw:ity measw:es of cow:se were never tested, but then as now, planning for 
catastrophes-for example the coordination of emergency services-was an essential 
component in national secw:ity. 
As well as physical secw:ity measw:es, MIS devised 'preventative secw:ity' 
measw:es to neutralise the communist and Soviet 'Fifth Colmnn' threat in Britain in the 
event of war. In March 1946 MIS submitted a report to the JIC on the 'Spread of 
21 Curry, The Securiry Service, pp. 72-73. 
22 NA KV4/37 'Report on the operations ofD.l'. 
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communism ' throughout the world and the extent of its direction from Moscow', 
codified asJIC (46) 101 (0). The report, which outlined the 'Communist Party as a Fifth 
Column in the event of war with Russia',' was a personal triumph for Roger Hollis, who, 
as we have seen, had been campaigning arguably more than anyone else in the British 
intelligence community for Whitehall to take seriously the Soviet threat throughout the 
war. When formulating their plans for dismantling the communist and Soviet 'Fifth 
Column' in 1946, MIS reverted to plans which they had devised before Moscow's entry 
into the war in June 1941, when the Soviet Union was allied to Nazi Germany. In their 
1946 report, MIS estimated that of a total Party membership of approximately 37,000, 
there was probably an 'inflexible hardcore' of 10,000 Party members who would 'blindly 
follow' Moscow. While MIS agreed that it might be necessary to detain all 10,000 
members of the 'inflexible hardcore', if 'so drastic a step were considered necessary', they 
judged that it would probably be possible to neutralise the Party with far fewer 
detentions. As with their plans before June 1941, the centrepiece of MIS's strategy was 
the centralised nature of the Party itself: MIS reasoned that a direct blow to the Party's 
headquarters would probably paralyse it. As MIS's report to the JIC explained, the 
banning of the Party on the outbreak of war and the 'simultaneous detention of the King 
Street officials would be followed, as far as it is possible to judge, by a period of extreme 
confusion in Communist circles'. By keeping the Party's leadership under close 
observation, MIS would be able to inform the police who were the most important 
leaders to be arrested at the outbreak of hostilities: 
The records, while far from complete, are extensive. The 
identities, activities, and antecedents of leading Party members 
are known, and knowledge of their places of work and residence 
is also in the possession of the Police.23 
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MIS estimated that as few as 1,00b key arrests could 'decapitate' the CPGB as an 
effective political organisation. When formulating their early Cold War plans for 
neutralising the communist 'Fifth Column' in Britain, MIS naturally fIrst turned to the 
plans they had devised before June 1940. But perhaps more importantly, MIS also 
turned to the most successful past experience of neutralising an 'internal enemy' in 
Britain: the example of the fascist threat in Britain between 1939 and 1940. The BUF 
example demonstrated that by arresting key leaders, depriving them of funds, 
headquarters and a press, a minority political movement in Britain could be effIciently 
neutralised: 'Deprived of these and surrounded by a hostile environment, there is no 
reason to think that the Communists in this country would fare very much better, as an 
organised 'Fifth Column', than the Fascists in 1940'.24 By turning to the pre-war fascist 
example, MIS was learning from past successes. However, there was another dimension 
to MIS's early Cold War internment strategy. Although it is not stated in the JIC report 
specifIcally, the reason why MIS urged restraint against the future mass-internment of 
communists seems to have been because of the Service's notorious overreaction during 
the 'Fifth Column' crisis in the summer of 1940. In other words, MIS was not only 
learning from past successes, but from past mistakes as well. The JIC report concluded 
with some overall lessons that could be drawn from the pre-war fascist threat for the 
post-war communist threat: 
... A more useful parallel may also be drawn with the fascist 
problem in this country in 1939-1940. The British Union 
23 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 101 (0), 'Spread of communism throughout the world and the extent 
of its direction from Moscow', (18 Nov., 1946), p. 6. 
24 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 101 (0), p. 6. 
of Fascists was friendly on ideological grounds with the 
Nazi regime (though not subservi~nt to it as the 
Communist Party of Great Britain is to the U.S.S.R.) and in 
1940 formed a potential Fifth Column of comparable 
dimensions. Its total membership at the outbreak of the 
war may at the outbreak of the war have been in the 
neighbourhood of 7,500. Action taken under the Defence 
Regulations in the spring of 1940, first in detaining the 
leading figures of the British Union and its district leaders 
to the number of 750, and then declaring the movement 
illegal and imposing penalties for activities on its behalf, had 
an altogether paralysing effect on organised Fascism for the 
duration of the war.25 
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The problem facing MIS in the early Cold War was that they had to assume that 
Soviet 'sleeper' agents remained undetected in government departments. As MIS 
explained to the ]IC, the Second World War had served as a catalyst for Soviet espionage 
recruitment in Britain: Britain's wartime alliance with the Soviet Union created an 
enthusiasm for the Soviet regime that, for the first time, occurred across 'class' 
boundaries in Britain. In the inter-war years the communist threat had been, broadly 
speaking, a 'working class' threat. This was epitomised by arguably the most dramatic 
peacetime demonstration in twentieth century Britain, the General Strike in 1926, when 
nearly two million workers instigated the only ever General Strike in British history.26 
The Second World War, however, transformed the nature of the communist threat, both 
in Britain and abroad: during the war a considerable number of clerical, intellectual, 
professional and scientific workers became Party members or communist sympathisers, 
and among them were civil servants and individuals training to become civil servants. 
MIS warned the JIC that war with the Soviet Union would transform these civil servants 
into a 'Fifth Column' at the heart of the British government. MIS explained that 
although they were doing their best to detect such individuals, it was a slow and onerous 
25 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 101 (0), pp. 7-8. 
26 Anne Perkins, A Very British Strike. The General Strike 1926, (London, 2006). 
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task: 'There remains a probability that there are some Communists not known to be 
such~ who are engaged on secret work,.27 MIS's warning was more prescient than they 
realised. As we have already mentioned, almost certainly MIS's report to the JIC in 
March 1946 was drafted with the assistance of Kim Philby in SIS. 
Although MIS first urged restraint regarding the mass-internment of communists 
in Britain, as the political climate of the Cold War radicalised they were forced to re-
consider such a policy. The Berlin Blockade, which began in June 1948, has rightfully 
been considered one of the 'flashpoints' of the Cold War. Like the outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950, the Berlin Blockade risked sparking a 'hot' war.28 As Allied 
governments began an unprecedented airlift to the besieged city of Berlin in June 1948, 
MIS therefore devised the first plans in the atomic age for mass-internment in Britain. 
MIS's early Cold War plans for mass-internment followed the precedents of mass-
internment in the First World War, during which over 32,000 'enemy aliens' were 
interned in Britain, but more immediately they followed the example of the Second 
World War, during which, as we have seen, approximately 27,000 enemy aliens were 
interned in June 1940.29 MIS's plans for mass-internment in the early Cold War were 
principally devised by Dick White, Graham Mitchell, W.H. Oughton, S.H . Burley and 
MIS's post-war legal adviser, Bernard Hill. In early August 1948 Sir Percy Sillitoe held an 
emergency meeting with representatives from the Home Office and War Office in which 
they devised plans for the detention and internment of communists in Britain: six camps 
were to be established to hold up to 15,000 British and 'enemy alien' detainees.3D MIS 
would compile lists of those who were to be detained and, within days of the outbreak of 
27 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 101 (0), p. 7. 
28 Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee', pp. 23, 88, 109, 130,206. 
29 NA HO 45/10946/266042 'Detention of enemy aliens in various internment camps', (1914-
1920); Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War. 
30 NA KV4/245 'Policy regarding the setting up of detention and internment camps in the UK 
for the detention of British subjects and the internment of aliens in the event of an emergency, 
1948-1954', s.2a: W.H. Oughton, (3 Aug., 1948). 
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would compile lists of those who were to be detained and, within days of the outbreak of 
27 NA CAB 81/134 JIC (46) 101 (0), p. 7. 
28 Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee', pp. 23, 88, 109, 130, 206. 
29 NA HO 45/10946/266042 'Detention of enemy aliens in various internment camps', (1914-
1920); Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War. 
30 NA KV4/245 'Policy regarding the setting up of detention and internment camps in the UK 
for the detention of British subjects and the internment of aliens in the event of an emergency, 
1948-1954', s.2a: W.H. Oughton, (3 Aug., 1948). 
199 
hostilities, special camps would be established, organised by the War Office but run by 
the Home Office and civilian police.31 Unfortunately MIS's arrest-lists are not on file, 
but we know that they contained CPGB members and 'enemy alien' nationals such as 
Russians, Czechs, Poles and other nationals from the Eastern Bloc.32 Following the 
example of both world wars, those detained would be physically separated between 
'enemy aliens' (DR.18a) and 'non-alien', British subjects (DR.18b). As in both world 
wars, the majority of 'enemy aliens' would be housed in requisitioned holiday camps on 
the Isle of Man. However, MIS also designated other locations for detention camps: one 
holiday camp in North Wales (Butlin's in Rhyl and Prestatyn) and two racecourses near 
London (Ascot and Epsom). While these locations were doubtless functional-Ascot 
had been used as a detention camp during the Second World War-the idea of holiday 
camps and racecourses being used for internment camps still seems fantastic. 33 
MIS's plans for mass-internment in the early Cold War were undermined by 
bureaucratic red-tape and, more importantly, disputes with other Whitehall departments. 
One of the first disputes MIS encountered was with the Home Office, which advocated 
that both British and foreign-national detainees should have the right to appear before 
special Tribunals to hear their cases. MIS was strongly opposed to the use of Tribunals 
in the early stages of a war: between 1939 and 1940, Tribunals had distracted MIS from 
counter-espionage work, and MIS feared that future Tribunals would give detainees so 
many rights that it would be impossible to extract any useful intelligence from them.
34 
The second dispute which MIS encountered followed similar lines, involving 
international law. In a manner which is striking given events at the start of the twenty-
31 NA KV 4/245, s.3a: S.H. Burley, 'Arrangements for detention of Communists', (5 Aug., 1948). 
32 NA KV4/245, Minute 23a: Guy Liddell, (25 May, 1950). 
33 NA KV4/245, s.16a: Bernard Hill, 'Note', (20 Sept., 1949); Ibid., s.17z: Bernard Hill, (28 Feb., 
1950); Daniel Sherman, 'Learning from Past Mistakes? Planning for Internment of subversives 
during a transition to war 1948-1964', (M.A. dissertation, University of London, 2005). 
34 NA KV4/245, Minute lla: Bernard Hill, (24 Nov., 1948). 
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first century,' MIS was vehemently opposed to applying the Geneva Conventions to 
'enemy alien' internment camps in Britain. As MIS's legal adviser explained to the Home 
Office, applying the Geneva Conventions would give detainees so many rights and would 
burden the 'Protecting Power', Britain, with so many obligations that intelligence 
gathering would be rendered impossible. Article 8 in the 1947 Geneva Conventions, for 
example, required that when an 'enemy alien' was detained, the 'Protecting Power' had to 
inform the detainee's national government. As MIS warned, in effect this would make it 
impossible to orchestrate another Double Cross System-which obviously relied on 
foreign governments being unaware that their agents had been captured.35 As soon as 
the British government began discussing the 1947 Geneva Conventions, Sir Percy Sillitoe 
therefore wrote to Attlee himself to express MIS's reservations about applying the 
Convention on 'enemy alien' detainees. Sillitoe warned that if the government insisted 
on applying the Convention in Britain in a time of war, MIS would be unable to 
guarantee British national security.36 As Sillitoe and MIS's legal adviser explained to the 
Home Office, if MIS were to stand a chance of gaining useful intelligence from detainees 
(for instance concerning enemy espionage networks in Britain), there were some basic 
conditions they required: MIS would need 'informal access' to detainees (presumably 
without their lawyers present), camp commandants who were sympathetic to the needs 
of intelligence gathering, and for bugging equipment to be installed in detainees' cells.
37 
Ultimately MIS's resistance meant that Attlee's government did not adhere to the 
Convention pertaining to 'enemy aliens'.38 These exact issues, namely the legal standing 
35 NA KV4/245, s.7a: Bernard Hill, 'Note', (3 Nov., 1947). 
36 NA PREM 8/929 'Proposed convention on treatment of enemy aliens in time of war', Sir 
Percy Sillitoe to Clement Atdee, 'Security Service case for a general security reservation', (16 
Dec., 1947). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., Guy Liddell to L.N. Helsby, Prime Minister's office, (14 Feb., 1949); Sherman, 'Learning 
from Past Mistakes? Planning for Internment of subversives during a transition to war 1948-
1964'. 
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of detained 'enemy aliens', are still tormenting governments and intelligence agencies 
today, Then as now, the requirements of intelligence gathering appeared to be 
incompatible with some of the most ' basic tenets of post-war international law. 
Combined with a good deal of bureaucratic red-tape in Whitehall, this explains why it 
was impossible for MIS to finalise plans for mass-internment in the early Cold War. 
Though MIS devised the basic procedures for mass-internment in 1948, and these plans 
entered into the government's War Book in 1954, clucial details such as the obligations 
of the 'Protecting Power' were still being deliberated at that stage-five and a half years 
after the first emergency meeting was held in August 1948. Balancing the requirements 
of intelligence gathering with international law was as difficult a task half a century ago 
as, apparendy, it is today.39 
II. Post-war pigeon policy 
MIS's contingency planning for World War Three led in directions other than 
straightforward physical and preventative security counter-measures. Learning from the 
examples of both the First World War and the Second World War, the British 
intelligence community predicted that pigeons would playa role in the future war with 
the Soviet Union.4O During the Second World War, MIS had established their own 
pigeon and falconry unit (B.3.c), under Flight-Lieutenant R.M. Walker.
41 
MIS's wartime 
pigeon policy had got off to an inauspicious start in 1942, when reports came to MIS of 
'suspicious' pigeons flying over the Scilly Isles (it is unclear what made these pigeons 
39 NA KV2/262 'General papers on the internment and restr1ctions on movement and 
possession of aliens in the event of an Emergency', Minute 20: Bernard Hill, (31 Jan., 1951). 
40 For the role of pigeons in British national security during the First World War, see: Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, (London, 1959), p. 12. By now, there is even pigeon historiography, 
see: Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 162-64; Wilson, 'War in the dark', pp. 198-99. 
41 NA KV 4/179 'Organisation and function of B.3'. 
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'suspicious'). Flight-Lieutenant Walker was despatched to the Scilly Isles with hawks to 
neutralise their threat. Between December 1942 and February 1943, Walker's falconry 
unit commendably brought down three pigeons, but in the event all three were found to 
be stray British pigeons. Despite this unfortunate murder of innocent pigeons, MIS's 
wartime pigeon policy continued to expand. 'Tar' Robertson was a keen supporter of 
using pigeons for deception purposes, a policy which subsequendy achieved considerable 
successes. Despite the logistical difficulties they encountered, MIS managed to 
successfully manufacture fake German pigeon tags, and attach them to British pigeons to 
carry false messages. This policy reached its highpoint surrounding the D-Day 
operations, when numerous deception pigeons were released to the Continent. In 
September 1944 Liddell proudly noted in his diary that Belgium and Holland were 'being 
filled with phoney pigeons,.42 
Despite the successes of MIS's pigeon section, throughout the war they were 
'continuously forced to swim in a sea of pigeon politics,.43 As so often appears to be the 
case in the British intelligence community, various departments claimed responsibility for 
a project's success, but none was willing to finance it. By the end of the war MIS, SIS, 
the RAF and the War Office all had their own 'pigeon experts', with the JIC even 
establishing their own 'subcommittee on pigeons'. Whitehall discussions of Britain's 
post-war pigeon policy produced memorable reports, with 'Tar' Robertson noting in 
October 1946 that he 'attended a pigeon meeting' at the Cabinet Offices, which 
subsequendy established a 'thinking committee on pigeons', while another report was 
appropriately en tided 'From SIS reo pigeons,.44 Eventually MIS, SIS and the RAF agreed 
to share the cost of Britain's post-war pigeon policy, maintaining a loft in London of 100 
42 Wilson, 'The war in the dark', p. 199; Liddell diaries, (6 Sept., 1944). 
43 NA KV4/229 'Post-war policy on the organisation, control and maintenance of pigeons', 
Mllute 16: Fl.Lt. R.M. Walker, (29 Aug., 1945). 
44 NA KV4/229 'Post-war policy on the organisation, control and maintenance of pigeons', 
Minute 48: 'From SIS reo pigeons', (13 Dec., 1946); Minute 66: T.A. Robertson, (8 Oct., 1946). 
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presumably mter-service pigeons, manned by civilian handlers. As Britain's intelligence 
agencies planned for war with the Soviet Union, pigeon policy developed in two 
directions: the first strategy, implemented from September 1946, involved MIS and SIS 
using the All British Pigeon Gazette to contact pigeon fanciers throughout Europe, 
especially behind the Iron Curtain, so that if war broke out, carrier pigeons could be 
deployed to resistance movements in Soviet occupied territories. 45 The second strategy 
was equally logical, but somewhat more exotic: 'homing' pigeons could be trained to 
target a specific area in the Soviet Union and deliver small quantities of either 
bacteriological agents or explosives. The plan was based on the fact that, to find their 
direction, pigeons relied on electro-magnetic fields which occurred at equal points across 
the globe's surface. The RAF's pigeon expert, Wing Commander W.D. Lea Rayner,46 
explained to the JIC subcommittee that with three weeks of 'special training', pigeons 
could be trained within British territory to 'home in' on an area in the Soviet Union with 
corresponding electro-magnetic fields. They could then be released by special apparatus 
from aircraft up to 200 miles away from their target, and fly, undetected by radar, 
carrying a capsule of up to two ounces' weight. Although this did not seem particularly 
significant on first impression, Rayner explained: 'A thousand pigeons with a two ounce 
explosive capsule, landed at intervals on a specific target might be a seriously 
inconvenient surprise,.47 It is uncertain, however, how much further the British 
intelligence community took preparations for exploding pigeons. Ranyer conceded that 
the electro-magnetic fields caused by nuclear research plants might divert pigeons from 
their targets, the implication being that the pigeons might accidentally bomb the wrong 
45 NA KV4/229, s.75a: 'Joint Intelligence Subcommittee ad hoc committee on pigeons', (18 
Sept., 1946). 
46 See WD. Lea Rayner's subsequent work, Creation of a Strain: Tracing the Evolution of the Racing 
Pigeon from the Earliest Time to the Present, (London, 1956). 
47 NA KV4/229, s.69a: 'Joint Intelligence Subcommittee ad hoc committee on pigeons', (8 Oct., 
1948). 
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target. By 1948 Britain's pigeon policy was furthermore facing funding-reductions. In 
what is by no means the only instance in post-war British national security planning, in 
1948 MIS and SIS were forced to ask ~hether Washington would be willing to help 
finance their pigeon plans. 48 
III. Protective security: (b) personnel security measures 
Britain's post-war plgeon policy was a clear example of the imaginative and 
creative lengths which the British intelligence community went to in order to prepare for 
war with the Soviet Union. Although pigeon policy might on first impression seem 
highly eccentric, or even ridiculous, in fact it displayed a streak of imagination which 
repeatedly proved itself to be an essential component for intelligence successes: much of 
the success of the Double Cross System was derived from the imagination of B-Division 
officers, while the creative ingenuity of Bletchley Park likewise has long been lauded.49 
As the Cold War set in, however, MIS's 'protective security' measures led in other 
directions than contingency planning for war with the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1947, 
MIS helped to orchestrate a revolution in 'personnel security' measures, namely vetting 
procedures, in British government departments. Based on the disclosure of Alan Nunn 
May, and in response to mounting pressure from Washington through the McMahon 
Act, which terminated American cooperation in atomic research, in March 1947 the 
British government began to redraw the entire architecture of security procedures in 
Britain, devising new methods for vetting individuals engaged on secret work. Even the 
most cursory examination of post-war security standards in Whitehall departments 
48 NA KV4/230, s.99a: T.A. Robertson to Anderson, MIl, (14 Feb., 1948). 
49 Wilson, 'The war in the dark', p. 120. Sir John Masterman memorably described MIS's double-
agents as 'create geniuses' and 'mute inglorious Miltons', who 'could not ftnd a publisher before 
the war'. See: Masterman, The Double-Cross System, p. 17. 
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revealed a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation. The Foreign Office, for example, did not 
havea single security officer-let alone a security department-before CA. Carey-Foster 
was appointed to that position in October 1946.50 As the Cold War set in, insufficient 
security standards in government departments posed a twofold threat for British national 
security. The successful penetration of Soviet agents into government departments 
presented a military threat for Britain, whereby Moscow could obtain advanced 
scientific-military research. But Soviet penetration also posed a 'Fifth Column' threat for 
Britain by which, if war broke out with the Soviet Union, Moscow could rely on sabotage 
agents within British government departments. Attlee's 'committee on subversive 
activities', known as GEN 183 after its official Cabinet Office designation, was the first 
comprehensive attempt by the British government to address the threat of communist 
penetration in government circles. Instigated in May 1947, and announced to parliament 
in March 1948, GEN 183 sought to create common vetting procedures and common 
employment standards for government departments with access to secret information. 
GEN 183, commonly known as the 'Attlee purge procedure', was the culmination of 
previous failed attempts to establish uniform vetting mechanisms in Whitehall, such as 
Churchill's ill-fated wartime Panel. Although GEN 183 was theoretically designed to 
exclude both fascists and communists from sensitive government departments, in 
practice it was overwhelmingly concerned with communists. By excluding Communist 
Party members from secret work, in effect GEN 183 transformed what constituted 
loyalty to the British state. 51 
GEN 183 was established by Attlee's government in May 1947 in response to the 
security threats-expressed by MIS throughout the war-posed by insufficient vetting 
50 Cecil, 'The Cambridge Comintern', in Andrew and Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension, p. 182. 
51 NA CAB 130/20 GEN 183/1 'Cabinet committee on subversive activities ', 'The employment 
of civil servants etc., exposed to communist influence', (29 May, 1947); Hennessy, The Secret State, 
p. 87; Peter Hennessy and Gail Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War security purge: the origins of 
positive vetting', The Historical Journal, 25, no. 4, (1982), pp. 965-973. 
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standards in ' government departments. GEN 183 was established in response to the 
sharp escalation in Soviet espionage in western governments in 1946, a year that 
witnessed the expulsion of Earl Browder from the Communist Party in United States 
(CPU SA) in connection with Soviet subversion, the appointment of the Gouzenko Royal 
Commission in Canada and, as we have seen, the arrest of Alan Nunn May. At the first 
meeting of GEN 183 in May 1947, chaired by Attlee himself and at which Sillitoe was a 
leading contributor, the committee recognised the considerable problems they faced 
when attempting to exclude British citizens from secret work. The tenets of liberal 
democracy naturally allowed British citizens to be members of the Communist Party if 
they desired. But as Attlee's committee argued, membership of the Communist Party 
required, at the least, a divided loyalty between Britain and the Soviet Union, and, 
through the existence of COMINFORM, Party membership could potentially lead to 
disclosures of secret information to Moscow. At the first meeting of GEN 183, the 
committee emphasised that their objectives were not simply a knee-jerk reaction to 
commurusm. In fact, they considered their recourse to more comprehensive vetting 
procedures as an act of desperation. Faced with the likelihood that Soviet intelligence 
networks were operating in Britain in similar ways to Canada, the committee argued that 
it was the government's duty, and obligation, to ensure that known communists were 
excluded from secret work.52 Faced with a rising Cold War, the government had no 
other choice than to exclude communists from sensitive positions. As Attlee wrote in 
December 1947: 
We cannot afford to take risks here, and the general public 
will support us. Fellow travellers may protest, but we 
should face up to this. Action should be taken in regard to 
52 Hansard' Parliamentary debates, House if Commons, (15 March, 1948), pp. 1703-07. 
Fascists as well as Communists although the former are 
feeble. 53 
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In fact, MIS reasoned that if war broke out with the Soviet Union, it was likely 
that British fascists would support the war-the corollary to the way that British 
communists had supported Britain's war-effort after June 1941. Theoretically, this made 
fascists far less of a future security threat than communists, though as one MIS report 
phrased it, the 'emotionally unstable' nature of most British fascists meant that it would 
be inadvisable to ever trust them with confidential work. 54 Under the effective leadership 
of Sir Percy Sillitoe, Sir Edward Bridges (head of Civil Service) and A.J.D. Winnifrith (an 
under secretary at the Treasury), GEN 183 devised several procedures to enhance 
government security standards: first government departments were divided into 'safe' 
(non-secret) and 'unsafe' (secret) categories. Each 'unsafe' department with access to 
secret information was then required to submit to MIS the names of individuals to be 
vetted. As they had done during the war, MIS (C-Division) relied on a process of 
'negative vetting', by which names were checked for traces in the Registry. In cases 
where security doubt was shown, any action taken against employees-such as 
transferring them to non-secret work or, as a last resort, making them redundant-was 
the sole responsibility of the relevant Minister. By March 1948, when Atdee's 'purge 
procedure' was announced to parliament, a special panel of 'Three Wise Men', composed 
of high-ranking civil servants, had also been established to receive appeals from 
government employees who had been refused vetting clearance and who felt aggrieved.
55 
53 NA KV4/203 'Policy on investigation & measures to control fascists in government 
contracting firms', s.25a: Prime Minister's personal minute (21 Dec., 1947). 
54 NA KV4/204 'Policy regarding fascists in government departments', s.43a: H.I Lee to R.H. 
Hollis, (21 May, 1948). 
55 In 1949 the 'Three Wise Men' were Sir Thomas Gardiner (former Director-General of the 
Post-Office); Sir Frederick Leggett (former Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labour and National 
Service); and Mr. ].W. Bowen (former General Secretary of the Union of Post Office Workers) . 
See: Hennessy and Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War security purge', pp. 966-7; NA KV4/203, 
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MIS helped to devise the guiding principles of Attlee's 'purge procedure'. MIS 
advised Attlee's GEN 183 committee that whenever possible, government Ministries 
should avoid simply sacking individuals ~ho posed security risks and, instead, attempt to 
transfer them to non-secret work. MIS did not advise this strategy for altruistic reasons. 
As Liddell explained to Winnifrith: 'Evident dangers to security are opened by having 
disgruntled Communist ex-officials kicking their heels for any length of time'.56 Another 
guiding principal of the 'purge procedure' was that MIS never held any executive powers. 
MIS offered advice to government departments based on what names were submitted to 
them, but they themselves never had the ability to take action against government 
employees. From the outset of the 'purge procedure', MIS was also careful to insist not 
on identical security procedures in government departments, but rather common levels of 
security, ensuring standardised levels of employment in government offices. As we shall 
see, these in-built restraining mechanisms in Attlee's 'purge procedure' made it possible 
to avoid overreactions and anti-communist 'witch-hunts' in Whitehall departments in the 
early Cold War. 
With these general principals of the 'purge procedure' devised, the GEN 183 
committee established a set of rules for all government departments to follow: first, 
members of the Communist Party were to be excluded from all government posts with 
access to secret information and, second, every individual employed on secret work had 
to be vetted by MIS. To avoid situations which MIS had encountered during the war, 
when individuals were transferred into secret work after their initial employment, MIS 
required Ministries to re-submit all employees' names whenever they were entering work 
s.28a: GEN 183/1 'Cabinet committee on subversive activities', (29 May, 1947), pp. 5-7; 
KV4/204, s.39a: T. Pacimore, Treasury, to A.J.T. Day, Civil Service, (5 April, 1948). 
56 NA KV4/203, s.31z: G.M. Liddell to A.J.D. Winnifrith, Treasury, (6 March, 1948). 
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of higher gr~de secrecy. 57 These procedures were laid out in a new Booklet if Standard 
Conditions if Emplqyment, written by the Home Office with MIS's assistance, which was 
distributed to all government departments. 58 The initial findings of GEN 183, however, 
did not instil the government's confidence. A preliminary survey revealed that in March 
1948, sixteen known communists were employed by the Ministry of Supply, who, 
alarmingly, were 'mainly scientists engaged in highly secret work'. The Ministty of 
Supply conceded that it might be necessary to investigate as many as fifty cases in total of 
communists employed on secret work. 59 The threat of communist penetration ill 
government departments was confounded by the fact that a considerable number of 
government-contracting firms were involved in secret work. The nature of scientific and 
technical research meant that much of it was franchised work to specialised firms and 
research institutions: in 1948 the British aircraft industty alone was known to have 182 
communists and 'untrustworthy' individuals employed on secret work.60 
Sillitoe explained to the GEN 183 committee that while MIS was obviously the 
strongest advocate of enhanced security standards in government departments, increased 
vetting responsibilities placed MIS in an awkward position. In July 1948 Sillitoe warned 
the committee of the 'somewhat disturbing' effect that increased vetting would have on 
his Service. In fact, Sillitoe outlined the perennial tension which MIS had experienced 
between intelligence-collection and vetting responsibilities. Sillitoe warned that if all 
Service departments categorised themselves as responsible for 'secret work', MIS would 
57 NA KV4/203, s.28a: GEN 183/1 'Cabinet committee on subversive activities', (29 May, 1947), 
p. 7; KV4/204, s.60a: 'The Civil Service purge procedure', (25 Oct., 1948). 
58 For example, see: NA KV4/202 'Policy on employment of British subjects by marriage 
naturalisation or of alien origin in ftrms', s.42a: Ministry of Supply to G.c. Byrde, MI5, (4 Dec., 
1946). 
59 NA KV4/203, s.32b: 'Employment of fascists and communists in the Civil Service', (2 March, 
1948), p. 3. 
60 NA CAB 158/2 JIC (47) 68 'Security of military secrets in the Ministry of Supply', (8 Nov., 
1947); AVAI 46/541 'Subversive activity in industry', s.e1: 'Danger of leakage of information 
through the employment of communists in industry on secret government work', MI5 
memorandum, (19 July, 1948). 
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face a three-fold Increase In vetting, from approximately 100,000 names in 1947 to 
approximately 300,000 names in need of immediate vetting in 1948, with an average of 
approximately 50,000 names per annum thereafter. MIS's new obligations meant that on 
average they would be vetting 2,500 names per week. While MIS could theoretically 
handle these increased vetting obligations, Silllitoe warned that it was a misuse of MIS's 
resources and could 'blunt' his Service's efficiency: 
Vetting as a security precaution is subject to a number of 
limitations. It must first be backed by intelligence activities to 
build up the records and to keep them up to date. It is 
manifest that neither the records nor the experienced 
intelligence officers can be used for the two different 
purposes at the same time; the maintenance of a proper 
balance between the positive intelligence activities on the one 
hand and the defensive purposes of vetting on the other is, 
therefore, all-important. 61 
Contrary to what we might assume, it was therefore Atdee's committee on 
subversive activities, and not MIS, that was pushing for blanket increases in vetting 
numbers. Rather than blanket increases in vetting, MIS advocated targeted increases for 
only the most 'sensitive' government positions. After the crisis of June 1940, MIS was 
acutely aware of the internal administrative problems that could be caused by too many 
vetting obligations, and by records being used for different purposes at the same time. 
When addressing the question of increased vetting obligations, MIS's standpoint was 
that, in a utopian world with unlimited resources, they would be the greatest advocates of 
vetting all government employees with access to even the lowest grade secret 
information. Indeed, in a utopian world, MIS would chose to instigate 'positive' vetting 
enquiries, for as they recognised, 'negative vetting' failed to indicate proof of an 
61 NA KV 4/204, s.49a: Sir Percy Sillitoe to Sir Edward Bridges, (9 July, 1948). 
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individual's trustworthiness. 62 The reality of MIS's limited resources after the Second 
World War, however, made both of these strategies impossible. As always, security 
considerations were governed by the prac'ticalities of manpower constraints, and the need 
to balance finite resources between different and often opposing tasks. To help ease the 
burden on MIS, the GEN 183 committee therefore urged all government departments to 
keep names submitted to MIS 'within reasonable limits', for otherwise vetting 'which is 
inevitably an imperfect protection, will swamp the more positive security work of the 
Service and will ultimately decrease the value of those records on which the vetting itself 
depends'.63 Within MIS's ranks, increased vetting obligations led to a resurgence of the 
wartime dispute which Roger Hollis had encountered with the Registry over the carding 
of Communist Party members. Reviewing MIS's policy of carding communists after the 
war, Liddell supported Hollis' long-standing contention, and ordered that with the onset 
of the Cold War, it was imperative to card as many Party members as possible: 
It would be a poor excuse to say that after twenty-five years 
of this problem we had the names of certain Party members 
in our records but that we had not carded them and 
consequendy did not know where the individuals were 
employed.64 
Both in B-Division, and then as head of C-Division after July 1948, Hollis argued 
that in many ways, the most threatening information on communism was that which 
originated from after the Second World War. Anyone who joined the Communist Party 
after the war could no longer do so in a spirit of wartime enthusiasm, but rather did so, 
62 For a wartime discussion of these points, see: NA KV4/168 'Policy regarding investigation of 
subversive activities in H.M. Forces by Security Service F-Division', s.14a: Roger Fulford to 
DDG [A.W.A. Harker], (16 Aug., 1942); NA KV4/203, s.35a: GEN 183/1 'Cabinet committee 
on subversive activities', (29 May, 1947), p. 4. 
63 NA KV4/203, s.35a: GEN 183/1 'Cabinet committee on subversive activities', (29 May, 1947), 
pp.6-7. 
64 NA KV4/267, Minute 202: Roger Hollis, (9 Nov., 1946); Ibid., Minute 203: Guy Liddell, (13 
Nov., 1946). 
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'with the int~ntion of shutting his eyes to Russian intentions which have recently been 
. h · ,65 glven so muc attention. To help codify the information coming to MIS on 
communism after the war (from police ~urveillance records, HOWs, other government 
departments), Hollis devised a system by which different coloured card-indexes were 
used in the Registry to indicate the most recent information.66 Despite this attempt to 
reform record-keeping on communism in the Registry, the scope of MIS's new vetting 
obligations was inescapably onerous for C-Division and the Registry staff. MIS's 
obligations even stretched to vetting government ministers in occupied Germany. This 
was implemented both as part of the process of denazification, and to check for covert 
communist affiliations. However, as the British Control Commission noted, the vetting 
of government ministers raised awkward questions about how 'free' elections were in 
post-war Germany.67 Although it is not stated explicitly in MIS records or those from 
other departments, London's argument was presumably that it was imperative for no 
minister to be elected in occupied Germany who held Nazi sympathies, and furthermore, 
that the German electorate should be aware if a minister harboured covert communist 
affiliations. Britain's experiences with vetting ministers in post-war Germany have 
parallels for governments holding democratic elections in war-ravaged, occupied 
territories today. 
Attlee's 'purge procedure' was therefore limited in its effectiveness by the 
practical tensions existing within MIS between intelligence-collection, on the one hand, 
and the act of vetting itself, on the other. However, Attlee's 'purge procedure' was 
limited in its effectiveness for another reason. The GEN 183 committee displayed a 
65 NA KV4/267, Minute 202: Roger Hollis, (9 Nov., 1946). 
66 NA KV4/267, Minute 207: R.H. Hollis, (29 Nov., 1946). 
67 NA FO 1049/1088 'Use of Germans: vetting policy', HQ intelligence division, BAOR, 
'Vetting of Germans', (16 August, 1947). 
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degree of gentlemanly liberalism-but unfortunately naivete-regarding the scope of 
information on which vetting was to be based. Atdee took the personal decision that: 
... no action should be taken about a young person who 
happened to join a political club at the Universities. The 
test should only apply to persons of more mature years.68 
Contrary to Attlee and the GEN 183 committee's assumptions, it was actually the 
deliberate tactic of Soviet agents like the 'Cambridge Five' to break with communist 
affiliations in their backgrounds, such as university clubs. Furthermore, as a general rule 
at the time, MIS did not keep records on juveniles under the age of 21.69 Although it 
does not appear that MIS faced this situation in the early Cold War, theoretically the 
Service's vetting procedures therefore would have been unable to detect a Soviet agent 
like Theodor 'Ted' Hall, the prodigious Harvard-educated American nuclear physicist, 
who joined the MANHATTAN project at Los Alamos at the age of nineteen, and began 
passing secret information to Moscow.7o The implication to be drawn here is not to 
advocate comprehensive record-keeping on all citizens-a characteristic of a 'police state' 
which Sillitoe, for one, was adamant to avoid.71 Rather the point is to recognise the 
delicate balance which, in the early Cold War as now, had to be struck between civil 
liberties and necessary security procedures. 
Atdee announced the initial results of the 'purge procedure' to the House of 
Commons in January 1949. At that point, the panel of 'Three Wise Men' had examined a 
total of seventeen cases, which led to eleven individuals being removed from sensitive 
positions (it is unclear whether they were transferred or made redundant), while in six 
68 NA KV4/203, s.29a: Memorandum by Prime Minister, 'Employment of fascists and 
communists in Civil Service', (17 Feb., 1948). 
69 NA KV4/203, s.35a: GEN 183/1 'Cabinet committee on subversive activities', (29 May, 1947), 
p.5. 
70 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB and the West, pp. 169-70. 
71 Sillitoe, Cloak Jvithout dagger, pp. v, xv. 
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cases minist~rs decided to take no further action.72 All the cases involved communists, 
though the GEN 183 committee was overjoyed when they eventually detected a single 
case of a fascist, which gave the entire ' enterprise an air of objectivity.73 In the years 
following Atdee's statement to the House, however, a series of espionage scandals 
proved that Britain's vetting procedures remained woefully insufficient to detect Soviet 
agents: the revelation of the 'atom spy' Klaus Fuchs (September 1949) was followed by 
the defection to the Soviet Union of the atomic physicist Bruno Pontecorvo (August 
1950), which in turn was followed by the defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean 
(May 1951), leading to the first indications of the 'Cambridge Five'. As we shall in the 
next chapter, in the wake of these Soviet espionage scandals the government was again 
forced to radically reform vetting procedures and introduce positive enquires, 'positive 
vetting'. Despite a series of Soviet espionage scandals, and a political atmosphere in 
Britain demanding 'results' after 'intelligence failures', the central concepts of Atdee's 
'purge procedure' nevertheless remained in place: MIS never held executive powers and 
could only offer advice to Ministries, which remained responsible for taking action 
against employees. MIS, furthermore, continued to allow for a degree of flexibility when 
it came to vetting procedures, emphasising not identical security procedures but rather 
common and standardised security standards in government departments. Even with the 
'red menace' looming large in Whitehall departments in the early 1950s, and with 
confidence in Britain's intelligence agencies on both sides of the Adantic arguably at its 
lowest ebb in the entire twentieth century, MIS and the government managed to avoid a 
McCarthyite purge of suspected communists in government departments. 
72 NA PREM 8/948 'Prime Minister agreed to receive a deputation from the TUC regarding 
representation by Trade Union officers at proceedings before the three advisers on the treatment 
of communists and fascists in the Civil Service'; cf. David Williams, Not in the public interest: the 
problem ofsecuri!J in democrary, (London, 1965), pp. 171-72. 
73 Hennessy and Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War security purge', p. 968. 
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IV. Soviet counter-espionage in the early Cold War 
When it came to safeguarding Britain's national security, vetting and counter-
espionage investigations were two complementary sides of the same coin. As the 
political temperature of the Cold War chilled, MIS began to gather information on the 
Soviet Union in a variety of ways: through the surveillance of Soviet organisations and 
individuals in Britain, through the traditional surveillance of the CPGB, by attempting to 
recruit agents in the CPGB, and by re-opening old Soviet espionage cases which 
necessarily had taken a lower priority during the Second World War. As the Cold War 
escalated, B-Division underwent a process of rapid expansion so that by 1950 it 
contained over sixty desk-officers-a figure which Dick White believed 'was large 
enough to make us stop and think hard about where we are going'. As White 
complained: 'The constandy increasing mass of business to transact here has led to a 
crisis in management and a crisis in manpower,.74 This was a shrill warning from the 
Director ofB-Division. B-Division's management and manpower crisis in the early Cold 
War was caused by the twin demands of 'research' (compiling analytical reports) and 
investigations. White warned MIS's senior management that any increase over seventy 
desk-officers in B-Division risked re-creating many of the problems which had led to the 
crisis in the summer of 1940. As with the German threat before the Second World War, 
B-Division was responding to the Soviet threat in the early Cold War by a proliferation 
of uncoordinated sections. White's warning had the desired effect: MIS learned from 
past mistakes. The Deputy Director-General, Guy Liddell, ordered that thereafter MIS's 
Soviet counter-espionage effort would no longer be met by 'horizontal' expansion of 
new B-Division sections, but by 'vertical' expansion of existing sections. 'Vertical' 
74 NA KV4/162 'Organisation and function of B-Division', s.95b: Dick White, 'Review of B-
Division', Guly 1950), p. 1. 
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expansion meant that desk-officers ~ould more easily coordinate their efforts and avoid 
the 'atomisation' of duties.75 
For MIS one of the most valuable, but difficult to obtain, sources of information 
on the Soviet Union was the Soviet embassy in London. By 1950 MIS had 162 letter and 
ninety-five telephone HOWs operating in Britain-comparable to the number of HOWs 
imposed during the Second World War.76 It is probable that these HOWs included the 
Soviet embassy and various Eastern Bloc embassies in London.77 As well as the likely 
interception of Soviet diplomatic (telephone and letter) communications in Britain, MIS 
also maintained physical surveillance on the Soviet embassy in London. The overall scale 
of the Soviet diplomatic establishment in Britain, however, was daunting for MIS. At the 
end of the Second World War, the Soviet embassy in London contained ninety-three 
members of high-ranking staff, excluding embassy servants and chauffeurs-whom 
Gouzenko indicated were used for Soviet espionage activities.78 In 1948 the Soviet 
Union had seventeen military attaches stationed in London, while Britain, by contrast, 
had just six military attaches in Moscow.79 Awkwardly for MIS, the Soviet diplomatic 
establishment in London was spread over various addresses, notably numbers 10, 13 and 
16 Kensington Palace Gardens Road. These addresses had a total of 104 telephone lines 
installed.8o The secluded nature of Kensington Palace Gardens furthermore made 
surveillance difficult for MIS. To meet these challenges, by 1950 B-Division's 
observation unit increased its staff to twenty-three 'watchers', who in that year were 
experimenting with using 'action pictures', both still and moving, for surveillance of 
75 Ibid.; cf. NA KV4/88, s.2a: Sir David Petrie, 'Report on the Security Service', (13 Feb., 1941), 
p.14. 
76 NA KV4/162, s.95b: Dick White, 'Review ofB-Division', Ouly 1950), p. 6; for the number of 
HOWs during the war, see: NA KV4/222, s.28a: Memo (2 April, 1941); also see p. 65 above. 
77 For MI5's surveillance of neutral embassies during the war, see: Curry, The Security Service, pp. 
259-61. 
78 NA KV4/228, s.la: 'The work ofF.2.e., formerly B.4.C, in wartime, 1939-1945', p. 3. 
79 NA CAB 158/3 JIC (48) 15 (0) Final, 'British service attaches in Moscow', (13 Feb., 1948). 
80 NA KV4/228, s.la: 'The work ofF.2.C', p. 3. 
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Soviet offici~ls.81 Despite these technological advances, MIS faced a recurring problem 
true to all investigations of diplomatic legations: the diplomatic immunity claimed by 
Soviet embassy officials made it impossible for them to be stopped and searched. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, however, MIS's observation of the Soviet embassy's staff 
led to the successful identification of at least one Soviet agent working in a confidential 
British government department, William Marshall. 
At the same time as investigating Soviet activities in Britain, MIS also studied 
domestic communism in Britain. As the Cold War set in, B-Division expanded their 
investigations to areas which F-Division had been unable to explore during the war. In 
recognition of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Soviet espionage activities were 
unconnected to the Communist Party, B-Division began to make enquiries into the 
Marxist movement in Britain, in the hope that Marxist sympathisers-as opposed to the 
Party itself-could provide clues of Soviet espionage. As the Cold War escalated in the 
late 1940s, B-Division either opened files on, or began scrutinising existing records on, 
leading intellectual Marxists in Britain, such as George Thompson at Birmingham 
University. 82 Although such investigations failed to produce positive intelligence about 
Soviet espionage, they undoubtedly helped B-Division to understand the mindset of 
British Marxism. As is now well established, the Foreign Office's Information Research 
Department (IRD) used Marxist intellectuals who had become disillusioned with the 
Soviet regime, such as George Orwell and Arthur Koestler, in their early Cold War 
counter-propaganda campaIgns directed against Moscow. IRD counter-propaganda 
campaigns labelled communism the 'god that failed, .83 
81 NA KV4/162, s.95b: D.G. White, 'Review of B-Division, July 1950', p. 6. 
82 NA KV2/1842 'George Thompson'. 
83 Arthur Koestler (et a~, The God that Failed: Six Studies in Commullism, (London, 1950); Aldrich, 
The Hidden Hand, pp. 122-141; W. Scott Lucas and C.J. Morris, 'A very British crusade: the 
Information Research Department and the beginning of the Cold War', in Richard Aldrich (ed.), 
British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, (London, 1992), pp. 85-111; Ray Merrick, 'The Russia 
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As ~ell as studying intellectual Marxism in Britain, MIS also continued to 
monitor the straightforward activities of the British Communist Party. MIS received 
almost daily reports on the Party's covert activities. These were derived from HOWs 
imposed both on the Party's headquarters and on leading members of the Party, as well 
as from B-Division surveillance reports and the eavesdropping equipment which MIS 
installed in the Party's headquarters (codenamed sources TABLE and NORTH). In the 
case of one leading member of the Party, Robert 'Bob' Stewart, in 1950 MIS's 
eavesdropping (bugging) equipment revealed that the Party was receiving large amounts 
of money from foreign sources, almost certainly Moscow. MIS hoped to prosecute the 
Party with illegal currency offences, though eventually the Director of Public 
Prosecutions advised against prosecution due to the nature of MIS's evidence, which 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to admit as evidence in court.84 While 
MIS's surveillance of the Party produced important information for MIS on communist 
activities, which albeit was inadmissible in court, surveillance reports also sometimes 
revealed humorous incidents. For example MIS's eavesdropping equipment revealed 
that the Party's main 'security officer', Betty Reid, devised intense 'vetting' mechanisms 
to detect police (MIS) penetration agents in the Party. Clearly this was important for 
MIS to know. But on a lighter note, MIS's microphones also revealed that Reid had a 
'profound liking for cheese cake,.8s In the case of John Gollan, one time General 
Secretary of the Party, in January 1948 MIS's eavesdropping equipment detected an 
ironic moment when Gollan complained to his Party colleagues that he believed their 
telephone was being tapped by the 'bloody Secret Service'. Unaware of MIS's bugging 
committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War', Journal of Contemporary History, 20, no. 
3, (1985), pp. 453-68. Also see the work of Ms. Sarah Miller (peterhouse College, Cambridge) in 
a forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation on western counter-propaganda in the early Cold War. 
84 NA KV2/1181 'Robert Stewart', s.373b: Dick White, (6 Oct., 1950). 
85 NA KV2/2045 'Betty Reid', s.259a [no name] 'Comrade Betty Reid', NORTH material, (10 
Aug., 1953). 
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equipment, Gollan lamented that they would only be able to prove this when 'we've 
cracked the archives one day, then you'll know what was going on'.86 
Just as Maxwell Knight's section (MS) had done before the Second World War, 
as the Cold War developed B-Division also attempted to recruit agents in the British 
Communist Party. An opportunity was presented in 1950 with the case of Robert 
'Bobby' Robson, a former National Organiser of the Party. Following an apparent crisis 
of faith in communism and after contracting tuberculosis, in November 1950 Robson 
moved from London to Somerset and, as evidence suggested to MIS, became a keen 
churchgoer. B-Division reasoned that Robson's new-found evangelical faith was 
incompatible with his communist faith and that he might be induced to act an agent in 
the Party. On B-Division's request, the Somerset police even contacted Robson's local 
church Reverend to discover whether Robson had confessed disillusionment with 
communism. B-Division proposed using the Reverend to recruit Robson as an agent, 
but the Reverend flady refused to assist, 'explaining that his primary duty towards 
Robson is a spiritual one,.87 B-Division concluded that although Robson had likely 
become disillusioned with communism, it was unlikely that he would be willing to inform 
on his former Party colleagues.88 In the case of 'Bobby' Robson, it was thus not possible 
for B-Division to recruit an agent in the Party. Together with their attempts to recruit 
agents in the CPGB, it seems likely that B-Division also began to target communists in 
the trade unions. There is no available evidence, however, to suggest that in the early 
Cold War MIS was able to successfully recruit a high-ranking communist agent either in 
the Party or the trade unions. When attempting to recruit agents in the early Cold War, 
the overwhelming problem facing MIS and the rest of the British intelligence community 
86 NA KV2/1777 'John Gollan', s.474b: 'Source Table', (22 Jan., 1948). 
87 NA KV2/1178 'Robert Robson', s.241a: Sir Percy Sillitoe to JE. Ryall, Chief Constable 
Somersetshire, (15 Nov., 1950); Ibid., s.246a: Norman Himsworth, 'R.W. Robson', (5 Dec., 1950); 
Ibid.,JE. Ryall to K.M.D. Mills, (16 Dec., 1950). 
88 NA KV2/1178, s.256a: K.M.D. Mills to JE. Ryall, (28 Dec., 1950). 
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was that, unlike wartime German Abwehr agents, Soviet agents were ideologically 
committed and were of a high standard. Responding to a cabinet proposal in 1952 that it 
might be possible to instigate a future 'Double Cross System' against the Soviet Union, 
Liddell gloomily concluded that the ideological nature of communism meant that it was 
unlikely that Britain would be able to 'do it again' to the Soviet Union.89 
Another counter-espionage strategy for B-Division in the early Cold War was to 
reopen old Soviet espionage cases in the hope of detecting previously overlooked 
connections. In the late 1940s B-Division reviewed the wartime cases of Percy Glading, 
Oliver Green and Douglas Springhall.90 In at least two instances, reviewing these cases 
produced names of Party members which previously had not been carded in the 
Registry.91 Thus, as we have seen, B-Division's counter-espionage effort in the early 
Cold War was based on their surveillance of Marxist, communist and Soviet activities in 
Britain. However, as the Cold War set in, arguably the single most important source of 
information for Britain's intelligence services on the Soviet Union was derived from 
interrogations. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain and its western allies 
established several interrogation centres in occupied Germany. Dr. Paul Maddrell has 
demonstrated the valuable role that such interrogation centres performed in the early 
Cold War, producing scientific, technical and counter-espionage intelligence unavailable 
from other sources.92 What has not been discussed in any scholarly literature, however, 
is a scandal that erupted in the winter of 1947 at a British interrogation camp at Bad 
89 NA CAB 154/104 J.H. Godfrey, Double Crossing and Deception, (March, 1952), with a response 
from Guy Liddell. 
90 NA KV2/1597 'Douglas Springhall', s.388a: 'The Springhall case', (March, 1950); KV2/1024, 
s.865a: B-Division report, 'The Woolwich Arsenal case', (18 Nov., 1950); KV2/2205 'Oliver 
Green', Minute 244: W.J. Skardon, (8 Feb., 1952). 
91 NA KV2/1188 'John Ross Campbell', Minute 237: Michael Serpell, (1 March, 1946); 
KV2/2233 'Alan Osborne', s.102z: [name withheld] to Special Branch, (12June, 1952). 
92 Paul Maddrell, 'Britain's exploitation of occupied Germany for scientific and technical 
intelligence on the Soviet Union', (phD. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1998); Paul 
Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germat!)', 1945-1962, (London, 2006). 
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Nenndorf, a spa town near Hanover. During the winter of 1947 several horrendous 
cases of torture emerged from the British interrogation facility. The scandal at Bad 
Nenndorf has recendy attracted a substantial amount of media interest, with several 
newspaper and radio reports drawing parallels between Bad Nenndorf and Abu Ghraib. 93 
In June 2006 a neo-Nazi rally was even held at Bad Nenndorf to commemorate SS 
officers tortured by British interrogators. 94 The rest of this chapter will discuss the 
scandal at Bad Nenndorf and MIS's policies for interrogating detainees. As we shall see, 
all of the recent media reports have overlooked the measures that the British government 
implemented in the wake of the scandal. In fact, a careful examination of recendy 
declassified Foreign Office records reveals counter-measures instigated by the British 
government in 1948 that can provide useful lessons for governments and intelligence 
agencies at the start of the twenty-first century. 
Interrogations have always been at the coal face of intelligence gathering, whether 
for counter-espionage purposes in the early Cold War or for counter-terrorism today. 
Interrogators half a century ago faced broadly the same issue as they do today: how to 
extract valuable information from detainees in a useful period of time. Just as today, 
interrogations in the early Cold War provided crucial information on an othelwise 
unknown enemy. Britain's interrogation centre at Bad Nenndorf was established in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War (in July 1945). The primary objective of 
Bad Nenndorf was to gather information on the German intelligence services and Nazi 
resistance movements, with the aim of preventing a Nazi revival in post-war Europe.
95 
One of the main Abwehr controllers responsible for sending agents to Britain during the 
93 'The interrogation camp that turned prisoners into living skeletons', The Guardian, (17 Dec., 
2005); BBC radio 4 programme 'Document', Mike Thompson (ed.), (broadcast 9 Jan. , 2006). 
94 'Tommies als Tater', Die Zeit, (4 April, 2006); 'Bad Nenndorf ist bunt', Niedersachen Mitte, (11 
July, 2006); As of August 2006, several internet 'blog' sites exist which discuss MIS's wartime 
'torture' practices. 
95 NA FO 371/70828 'Germany: Bad Nenndorf, 'The value of a detailed interrogation centre', 
(17 Dec., 1947), pp. 1-2. 
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Second World War, Nicholas Ritter, was captured and interrogated at the camp.96 In 
several cases, interrogators at Bad Nenndorf worked closely with Allied war crimes 
prosecutors at Nuremberg.97 By 1946, however, with the decline of the fascist threat in 
Europe, Bad Nenndorfs priorities began to 'swing eastwards' to gather information on 
the Soviet Union.98 Horst Kopkow, whom we have already discussed, was interrogated 
at Bad Nenndorf on several occasions between 1945 and 1946 and provided detailed 
information on wartime Soviet intelligence activities in occupied Europe.99 By 1947, 372 
male and forty-four female prisoners had been detained at Bad Nenndorf, and they were 
divided into three distinct categories: self-confessed Nazi and Soviet agents, political 
refugees and deserters from the Soviet Armed Forces. Prisoners were transferred to Bad 
Nenndorf from internment camps throughout the occupied zones of western Germany. 
They were detained at Bad Nenndorf usually for a period between two months and a 
year and, after they had been interrogated, were released back to the internment camps 
from where they came. lOO 
Contrary to what was alleged at the time, and what has been claimed in several 
recent media reports, Bad Nenndorf was not an 'MIS' interrogation centre. 101 It was run 
by the War Office as a 'Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre' (CSDIC), 
bearing the official title No. 74 CSDIC WEA ('West European Area'), with personnel 
drawn from across the British intelligence community and Armed Forces. During the 
96 [Stephens], Camp 020, p. 92. 
97 NA FO 371/70828, Brigadier E.K. Page to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Foreign Office, (19 Feb., 
1947). 
98 NA FO 371/70828, 'The value of a detailed interrogation centre', (17 Dec., 1947); Ibid., 
Brigadier E.K. Page to Basil Marsden-Smedley, Foreign Office, (24 Feb., 1947); CAB 158/2 JIC 
(47) 74 (0) 'Priorities of tasks for collection of intelligence information from Germany', (24 Nov., 
1947). 
99 NA KV2/1501, s.25a: 'Note on interrogation of Horst Kopkow, CSDIC/WEA', (6 May, 
1946); Ibid., s.34a: 'Report on Horst Kopkow', (10 July, 1946). 
100 NA FO 371/70829 'Trial and acquittal of R.G.W. Stephens', Basil Marsden-Smedley, 'Brief 
for the Secretary of State', (23 March, 1948), pp. 1-2. 
101 NA FO 371/70828, Sir Percy Sillitoe to Sir Orme Sargent, Foreign Office, (23 Dec., 1947). 
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war, similar CSDIC's were established in evely major theatre of operations. 102 Even 
though Bad Nenndorf was not an 'MIS' interrogation centre, it was run by a senior MIS 
officer, Robett 'Tin Eye' Stephens. 'Tin Eye' Stephens-so called because of his thick 
monocle-had formerly run MIS's wartime interrogation centre in Britain, Camp 020, 
based at Latchmere House in Ham Common, south London. As several studies have 
now shown, Camp 020 achieved extraordinary successes during the war: interrogations at 
Camp 020 played a significant role in the successes of the Double Cross System, in total 
providing eleven double-agents for B.1.a, approximately ten percent of the total number 
of double agents run by MIS during the war.103 On first impression, Camp 020 certainly 
bears the hallmarks of an ominous secret interrogation centre. By most accounts, 
Stephens was a ferocious character who had an extraordinary ability to 'break' even the 
hardest of agents. Furthermore, Camp 020 was not designed for paws, but for 
captured civilian agents (spies). Consequently neither the Geneva Conventions-which 
only pertained to PaWs-applied to the camp, nor was it listed by the Red Cross. But 
contrary to what we might assume, Stephens governed Camp 020 according to a strict 
rule of non-physical violence. In fact, Stephens later put the extraordinary successes of 
Camp 020 down to his emphatic rule of non-violence. While every kind of what he 
termed 'mental pressure' was employed during interrogations at the camp (SIGINT was 
used to trick prisoners, 'stool pigeons' were employed and microphones installed in 
cells), Stephens forbade all forms of 'physical pressure'. 'Violence is taboo', wrote 
Stephens in his in-house post-war history of the camp, sarcastically entitled a Digest of 
102 NA WO 208/3453 'CSDIC's abroad'; WO 208/5692 'Operations of CSDIC in Middle 
Eastern theatre'; WO 208/3425 'CSDIC East Africa'; WO 208/3454 'CSDIC North Africa'; WO 
208/3463 'CSDIC India'; WO 208/3468 'CSDIC Canada'; WO 208/12386 'CSDIC Italy'. 
103 Wilson, 'War in the dark', p. 128; [Stephens], Camp 020, pp. 25-26. 
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Ham, 'for n~t only does it produce an answer to please, but it lowers the standard of 
. £ . , 104 
ill ormation. 
Stephens' rule of non-violence during interrogations at Camp 020 is supported by 
other contemporary records, such as Liddell's diary-which significantly were not 
intended to be declassified. In September 1940, for example, Stephens reprimanded an 
interrogator from the War Office for hitting the double-agent TATE. The interrogator 
in question, Alexander Scotland, ran Britain's war crimes interrogation unit (WCID), the 
London branch of which was unpromisingly termed the 'London Cage'. Ironically the 
'London cage' was located on the same road as the Soviet embassy, Kensington Palace 
Gardens. lOS Perhaps significantly, Scotland had begun his military career in 1905 as an 
attache to the German army in Southwest Africa (Namibia)-not a theatre usually 
associated with humanitarianism. 106 In his memoirs, Scotland claimed that during his 
posting to the German army he had acted as a 'spy', and that during his subsequent 
career as a war crimes interrogator, he had conducted interrogations according to a rule 
of non-violence.107 Scotland's claim of non-violence is not supported by Liddell's 
description of TATE's interrogation on 22 September 1940: 
The interrogation broke off at lunchtime, when Colonel 
Alexander Scotland left the room. Frost [an MIS officer], 
wondering where he was, followed him and eventually 
discovered him in the prisoner's cell. He was hitting TATE 
in the jaw and I think got one back for himself. Frost 
stopped this incident without making a scene, and later told 
me what had happened. It was quite clear to me that we 
cannot have this sort of thing going on in our 
establishment. Apart from the moral aspect of the whole 
thing, I am quite convinced that these Gestapo methods do 
not pay in the long run .. . I am told that Scotland turned up 
104 [Stephens], Camp 020, pp. 57-58. 
lOS NA WO 208/4294 'Notes on the operations of war crimes' interrogation unit (WCIU)'. 
106 See Walton, 'Colonial rule and occupation policies: German colonial rule in Southwest Africa 
and German occupation policies in the East during the First World War'. 
107 WO 208/5381 Lt.Col. Scotland, The London Cage, (London, 1954), pp. 22, 32, 100. 
this morning with ~ syringe containing some drug or other, 
which it was thought would induce the prisoner to speak. 
Stephens told Scotland that he could not see TATE, who 
was not in a fit state to be interrogated. Actually there was 
nothing seriously wrong with TATE. 108 
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Stephens saw to it that Scotland never returned to Camp 020.109 If there had 
been a policy within MIS to apply 'physical pressure' (torture) during interrogations, it 
seems logical to assume that it would have manifested itself in the autumn of 1940, when 
Britain was fighting for its survival and British national security was threatened as never 
before. Stephens' action against Scotland shows that MIS rejected the use of torture 
during interrogations, even in times of the most extreme national emergency. Notably, 
MIS's other most successful contemporary interrogator, William 'Jim' Skardon, a former 
Special Branch graphologist, also relied on a policy of non-violence during interrogations. 
Skardon's tactic was to befriend and quietly win the confidence of those he was 
interviewing, as he did successfully with Alan Nunn May and, as we shall see, Klaus 
Fuchs. 
By the end of the Second World War, 'Tin Eye' Stephens was the obvious person 
to run Britain's new interrogation camp at Bad Nenndorf. Stephens had more 
experience in interrogating enemy agents, and enjoyed more successes in doing so, than 
anyone else in the British intelligence community. When Stephens was posted to Bad 
Nenndorf in July 1945, he transferred his rule of non-violence to the new interrogation 
camp. Stephens rejected 'third degree' measures during interrogations not because he 
was a humanitarian-fourteen German agents held at Camp 020 were executed, and 
Stephens later admitted that he wished more had been. llo Rather Stephens rejected 
'physical pressure' during interrogations because, in his opinion, it produced poor 
108 NA KV4/186 'Liddell diaries', (22 Sept., 1940). 
109 [Stephens], Camp 020, pp. 139-40. 
11 0 Ibid., p. 368. 
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intelligence . . Stephens used his history of Camp 020, in which he outlined his lUle of 
non-violence, as instlUctions for interrogators at Bad Nenndorf: 
Never strike a man. In the first place it is an act of 
cowardice. In the second place, it is not intelligent. A 
prisoner will lie to avoid further punishment and 
everything he says thereafter will be based on a false 
premise. Through stupidity, therefore, an 
investigation becomes valueless. 111 
Stephens believed that in a protracted ideological battle like the Cold War, the 
quick benefits that might be gained from physical abuse during interrogations were 
outweighed by the long-term damage to intelligence gathering which those acts inevitably 
would cause. Stephens believed that the objective of interrogations should not be to 
obtain quick answers to a few, specific questions. Rather interrogations should induce 
prisoners to disclose all information in their possession-and the most effective way to 
do that, Stephens judged, was to abide by a rule of non-violence. Stephens' judgment 
has been confirmed by the experiences of other countries' security agencies, from the 
Americans in the Pacific during the Second World War, who similarly found that 
abstaining from violence during interrogations produced more valuable intelligence than 
its use, to the French army in Algeria in the 1950s, which under General Jacques Massu 
became the first army of a modern democratic state to explicitly experiment with torture 
during interrogations. 112 Throughout history, the non-use of violence during 
111 NA FO 1005/1744 'Detailed interrogation centre 10, Bad Nenndorf. Court of inquiry 
reports', statement Lt. Col. R.G.W Stephens, (7 April, 1947), pp. 3-4. 
112 Jacques Massu, La vrai battalie d'alger, (pIon, 1971); Adam Shatz, 'The torture of Algiers', The 
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interrogations has repeatedly proved itself to be more effective for long-term intelligence 
gathering than the use of violence. 113 
Bad Nenndorf was modelled on Camp 020, with some of its staff drawn from 
the wartime interrogation camp.114 Like its wartime predecessor, the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to Bad Nenndorf, nor was it inspected by the Red Cross. As 
we have seen, MIS's legal adviser, Bernard Hill, also argued against applying international 
law to internment camps in Britain in the early Cold War. Like their wartime 
predecessors at Camp 020, prisoners at Bad Nenndorf were detained not for criminal 
offences but instead to gather intelligence, which involved fundamentally different 
principles. One Foreign Office report on the aims of Bad Nenndorf stated frankly: 
'There were a number of prisoners who had admittedly committed no offence, the 
purpose of their detention being that they were believed to hold information of security 
interest'.115 As in other CSDIC's, some prisoners' cells in Bad Nenndorf were equipped 
with microphones, which produced valuable intelligence, but which was inadmissible as 
evidence in British courtS. 116 As Sillitoe noted in his memoirs, intelligence evidence often 
did not constitute legal evidence. ll7 Like Camp 020, Bad Nenndorf was run outside of 
international law and without government oversight, but unlike at Camp 020, several 
prisoners were physically abused by interrogators at Bad Nenndorf. Bad Nenndorf is a 
striking example of what can happen when interrogation centres operate without 
government oversight and are staffed by undisciplined interrogators. 
113 One of the main reasons why England avoided a 'witch craze' in the sixteenth century was 
because, unlike on the Continent and in Scotland, English common law did not permit torture 
during witch interrogations. See (appropriately): Hugh Trevor-Roper, The European Witch Craze of 
the 16th and 17th Centuries, (London, 1969). 
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In th~ two and a half years of its existence, Bad Nenndorf produced a range of 
military, counter-espionage and scientific-technical information which proved essential to 
Britain's intelligence services in the early Cold War. As one report noted in 1947, 
interrogations of defectors from the Soviet Armed Forces produced 'as complete an 
Order of Battle for the Red Army' as was possible to obtain at the time. I 18 Interrogations 
of self-confessed or caught Soviet agents at the camp produced information on Soviet 
internal and foreign intelligence services (the NKVD and KGB), and on how Moscow 
was attempting to recruit agents in western zones in Germany.119 Interrogations at the 
camp produced intelligence on the Soviet Union's development of long-range missiles 
and Moscow's attempts to entice German scientists to the East. Perhaps most 
importantly, interrogations of scientists, such as Grigori Aleksandrovich Tokaev, 
produced otherwise scarce intelligence on Soviet aerodynamics research and even atomic 
research. 120 
Despite the valuable role which camps like Bad Nenndorf performed in the early 
Cold War, which the JIC recognised and rated as a priority, Stephens struggled to run the 
f£ . I 121 camp e ectlve y. Bad Nenndorf was undermined by funding-reductions and 
insufficient resources and, due to post-war demobilisation, was staffed by under-trained 
and under-experienced interrogators, some of whom were non-British nationals and 
118 NA FO 371/70828 'Germany: Bad NenndorP, 'The value of a detailed interrogation centre', 
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119 Also see: NA CAB 81/132 JIC (46) 8 (0) (Terms of Reference), 'Disposal of German 
scientists and Russian activities in connection therewith', (18 Jan., 1946); CAB 81/131 JIC (46) 51 
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some of wh~m, we are told, even had criminal records. In 1945 Bad Nenndorf enjoyed a 
staff of 700, but by 1946 this had been reduced to approximately 330.122 During the 
winter of 1946 to 1947, Stephens lost co~trol of interrogations at Bad Nenndorf and, to 
quote one prisoner's subsequent testimony, the camp became a 'place of nightmares'. 
Between January and March 1947, several shocking cases of abuse emerged from the 
interrogation facility. Some prisoners suffered such severe physical abuse that they had 
to be taken to a local civilian internees' hospital (at Rotenburg). Two prisoners (Walter 
Bergmann and Franz Osterreicher) died within twenty-four hours of arriving at the 
hospital, while another prisoner (Robert Buttlar) was subjected to such inhumane 
conditions at Bad Nenndorf that he attempted suicide (by swallowing a spoon), and after 
arriving at hospital, four of his toes had to be amputated due to frostbite. Another 
detainee (Adolf Galla) was so badly malnourished that it took him six months to recover. 
The scandal at Bad Nenndorf caused a public outcry, both in Britain and Germany. 
Britain, it was claimed, had established 'concentration camps' similar to the Nazis. 123 
Contrary to what has been recently claimed, the horrific abuse which occurred at 
Bad Nenndorf was not condoned, let alone instigated, by MIS. The acts of abuse 
occurred at the hands of officials who specifically ignored Stephens' instructions for 
interrogations. Recent media reports furthermore have neglected the range of policies 
which the British government took in response to the scandal. London took a variety of 
measures to prevent another scandal like Bad Nenndorf occurring. Following an initial 
court of enquiry, a full court-martial was instigated, which between March and July 1948 
investigated the scandal and brought proceedings against all those officers implicated. 
The chief medical officer at the camp (Capt. John Smith) was prosecuted on six counts 
122 NA FO 1005/1744, Statement Lt. Col. R.G.W Stephens, (7 April, 1947), p. 9. 
123 NA FO 1005/1744 'Detailed interrogation centre 10, Bad Nenndorf: court of inquiry reports', 
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of gross-neglect and dismissed fro~ the Armed Forces.124 The officer in charge of 
interrogations (Lt. Richard Langham) was likewise investigated, but acquitted by the 
court. 125 The main interrogation officer implicated ill the scandal (Capt. Frank 
Edmunds) was charged, but escaped prosecution due to a legal technicality on the 
grounds that he had resigned from the Army and no mechanism existed for him to be 
extradited to Germany and tried as a civilian. 126 
As commanding officer at Bad Nenndorf, Stephens was also court-martialled. 
The evidence against Stephens, however, was so weak that several of the charges were 
dropped on the first day of his trial in June 1948. In his defence, Stephens pointed out 
that more than anyone else in the British intelligence community, he had persistendy 
stood against the use of 'physical pressure' during interrogations. But at the same time, 
Stephens warned the court that it should not be under false illusions: Bad Nenndorf was 
a brutally tough place, for brutally tough people. Prisoners included former SS officers, 
such as Oswald Pohl, who had helped to implement the Holocaust. Stephens admitted 
that every kind of 'mental pressure' was used to 'break' such prisoners during 
interrogations, but his orders were that in order to gain reliable intelligence, no 'physical 
pressure' could be tolerated. Stephens' orders had been disobeyed by poorly trained 
interrogators, with horrific consequences. Some of the most distinguished officers in the 
British intelligence community, including Dick White, testified in Stephens' defence, 
pointing out that 'physical pressure' was anathema to his established interrogation rules. 
The court accepted Stephens' defence and in July 1948 cleared him of all charges. 127 As 
124 NA FO 371/70830 'No 10 DIe. Trial and acquittal of Lt.Col. R.G.W. Stephens', Basil 
Marsden-Smedley to Prime Minister, 'Bad Nenndorf trials: a note leading up to the situation on 
19 June, 1948'. 
125 'Lt. Langham acquitted', The Times, London: (1 April, 1947). 
126 NA PREM 8/794 'Germany: occupation', 'Bad Nenndorf trials', (22 June, 1948); FO 1061/11 
'Operation Greenford'. 
127 'Court martial of Colonel', The Times, London: (9 June, 1948); NA FO 1060/735 'Detailed 
interrogation centre: court inquiry', Major-General W.H.A. Bishop to Major-General E .M. 
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we shall see 'in the final chapter of this dissertation, Stephens subsequently became an 
MIS liaison officer stationed in West Africa. 
As much a symbolic gesture as ' a recognition of the fact that the camp was 
patently unable to conduct interrogations in a humane manner, in July 1947 British 
military authorities in Germany closed the camp at Bad Nenndorf. It was replaced by a 
new interrogation camp at Harswinkel ('No. 10 CSDIC), run under new management 
and with more detailed written instructions for interrogators than Stephens had issued at 
Bad Nenndorf-for which the court criticised Stephens.128 In the wake of the scandal at 
Bad Nenndorf, British military authorities in Germany and the government in London 
also took a series of broad decisions about how interrogation centres should be operated. 
The Prime Minister personally involved himself in responding to the scandal and asked 
the Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross MP, who led Britain's war crimes delegation 
at Nuremberg, and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Frank Pakenham, who 
visited Bad N enndorf in March 1948, for their opinions on the case. On their advice, 
Attlee's government urged that oversight mechanisms should be instigated for British 
interrogation centres in occupied Germany. As it was, they existed in a legal void. The 
government accepted the position put forward by the British Army and British 
intelligence services that in order to be effective, interrogation centres had to be secret. 
However, the Prime Minster's office argued that while interrogators clearly had a 
valuable role to perform and were gathering essential intelligence, this should not be 
done at the expense of the rights of those detained. As one memorandum sent by 
Bastyan, (12 April, 1948). Stephens' defence was led by Richard Butler, Sir David Petrie's former 
personal secretary in MIS. 
128 NA FO 371/70828, General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Control Commission, to Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, Foreign Office, (19 Feb., 1948). 
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Shawcross to the Prime Minster in June 1948 explained, interrogations should not be 
considered incompatible with oversight mechanisms. 129 
The government worked with military authorities in Germany to find a solution 
whereby necessary levels of secrecy could be maintained in interrogation centres, but 
oversight procedures also guaranteed. In the wake of the scandal they agreed that British 
interrogation centres in Germany would continue to be run by the War Office, but from 
1948 they also came under the control of the Home Office, and the Chief Inspector of 
Prisons was obliged to make inspections. No activities would be permissible in 
interrogation centres in the British Zone of Germany that would not be permissible in a 
domestic British jail. 130 These procedures allowed British intelligence officials to 
interrogate prisoners in an effective manner, under secrecy, but also guaranteed the 
humane treatment of prisoners. These measures were introduced on a consensus 
between British civilian and military authorities that 'physical pressure' during 
interrogations was morally reprehensible, and it was also counter-productive because it 
produced poor intelligence. Furthermore, the government realised that instigating 
oversight mechanisms was essential in order to win 'hearts and minds' in occupied 
Germany.13I Britain's response to the scandal at Bad Nenndorf half a century ago is 
instructive for governments and intelligence services today, which, waging the so-called 
'war on terror', are similarly interrogating detainees, but also need to win 'hearts and 
minds' in occupied territories. 
129 NA PREM 8/794 'Germany: occupation', Sir Hartley Shawcross to Prime Minister', (17 June, 
1948). 
130 NA FO 371/70830, H.M., Mathven, H.M. Commissioner of Prisons, to military Governor, 
Control Commission, (2 Nov., 1948). 
131 NA FO 371/70830, Basil Marsden-Smedley to Prime Minister, (22 June, 1948). 
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The existing historiography generally misrepresents the history of the early Cold 
War. Ahnost every history of the Second World War now incorporates the essential role 
performed by SIGINT in the Allied war-effort, usually mentioning the ULTRA and 
MAGIC secrets. Inexplicably, however, even the most recendy written histories of the 
early Cold War fail to mention SIGINT. Judging from the historiography, we are 
supposed to believe that western SIGINT efforts somehow ceased in 1945. John Lewis 
Gaddis' otherwise outstanding history of the Cold War, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold 
War History, unfortunately fails to fulfil the full claim of its tide, apparendy not knowing 
that SIGINT continued to playa significant role after the Second World War.l To be 
sure, as we have discussed, in 1945 Allied cryptanalysts were unable to break any 
significant Soviet traffic due to the use of one-time pads by Soviet wireless operators. 
But contrary to what most of the secondary historical literature suggests, due to the 
careless use of one-time pads by Soviet cryptanalysts, western cryptanalysts were able 
successfully to break a series of high-grade Soviet communications in the early Cold 
War.2 
Although it is rruSS11lg from most of the historiography, SIGINT played an 
important role in the response by western governments to the Cold War. Britain and 
America shared SIGINT through a still-classified agreement finalised in June 1948, 
termed the UKUSA agreement-whose other signatories included Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand-which divided the world into different SIGINT spheres, as covered by 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, We Notll Knotll: Rethinking Cold War History, (London, 1997); John Lewis 
Gaddis, The Cold War, (London, 2006), is equally silent on the role of SIGINT in the early Cold 
War. The author would like to thank Professor Christopher Andrew for discussing these matters. 
2 For general comments, see: Christopher Andrew, 'Codebreaking and signals intelligence', 
Intelligence and National Security, 1, no.l, (1986), pp.1-5; Christopher Andrew, 'Intelligence in the 
Cold War: lessons and learning', in Harold Schuckman (ed.), Agents for Change. Intelligence Services in 
the 21st Century, (London, 2000), pp.1-3; Christopher Andrew, 'Intelligence and international 
relations in the early Cold War', Review of International Studies, 24, (1998), pp. 321-330; Richard J. 
Aldrich, 'GCHQ and Sigint in the early Cold War, 1945-70', i..11 Matthew Aid and Cees Wiebes 
(eds.), Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War, (London, 2001), pp. 67-96. 
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each signatory's listening posts. The UKUSA agreement was based on a similar Anglo-
American . SIGINT treaty established during the Second World War, the BRUSA 
agreement of 1943, brokered in part by F.H. Hinsley. In the years following the Second 
World War, American cryptanalysts (assisted to some extent by their British colleagues) 
managed to break a series of high-grade Soviet diplomatic communications passing 
between Moscow, Washington and New York, which were subsequently codenamed the 
VENONA decrypts. The VENONA decrypts, described as 'Y-Box' in MIS records, 
probably identified more Soviet agents than any other western intelligence operation 
during the Cold War.3 The VENONA decrypts, in total nearly 3,000 Soviet diplomatic 
communications, revealed Soviet penetration of western governments of extraordinary 
proportions. VENONA showed that over 200 Americans had worked for Moscow 
during the war and after it, and that every department of Roosevelt's administration had 
been penetrated by Soviet agents.4 
The UKUSA agreement symbolised the close Anglo-American intelligence 
relationship, a central part of the broader 'special relationship', which developed as the 
Cold War set in.5 To meet the demands of the Cold War, the British and American 
intelligence communities worked closely together, as they had done during the Second 
World War. Attlee's 'committee on subversive activities', GEN 183, helped to alleviate 
some of Washington's immediate post-war fears about British security and by 1949, 
discussions were even being held between London and Washington about reopening the 
exchange of atomic research. The close Anglo-American intelligence relationship in the 
early Cold War was illustrated by the fact that after the establishment in 1952 of 
3 MIS's liaison officer with GCHQ was Arthur Martin (B.2.c), who subsequently became 
involved with the Hollis conspiracy, see: Wright, Spycatcher, pp. 122, 186. 
4 Christopher Andrew, 'The Venona secret', in K.G. Robertson (ed.), War, Resistance and 
Intelligence. Essqys ifl HOflOllr rf M.RD. Foot, (London, 1999), pp. 203-225; John Earl Haynes and 
Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decodiflg Soviet Espioflage in America, (New York and London, 1999); Nigel 
West, Venona. The Greatest Secret rfthe Cold War, (London, 1999). 
5 Reynolds, From World War to Cold War; pp. 320-321. 
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America's SIGINT agency, the National Security Agency (NSA) , GCHQ received 
significant funding from it. The NSA established its own stations in Britain, for example 
at Chicksands in 1950. Many leading American intelligence officers in the Cold War had 
begun their careers serving in the OSS and spoke of their wartime British colleagues with 
a degree of reverence. In the post-war years, British and American intelligence agencies 
established permanent liaison officers in both capitals, though significantly in 1946 the 
first permanent MIS liaison officer in Washington, Richard 'Thistle' Thistlethwaite, and 
his successor Geoffrey Patterson, did not share unrestricted access to the FBI as their 
opposite numbers did to MIS in London.6 Despite an intelligence relationship between 
London and Washington that arguably was uniquely close among international relations 
of the Cold War, in the late 1940s and early 1950s a series of catastrophic security failures 
in Britain put extraordinary strain on the 'special relationship'. At the outset of the Cold 
War, the Anglo-American intelligence relationship was less close than commonly 
assumed.? 
1. MIS and the case of Klaus Fuchs 
In September 1949, the VENONA decrypts identified a Soviet agent successively 
codenamed REST and CHARLES.8 A process of elimination revealed that the agent was 
Dr. Klaus Fuchs, an eminent German emigre mathematical physicist who during the war 
6 NA KV4/242 'Security Service action in the case of Pontecorvo', s.S2b: Michael Serpell, 'Note 
on meeting with Prime Minister', (2 Nov., 1950). From 1943 MIS had representation in Canada, 
in the person of Mr. Cyril Mills, who also often liased with the FBI in Washington. The subject 
of MIS-FBI liaison in the early Cold War is currently being researched by Mr. David McCrary 
(Girton College, Cambridge) in a forthcoming Ph.D. 
? Typical of the historiography of the 'special intelligence relationship' during the Cold War is 
Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft CatTier:' American Military P01ver in Britain, (London, 
1984). 
8 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, pp. 151-2, 
167-9. 
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had worked on the MANHATTAN project, and who by 1949 was working at the heart 
of Britain's top-secret nuclear programme based at Harwell-Fuchs was head of 
Harwell's department of theoretical physics. Fuchs' identification had profound 
consequences for Britain's bid to obtain nuclear capabilities. Facing alienation from 
Washington in atomic research after the war, in 1947 London had decided to 'go it alone' 
and pioneer its own atomic bomb project-'with a bloody Union Jack on it', as Bevin 
phrased it.9 Britain's nuclear project, however, was based on more than national pride 
and great power nostalgia. As the Cold War escalated, Britain had a straightforward 
strategic interest in gaining nuclear capabilities. Without an atomic weapon, London was 
dependent on Washington for nuclear deterrence against Moscow. However, with 
American B-29s stationed on British airbases from which, if war broke out, they would 
launch attacks on the Soviet Union, Britain had actually become a heightened target for 
Soviet nuclear attacks. A strategic deterrent for London was therefore to have nuclear 
capabilities itself. 10 The revelation of Klaus Fuchs' espionage appeared to jeopardise 
Britain's atomic project. 
The news of Fuchs' espIonage could not have come at a worse moment for 
western governments. Fuchs, who according to Montgomery Hyde was the 'most 
dangerous and damaging of the atom bomb spies', was identified the month after the 
Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon (August 1949).11 When the Fuchs case broke 
to the public in February 1950, the British media began to describe the scientist, in an 
exaggerated but not entirely unjustified manner, as the 'man who gave the bomb to the 
Soviet Union'.12 During the MANHATTAN project, Fuchs had been responsible for 
many of the theoretical calculations concerning atomic fission and the 'implosion 
9 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 67. 
10 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, pp. 170-71. 
II Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies, p. 222. 
12 Norman Moss, Klaus Fuchs: the Man who Stole the Atom Bomb, (London, 1989). 
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method' used in a plutonium bomb. Fuchs' research was so useful that during the war 
the head of the British atomic mission, Sir John Cockcroft, predicted that he would 
receive a CBE.13 Although it is now established that Fuchs' espionage was not direcdy 
responsible for Moscow acquiring atomic capabilities, the Soviet atomic project, led by 
the notorious head of the NKVD, Lavrenti Beria, undoubtedly made use of Fuchs' 
information by corroborating it with on-going Soviet research.14 Fuchs' esplOnage 
activities certainly assisted the Soviet atomic project, and probably hastened its overall 
1 · 15 comp etlOn. 
Following Fuchs' identification, MIS launched an intensive investigation into the 
scientist. MIS was acutely aware that both the British and American governments 
considered Fuchs' non-identification a grievous failure on the part of British security. 
Fuchs had been through MIS vetting for his wartime work on the British TUBE 
ALLOYS project in 1941; for the MANHATIAN project in the United States in 1943; 
and then for his post-war work on Britain's atomic project in Harwell in 1947. In all 
these cases Fuchs had been 'cleared' by MIS vetting. At the time, MIS held two adverse 
pieces of information on Fuchs, the nature of which however made them both 
unreliable. Fuchs' first 'trace' in MIS's Registry came from a letter from the Gestapo in 
1933 stating that Fuchs, who fled Germany when the Nazis came to power, had been an 
anti-Nazi communist 'agitator' during his university education in Kiel. I6 The second 
contemporary 'trace' which MIS had on Fuchs was that during the general internment of 
'enemy alien' nationals in Britain in June 1940, he had been interned and deported to 
Canada, where he was understood to have associated himself closely with a known 
13 Moss, Klaus Fuchs, p. 124. 
14 The MIS fties on Beria are NA KV2/1236 'Laurenti Beria'. 
15 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 222-23. 
16 NA KV2/124S 'Klaus Fuchs', s.la: Copy ofletter, registration office, Kiel, (11 Oct., 1934). 
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communist in the internment camp, a certain Hans Kahle.17 Neither piece of 
information was satisfactory for MIS to make an adverse vetting recommendation. The 
letter from the Gestapo resembled a letter of denunciation and, at the time, the Gestapo 
rarely differentiated between socialists, communists and Jews. Fuchs' friendship with a 
known communist during his internment in Canada was explainable in that many of the 
detainees in the camp were ardent Nazi supporters and, in these circumstances, it was 
not surprising that two non-Nazis would befriend each other. In short, the 
contemporary information held by MIS on Fuchs showed that he was definitely 'anti-
Nazi', but not that he was necessarily 'pro-Soviet'.18 Indeed, Fuchs was considered so 
litde security risk, and his research so important to Britain's war-effort, that he was one 
of the few people successfully released from internment in Canada after only a few 
months, in January 1941.19 
When MIS was vetting Fuchs for the TUBE ALLOYS project in 1941, and then 
for the MANHATTAN project in Los Alamos in 1943, C-Division warned the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) that he might present a security 
risk. As with the cases of Engelbert Broda and Alan Nunn May, however, Klaus Fuchs 
was the only suitably qualified person who could perform specialised research. As with 
these other cases, Fuchs' vetting involved MIS making recommendations to his 
employment department (DSIR) regarding his security risk, and then that department 
making a decision on his employment based on MIS's advise. In practical terms, 
however, Fuchs' vetting-like that of Broda and May-involved MIS and his 
employment department judging between an individual's potential security risk, and that 
individual's valuable use in the Allied war-effort. As part of their vetting procedures in 
17 NA KV2/1245, s.lb: C-Division note, 'Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs', (2June, 1942). 
18 NA KV2/1245, Minute 55: Roger Hollis, (4 Dec., 1946). 
19 For a remarkable description of Fuchs by one of his colleagues in the internment camp in 
Canada, see: Max. F. Perutz, Is Science Necessary? Essqys on Science and Scientists, (London, 1989), p. 
142. 
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1941 and 1943, MIS applied a 'return of correspondence'-as opposed to a full HOW-
on Fuchs, then conducting research with Professor (Sir) Rudolf Peierls at Birmingham 
University, and asked their Regional S~curity Liaison Officer in Birmingham to make 
local enquiries through the police into Fuchs' political activities.20 Neither of these 
enquiries produced evidence that Fuchs was politically active, let alone that he was an 
ideologically committed communist, or involved with Soviet espionage. Consequently 
Fuchs was given security clearance by MIS, naturalised as a British citizen, and joined the 
TUBE ALLOYS project. With hindsight, however, F-Division showed a degree of 
naivete when granting Fuchs an exit permit to travel to the United States in December 
1943, reasoning that whatever communist affiliations Fuchs might hold, it would be 
more difficult for him to make contact with communists in America.21 As Michael 
Serpell of B-Division noted after the war, this argument was proved by the Gouzenko 
case to be 'quite unsound'-to say the least.22 
When Fuchs returned to Britain after the war, he was again vetted by MIS in 
order to join Britain's new Atomic Energy Research Establishment (A ERE) at Harwell. 
When MIS was vetting Fuchs in late 1946 and early 1947, his case caused a 'considerable 
difference of opinion' between B-Division and C-Division. In October 1946, shortly 
before his retirement from MIS, 'Tar' Robertson explained the problems that MIS faced 
with Fuchs. On the one hand, Robertson noted, it was possible that Fuchs 'may be 
passing vitally important information, which he has by virtue of his work, through 
various channels to the Russians'. On the other hand, if Fuchs were simply removed 
from his research, 'his technical ability is such that Atomic Energy Research would suffer 
20 NA KV2/1245, Minute 33: Hugh Shillito, (4 Sept., 1943); Ibid., s.6a: Milicent Bagot to Chief 
Constabulary, Binningham, (9 Aug., 1943). 
21 NA KV2/1245, s.41b: F-Division note, (16 Jan., 1944). 
22 NA KV2/1245, Minute 49: Michael Serpell, (13 Nov., 1946). 
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very conside~ably'.23 Leading officers in C-Division-such as H.I. Allen, ].H. Adam and 
].0. ,Archer-took a hard-line stance against Fuchs, advising that he presented such a 
potential risk that he should be immediately divorced from all atomic research.24 By 
contrast, leading officers in B-Division-such as Dick White, Roger Hollis and Graham 
Mitchell-argued that the evidence against Fuchs was circumstantial, pointing out that 
Fuchs had outstanding references, from Professor (Sir) Neville Mott at Bristol 
University, later a Nobel Laureate, and from one of the most influential figures in 
contemporary nuclear physics, Professor Max Born at Edinburgh University.25 
Ultimately the case was passed up to the Deputy Director-General, Guy Liddell, to 
review and make a balanced judgement. Liddell decided that although there was no 
significant positive evidence against Fuchs, there appeared to be a case for further 
investigation. Liddell decided to impose another HOW on Fuchs and used the security 
officer at Harwell, Henry Arnold, to make local enquiries into Fuchs, especially 
concerning his friendship with his Harwell colleague, Rudolf Peierls, who was known to 
have a Russian wife.26 As a matter of precaution, MIS also imposed an HOW on 
Peierls.27 Again, these enquiries failed produced any adverse information on Fuchs and 
in March 1947 Liddell concluded: 
I feel that in the absence of any further facts which may 
have been brought to our notice, we have no case on which 
23 NA KV2/1245, Minute 48: T.A Robertson, (15 Oct., 1946). 
24 NA KV2/1245, Minute 52: ].0. Archer, (27 Nov., 1946); Ibid., Minute 53: H.I. Allen, (30 Nov., 
1946). 
25 NA KV2/1245, Minute 55: Roger Hollis, (4 Dec., 1946); KV2/1259 'Klaus Fuchs', Max Born 
to Edinburgh tribunal, (30 Oct., 1939); KV2/1246 'Klaus Fuchs', Max Born to internment 
committee, (29 May, 1940). Sir Neville Mott was also later Master of Gonville & Caius College, 
Cambridge. 
26 NA KV2/1245, Minute 57: Guy Liddell, (20 Dec., 1947). 
27 MI5 also imposed an HOW on Peierls, see: NA KV2/1658 'Rudolf Peierls', Minute 36: 
Graham Mitchell, (1 Jan., 1947). 
to make any adverse recommendation to the Ministry of 
Supply.28 
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When VENONA identified Fuchs as a Soviet agent in September 1949, the 
scientist had been a source of MIS's enquiries on four previous occasions. Between 
September 1949 and January 1950, MIS then carried out a rigorous investigation into 
Fuchs at Harwell. MIS's case against Fuchs rested on gaining evidence that would stand 
up for itself in court, for VENONA intercepts were impermissible as evidence. MIS's 
investigation involved the full repertoire of techniques at their disposal. An HOW, 
involving both telephone and letter interception, was imposed on his home address and 
office, and much of his intercepted correspondence was tested for secret ink.29 The 
security atmosphere surrounding the investigation was so great that MIS even checked 
the background credentials of post office workers responsible for intercepting Fuchs' 
mail. 30 MIS installed bugging equipment, termed 'special facilities', in Fuchs' home in 
Harwell and three B-Division officers were housed at a local hotel in Newbill)" who, 
equipped with a scrambler telephone, relayed daily surveillance reports to London. 31 
Henry Arnold kept Fuchs ( codenamed RAMSAY by MIS) under close observation 
within Harwell and whenever the scientist left the research facility, B-Division 'watchers' 
tailed him. One report from B-Division's surveillance team, under David Storrier 
(B.4.d), humorously noted that it was difficult to tail Fuchs because he was a 'bad 
driver'.32 MIS scmtinised Fuchs' bank records and travel expenses, which were obtained 
28 NA KV2/124S, Minute 97: Guy Liddell, (22 May, 1945). 
29 NA KV2/1246 'Klaus Fuchs', s.114a: James Robertson, HOW applications, (9 Sept., 1949). 
MIS's use of secret inks and other forms of tradecraft are currently being studied by Mr. Kevin 
Quinlan in a forthcoming PhD. dissertation (Cambridge University). 
30 NA KV2/1246, s.114a: James Robertson, 'Klaus Fuchs', (7 Sept., 1949). 
31 NA KV2/1246, s.124: James Robertson, 'Progress report', (16 Sept., 1949); NA KV2/1266-67 
'Klaus Fuchs', supplement vol. including telephone checks and bugging reports. 
32 NA KV2/1246, s.l77b: David Storrier, (27 Sept., 1949). 
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. 33 . 
from Henry Arnold. HOWs were also imposed on Fuchs' close colleagues and friends 
in Harwell, such as Herbert and Erna Skinner.34 In order to establish details on Fuchs' 
family abroad, which he had in Germany, Switzerland and America, MIS turned to SIS.35 
The results of all these enquiries, however, were in the negative. Despite a heavily 
resource-intensive investigation, in which MIS gained an insight into Fuchs' daily life in 
astonishing detail, their enquiries failed to produce any evidence of espionage. 
Much like their investigation into Alan Nunn May, MIS's case against Fuchs 
eventually came down to 'Jim' Skardon's outstanding interrogation abilities. Beginning 
on 21 December 1949, Skardon conducted a series of masterful interviews with Fuchs, 
during which he gradually won the scientist's confidence. Using the appointment of 
Klaus Fuchs' father, Emil Fuchs, a Lutheran pastor, to the University of Leipzig (in the 
Soviet Zone of Germany) as a pretext for an interrogation, Skardon combined both 
friendship and psychological pressure in order to gain a confession. Ultimately Skardon 
used a slight of hand to gain his confession, urging Fuchs that his position would be 
made better if he confessed, and that he could probably be transferred to a university, 
even though Skardon understood from MIS and the Ministry of Supply that Fuchs' 
employment at a British university was unlikely. On 24 January 1950, 'under 
considerable mental pressure', Fuchs finally confessed to Skardon that he had 'supplied 
the Russians with all the information in his possession about British and American 
research in connection with the atomic bomb,.36 On 27 January 1950 Fuchs made a full 
written statement at the War Office, in which he confessed that from 1942 he had 
volunteered his services to the Soviet Union and had been run by a series of different 
33 NA KV2/1246, s. 168b: Guy Postan, (22 Sept., 1949). 
34 NA KV2/2080 'Herbert Skinner and Erna Skinner'. MIS's investigations suggested that Fuchs 
was having an affair with Erna Skinner. 
35 NA KV2/1248 'Klaus Fuchs', s.344a: James Robertson, 'Summary of Fuchs case', (23 Nov., 
1949); KV2/1248, s.344z: 'Summary of Fuchs' career up to the present time', (23 Nov., 1949), p. 
3. 
36 NA KV2/12S0 'Klaus Fuchs', s.433a: James Robertson, (24 Jan., 1950). 
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KGB and GRU handlers, both in America and Britain. 37 Based on Fuchs' self-
incriminating confession, and after close liaison with MIS's legal adviser, Bernard Hill, on 
1 March 1950 Fuchs was successfully prosecuted for breaking the Official Secrets Act. 
In proceedings that took just ninety minutes, the judge hearing the case in camera at the 
Old Bailey, Lord Goddard, sentenced Fuchs to the maximum possible time of 
imprisonment, fourteen years.38 Fuchs, deprived of his British nationality, was released 
from prison on good behaviour in 1959 and moved to East Germany, where he received 
the Order of Merit of the Fatherland and continued his research as an eminent nuclear 
physicist until his death in 1988. 
Fuchs' imprisonment in March 1950 did not end the interest of western 
intelligence agencies in him. The FBI liaison officer in London, John Cimperman, was 
given access to MIS reports on the case during the investigation, and after Fuchs' 
prosecution another two FBI officers, Lish Whitson and Robert Lamphere, interviewed 
him in prison.39 In his interviews with the FBI in May 1950, Fuchs identified one of his 
Soviet contacts in America, codenamed ARNO but whom Fuchs knew as 'Raymond', as 
Harry Gold.40 The FBI used Fuchs' information to implicate Gold, who subsequendy 
helped to identify other Soviet agents in America, such as David Greenglass, and 
notoriously, the Rosenbergs. As some studies have recendy claimed, it is possible that 
during his imprisonment Fuchs also effectively 'spied' for Britain. When Fuchs was 
arrested in February 1950, it is known that his safe in Harwell was opened, and its 
37 NA KV2/1250, s.439c: Statement of Klaus Fuchs at War Office, (27 Jan., 1950); Ibid., s.442a: 
W.J. Skardon, 'Fourth, fifth and sixth interviews', (31 Jan., 1950). 
38 NA KV2/1263 'Klaus Fuchs', prosecution volume; KV2/1264 'Klaus Fuchs', prosecution 
volume and papers on denaturalisation. The prosecution was opened by the Attorney General, 
Sir Hartley Shawcross, who had deliberated on the Bad Nenndorf scandal. 
39 FBI officers were officially entitled 'Special Agents'. 
40 NA KV2/1255 s.689a: 'Extract from statement made by Dr. Fuchs to the FBI', (26 May, 
1950); Michael S. Goodman, 'Who is trying to keep what secrets from whom and why? MIS-FBI 
relations on the Klaus Fuchs case', Journal of Cold War Studies, 7, no. 3, (2005), pp. 124-146. 
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contents alm~st certainly assisted th~ British atomic project.41 Furthermore, Fuchs was 
repeatedly interviewed in prison by the deputy controller of atomic energy at the Ministry 
of Supply, (Sir) Michael Perrin, though his interviews seem to have been made to assess 
what information Fuchs disclosed to Moscow rather than to extract technical intelligence 
from him.42 As both the British and Soviet governments realised, obtaining technical 
information was not the same as building an atomic weapon. Although Harwell boasted 
a range of extraordinarily talented physicists working on Britain's nuclear project, the 
head of which, Sir John Cockcroft, and others such as Rudolf Peierls and Otto Frisch, 
had been involved with the wartime Allied projects, Britain did not build an atomic 
weapon until 19S2. 
Ultimately MIS's failure to detect Fuchs was due to the difficult nature of 
detecting agents who recruit themselves, and who purposefully distance themselves from 
outward manifestations of their ideological sympathies. Fuchs never became a member 
of the CPGB, for example, and his espionage activities in Britain and America took place 
at meetings rarely lasting more than a few hours. Fuchs, furthermore, claimed that by 
the time MIS started their intensive investigation into him in September 1949, he had 
ceased passing information to Soviet authorities. MIS's investigations after September 
1949 therefore failed to detect Fuchs' espionage activities because there were none to 
detect. If Fuchs' claim is to be believed, and it is impossible to say whether undetected 
Fuchs would have remained out of espionage service, it could explain why Moscow was 
unable to warn him that he had been compromised. Although Moscow was aware that 
Fuchs had been identified, information that Moscow probably gained from the 
'Cambridge Five', it would have been too risky to contact the scientist, and furthermore 
41 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 379. 
42 NA AB 1/695 'Michael Perrin interviews with Dr. Klaus Fuchs', Gan-March, 1950). 
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he had brok~n off local Soviet contacts in Britain.43 A sununary report by B-Division on 
the Fuchs case concluded that the type of espionage he had engaged in would have made 
it nearly impossible to detect in any dem~cratically governed state.44 
Although MIS's counter-espionage failures regarding Fuchs are understandable, if 
MIS had looked closer, as later they did, they would have discovered clues indicating his 
communist affiliations. When Fuchs first arrived in Britain in 1933, he lived in Bristol 
with a certain Robert Gunn, whose communist sympathies were relatively well known, 
but were overlooked by MIS at the time.45 Before Fuchs left Germany, apparently his 
family was known locally as the 'red foxes of Kiel', making a pun on the German word 
'Fuchs' for 'fox,.46 On one occasion, Fuchs had impressed his Ph.D. supervisor at Bristol 
University, Neville Mott, with his convincing portrayal of the Stalinist show-trials ' 
prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinsky.47 GCHQ later decrypted a message, dating from 1941, 
aski?g the GRU to make contact with an agent in Birmingham, almost certainly Fuchs.48 
Ironically, on at least one occasion Fuchs attended the same Anglo-American conference 
on atomic research as the 'Cambridge spy' Donald Maclean, who was using his position 
in the Foreign Office similarly to pass over atomic secrets to Moscow.49 Furthermore, 
unknown to MIS when the case broke in 1949, they had already come extraordinarily 
close to detecting Fuchs' network in Britain. When Fuchs returned to Britain after the 
war, one of his Soviet handlers had been Ursula Beurton (nee Ursula Kuczynski, 
codenamed SONYA, known as 'Red Sonya') . MIS had been suspicious of Beurton when 
she first arrived in Britain from Switzerland in 1942, with one F-Division officer, Hugh 
Shillito, warning that her background and activities in Switzerland seemed to indicate that 
43 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 204. 
44 NA KV2/1253, s.568c: B-Division 'Memorandum', Gune, 1950), p. 2. 
45 NA KV2/1245, s.28a: D.B. Dykes, RSLO Birmingham, to Daphne Bosanquet, (15 June, 1943). 
46 Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations, p. 255. 
47 Ibid., pp. 138-9. 
48 NA HW 15/44 'Fuchs and probable reference to Atomic Energy Project', (10 Aug., 1941). 
49 Robert C. Williams, Klaus Fuchs. Atom Spy, (Cambridge Ma., 1987), p. 159. 
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she was involved with Soviet espionage. 50 Consequendy F-Division periodically 
monitored Beurton's wartime activities in Britain. After the war, MIS received further 
information on Beurton from the Soviet defector Alexander Foote, whom as we have 
seen, worked with Beurton in Rado's wartime Soviet network in Switzerland. Based on 
Foote's information, in 1947 Jim Skardon interviewed Beurton at her home in Banbury, 
near Oxford. In a rare occurrence, Skardon's interview techniques failed to produce 
results, and Beurton refused to talk. 51 If Skardon's enquiries had been successful, MIS 
would have discovered that at that precise moment Beurton was acting as Fuchs' Soviet 
controller, the so-called 'woman from Banbury' whom Fuchs described in his 
confession. 52 
II. MIS and the case of Bruno Pontecorvo 
The public exposure of Fuchs in February 19S0 led to a breakdown in Anglo-
American talks taking place at the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) about the 
possibility of renewing the exchange of atomic information. 53 To make matters worse 
for British security, however, the Fuchs case was followed by another Soviet atomic 
espionage scandal in Britain: the defection to the Soviet Union of the Italian nuclear 
physicist, Bruno Pontecorvo, in late August 19S0.54 Like Fuchs, Pontecorvo had worked 
on the MANHATTAN project during the war, had moved to Britain after the war, and 
by 19S0 was also working at Harwell. Pontecorvo's defection led to a fierce exchange of 
50 NA KV6/41 'Leon Beurton and Ursula Beurton', Minute 50: Hugh Shillito, (29 Nov., 1942). 
51 NA KV6/42 'Ursula Beurton', s.170a: W.J. Skardon, 'Note', (15 Aug., 1947). 
52 NA KV2/1253 'Klaus Fuchs', Minute 577: John Marriott, (8 March, 1950). 
53 NA CAB 126/140 'Tripartite talks', (27 Sept., 1949); FO 371/82902 'Arrest and conviction of 
Dr. Fuchs on charges of spying for Russia', British Joint Services Mission, Washington, to 
Cabinet Office, (8 Feb., 1950). 
54 Simone Turchetti, 'Atomic secrets and government lies: nuclear science, politics and security in 
the Pontecorvo case', British Journal for the History of Science, 36, (Dec. 2003), pp. 389-415. 
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correspondence between MIS and the FBI, with both agencies blaming each other for 
failing to detect his communist affiliations. The FBI claimed that during the war, in 
1943, they had passed information concerning Pontecorvo's communist affiliations in 
America to the inter-Service British intelligence outfit based ill New York, British 
Security Co-ordination (BSC), but apparendy BSC had failed to fOlward this on to 
London. The relationship between the head of BSC, (Sir) William 'Litde Bill' Stevenson, 
a flamboyant ex-professional boxer-'the man called intrepid'-and the FBI were 
certainly not always close.55 It is impossible to say, however, whether the FBI had failed 
to pass information concerning Pontecorvo on to BSC, or whether BSC failed to report 
this information to London. The fact remained, however, that before 19S0 MIS did not 
hold any adverse information on Pontecorvo-he was 'no trace' ('NT') in MIS's 
Registry.56 Once again, the Pontecorvo case illustrated how inadequate 'negative vetting' 
was for counter-espionage. Retrospectively, the clues surrounding his background were 
painfully obvious: some of Pontecorvo's family members were well-known communists 
in Italy.57 
The most remarkable aspect of MIS's investigation into Pontecorvo was the fact 
that his defection occurred when the Director-General happened to be in Washington, 
where Sillitoe was attempting to re-build confidence with the FBI after the Fuchs case. 
Pontecorvo's defection threatened to wreck Sillitoe's bridge-building mission in 
Washington. In an attempt to assuage the FBI's fears after the Fuchs case, J. Edgar 
Hoover had been bestowed with an honorary KBE by the British embassy in 
55 For friction between BSC and FBI, see: NA KV4/190 'Liddell diaries', (31 March, 1942); 
William Stevenson, A Man called Intrepid· the Secret War, (London, 1976); H. Montgomery Hyde, 
The Quiet Canadian: the Secret Service story of Sir William Stephenson, (London, 1989); Thomas F. Troy, 
Wild Bill and Intrepid· Donovan, Stephenson and the Origin of the CIA, (New Haven and London, 1996); 
Bill Macdonald, The True Intrepid· Sir William Stephenson and the unktlOlvn A gents, 2nd 
ed.:(Vancouver,2001). 
56 NA KV4/242 'Security Service action in the case of Pontecorvo', s.54d: Ministry of Supply 
brief drafted with help of Roger Hollis, (6 Nov., 1950). 
57 NA KV4/242, s.64a: G.TD. Patterson, SLO Washington, to MI5 London, (13 Nov., 1950). 
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Washington-' an honour of which Hoover, apparently, was proud. 58 Nevertheless, in 
October 1950 MIS's liaison officer stationed at the British embassy in Washington, 
Geoffrey Patterson, gloomily reported to London the implications in Washington of 
Pontecorvo's defection: 
The Embassy were most concerned because it looked at 
first sight that British Intelligence had again allowed 
themselves to be a target for u.s. criticism. The D .G. 
[Director-General] had just put our relations right with Mr. 
Hoover. A.E.C. [Atomic Energy Commission] were 
thinking of reopening the exchange of atomic information, 
Fuchs was becoming a dim (but admittedly unhappy) 
memory and everything in the garden was rosy. Now we are 
faced with another case which can, to put it bluntly, upset 
the apple-cart.59 
While Sillitoe was in Washington in October 1950, he naturally desired the most 
up-to-date information concerning Pontecorvo's defection, not least to keep the FBI 
informed. Sillitoe was therefore regularly briefed by Patterson on how the case was 
proceeding in Britain. However, the fact that Pontecorvo had defected on non-British 
territory, while the scientist was on summer holiday in Europe, meant that SIS rather 
than MIS took the lead role in tracking down the scientist.6o Consequently Sillitoe also 
received briefings on the case from the SIS liaison officer in Washington. Unfortunately 
for British security, this was none other than Kim Philby.61 After serving as the SIS head 
of station in Istanbul in 1947, in October 1949 Philby had become the SIS liaison officer 
in Washington, a position that suggested to some of his SIS colleagues, and his KGB 
58 NA KV4/242, s.52b: Michael S erp ell, 'Note on Director-General's meeting with Prime 
Minster', (2 Nov., 1950). 
59 NA KV4/242, s.45a: G.T.D. Patterson, SLO Washington, to MI5 London, (22 Oct 1950). 
60 NA KV2/1888 'Bruno Pontecorvo', s.97c: [name withheld] SIS, to J.c. Robertson MI5, (27 
Oct., 1950). 
61 NA KV4/242, s.46a: G.TD. Patterson, SLO Washington, to MI5 London, (24 Oct., 1950). 
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handlers, that he was being groomed as the next Chief of SIS.62 Among other activities, 
Philby's SIS position in Washington allowed him to sabotage Anglo-American covert-
operations in Albania in the summer of '1950. In his memoirs, Philby later gloated over 
the fate of hundreds of agents he had betrayed. Referring to those who parachuted into 
the arms of the KGB in Albania, Philby wrote with macabre irony, 'I do not know what 
happened to the parties concerned. But I can make a good guess,.63 As well as 
sabotaging Albanian operations, Philby used his SIS position in Washington to 
coordinate the British handling of the Pontecorvo case. MIS records therefore reveal an 
extraordinary situation whereby the head of MIS, temporarily in Washington, was briefed 
on the case of a defecting Soviet agent (pontecorvo) by another Soviet agent (Philby).64 
It is likely that Philby passed over to Moscow information on London and Washington's 
response to the Pontecorvo defection. 
The Fuchs case and Pontecorvo's defection occurred against the background of a 
dramatically radicalising Cold War. Following Mao Zedong's seizure of power in China 
in 1949, which brought communist control to one of the world's territorially largest 
nations, in June 19S0 the Korean War broke out. Like the Berlin crisis in 1948, the 
Korean War threatened to turn the Cold War 'hot'.65 In short, Soviet espionage scandals 
in the west seemed to confirm the general impression of Soviet aggression across the 
globe, which from Washington's perspective was exacerbated by the apparent inadequacy 
of British security. With Moscow's acquisition of nuclear capabilities in 1949, before 
either London or Washington had predicted, the JIC's threat analysis of Soviet nuclear 
capabilities reached new levels of alarm. In June 1950 the JIC considered the apocalyptic 
consequences of a clandestine Soviet atomic weapon being smuggled into Britain and 
62 Knightley, Philqy. The Ufe and Views of the KGB Masterspy, pp. 140-50. 
63 Philby, My Silent War, p. 159. 
64 NA KV4/242, s.13a: Meeting held by DDG [Liddell], DB [White] and SIS, (21 Oct., 1950). 
65 NA CAB 158/5 JIC (48) 133 (Revise) 'Effects of communist success in China', (6 Jan., 1949). 
251 
detonated in a heavily populated area. The]IC considered that it would be 
comparatively easy for a Soviet atomic weapon to be broken down into its component 
parts and smuggled into Britain, for example on board a merchant ship, and it would be 
virtually impossible to detect such a ship arriving. Such an atomic weapon could be 
assembled in as litde as twenty-four hours, and would only require a small group of 
handlers to do so, who could then detonate the weapon by remote-control or time 
delay.66 This was not the only alarming threat analysis of a clandestine Soviet atomic 
attack that London considered in 1950. In the anxious period following the outbreak of 
the Korean War, another secret Whitehall intelligence group, operating under the 
deliberately misleading tide of the Imports Research Committee (IRq, examined the 
possibility of another kind of unorthodox Soviet atomic attack in Britain. In November 
1950 the IRC considered the prospect of an atomic bomb being detonated 'in a "suicide" 
aircraft flying low over a key point', such as London. The committee concluded with 
some chilling remarks about the feasibility of preventing such an attack: 
.. . the use of a civil aircraft carrying an atomic bomb to be 
exploded at low altitude-we do not consider as likely as the 
use of a merchant ship; nevertheless it is possible and there 
does not seem to be any answer to it. The crew of the 
aircraft in order to detonate the bomb at the right time would 
have to know what their cargo was and would therefore be a 
'suicide' squad. Short of firing on every strange civil aircraft 
that appears over our shores we know of no way of 
preventing an aircraft that set out on such a mission from 
din 67 succee g. 
66 NA CAB 158/9 JIC (50) 21 (Final), 'Clandestine use of atomic weapons', (12 June, 1950). 
67 Hennessy, The Secret State, pp. xvii-xviii; NA AVI IR (50) 5 Final, 'Ministry of Defence. Imports 
Research Committee, report to Chiefs of Staff, (2 Nov., 1950), p. 5. 
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III. MIS and the identification of the 'Cambridge Five' 
Facing a radicalising Cold War in 'which more extreme forms of warfare-atomic, 
biological and chemical-were considered likely, in 1951 London was then presented 
with the most alarming cases of Soviet penetration to date. 1951 was the annus horribilis 
for British intelligence, during which London was faced with the worst cases of Soviet 
penetration in Britain in the entire twentieth century. The VENONA decrypts identified 
a well-placed Soviet agent, codenamed HOMER, who had been working in the British 
Foreign Office in Washington after the Second World War. After a process of 
narrowing down possible suspects during the winter of 1950 to 1951, in April 1951 agent 
HOMER was identified as Donald Maclean. In May 1951 Donald Maclean and Guy 
Burgess both then abruptly defected to the Soviet Union. At the time of his flight to 
Moscow, Maclean was head of the American desk in the Foreign Office, while until a 
matter of weeks before Burgess had been second secretary at the British embassy in 
Washington. Their defection, in reality the result of a tip-off from Philby, began the 
process by which the other 'Cambridge spies' were identified. By now the story of how 
the net closed in on Philby is well documented-Philby had given his old Cambridge 
friend, Guy Burgess, a room in Washington. Philby's friendship with Burgess 
immediately cast suspicion on him. At the insistence of the CIA, Philby was terminated 
as SIS liaison officer in Washington and recalled to London, where he was officially 
retired from SIS, with a £4,000 golden handshake paid in instalments.68 
In December 1951, Philby appeared before a 'judicial enquiry' at MIS's 
headquarters on Curzon Street, codenamed the PEACH investigation. Among others, 
Philby was interrogated by Dick White and one of MIS's legal advisers, Helenus 'Buster' 
68 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhitl Archive, vol. I: The KGB itl Europe atld the West, p. 210; 
Yuri Moclin, My Five Cambridge Friends, (London, 1994), pp. 221-32. 
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Milmo, who earned his nickname from his ability to 'bust' a confession from a prisoner. 
However, Philby used his speech stutter to disarm his interrogators. Philby was also 
, . 
repeatedly interrogated by Jim Skardon, but knowing that without a confession MIS and 
SIS lacked a case, Philby never confessed.69 The MIS files on the 'Cambridge Five' have 
not yet been declassified, and therefore any conclusions must remain somewhat 
speculative. It will be fascinating to see how MIS responded to their identification, what 
information MIS already held on them, and how they subsequendy used this 
information. We know that at the time, both Sir Stewart Menzies and his successor as 
Chief of SIS, (Sir) John 'Sinbad' Sinclair, were convinced of Philby's innocence.70 It is 
therefore likely that, as Philby hints at in his memoirs, he remained in SIS employment 
after 1951 in an unofficial capacity. Some observers have suggested that in 1956 Philby 
acquired his job as the Beirut correspondent of the Economist and Observer with the help 
of SIS, though this may have been a deception campaign on the part of MIS and SIS to 
see whether disinformation passed to Philby emerged in Moscow. Whether or not this 
was the case, MIS and SIS were humiliated when Philby finally defected to the Soviet 
Union from Beirut in 1963. 71 
When Burgess and Maclean defected in May 1951, and the other agents in the 
Cambridge network were subsequendy identified, MIS discovered that many of their 
espionage contacts were already the subject of detailed MIS records. Philby's first wife, 
Litzi Friedmann, was a close friend of Edith Tudor-Hart, who almost certainly had acted 
as Philby's talent spotter for the KGB in Vienna in the early 1930s. Tudor-Hart, whose 
69 I would like to thank Mr. Hayden Peake, Centre for the Study of Intelligence, Washington DC, 
for sharing with me a recording of a lecture which Philby gave to the KGB in which he urged 
Soviet officers never to confess. 
70 Andrew, Secret Se17Jice, p. 493. 
71 Philby, My Silent War, p. 199; Knightley, Phillry, pp. 169-199; NA FO 953/2165 'Disappearance 
of Kim Philby, (1963)'. Anthony Blunt finally confessed in 1964, in retum for a guarantee of 
immunity from prosecution and was not publicly identified as a former Soviet agent until 1979; 
John Cairncross was publicly identified as the missing 'Fifth Man' by Andrew and Gordievsky, 
KGB: The Inside Story ofits Foreign Operations. 
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unimpressive Soviet codename was EDITH, had been on MIS records since the 1930s, 
especially concerning her friendship with the Austrian emigre scientist, Engelbert Broda, 
whose wartime vetting had proved so problematic for MIS.72 In short, when Burgess 
and Maclean defected many of the figures subsequendy identified in the Cambridge 
network, such as Maurice Dobb, were already well known to MIS, holding significant 
'traces'in the Regis try. 73 MIS responded to the Philby affair by reopening investigations 
into the agents' established contacts, such as Dobb, placing HOWs on them and, when 
necessary, interviewing them.74 Following the identification of the 'Cambridge Five', 
however, the broader task facing MIS was to reform vetting procedures so as to avoid 
situations where information was held in the Registry, but had not been properly 
assessed. 
The 'Cambridge spies' were the Soviet Union's most valuable, and successful, 
agents in Britain. Moscow calculated that from their recmitment in 1933 to 1935, Philby, 
Burgess and Maclean supplied more than 20,000 pages of 'valuable' classified documents 
and agent reports.75 At the end of the war, Maclean's position in the Foreign Office 
furnished him, and Moscow, with important Allied 'post-hostilities planning' (PHP) 
documents. Burgess, Maclean and Philby provided Moscow with useful intelligence on 
the Berlin Crisis and the outbreak of the Korean War.76 Through Philby and other 
agents in the west, Moscow learned of VENONA and, when possible, took counter-
72 NA KV2/1013 'Edith Tudor-Hart', s.56a: Milicent Bagot, 'Edith Tudor-Hart', (3 May, 1942); 
KV2/1014 'Edith Tudor-Hart', s.143a: Arthur Martin, (3 Oct., 1951). 
73 KV2/1759 'Maurice Dobb', s.l17b: 'Extract from an interview of H.A.R. Philby by W.J. 
Skardon' (28 Dec., 1951); NA KV2/1013, s.5w: Intercepted letter from Maurice Dobb, Trinity 
College, Cambridge, to Alexander Tudor-Hart, (2 Dec., 1930). 
74 NA KV2/1014 'Edith Tudor-Hart', s.146a: Home Office Warrant, (2 Oct., 1951); KV2/1603 
'Alexander Tudor-Hart', Minute 228: A.F. Burbridge, (6 Dec., 1951) 
75 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 209. 
76 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 422-23. 
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measures to warn compromised agents.77 Despite their extraordinarily damaging 
achievements, however, the consequences of the 'Cambridge spies' should not be 
overstated. Luckily for western governments, the Soviet intelligence system was beset 
with an inherent flaw: Stalin acted as his own intelligence assessor and, viewing the world 
through a conspiratorial paradigm, consequendy even most valuable information from 
the west was not beyond suspicion of deception. Whereas the central problem facing 
western governments in the early Cold War was intelligence collection on the Soviet 
Union and not its assessment, for the Soviet Union the corollary was the case. Like all 
authoritarian regimes, the central problem facing the Soviet state was not intelligence 
collection but its assessment. Moscow's ability to collect intelligence from the west 
always far exceeded its capacity to interpret such intelligence. At the moment during the 
Second World War when the 'Cambridge spies' were most active, Moscow perversely 
mistrusted them as British deception agents.78 Moscow's distrust of its most valuable 
agents in Britain even continued after Burgess, Maclean and Philby successfully defected 
to the Soviet Union. Contrary to the misleading impression he cultivated in his memoirs, 
even after he was safely in Moscow, Philby was never made an 'officer' in the KGB, 
instead having to setde for the status of 'agent'.79 
IV. MIS and the case of William Marshall 
Following the series of unprecedented security failures in Britain between 1949 
and 1951, MIS's routine surveillance of the Soviet embassy's staff in London revealed yet 
77 For the Soviet agent who fIrst revealed the VENONA secret to Moscow, William Weiseband, 
see: Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner (eds.), Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American 
Response, (Washington DC, 1996), pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
78 Craddock, Kno1J) your Enemy, pp. 281-89. 
79 Philby, My Silent War, p. xxviii; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB: The II/side Story of its Foreigl/ 
Operations, p. xxiii; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB in Europe and the 
West, p. 210. 
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another Soviet agent in a confidential British government department. In April 1952, 
after a prolonged surveillance operation in London, MIS observed a member of the 
Soviet embassy's staff, P .S. Kutzeno~, receiving information from an individual 
subsequently identified as William Marshall, a wireless operator in the Foreign Office. 
MIS's investigation into Marshall was dramatic, at one stage ironically involving an HOW 
imposed on Marshall's telephone line in his office in Bletchley Park.80 The pressure 
exerted on MIS by the government in the case was immense: in the chilled-if not 
freezing-climate following Fuchs, Pontecorvo and the defection of Burgess and 
Maclean, London could ill-afford another Soviet espionage scandal. In June 1952 
Churchill personally asked Dick White to give an explanation of the Marshall case and 
the failures of British security, which White was obliged to do in a typically Churchillian 
manner-at the Prime Minister's bedside.8! Contrary to what MIS normally would have 
done, MIS's legal advisers were pressured into moving for a 'quick and early prosecution' 
of Marshall. MIS's usual tactic would have been to leave Marshall in place in order to 
gather as much information as possible about his network. Although Marshall was 
successfully prosecuted at the Old Bailey in August 1952 for breaking the Official Secrets 
Act, his conviction was essentially based on circumstantial evidence. Probably for the 
first time in MIS's history, B-Division's own surveillance officers were forced to appear 
as witnesses in court, described anonymously as 'Mr X'-as MIS officers do today. 
Despite Marshall's successful prosecution, MIS records reveal that B-Division was 
dissatisfied with the outcome of the case. Following Marshall's conviction, B-Division 
concluded that he had probably been prosecuted before his espionage activities had 
begun in earnest. Significantly, MIS also concluded that in the Marshall case, they had 
80 NA KV2/1636 'William Marshall', s.13a: James C. Robertson, 'Report on Marshall', (30 April, 
1952). 
8! NA KV2/1636, s.88b: D.G. White, 'Note', (16 June, 1952). 
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been forced to act more like the FBI-a law enforcement agency-than they, as an 
intelligence service, would have preferred.82 
V. British security counter-measures in the 1950s: 
Following the series of catastrophic failures of British security between 1949 and 
1951, confidence in Britain's intelligence services reached arguably the lowest point it 
would in the entire Cold War-on both sides of the Atlantic. As we shall see, the Philby 
affair produced damaging, but not devastating, tensions in the Anglo-American 
intelligence relationship. It also caused tensions within the British intelligence 
community, especially between MIS and SIS. In the years after the Second World War 
collaboration between MIS and SIS never approached their close wartime alliance in 
running the Double Cross System.83 Some SIS officers apparently described the 1950s as 
the time of 'the horrors,.84 In the wake of Burgess and Maclean's defection, there were 
discussions within Whitehall about bestowing greater FBI-style 'policing' powers on MIS, 
an idea hitherto anathema to the British intelligence community. One of the most 
significant Whitehall proposals was to introduce greater 'personnel security' measures at 
British ports, allowing individuals to be detained for up to fourteen days when suspected 
of fleeing on espionage. At the time of Burgess and Maclean's defection, no legal 
mechanism existed for MIS to detain such individuals at British ports. Following 
Cabinet discussions with Sir Percy Sillitoe in August 1952, however, the proposal was 
dropped. Sillitoe advised that, almost certainly, 'dangerous characters' would not attempt 
to use official ports to leave the country and, in fact, such powers would probably have a 
82 NA KV2/1638 'William Marshall', s.97y: G.TD. Patterson, SLO Washington, to MI5 London, 
(16 June, 1950); KV2/1641 'William Marshall', Minute 222: James C. Robertson, (27 Feb., 1953). 
83 Andrew,S eere! 5 eruice, pp. 493-94. 
84 Private information. 
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counter-productive effect. In a manner with strilcing parallels for start of the twenty-first 
century, Sillitoe considered that greater 'personnel security' measures at ports would 
simply delay innocent people.8s 
The failures of British security between 1949 and 1951 had a profound impact on 
the Anglo-American intelligence relationship. In the wake of the Fuchs case, 
Washington called what became a series of tripartite conferences on security between 
America, Britain and Canada-known as the 'ABC' conferences.86 At the first 
conference in June 1950, which convened as the Korean War erupted, Washington 
pushed hard for Britain and Canada to impose more advanced vetting mechanisms, like 
those which America had already adopted. Washington made it clear that it would refuse 
to renew exchange on atomic research until Britain and Canada had done so. 
Washington followed this position in even stronger terms at another tripartite conference 
in July 1951, held in the aftermath of the defections of Ponte corvo, Burgess and 
Maclean.87 Largely in response to American pressure, in October 1951 the British 
government decided in principle to implement 'positive vetting', a term likely invented by 
Winnifrith on the GEN 183 committee in order to distinguish it from the existing 
procedures of 'negative vetting'. At one of the meetings of the GEN 183 committee in 
August 1951, held in the wake of Burgess and Maclean's flight, Winnifrith explained 
frankly why the committee was advocating 'positive vetting': 
. .. in the hope that they would lessen American doubts 
about the efficacy of our security arrangements and remove 
obstacles to greater co-operation in atomic energy matters.88 
8S NA PREM 11/999 'Legislation restricting travel by security suspects arising out of the Burgess 
and Maclean case', Sir Norman Brook, Memo, (2 April, 1955). 
86 For earlier 'ABC' conferences, for example see: NA CAB 158/8 JIC (49) 72 'Meeting between 
British and United States planners and intelligence teams', (20 Aug., 1949). 
87 Hennessy and Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War security purge', p. 970. 
88 NA CAB 130/20 GEN 183 'Cabinet committee on subversive activities', Meeting no. 7, (17 
Aug., 1951), p. 1; also GEN 183/12 'Atomic Energy Security', (15 Aug., 1951), p. 5. 
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As Professor Peter Hennessy has shown, positive vetting revolutionised vetting 
procedures in British government departments, and radically expanded MIS's 
responsibilities. The introduction of positive vetting, or 'PVing' as it became known, was 
one of the final decisions taken by Attlee's government, but it was formally introduced 
by Churchill's new Conservative government in January 1952. Positive vetting effectively 
made vetting an active enquiry, similar to MIS's traditional counter-espionage enquiries. 
Through positive vetting procedures, security clearance was based not just on old traces 
in MIS's Registry, but also on interviews and confidential references to check an 
individual's political sympathies.89 The aim of positive vetting was to discover not merely 
whether an individual could not be trusted, as negative vetting sought to do, but whether 
an individual could be trusted, that is proof of trustworthiness. Almost certainly, positive 
vetting had a social impact on British government departments: it functioned as an 
'equaliser' of social 'class' ill government departments, for regardless of social 
background every applicant had to pass through the same vetting tests. In some 
respects, as Professor David Cannandine has suggested, the transformation of Whitehall 
vetting procedures represented another stage in the decline and fall of the British 
aristocracy.90 After 1952 recruitment practices such as school and university education, 
epitomised by the 'Cambridge spies', were no longer sufficient in themselves to guarantee 
entry into the British intelligence community. Following the identification of the 
'Cambridge spies', the notion could no longer be held that 'gentlemen' were incapable of 
being spies.91 It is not an exaggeration to say that the introduction of positive vetting in 
1952 permanently transformed the nature of work in British government departments-
for the rest of the twentieth century. Indeed, positive vetting, now further refined as 
89 Ibid.; KV4/162 'Organisation and function of B-Division', s.95b: D.G. White, 'Review of B-
Division, July 1950', p. 4. 
90 David Cannan dine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocrary, (New Haven, 1990), pp. 662-3, 
670-71. 
91 Also see: Madeira, 'Moscow's Interwar Inflltration of British Intelligence'. 
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'developed vetting', continues to play an important role in British national security today. 
Significantly, however, unlike their American counterparts, Britain's intelligence services 
have resisted introducing polygraph test~ for new recruits, largely on the grounds that it 
would be objectionable to 'British mentality', and would probably deter potential recruits. 
Facing the challenges of the twenty-first century, however, some Whitehall departments 
are currently suggesting that polygraph tests should be introduced for new intelligence 
. 92 recrwts. 
As MIS had been during the Second World War and since the first meeting of 
the GEN 183 committee in 1947, the Service was apprehensive about the practicalities of 
introducing positive vetting in 1952. To avoid overloading MIS's bureaucracy, Sillitoe 
requested that positive vetting numbers should be kept to a minimum. The GEN 183 
committee therefore originally planned for positive vetting to be introduced to 
approximately 1,000 key 'sensitive' government posts. Soon after its introduction in 
1952, however, this somewhat naively hopeful number had dramatically expanded-to 
include, significantly, Members of Parliament with access to secret in formation. 93 A 
report issued by Lord Diplock in the early 1980s stated that in the thirty years after the 
introduction of positive vetting, its net had expanded to include a staggering 68,000 civil 
servants.94 From its introduction in 1952, the scope of positive vetting was increased by 
government contracting firms, many of which performed highly sensitive research. 95 To 
meet the demands of positive vetting, MIS increased staff numbers so that by the mid-
1950s the Service had a total staff of approximately 850-a figure comparable to staff 
92 Ken Alder, 'A social history of untruth: lie detection and trust in twentieth century America', 
Representations, 80, (2002), pp. 1-33; Hennessy, Secret State, pp. 93-94; 'Al Quaeda bid to infiltrate 
MIS', report on BBC news website, www.news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 3 July, 2006). 
93 NA PREM 11/1585 'Extension of positive vetting to non civil servants'. 
94 Hennessy, The Secret State, p. 97. 
95 Argued in a warning by the JIC in 1949. See: NA CAB 158/6 JIC (49) 7 (0), 'Employment of 
certain fIrms on secret government contracts', (20 Jan., 1949). 
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numbers at the height of both world wars.96 More importandy than increased 
manpower, however, MIS devised an ingenious method to meet the dramatic new 
demands of vetting. To overcome the persistent in-house tension-even 
contradiction-which existed between vetting procedures and intelligence gathering, 
after the introduction of positive vetting, MIS established a duplicate Registry (based in 
Acton, London). This allowed vetting and intelligence enquires to be separated and 
conducted without risk of conflicting with each other.97 By establishing a duplicate 
Registry, MIS finally overcame many of the problems which had led to the Service's 
breakdown during the 'Fifth Column' crisis in 1940. MIS's establishment of a duplicate 
Registry is a remarkable example of an intelligence agency learning from past mistakes. 
The results of positive vetting in the Cold War are striking. Despite a political 
climate demanding 'results' after the series of security failures in Britain between 1949 
and 1951, MIS and the GEN 183 committee managed to avoid a McCarthyite 'witch-
hunt' for communists in government departments. MIS was never given executive 
power to take action against government employees, a characteristic of a 'police state' 
which Sillitoe was keen to avoid.98 A restraining influence on government 'purges' in the 
Cold War was that the new positive vetting procedures retained the original aim of 
Atdee's 'purge procedure': vetting aimed not for identical security procedures in British 
government departments, but instead for common security standards. MIS and GEN 183 
allowed for a degree of flexibility in how government departments arrived at a common 
level of security employment. To judge the measured response of GEN 183 after the 
security failures of 1949 to 1951, a comparison to the United States is instructive. 
Between 1945 and 1982, as Professor Hennessy has shown, security purges in America 
96 Figures derived from MIS's website, see: http: //www.miS.gov.uk/ output/ Page401.html (last 
accessed 2 Sept., 2006). 
97 NA KV4/267, Minute 206: D .G. White, (28 Nov., 1946); personal information; on the front of 
numerous :MIS ftles there are references to placing records in the Registry in Acton. 
98 Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger, p. xv. 
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led to the sacking of 9,500 federal civil servants, and a further 15,000 resigned while 
under investigation for suspected communist affiliations. All were publicly named. Even 
taking into consideration the larger size of the American federal bureaucracy, there was 
no comparable government purge in Britain. In the same time period in Britain, just 
twenty-five British officials were dismissed on security grounds, twenty-five resigned, 
eighty-eight were transferred to non-sensitive work, and thirty-three were later reinstated. 
None was publicly named. Although these numbers do not indicate the deterrent effect 
which positive vetting had on preventing individuals from entering government 
departments, they do illustrate MIS and GEN 183's success in not over-reacting to 
security failures in Britain in the early Cold War.99 
Together with the introduction of positive vetting, the British government 
responded to the series of security failures between 1949 and 1951 by giving MIS 
ministerial responsibility. Before 1951, MIS's ministerial responsibility had been resolved 
on a somewhat ad hoc basis. Before the Second World War, MIS had lacked ministerial 
responsibility altogether, and consequendy someone who could defend the Service's 
activities in parliament. The essence of the problem had been captured by Lord Hankey 
on Churchill's wartime Security Executive when, during the crisis of 1940, he described 
MIS as 'something of a lost child,.100 Since the appointment of Sir Percy Sillitoe as 
Director-General in 1946, which Atdee had played an instrumental role in, the Director-
General had enjoyed special rights of access to the Prime Minister. 101 Following the 
series of security crises between 1949 and 1951, the cabinet secretary, Sir Norman Brook, 
conducted an enquiry into MIS's responsibility, and recommended that MIS should be 
transferred from the Prime Minister to the Home Secretary. Brook's proposal was 
99 Hennessy and Brownfeld, 'Britain's Cold War security purge', pp. 970-72; Williams, Not in the 
Public Interest, pp. 172, 180-84; Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 427. 
100 Hinsley, B1itish Intelligence in the Second World War. vol. IV: Securiry and Counter-Intelligence, p. 8. 
101 NA KV4/89 'Report on the duties of the Security Service in connection with defensive 
security and leakage of information prepared for Sir Findlater Stewart in 1945'. 
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(unsurprisingly) rejected by Attlee, and the cabinet committee he summoned, in favour 
of the status quo. After the election of the Conservative government in October 1951, 
however, ministerial responsibility for MIS was finally transferred to the Home Secretary, 
then David Maxwell-Fyfe. The so-called 'Maxwell-Fyfe Directive' of 1952 formed the 
basis of MIS's operative framework until the Service was finally given statutory basis in 
1989, with the Security Service Act.102 
Despite the range of security counter-measures introduced in British government 
departments in the early 1950s, they were by no means perfect, and high-level Soviet 
agents remained undetected. By 1953 another SIS officer, George Blake, was working 
for the KGB as a remarkably successful double-agent. 103 Another Soviet agent in Britain, 
Melita Norwood, codenamed HOLA, also remained undetected. Norwood had become 
a secretary at the British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association in 1932, a position 
which she held for forty years. Norwood's employment gave her extensive access to 
classified scientific documents, including atomic research. For much of her career at the 
British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association, Norwood was an undeclared member 
of the CPGB, and throughout her employment she passed classified information in her 
possession to Moscow. As such, Norwood ranks as the 10ngest-sel'Ving of all Soviet 
agents in Britain. Marginal notes in already declassified MIS records suggest that MIS 
opened a file on Norwood (then Melita Sirnis) for her initial wartime vetting. 104 Despite 
MIS's apparent wartime vetting, and the introduction of positive vetting in 1952, 
Norwood remained undetected until the Soviet defector Vasili Mitrokhin revealed her 
activities in the early 1990s. After her public identification in 1999, Norwood, who was 
102 Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, In From the Cold National Security and Parliamentary 
Democrary, (Oxford, 1994), p. 517; Williams, Not in the Public Interest, p. 165; private information. 
103 George Blake, No Other Choice. An Autobiography, (London, 1990), pp. 207-8; Oleg Kalugin, 
Spymaster: My 32 years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, (London, 1994), p. 141. 
104 Dr. David Burke is currently completing a biography of Melita Norwood. I am thankful to Dr. 
Burke for sharing some his research with me at the Cambridge University Intelligence Seminar. 
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then living in retirement in Bexleyheath, instantly became known in the British media as 
the 'great granny spy'. The Times memorably described Norwood as the 'spy who came in 
from the Co-op', which was where, for ideological reasons, Norwood did most of her 
shopping. lOS Melita Norwood died in 2005 at the age of ninety-three. 106 
As stated, the failures of British security between 1949 and 1951 had a damaging 
effect on Anglo-American intelligence relations. The Director of Central Intelligence, 
Walter Bedell Smith, and the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, were both alarmed by 
British security failures . For some American intelligence officers who had worked 
closely with the 'Cambridge spies', their identification had a dramatic personal impact. 
Almost certainly much of the subsequent paranoia of the CIA's head of counter-
intelligence staff, J ames Angleton, derived from his close friendship with Philby.107 One 
of the most immediate consequences of British security failures between 1949 and 1951 
occurred in the way Washington and London shared intelligence. At the same time that 
MIS was dealing with counter-espionage failures in Britain, the FBI was grappling with a 
series of high-level Soviet agents in America, many of which cases were inter-connected. 
Hoover described Soviet atomic espionage, discovered on both sides of the Atlantic, as 
the 'crime of the century,.108 Facing respective security failures, London and Washington 
appear to have become equally apprehensive about sharing intelligence. All intelligence 
agencies 'doctor' reports before forwarding them to foreign agencies, even to their 
closest allies. An old idiom states that there is no such thing as a friendly secret service, 
only the secret service of a friendly country.109 MIS records show that by the early 1950s, 
lOS 'The Spy who came in from the Co-Op', The Times, London: (11 Sept., 1999). 
106 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. I: The KGB and the West, pp. xxv-xxvii, 152-
53; 'Obituaries: Melita Norwood', The Times, London: (12 June, 2005). 
107 Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior.· James Jesus Angleton. The CIA's Master Spy Hunter, (New York, 
1991), pp. 41-49. 
108 J. Edgar Hoover, 'The crime of the century: the case of the A-bomb spies', Reader's Digest, 58, 
(May, 1951), pp. 113-48. 
109 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 9, 81-7,428. 
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MIS had become extremely nervous about forwarding information to Washington that 
would expose further British security failures. In January 1950, reviewing the pre-war 
Soviet espionage case of Percy Glading a~d the Woolwich Arsenal, John Marriott of B-
Division noted: 
In the ordinary way I should like to send a copy of this note 
to the F.B.I. and C.I.A., the former of whom in particular 
have, at any rate in the past, been very forthcoming in 
supplying us with particulars of their own cases. I am 
however a little doubtful about the propriety of letting them 
have more than the first nine pages, which deal directly with 
the case ... It will undoubtedly facilitate liaison if we give the 
Americans the whole report, but at this particular juncture I 
question whether it is really wise to give them any more 
evidence of Soviet penetration in our official circles. I 10 
Although security failures in Britain between 1949 and 1951 were damaging to 
the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, they were not devastating. By taking 
necessary counter-measures, London was able to retain Washington's confidence in 
security. In the early 1950s Britain implemented security counter-measures both 
domestically, as we have seen, but also abroad. 111 Following the series of British security 
failures between 1949 and 1951, a pressing issue for London and Washington was how 
to pass intelligence on to valuable Cold War allies. This was clearly the case after the 
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949. The 
British government played a leading role in the establishment of NATO, which, 
following the treaty of Dunkirk (March 1947) and the Brussels treaty (March 1948), 
110 NA KV2/1024, Minute 2: John H. Marriott, (15 Feb., 1950). 
III This dissertation does not have space to discuss the role that MI5 played in establishing 
security at the front-line of the Cold War, with the West German Security Service (BfV), which 
from its creation in c.1950 was undermined by the political difficulties of establishing a 
clandestine security agency in Germany after the Second World War. See: NA CAB 158/8 JIC 
(49) 100 (Final), 'Establishment of security services in Germany', (12 Nov., 1949). 
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provided common security within the context of the rising Cold War. l12 After the 
decision was taken to turn NATO into a military alliance, following the outbreak of the 
Korean war, MIS played a key role in advising NATO member states on security 
standards and how to circulate intelligence securely, especially atomic intelligence 
(codenamed the COSMIC procedure by NATO).113 In fact, a parallel can be drawn 
between the domestic vetting procedures which MIS devised for British government 
departments, and the security procedures which MIS helped to establish among NATO 
members. As with government departments in Britain, security standards among NATO 
member states were based on common security standards rather than identical security 
procedures. As with British government departments, this allowed for a degree of 
flexibility and individuality among member states, while maintaining common security 
standards. 114 
The question for London, however, was not merely how intelligence should be 
shared among NATO members. Even before the Fuchs case in 1949, pressure from 
Washington had forced the]IC to consider how American intelligence should be passed 
on to commonwealth countries. ll5 One of the consequences of Anglo-American 
intelligence tensions bebNeen 1949 and 19 Sl was how London would share intelligence 
with commonwealth countries whose security levels were often considerably worse than 
112 Raymond Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des debuts de la construction europeenne, mars 1948-mai 1950, 
(Brussels, 1986). 
113 NA CAB 158/11 ]IC (50) 78 'Security checks within the Cosmic system-access to cipher 
offices', (16 Aug., 1950). For the Korean War, see: Robert Jervis, 'The impact of the Korean War 
on the Cold War', Journal oJConjlict Resolution, 24, (1980), pp. 563-92. 
114 NA CAB 158/10 JIC (50) 40 'North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-coordination of security 
arrangements', (8 May, 1950). . 
115 NA CAB 158/4 JIC (48) 52 Final, 'Marking of documents containing information of Uruted 
States origin', (6 May, 1948); Ibid., JIC (48) 54 (0) Final, 'Disclosure of British military 
information to foreign nations', (23 July, 1948). 
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in Britain its~lf.116 A JIC report in February 1948 on security standards in India and 
Pakistan was unambiguously critical, noting that, 'the standard of security in the two 
countries is so low as to be practicallynon-existent'.117 On the one hand, Britain's 
intelligence setvlces probably would have preferred not to share highly secret 
information with such countries, but on the other hand, the nature of the Cold War 
often made those countries strategically vital.I 18 The Cold War necessitated that London 
maintained close intelligence relations with the 'Old Dominions', while also building 
close intelligence relationships with new states entering the commonwealth. Much like 
today, the question facing the British intelligence community in the early Cold War was 
how to share information in an effective and secure manner with countries allied against 
a common ideological enemy. MIS responded to the challenge of circulating intelligence 
securely by ranking the respective security standards of commonwealth countries, 
dividing them into groups (A,B,q, and restricting what intelligence was passed to each 
category. Only Canada made the top category ('A'), accompanying Britain and America, 
while Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were placed in the medium category ('B'). 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon formed a lowly underclass ('C), to whom intelligence was 
hihl . d l19 g y restrlcte . 
MIS therefore responded to the problem of sharing intelligence in the early Cold 
War by restricting the flow of intelligence to 'non-secure' commonwealth countries. 
116 NA CAB 158/8 JIC (49) 89, 'Disclosure of Anglo-American classified information to third 
parties', (5 Oct., 1949); Ibid., JIC (49) 90 'Disclosure of classified US military information to 
Western Union', (29 Sept., 1949). 
117 NA CAB 158/3 JIC (48) 17 (0) 'Disclosure of information to India and Pakistan', (16 Feb., 
1948); CAB 158/4 JIC (48) 66 (0) (Final), 'Pakistan-Service liaison staffs in the UK', (1 July, 
1948). 
118 CAB 158/1 JIC (47) 12 (0) (Final Revised), 'Role of colonies in war', (8 April, 1947); CAB 
158/2 JIC (47) 65 (0) (Final), 'Summary of principal factors affecting commonwealth security', 
(29 Oct., 1947). 
119 NA CAB 158/3 JIC (48) 22 (0) Final, 'Disclosure of information to India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon', (13 April, 1948); CAB 158/8 JIC (49) 91 (Final), 'Supply of classified information to the 
new commonwealth countries', (12 Oct., 1949). 
268 
However, as 'the Cold War set in and Britain was beleaguered with domestic security 
failures, MIS also responded to the challenge of sharing intelligence by embarking on a 
positive programme of enhancing imp~rial and commonwealth security standards. 
American pressure on British security had a reciprocal effect whereby London, in turn, 
exerted pressure on imperial and commonwealth security. In many ways, MIS's role in 
the early Cold War embodied Churchill's vision for Britain's role in the post-war world, 
as three inter-locking circles of influence between America, Europe and the 
commonwealth. 120 As we shall see in the next chapter, in the early Cold War MIS 
embarked on a massive programme of reforming security standards throughout the 
empire and commonwealth. Although it is missing from most of the existing 
historiography, MIS played a role in British decolonisation, both in East and West Africa. 
120 Hennessy, Never Again, pp. 342-43. 
Chapter six: 
The empire strikes back: 
British intelligence and British decolonisation in Ghana and Kenya. 
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Intelligence is the 'missing dimension' of the history of British decolonisation. 
Judging from most of the existing historiography, we are supposed to believe that 
intelligence did not playa role in Britain'~ retreat from empire. By now the historical 
literature on British decolonisation is vast, but even in the most recently written studies 
one looks in vain to find a reference to 'intelligence,.l The Oxford History of the British 
Empire, for example, does not contain a discussion of intelligence.2 The large official 
collection of documents on Britain's end of empire-spanning thirteen volumes in total, 
dealing with British colonies across the globe-is likewise conspicuously silent regarding 
the activities of Britain's three main intelligence services, MIS, SIS and GCHQ.3 When 
intelligence is discussed in the history of decolonisation, it tends to be sensationalist.4 
Put simply, with the exception of a few pioneering studies, intelligence does not feature 
in the historiography of British decolonisation.s 
The reason why intelligence is missing from the historiography of British 
decolonisation is understandable. For most of the twentieth century, Britain's 
intelligence services did not officially exist and, both in Britain and the empire, their 
activities were shrouded in secrecy. Consequently their activities have left few traces in 
official documentation. Some historians, however, have known better than to accept the 
1 William Roger Louis, The End of British Imperialism: the Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonisation, 
(London, 2006); Ronald Hyam, Britain's Declining Empire: the Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968, 
(Cambridge, 2006); Brian Lapping, End of Empire, (London, 1985); John Darwin, Britain and 
Decolonisation. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, (Basingstoke, 1988); A.N. Porter and 
A.J. Stockwell, British Imperial Poliry and Decolonisation, 1938-64, 2 vols.: (Basingstoke, 1987). 
2 Judith M. Brown, William Roger Louis and Alaine M. Low (eds.), The Oxford History of the British 
Empire: The TlIJentieth Century, (Oxford, 2001). 
3 British Documents on the End of Empire, 13 vols.:( London, 1992-2004). 
4 Errol Trzebinski, The Life and Death of Lord EtToll. The Truth behind the Happy Vallry Murder, 
(London, 2000). Lord Erroll's murder was depicted in a BBC television programme in 1987, 'The 
Happy Valley', and also in the ftlm 'White Mischief (dit. Michael Radford, 1987), which took its 
name from James Fox's novel of the same name. 
S Pioneering studies include David A. Percox, Britain, Ke'!Ya and the Cold War.' Imperial Difence, 
Colonial Securiry and Decolonisation, (London, 2004); Philip Murphy, 'Creating a commonwealth 
intelligence culture: the view from central Africa, 1945-1965', Intelligence and National Securiry, 17, 
no. 3, (2002), pp. 131-162. 
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picture received through official documentation. Absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence. By combing through what little evidence existed in archives, some observers, 
such as Professor Richard Rathbone and Dr. Philip Murphy, have argued that 
intelligence undoubtedly played a role in British decolonisation in Africa, even if that role 
could not be fullyassessed.6 Thus far, studying the role of intelligence in Britain's end of 
empire in Africa has been almost impossible, for the relevant documents have been 
classified, kept under lock and key within Whitehall. The result, unintended by Whitehall 
as a historical conspiracy, has been a distortion in our understanding of Britain's retreat 
from empire. Contrary to what one reads in official documentation, and consequently 
the secondary historical literature, intelligence actually played a significant role in British 
decolonisation, in Africa and elsewhere. Intelligence was a normal function of 
government, and British government departments used intelligence to help orchestrate 
an orderly retreat from empire, just as they used intelligence to inform policy when 
making other key political decisions in the twentieth century. 
Until now, studying the role of intelligence in British decolonisation in Africa has 
been undermined by a lack of documentation.7 The declassification of MIS records on 
the first leader of independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, and the first leader of 
independent Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, overturn this situation.8 These MIS records shed 
light on some of Whitehall's darkest corners, and reveal a process of decision-making, 
both in London and the empire, which hitherto has remained secret. As we shall see, 
contrary to what might be expected, MIS exerted a 'calming' influence of restraint within 
Whitehall as London was faced with the potential threat of Soviet subversion in African 
6 Richard Rathbone, 'Political intelligence and policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 1950s', in 
David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.), Policing and Decolonisation. Nationalism and the 
Police, 1917-1965, (Manchester, 1992), pp. 84-104; Murphy, 'Creating a Commonwealth 
Intelligence Culture'. 
7 A point made repeatedly by Marika Sherwood, Nkrumah. The Years Abroad, (Legan, 1996). 
8 NA KV4/1847-50 'Francis Kwameh Nkrumah'; KV4/1787-90 'lorna Kenyatta'. 
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decolonisatio~ movements. A parallel may be drawn here to the 'calming' influence 
which~ it has been shown, the JIC exerted during the Berlin crisis in 1948.9 We shall see 
that, in fact, MIS helped to influence British policy-making in response to decolonisation 
in Africa. MIS's influence on British policy-making occurred, first, by circulating reports 
within Whitehall on the political affiliations of African 'national liberation' leaders like 
Nkrumah and Kenyatta and, second, through intelligence officers stationed in African 
colonies that were moving towards independence. Using MIS records, this chapter 
therefore studies a subject hitherto undocumented in the historical literature: the role 
performed by MIS in British decolonisation in Africa, first in Ghana and then Kenya. In 
doing so, this chapter seeks to correct the existing historiography, and offers a new 
perspective on Britain's retreat from empire in those colonies. 
Britain's response to decolonisation in Africa occurred against the background of 
the violent, communist-inspired insurgency in Malaya. Like British counter-insurgency 
campaigns in Palestine and Cyprus, and much like Britain's transfer of power to India, 
which involved enormous population displacements and ethnic violence during 
partition,10 the emergency in Malaya led to extraordinary levels of violence inflicted on 
the Malayan population, both by British forces and by insurgents. I I In Whitehall, the 
Malayan emergency had a galvanising effect on those who suspected communist 
involvement in 'national liberation' movements. Britain's intelligence agencies took a 
leading role in responding to the emergency in Malaya. In May 1948 Sir Percy Sillitoe 
personally travelled to Malaya, where he helped to reform the Malayan Security Service 
9 Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee', pp. 90-93. 
10 The classic accounts of which are: Gopal das Khosla, Stern Reckoning: A SU17Jry oj Events Leading 
up to and PollOllling the Partition oj India, (Delhi, 1948); Henry V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain, 
India, Pakistan, (London, 1969). 
11 Karl Hack, 'British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of decolorllsation: the 
example of Malaya', Intelligence and National S ecuriry, 14, no. 2, (1999), pp. 124-155; Anthony Short, 
The Communist Insurrection in Malcrya, (London, 1975); Timothy N. Harper, The End ojEmpire and the 
Making ojMalcrya, (Cambridge, 1998). 
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(MSS), and assisted with establishing Britain's new inter-Service intelligence outfit in the 
Far East, Security Intelligence Far East (SIFE).12 At the same time as the Malayan 
emergency, however, London was faced' with the question of decolonisation in other 
parts of the empire. In February 1948 civil disorder in the Gold Coast in Accra , , 
abruptly forced London to address the question of decolonisation in Africa. Riots in the 
Gold Coast initiated what, broadly speaking, became the 'turning point' in twentieth 
century African history: Britain's withdrawal from its colonies on the African continent, 
first from Ghana-the first black African state to gain independence-and then from 
Kenya. 13 Many observers in London, Accra and Nairobi convinced themselves (and 
others) that communism lay behind both civil disturbances in West Africa and the 
violent insurgency which erupted in Kenya in 1952, the Mau Mau revolt. 
In these circumstances, the tasks facing the British government were twofold-
and appeared to be contradictory. On the one hand, Britain had to deal with a series of 
violent wars of decolonisation, across the globe. On the other hand, with the Cold War 
escalating, Britain had to try to keep new national governments within the western sphere 
of influence. The twin demands facing London were ostensibly irreconcilable: violent 
anti-colonial struggles in the empire, while at the same time a need to prevent new 
national governments from gravitating towards the Soviet Union. To this end, as Dr. 
David Percox has recently shown, London devised a series of strategies to bolster 
12 Richard Aldrich, 'Secret intelligence for a post-war world: reshaping the British intelligence 
community, 1944-51', in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, StrateJ!J and the Cold War, 1945-
51, (London, 1992), p. 34; Leon Comber, 'The Malayan Security Service (1945-1948)', Intelligence 
and National Security, 18, no. 3, (2003), pp. 128-153. 
13 Robert Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Poliry, 1938-1948, (London, 1982); 
John W. Cell, 'On the eve of decolonisation: the Colonial Office's plans for the transfer of power 
in Africa', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 8, no. 3, (May 1980), pp. 235-57; Ronald 
Hyam, 'Africa and the Labour government', Journal of Imperial and CommotJ1vealth History, 16, no. 3, 
(May 1988), pp. 148-72. 
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moderate politics in governments moving towards independence. 14 London hoped that 
by maintaining political, economic and military connections with new independent 
governments, an urgent Cold War threat 'could be neutralised, while at the same time 
Britain could secure its 'vital interests' in the post-colonial period. IS Within the context 
of the Cold War, London set about attempting to manage an orderly retreat from empire. 
Into this whirlwind of political decision-making, both in Whitehall and the empire, the 
intelligence provided by MIS came to play an important role. The aim in this chapter is 
not to revert to an older, and misleading, 'metropolitan' historiographical tradition, 
depicting British decolonisation as a result of political manoeuvring in London. Such an 
interpretation misrepresents, and undermines, the nature of colonial emancipation 
movements themselves. Rather the aim here is to use newly available archival sources to 
try to understand why, sometimes against all ostensible indications, London was able to 
maintain close relationships with countries that were violendy rejecting British colonial 
rule. 
MIS provided the British government with intelligence on decolonisation in 
Africa in a variety of ways. MIS circulated intelligence reports derived from their secret 
sources-in Britain and the empire-both to government departments in Whitehall, and 
to colonial administrations in the empire. At the highest level, MIS was able to pass 
intelligence reports direcdy to colonial governors, channelled through MIS officers 
stationed in those colonies. As we shall see, the picture emerging from MIS records is 
that in the late 1940s, a stream of intelligence was flowing between London and MIS's 
liaison officers in the empire. This intelligence has left only the faintest of echoes in 
14 David A. Percox, 'Mau Mau & the arming of the state', in E .S. Atieno Odhiambo and John 
Lonsdale, Mau Mau & Nationhood Arms, Authority and & Narration, (Oxford, 2003), pp. 121-154; 
Percox, Britain, Kel!)'a and the Cold War.' Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonisation; Richard J. 
Rathbone, 'The transfer of power in Ghana 1945-57', (ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 
1968). 
IS William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The imperialism of decolonisation', Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 22, no.3 (1994), pp. 462-511. 
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official docwnentation. As well as circulating intelligence on African national leaders, 
MIS was able to assist the British government in another way: as the Cold War escalated, 
MIS played a key advisory role in refor~g security throughout the empire. In the late 
1940s and early 19S0s, MIS advised every major imperial security agency on how to 
reform themselves to meet the Cold War. The following chapter will discuss both of 
these themes. For purposes of structure, first we shall discuss MIS's involvement in 
reforming imperial security. Second we shall investigate what intelligence MIS passed 
over to the British government as the Cold War set in, and London was faced with 
colonial 'emergencies' in Africa. 
1. MIS and imperial security in the early Cold War 
During the Second World War, MIS had been represented by Defence Security 
Officers (DSOs) stationed throughout the empire. By August 1945 MIS had twenty-
seven DSOs permanendy posted abroad who, equipped with twenty-one secretaries 
despatched from London, were stationed in British territories ranging from Trinidad to 
Hong Kong. 16 DSOs were coordinated by 'Overseas Control' (OC) in MIS's 
headquarters in London, run by Bertram Ede. 17 At the end of the war, OC was 
disbanded as an independent section within MIS, and its functions were absorbed into B-
Division. Soon, however, MIS was forced to reprioritise the former responsibilities of 
Oc. As we have seen, the event that arguably started the Cold War-the defection of 
Igor Gouzenko-occurred in the commonwealth. When Sillitoe was appointed 
16 NA KV4/18 'Report on the operation of overseas control in connection with the 
establishment of DSO's in the British colonies & liaison with the security authorities in the 
Dominions during the war of 1939-1945', pp. 2-3. 
17 NA KV4/169 'Functions of overseas control'. 
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Director-General in May 1946, he was quick to recognise the connection between the 
Cold War and imperial security. As Sillitoe explained in his memoirs: 
With the opening of, as it were, a new phase of espionage 
marked by the disclosures made by Gouzenko, the Soviet 
Embassy cipher clerk who first revealed the extent of Russian 
espionage in Canada, the security arrangements of countries 
in the British Commonwealth apart from the United 
Kingdom became a matter of great concern to M.I.S. 
Previously the dominions had been regarded as reasonably 
immune from subversive activities, but now they were vitally 
concerned in co-operating with the United Kingdom in 
defence measures in scientific research to protect our 
common interests, it was obvious that they had become a 
fruitful field for espionage. 18 
The 'defence measures in scientific research' which Sillitoe referred to were 
atomic secrets. Largely in response to American pressure regarding cooperation in 
atomic research, MIS embarked on a massive programme of reforming security 
standards throughout the empire. In the late 1940s and early 19S0s, MIS helped to 
overhaul security agencies in every major imperial and commonwealth territory, many 
consequences of which are still lasting. In February 1948 VENONA exposed a 
substantial Soviet network operating in Australia and, to investigate the network, Sillitoe 
travelled to Australia accompanied by the then head of C-Division, Roger Hollis. Sillitoe 
and Hollis worked closely with MIS's liaison officer stationed in Canberra, Courtney 
Young.19 The security reforms which MIS initiated in Australia in 1948 eventually led to 
the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) .20 Like 
their reforms in Australia, MIS was also involved with reforming security in South 
18 Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger, p. xvii. 
19 Courtney Young was MI5's Far-Eastern expert, who had ghost-written Alexander Foote's 
book, Handbook for Spies. 
20 Christopher Andrew, 'The growth of the Australian intelligence community and the Anglo-
American connection', Intelligence and National Security, 4, no. 2, (1989), pp. 213-56; NA CAB 
158/6 ]IC (49) 17 'Joint intelligence bureau, Melbourne: priorities for Australian intelligence 
survey', (25 Feb., 1949); http: //ww\.v.aslo.gov.au (accessed 26 Aug., 2006). 
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Africa, though as Sillitoe warned South African security officials on a trip to Pretoria in 
1949, MIS .refused to play any role in helping to impose Apartheid rule.21 The case of 
Israel was a remarkable example of MIS's early Cold War security reforms abroad. After 
1948, MIS played a role in establishing the new state of Israel's intelligence apparatus. In 
some cases, this meant working closely with Israeli intelligence officials who before 1948 
had been connected to Zionist terrorism. In other cases, it meant working with Israeli 
intelligence officials, notably Reuven Zislani, who previously had acted as informers on 
Zionist terrorism.22 
MIS's role in imperial security in the early Cold War can be seen in the fact 
that, after he took office in 1946, Sillitoe became the first Director-General of MIS to 
travel extensively overseas, in an almost peripatetic manner-possibly a result of 
Sillitoe's often awkward relationship with MIS's staff. A chronological list of Sillitoe's 
trips overseas is striking. In 1946 Sillitoe travelled to Palestine, Egypt and South Africa; 
in 1947 he travelled to Kenya and Canada; in 1948 Malaya, Australia and New Zealand; 
in 1950, he returned to South Africa, and in 1951, he again travelled to Australia and 
New Zealand.23 Sillitoe's trips abroad were not always as secret as we might expect them 
to have been. His appointment as head of MIS was an open secret on Fleet Street, and 
consequently reporters were often waiting for Sillitoe when he arrived in, or departed 
from, British airports.24 Similarly when he arrived in a colony, local newspapers often 
speculated on what 'Sir Percy' was doing there.25 Sillitoe's attempts to disguise himself, 
21 PREM 8/1283 'Sir Percy Sillitoe's visit to South Africa', 'Visit by Director-General of the 
Security Service to South Africa', (14 Nov., 1949). 
22 NA CAB 158/15 JIC (53) 49 'Standards of security in Israel', (2 May, 1953); Herzog, Living 
History: a Memoir; pp. 102-114. . . 
23 Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger; pp. 191-93; NA WO 276/10 'Security conference, Natrobl', (18-
29 Aug., 1947); PREM 11/349 'Commonwealth security conference', (1953)'. 
24 'New Director at the War Office', The Times, London: (18 Jan., 1946); 'Kikuyu Base Surprised', 
The Times, London: (22 Nov., 1952); Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger, pp. 160-61. 
25 NA CO 822/445 'The organisation of the intelligence service in Kenya', Minute: Juxon Barton, 
(12 Nov., 1952). 
278 
such as wearmg sunglasses, proved ineffective and in fact probably attracted more 
attention than they detracted. Sillitoe's public identity, amusing at times, nonetheless 
forces us to rethink MIS's historical pUblic image. MIS's first Director-General to be 
named publicly was Dame Stella Rimmington in 1991. Sir Percy Sillitoe, by contrast, was 
the very public head of a Service that did not officially exist, and thus had no public 
image. For most of the twentieth century, MIS and the rest of the British intelligence 
community existed in a somewhat schizophrenic state of public deniability. 
The year 1948 was pivotal for imp erial- security. After the outbreak of the 
communist-backed insurgency in Malaya, the Colonial Office ordered a review of all 
colonial police forces. In a circular dispatched to all governors and police 
commissioners throughout the empire, the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech-Jones, 
warned in August 1948: 
It is in my view essential that every possible means should be 
taken to prevent similar happenings in other Colonial 
territories, and there is much evidence that the sources which 
have inspired the outbreak in Malaya (and have some indirect 
responsibility for those in the Gold Coast) are on the look 
out for similar opportunities elsewhere?6 
In December 1948, the Colonial Office appointed an inspector-general of colonial police 
forces, W .e. Johnson, who subsequendy examined police arrangements throughout the 
empire.27 While the Colonial Office played a role in imperial security reform in the early 
Cold War, the driving force for such reforms came from MIS. From 1948 onwards MIS 
concerned themselves with imperial security for two separate reasons: first, to raise 
26 NA CO 537/2788 'Review of police and security forces in relation to communist inftltration, 
Gold Coast' (1948), s.l: Arthur Creech-Jones, 'Circular to all Governors and colonial Police 
Commissioners', (5 Aug., 1948). Also see: Arthur Creech-Jones, 'British colonial policy with 
particular reference to Africa', InternationalAffairJ, 27 (April, 1951), pp. 176-183. 
27 NA CO 537/4418 'Review of police and security forces in relation to communist inftltration, 
Gold Coast', (1949). 
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imperial security standards in order to safeguard the circulation of intelligence, and 
second, for the purposes of preventative security-to plan for the outbreak of World 
War Three. If war erupted with the Soviet Union, London had to be able to rely on 
imperial security. To help meet the Service's new obligations in imperial security, in 
November 1948 MIS established a new section within B-Division to deal with colonial 
matters, Overseas Section, 'OS-section'.28 The first head of OS-section was Sir John 
Shaw, an experienced colonial official who had served in the Gold Coast in the 1920s, 
and who, as we have seen, had also served in Palestine, where he narrowly escaped being 
killed in the bombing of the King David Hotel. Following his service in Palestine, Shaw 
became the governor of Trinidad.29 It seems likely that Shaw's appointment as head of 
OS-Section was derived from his colonial experience in Africa, but also on account of 
his service in the West Indies: many of the leaders of African 'national liberation' 
movements first came to MIS's attention in connection to the West Indies, often in 
reports from the FBeo Working under Shaw's leadership, other officers in OS-section 
were Alex Kellar and Herbert Loftus-Brown, both of whom, as we have seen, had been 
leading MIS officers investigating Zionist terrorism.3! 
Although their activities have left few traces ill the historical literature, MIS 
officers travelled to West Africa and East Africa to advise on security. The month after 
riots erupted in Accra in February 1948, Alex Kellar travelled incognito to the Gold 
Coast. Some historians have successfully identified Kellar in archival records, but only as 
28 NA KV4/162 'Organisation and function of B-Division from 1941-1953', s.76a: 'Meeting in 
DG's office', (1 Nov., 1948). 
29 'Palestine outrage: the wrecked headquarters', The Times, London: (24 July, 1946); NA CO 
850/2071 'Appointment of Sir John Shaw as Governor of Trinidad', (1946); 'Obituary: Sir John 
Shaw', The Times, London: (22 Jan., 1983). 
30 Also see: W.M. Macmillan, Warning from the West Indies. A Tract for Africa and the Empire, 
(London, 1946). 
3! NA KV4/162, s.83a: R. Horrocks [Registry], A-Division Circular, (23 Nov., 1949). 
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a 'shadowy' ch~racter from MIS.32 Until now, his identity and the role he performed in 
the Gold Coast have been impossible to determine. We can now see that Kellar's trip to 
the Gold Coast led to a radical reform o(security in West Africa. A Colonial Office 
political intelligence report from 1948 summarised these reforms: 
Following the Gold Coast disturbances the head of MIS 
Overseas Department recently paid a visit to three of the four 
West African Territories; as a result of his tour a Security 
Liaison Officer has been appointed with HQ at Accra to 
coordinate security intelligence in that region ... The Director-
General of MIS last year paid a visit to East Africa and held a 
conference of all the intelligence and Security Officers of the 
East African Territories to review security arrangements. 
There is a Security Liaison Officer in Nairobi for East Africa, 
and a MIS Officer will shortly be leaving for Salisbury, where 
he will act as Security Liaison Officer for the Central African 
territories and will coordinate with the Union authorities.33 
Kellar's trip overturned the existing security arrangements 111 West Africa. 
Before Kellar's trip to the Gold Coast, MIS had been represented by a DSO in Accra, 
but this position only lasted for the duration of the Second World War. During the war 
the DSO in Accra had even established an inter-Service security outfit, the 'West African 
Intelligence Centre,.34 The DSO and the West African Intelligence Centre were both 
disbanded at the end of the war and, between 1945 and 1948, MIS therefore lacked 
representation in West Africa. Following Kellar's trip, MIS regained permanent 
representation in the Gold Coast in the form of a Security Liaison Officer (SLO). The 
importance of SLOs for British security in the early Cold War cannot be overstated. 
SLOs became the centrepiece of MIS's activities in all commonwealth countries, 
32 Rathbone, 'Political intelligence and policing in Ghana', in Anderson and Killingray (eds.), 
Policing afld Decoloflisatiofl, p. 86; NA KV 2/1847 'Francis Kwameh Nkrumah', s.51a: Sir Percy 
Sillitoe to R.W.H. Ballantine, Commissioner of Police, Gold Coast, (7 April, 1948). 
33 NA CO 537/3653 'Political intelligence reports, West Africa, reports on communism' (1948), 
'Secret. Communis t influence in Wes t Africa', (14 July, 1948). 
34 NA KV4/308-312 'West African intelligence centre and general security'. 
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throughout the Cold War. While DSOs were based in military headquarters, SLOs were 
usually attached to the Ministry of Defence in a colonial or commonwealth government. 
SLOs operated under civilian, not military; cover, but both DSOs and SLOs performed 
similar functions: they worked closely with colonial and commonwealth governments, 
liased with local security and intelligence officials, and passed intelligence between 
London and those governments. 
The first SLO in West Africa was none other than Robert 'Tin Eye' Stephens, 
whom we discussed in chapter four. Although it is not stated in MI5 documentation, it 
seems likely that Stephens was appointed to the Gold Coast to detract unwanted 
publicity from MI5 after the scandal at Bad Nenndorf. Whatever the precise details 
surrounding Stephens' appointment as SLO in West Africa, he was certainly not lacking 
the necessary qualifications, with a record of colonial service in India.35 After Stephens' 
appointment as SLO in West Africa (1948), subsequent SLOs were W.H .A. Rich (1950), 
and P.M. Kirby Green (1951).36 As elsewhere throughout the empire, SLOs in West 
Africa had access to the most important colonial officials in the Cold Coast. The 
security system which Kellar initiated in the Gold Coast, and which Stephens put into 
practice, gave SLOs direct access to the governor. SLOs in the Gold Coast were placed 
in charge of a new 'Central Security Committee', whose members were the governor, the 
local colonial secretary, the commissioner of police, and the officer in charge of the Gold 
Coast regiment.37 Using these channels, the SLO system in the Gold Coast allowed for 
intelligence to pass quickly and efficiendy between MI5 in London and colonial 
representatives on the ground. In 1951 the head of OS-Section, Sir John Shaw, travelled 
35 Camp 020, p. 8. 
36 NA KV2/1850, s.190a: W.H.A. Rich, SLO West Africa, to O .S.3 [Kellar], (27 Sept., 1951); 
Ibid., s. 206a: Director-General to P.W. Kirby Green, SLO West Africa, (26 Nov., 1951). 
37 Rathbone, 'Political intelligence and policing in Ghana', p. 86. 
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to the Gold Coast to check the progress of MIS's new security arrangements there, 
whichhe was pleased to find working smoothly.38 
As in West Africa, MIS also helped to overhaul security in East Africa. MIS's 
involvement with security in East Africa came at the highest level. In 1947 Sillitoe 
travelled to Nairobi, where he held a 'conference on security'.39 Doubdess Sillitoe had a 
personal interest in security arrangements in Africa: he had begun his career as a colonial 
policeman, serving in South Africa, Rhodesia and East Africa.40 Sillitoe's security 
conference led to the establishment of a new 'Intelligence Coordination Committee' 
(ICC), which, based in Nairobi, was comprised of senior officials from the colonial 
administration, representatives from the Armed Forces, and MIS's SLO in East Africa.41 
In 1948 MIS's SLO in East Africa was 0.]. Mason.42 Subsequent SLOs in East Africa 
were P. Perfect (1949), J. Baskervyle-Clegg (1950), and C.R. 'Bill' Major (1952).43 As in 
West Africa, SLOs in East Africa had access to the most important colonial officials-
the governor, colonial secretary, head of the armed forces, and chief of police.44 Like 
their colleagues in West Africa, SLOs in East Africa provided the Kenya administration 
with intelligence from MIS in London. However, just like their counterparts in West 
Africa, the activities of SLOs in East Africa have left litde evidence in the historical 
record. 
Despite MIS's reform of security arrangements in East Africa in 1947, they 
remained hopelessly insufficient to cope with the Mau Mau rebellion when it erupted in 
38 NA KV2/1850, Minute 261: Sir John Shaw (1 Dec., 1952) 
39 NA WO 276/10 'Security conference, Nairobi, August 18-29', (1947). 
40 Sillitoe, Cloak without Dagger, pp. 10-58. 
41 NA CAB 158/4 ]IC (48) 55 Terms of Reference, 'Intelligence coordination committee, East 
Africa', (6 Aug., 1948). 
42 NA KV4/18, p. 37. 
43 NA KV2/1788 'Jomo Kenyatta', s.299a: Geoffrey Patterson to Claude Burgess, Colonial 
Office, (20 Aug., 1947); NA KV2/1789 'Jomo Kenyatta', s.321a: J. Baskervyle-Clegg, SLO East 
Africa, to MIS London, (16 March, 1950); Ibid., s.357c: C.R. Major, SLO East Africa, (17 Nov., 
1952) 
44 NA CAB JIC (48) 55 [supm]. 
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1952. Security forces in East Africa were under-funded, under-staffed and under-
prepared to meet a large-scale insurgency. In October 1952, when the assassination of 
chief Waruhiu led the Kenya administrati~n to declare a state of emergency, the entire 
Special Branch of the Kenya police contained just three European officers.45 MIS's SLO 
in East Africa, C.R. Major, was in Nairobi at the outbreak of the emergency, and wrote 
reports back to London on what he observed. Like all reports from SLOs, Major's 
reports were intended for in-house circulation within MIS and were written 'outside' of 
the colonial administration. Consequently they provide a useful new insight into the 
development of the Mau Mau revolt. Major shared the Colonial Office's judgement that 
Mau Mau represented a catastrophic intelligence failure for the Kenya administration: 
security officers in Kenya failed to foresee the revolt.46 After the revolt erupted in 
October 1952, the new governor of the colony, Sir Evelyn Baring, sent an urgent plea to 
London to help reform Kenya's security apparatus.47 The month after the state of 
emergency was declared, Sillitoe therefore once again travelled to Kenya. In fact Sillitoe 
followed his trip in November 1952 with another trip to Kenya in April 1953.48 MIS's 
relationship with Baring may have been strengthened by the fact that he was related 
through marriage to Guy Liddell-Liddell had once been married to the London 
socialite, Calypso Baring, and Liddell's diary even shows that Evelyn Baring sometimes 
visited MIS's offices. 49 On both of his trips to Kenya, Sillitoe worked closely with 
Baring, travelling throughout the colony and inspecting local police arrangements. 
45 Randall W. Heather, 'Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56', Intelligence and 
National Security, 5, no. 3, (1990), p. 61. 
46 NA KV2/1788, s.357c: C.R. Major, SLO East Africa to Sir Percy Sillitoe, (17 Nov., 1952); CO 
822/445 'The organisation of the intelligence service in Kenya', Minute: Juxon Barton, (22 Dec., 
1952). 
47 NA CO 822/445, s.12: Sir Evelyn Baring to Sir Thomas Lloyd, (7 Nov., 1952). 
48 NA CO 822/445, Minute: Sir Thomas Lloyd to Mr. Rogers, (31 March, 1953). 
49 NA KV4/189 'Liddell diaries', (31 March, 1942). 
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Sillitoe visited the sites of some of the most horrific Mau Mau massacres.50 In late 
November 1952, Alex Kellar was also in Kenya, 'attending a conference,.51 Further 
details on this conference are unavailable, but the results of Sillitoe's trips and Kellar's 
conference in Kenya are clear: they led to an overhaul of security in East Africa. 
Sillitoe recommended far-reaching security reforms in East Africa, which were 
accepted by the Kenya administration in totality. 52 He began his recommendations by 
turning to the example of Malaya, which he, like many observers at the time, believed 
could provide useful lessons for Kenya. 53 Sillitoe judged that, as in Malaya, security 
reforms in Kenya first had to occur at ground level. First the police and Special Branch 
urgendy needed more manpower and, second, a distinction had to be drawn between 
police and intelligence work, with officers separated in their duties, which hitherto they 
had not been. Perhaps also taking inspiration from MIS's wartime arrangements in 
Britain, Sillitoe proposed that intelligence officers should be assigned to regional police 
forces throughout Kenya, where they could act as a filtering mechanism for information. 
Only the most important information should be passed to the Nairobi and Mombassa 
Special Branches, while less important information should be retained at regional police 
stations, filed on card-catalogue indexes.54 On the governor's request, Sillitoe left an 
experienced MIS officer in Nairobi to oversee these reforms and, presumably, bolster 
the SLO's existing duties. The officer chosen to oversee these reforms, A.M. 
MacDonald, had -outstanding imperial security credentials. MacDonald 'had a 
distinguished record in the Indian police', had worked in the CID in Bombay, served 
50 Sillitoe visited the site of the Mieklejohn attacks. See: Sillitoe, Cloak without Daggef~ pp. 191-93. 
51 NA CO 822/446 'Secondment of a Special Branch officer for Kenya', P. Rogers copied to J. 
Barton, (27 Oct., 1952). 
52 NA CO 822/445, s.20: 'Note of meeting held in the Secretary of State's room', (15 Dec., 1952). 
53 Heather, 'Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya', p. 65. For recommendations of the 
'Malayan model' in Kenya, see: NA CO 822/445, s.26: Sir Evelyn Baring, 'Kikuyu disorder. 
Directives by His Excellency the Governor', (21 Jan., 1953). 
54 NA CO 822/445, s.20: 'Note of meeting' (15 Dec., 1952). 
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under General Templar in Malaya, and spoke Hindi and Marathi.55 When Sillitoe 
returned to Kenya in April 1953, he found that the security reforms were progressing 
well under MacDonald. In fact, Baring regarded Kenya's security reforms as an 
outstanding success story, and wrote to London that Kenya should serve as a model for 
reforms in other colonies.56 Ultimately, however, the brutal efficiency of security 
reforms in Kenya was shown in the field. Successive military leaders observed that 
Kenya's new security arrangements provided British Armed Forces with useful 
operational intelligence on Mau Mau insurgents. Although it cannot be discussed here in 
detail, the response by British Armed Forces to the Mau Mau revolt was extraordinarily 
violent, leading to a devastating loss of black African lives in Kenya.57 
In the late 1940s and early 19S0s, MIS was thus directly involved with 
reforming imperial security, both in West and East Africa. However, MIS's influence on 
imperial security in Africa should not be overstated. In 1950 there were just three British 
security intelligence officers stationed on the entire African continent-the SLOs in 
West Africa (Accra), East Africa (Nairobi) and Central Africa (Salisbury).58 Although 
SLOs had access to the most important British officials in those colonies, clearly their 
activities were bound to be limited. Working within the obvious limits of manpower 
constraints, MIS's imperial security reforms were broadly designed to tackle two 
demands at the same time. First they were designed to meet immediate crises of 
'nationalist' insurgencies, but at the same time, they were also intended to meet the needs 
55 NA CO 822/445, s.14: Sir Thomas Lloyd to Sir Evelyn Baring, (15 Nov., 1952); MacDonald's 
appointment was reported by the Press: 'Kikuyu base surprised', The Times, London: (22 Nov., 
1952). 
56 NA CO 822/445, s.21 Sir Evelyn Baring to Sir Thomas Lloyd, (10 Dec., 1952); Ibid., s.22: Sir 
Thomas Lloyd to Sir Evelyn Baring, (9 Jan., 1953). 
57 NA WO 236/18 Gen. Sir George Erskine, 'The Kenya emergency', June 1953-May 1955', p. 3; 
WO 236/20 Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Lathbury, 'The Kenya emergency', May 1955-Nov. 1956', p. 10. 
58 NA FO 371/80617 'Political intelligence reports on West Africa for Colonel Stephens, Security 
Liaison Officer Accra', Juxon Barton, Colonial Office, to governor of Gold Coast, (13 Nov., 
1950). [Salisbury is now renamed Harare]. 
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of the Cold War. From London's perspective, the two requirements fused together: 
reforming imperial security was a battle integral to fighting the Cold War. For MIS, 
imperial security was, in many ways, synonymous with the Cold War. 
To help reform imperial security in the early Cold War, MIS convened a series 
of commonwealth security conferences in London. The first conference took place in 
1948 after Atlee, on MIS's suggestion, wrote to the Prime Ministers of Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and South Africa, and suggested that during a forthcoming conference 
of Prime Ministers they bring the heads of their security services to London.59 At the 
resulting conference, commonwealth security officials discussed how to safeguard 
intelligence passing between their governments, and how to reform vetting procedures in 
their respective governments. The success of the first commonwealth security 
conference in London led to a second conference in May 1951, with invitations extended 
to India, Pakistan and Ceylon.60 Evidence suggests that commonwealth security 
conferences took place every two years thereafter-and continue to the present day.61 
Imperial security reforms were similarly addressed at a conference held by the 
Colonial Office in April 1951 for colonial police commissioners. The three day long 
conference was attended by leading officials from the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, 
War Office and by police representatives from all the major colonies-sixteen in total. 
The aim of the conference was 'to discuss the functions and responsibilities of Police 
Forces in the Colonies in relation to normal police work, and to "cold war" conditions in 
the event of a major war'. The conference sought to establish uniform security 
standards throughout the empire. The audience heard lectures on a variety of subjects, 
59 NA PREM 8/1343 'Sir Percy Sillitoe's proposals for a commonwealth security conference in 
London 1951' Clement Attlee to Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South , , 
Africa, (29 July, 1948). 
60 NA PREM 8/1343, 'Commonwealth security conference', (15 May, 1951). 
61 NA PREM 11/349 'Commonwealth security conference Gune 1953)'; Murphy, 'Creating a 
commonwealth intelligence culture', p. 142. 
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notably counter-insurgency and riot control, in the hope that lessons from one theatre 
could be transferred to another. However, high on the agenda of the three day long 
conference-ill fact on its first day-was an address by Sir Percy Sillitoe, who was 
accompanied by the head of OS-section, Sir John Shaw, and the head of B-Division, 
Dick White. They spoke to the audience on: 
... the Security Service in general and its relations with 
Colonial Police Forces; on the organisation of the Security 
Service in relation to the Colonies; and the system of Security 
Liaison Officers; and on the methods of Soviet subversion 
throughout the world, and the objects and capabilities of the 
Communist Party in the UK.62 
At such a conference in 1951, it would have required little to conVlnce the 
audience that Moscow was targeting anti-colonial movements for subversion.63 Western 
capitals had every reason to believe that Moscow was subverting colonial 'independence' 
movements. Following the Malayan insurgency, the outbreak of the Korean War, and 
successive Soviet espionage scandals in the west, the 'red menace' understandably 
loomed large in the fears of many western governments. Fears of Soviet involvement in 
decolonisation movements, however, were not simply western paranoia. Through the 
Mitrokhin Archive, we now know that the KGB did indeed attempt to subvert 'national 
liberation' movements, especially in Africa. Colonial governments in Africa moving 
towards independence were the targets of KGB 'active measures,.64 Into this milieu of 
decolonisation and Cold War subterfuge, MIS was able to provide the British 
62 NA CO 885/119 'Record of the conference of colonial Commissioners of Police at the Police 
College, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, (April, 1951), p. 2. 
63 Subsequent conferences were held in 1954 and 1957, likewise addressed by the Director-
General of MIS: CO 885/124 'Record of the second conference of Commissioners of colonial 
police forces', auly, 1954); CO 885/125 'Record of the third conference of Commissioners of 
colonial police forces', aune, 1957). 
64 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. II: The KGB and the World, 
(London, 2005), pp. 4, 428-435. 
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government with useful intelligence. For the rest of the chapter, we shall explore the 
intelligence . which MIS passed to government departments regarding British 
decolonisation movements in West and Ea~t Africa. 
II. MIS and the leaders of African national governments 
When addressing the question of African 'national liberation' movements in the 
early Cold War, MIS found themselves in an extraordinarily useful position. Luckily for 
MIS, and therefore luckily for the British government, many of the leaders of African 
and other colonial 'liberation' movements had previously lived in Britain. Many of these 
leaders had studied in Britain in the intelwar years, especially it seems at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) , and during their residence in Britain, some of them had 
come to MIS's attention. Most of the individuals whom MIS investigated were only 
moderately influential when they returned to their countries of origin. 65 However, 
others-like Kwame Nlrrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Nnamdi Azikiwe-subsequcntly 
became the leaders of independent national governments in Africa.66 
MIS was not concerned with the leaders of African 'national liberation' 
movements because of their 'pro-independence' or 'Pan African' activities. Instead MIS 
was concerned with them because of their suspected, or established, connections with 
the Soviet Union. When reading the MIS files on African national leaders, it is striking 
how little information MIS needed in order to open a file on an individual. Files were 
usually opened on the basis of a Special Branch report, or intercepted communications 
of some kind, either telephone or mail, in which that individual was named. In other 
words, MIS took prophylactic measures against individuals who were of security interest 
65 NA KV2/1853 'Arnanke Okafor'; KV2/1856 'Uchernefuna Orno'. 
66 NA KV2/1818 'Benjamin Nnarndi Azoowe'. 
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in Britain. The benefit of MIS's prophylactic security measures was that by the late 
1940s, MIS had voluminous records on those individuals on which to draw. It was here 
that MIS excelled, for as the Cold War set m:, MIS had detailed records on the leaders of 
several African governments moving towards independence. 
During their residencies in Britain, several leaders of African 'liberation' 
movements had come to the attention of MIS's experts in counter-espionage. In the 
interwar years these officers included B-Division's Guy Liddell, Dick White and Jane 
Archer, and during the war, F-Division's Roger Hollis and Milicent Bagot-who is 
thought to have been the inspiration for John Le Carre's iconic character, 'Connie'.67 By 
1948 MIS's investigations into African 'national independence' leaders were the joint 
responsibility of B-Division and OS-section. The remit of OS-section specifically 
included making enquiries into 'African students during their stay in England,.68 The 
close-knit community of African students living in Britain in the early Cold War was 
captured by the South African writer, Peter Abrahams, in his fictional roman Ii cfef, A 
Wreath for Udomo, in which both Nkrumah and Kenyatta were loosely portrayed.69 The 
information which MIS gathered on African students like Nkrumah and Kenyatta was 
specifically secret; it was information which those individuals did not wish to be made 
public. By implication, it required secret methods to obtain. MIS gathered intelligence 
on African students in Britain principally through intercepted communications, facilitated 
by HOWs, and through bugging equipment. In many ways, MIS's currency was secrets; 
it was MIS's ability to obtain secrets which made them useful to the government. In the 
early Cold War, MIS provided the British government with unique intelligence on 
67 'Obituary: Milicent Bagot', The Times, London: (3 June, 2006). 
68 NA KV4/162 'Organisation and function of B-Division', s.76a: 'Meeting in DG's office' (1 
Nov., 1948). 
69 Peter Abrahams, A Wreath for Udomo, (London, 1956); Richard Rathbone, 'Peter Abraham's A 
Wreath for Udomo', in Margaret Jean Hay (ed.), African Novels in the Classroom, (London, 2000), pp. 
11-24; Hakim Adi, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960. Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and Communism, 
(London, 1998). 
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whether the leaders of African 'national liberation' movements presented a communist 
threat . . 
III. MIS and Kwame Nkrumah 
The first leader of independent Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, came to MIS's 
attention during the Second World War. In 1942 Nkrumah was mentioned in an FBI 
report on African students studying in America with possible communist affiliations. 
This information on Nkrumah, then studying at Lincoln University, Pennsylvania, was 
filed in MIS's Regis try. 70 Nkrumah next came to MIS's attention in November 1945, 
when a Special Branch report mentioned his name in connection with the 'Pan-African 
Congress' being held in Manchester. Nkrumah was one of the leading figures in the 
Congress, becoming editor of its newspaper, New Afiica.71 Based on the FBI report and 
this subsequent information, MIS opened a personal file ('PF') on Nkrumah, who at this 
time was registered at the LSE. The MIS files on Nkrumah reveal that he was not the 
object of MIS enquiries in his own right. Instead, MIS gathered information on 
Nkrumah from other sources, which albeit frequendy mentioned his name. The most 
useful source of information on Nkrumah was an HOW imposed on the offices of the 
West African National Secretariat (WANS) , in London.72 Following the Pan-African 
Congress in Manchester, Nkrumah and other West African students had established the 
WANS, based on Gray's Inn Road. Nkrumah was elected as Secretary General of the 
WANS while its chairman was Bankole Awooner-Renner, who was then studying Law in 
70 NA KV2!1847 'Francis Kwame Nkrumah', s.la: British Security Co-ordination, Washington 
DC, to Security Executive, London, forwarded to MIS, (31 Dec., 1942). 
71 NA KV2!1847, s.2a: Special Branch report cross-reference, (9 Oct., 1945). 
72 NA KV2!1847, s.3a: B.H. Smith, MIS, to Special Branch [no name], (29 June, 1946). 
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London. As Nkrumah later recalled, the headquarters of the WANS 'must have been 
the busiest little place of its size in the whole of London'; 
It was rarely empty, for as soon as word went round of its 
whereabouts, it became the rendezvous of all African and 
West Indian students and their friends. It was there that we 
used to assemble to discuss our plans, to voice our opinions 
and air our grievances. 73 
Unknown to Nkrumah and his colleagues, MIS was intercepting the mail and 
tapping the telephones of the headquarters of the WANS. The HOW imposed on the 
WANS produced detailed information on Nkrumah, Awooner-Renner and others.74 In 
1946 the activities of the W ANS also attracted the attention of the Colonial Office and 
Foreign Office and for information on it, they referred to MIS.75 MIS sent them a 
background brief, explaining that members of the W ANS were known to be in contact 
with the CPGB.76 MIS's evidence was indisputable, coming not only from sUlveillance 
of the WANS but also from surveillance of the CPGB.77 MIS had a long-standing HOW 
imposed on the CPGB's headquarters, but as we have seen, they also had installed 
bugging equipment in the Party's headquarters, codenamed sources TABLE and 
NORTH. These sources of information revealed to MIS that Nkrumah was regularly 
corresponding with the leadership of the CPGB.78 As well as targeting the Party's 
headquarters, MIS was also investigating the Party's leading colonial 'expert', Peter 
Blackman. A former priest, originally from Barbados, Blackman was an ideologically 
committed communist who was well connected among African students in London. 
73 Kwame Nkrurnah, The Autobiograpry ojK.JlJame Nkrumah, (London, 1959), pp. 45-6. 
74 NA KV2/1840-41 'Kweku Bankole Renner'. 
75 NA CO 537/3566 'West African national secretariat', s.2: MI5 [name withheld] to D. Bates, 
Colonial Office, (31 Oct., 1946); Ibid., s.6: MI5 [name withheld] to Sir Marston Logan, Colonial 
Office, (3 Dec., 1946). 
76 Later confirmed by Nkrurnah,Autobiograpry, p. 51. 
77 NA KV2/1847, s.9a: Telephone check on CPGB headquarters, (28 May, 1947). 
78 NA KV2/1847, s.l1a: Telephone check on CPGB headquarters, (5 June, 1947). 
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MIS imposed 'an HOW on Blackman;s personal address and office.79 These confirmed 
that the Party was taking an interest in West African and other colonial 'liberation' 
movements. Amassing the information available to them, in August 1947 MIS again 
informed the Colonial Office of the frequent correspondence passing between the 
CPGB and the WANS, and the interest shown by the CPGB in West African politics.80 
But contrary to first impressions, MIS's bugging equipment in the Party's headquarters 
revealed a growing sense of disillusionment among the Party's leadership regarding the 
communist credentials of African politicians like Nkrumah. 
Bugging equipment and intercepted communications were goldmines of 
information for MIS. In November 1947 an intercepted telephone conversation 
between Nkrumah and the CPGB revealed that he was planning to leave Britain for the 
Gold Coast later that month. MIS consequently placed Nkrumah on the Special Branch 
'stop-list', one of MIS's most important mechanisms in 'personnel security', requiring 
individuals to be stopped and searched at British ports. 81 When Nkrumah subsequently 
departed for the Gold Coast-on schedule-he was indeed stopped and searched.
82 
In 
his memoirs Nkrumah described the difficulties he experienced when departing: 
At Liverpool I unexpectedly encountered difficulties with 
the authorities at the docks for, unknown to me, the police 
had collected quite a file of information about my political 
activities in London. They were not at all happy about my 
presence at Communist meetings. In the end, after lengthy 
questioning, they grudgingly stamped my passport and I 
was allowed to embark. I had a feeling that whilst they 
were happy to see the back of me, they were a little worried 
about what I was going to do in the Gold Coast. I could 
have told them then, but they would never have 
understood. 83 
79 NA KV2/1838 'Peter Blackman', Minute 14: D.G. White, (6 July, 1938). 
80 NA KV2/1847, s.l9b: G.T.D. Patterson to Claude Burgess, Colonial Office, (6 Aug., 1947). 
81 NA KV2/1847, s.28a: Rosemary Villiers, 'Note', (1 Nov., 1947). 
82 NA KV2/1847, s.31a: H .M. Chief Inspector Liverpool to MIS [B-Division and C-Division], 
(15 Nov., 1947). 
83 Nkrumah, A utobiography, p. 63. 
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MIS informed the Accra Special Branch of Nkrumah's departure and, when 
Nkrumah subsequendy arrived in Gold Coast, travelling through Sierra Leone, they kept 
his activities under surveillance.84 MIS also supplied them with background dossiers on 
Nkrumah's activities in Britain.8s However, in January 1948 intercepted communications 
between the CPGB and the W ANS revealed to MIS that Nkrumah was planning to hold 
a 'Pan African Congress' in Nigeria later that year.86 MIS forwarded this information to 
the Lagos and Accra Special Branches, who were alarmed by the prospect of the CPGB's 
support of Nkrumah's congress.87 In the event, much to London, Lagos and Accra's 
relief, the congress was never held. When riots subsequendy broke out in the Gold 
Coast in February 1948, Nkrumah was arrested and imprisoned on charges of incitement 
and sedition. Nkrumah's arrest, however, transformed London and Accra's concerns 
about him. When he was arrested, documents were found on Nkrumah which revealed 
unambiguous communist connections: he was carrying an unsigned membership card of 
the CPGB, together with notes oudining an organisation called 'the Circle'. According 
to these notes, Nkrumah was the declared leader of 'the Circle', whose stated aim was to 
establish a 'Union of African Socialist Republics' in West Africa.88 Needless to say, this 
was a worrying security development for London and Accra. Following an urgent 
request from the Accra Special Branch, MIS began to make an assessment of Nkrumah's 
known communist affiliations. B-Division admitted that while 'the Circle' was an 
84 NA KV2/1847, s.34a: W.E. Rumbelow, Chief of Police, Freetown, to Sir Percy Sillitoe, (9 Jan., 
1948). 
8S NA KV2/1847, s.39a: Sir Percy Sillitoe to R.W.H. Ballantine, Commissioner of Police, Gold 
Coast, (28 Jan., 1948). 
86 NA KV 2/1847, s.33ab: 'Tele-check CPGB headquarters', (1 Jan., 1948). 
87 NA KV2/1847, s.38a: Sir Percy Sillitoe to R.W.H. Ballantine, (28 Jan., 1948). 
88 NA KV2/1847, sA8a: Commissioner of Gold Coast Police [R.W.H. Ballantine] to Sir Percy 
Sillitoe, (16 March, 1948). 
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organisation unknown to them, it · was certainly possible that Nkrumah received 
'outside'-Soviet-guidance to establish it.89 
MIS's investigation into Nkruffiah's political background proceeded in two 
directions: enquiries they made in Britain, and those they carried out in the Gold Coast. 
In Britain, MIS's energies were devoted to obtaining all the information they could about 
Nkrumah's associates. MIS's aim was to establish who Nkrumah's confidants were, and 
from whom he was seeking ideological advice. At the same time, MIS used their recendy 
established SLO in the Gold Coast to discover local information about Nkrumah. MIS 
supplemented both of these investigations with information they received from other 
sources, notably SIS. As MIS's enquiries proceeded, they received valuable information 
from the FBI concerning Nkrumah's former affiliations in America. MIS then collated 
these sources to make an overall assessment of Nkrumah's political persuasions. 
MIS's enquiries in Britain revealed that Nkrumah was associated with a number 
of well-known communists. Nkrumah's closest confidant in Britain appeared to be 
George Padmore, a Marxist-Leninist of West Indian origin. MIS imposed an HOW on 
Padmore's address in North London (Hampstead), which revealed that Nkrumah and 
Padmore were frequendy corresponding, and that Nkrumah seemed to be turning to 
Padmore for ideological inspiration.90 This presented MIS with what must have been a 
serious headache, for Padmore was already well known to them as connected to a 
number of communists, both in Britain and America. Padmore was a leading figure in a 
group of 'Pan African' intellectuals living in Britain, many of whom had open 
communist sympathies. These included the West Indian author and historian, CL.R. 
89 NA KV2/1847, Minute 50: G.T.D. Patterson, (1 April, 1948); Ibid., Minute 58: M.J.E. Bagot, 
(30 April, 1948). 
90 NA KV2/1849, s.128a: R. Stephens, SLO West Africa, to Director-General, (26 July, 1950). 
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James, who w'rote as a cricket correspondent for the Manchester Guardian. 91 Padmore was 
also connected to a number of African-American 'activist' groups, some of which were 
identified by the FBI as secretly connected to the American Communist Party. MIS 
obtained information from the FBI on African-American 'activists' known to be 
associated with Padmore, including the world-famous singer and actor, Paul Robeson.92 
Based on information supplied by the FBI, MIS also established that when Nkrumah 
was studying in America, he had been associated with Benjamin Azikiwe, who by the late 
1940s was one of the leading anti-colonial politicians in Nigeria. Again, Azikiwe was well 
known to MIS. Enquiries into 'Dr Zik', as Azikiwe was known, revealed that he had 
several communist connections.93 This begged the question for MIS as to whether a 
communist affiliation existed between Nkrumah and Azikiwe, perhaps dating from their 
student days in America. In short, MIS discovered that Nkrumah had a wide range of 
communist associations, both in Britain and America, and that most of these 
associations revolved around George Padmore. 
MIS made similar enquiries in the Gold Coast. The first SLO in West Africa, 
Robert Stephens, soon established a useful working relationship with the Accra Special 
Branch and colonial administration. Critically we could argue that, judging from 
Stephens' reports, he failed to understand the nature of African societies in the Gold 
Coast, for instance often confusing Chieftaincy names.94 Declassified Foreign Office 
files, however, reveal that Stephens never saw his role as 'studying' African societies. 
Stephens regarded his role as solely to discover the extent of communist penetration in 
91 NA KV 2/1824 'C.L.R. James'; C.L.R. James, Nkrumah and the Gold Coast Revolution, (London, 
1962). 
92 NA KV2/1829 'Paul Robeson'. Kenyatta appeared as an extra in a film starring Paul Robeson, 
'Sanders of the River', (00. Zoltan Korda, 1935). 
93 NA KV2/1818 'Benjamin Nnamcli Azoowe'. 
94 Nkrumah and Chieftaincy politics in the Gold Coast have been carefully examined by Richard 
Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs. The Politics ofChieftainry in Ghana, 1951-60, (Oxford, 2000). 
296 
the Gold Coas't.95 To help with MIS's enquiries in London, OS-Section despatched a list 
of questions to Stephens regarding Nkrumah's associates in the Gold Coast, and to 
answer these questions, Stephens turned to the Accra Special Branch. His answers did 
not make for pleasant reading for London. One of Nkrumah's closest associates in the 
Gold Coast was Kojo Botsio, again whom the Accra Special Branch believed to hold 
communist sympathies.96 Stephens also discovered that before NklUmah was arrested, 
he had attempted to contact several well-known French communists in French colonial 
territories.97 As well as making specific enquiries into Nkrumah's confidants, Stephens 
monitored the broader political developments in the Gold Coast, attending the major 
speeches which Nkrumah gave. Stephens was present at Nkmmah's speech in Accra in 
June 1949, at which Nkrumah outlined his plans for 'positive action' in the Gold 
Coast-implying strikes and boycotts.98 As the political temperature in the Gold Coast 
rose, Stephens attempted to predict when, in his own words, the 'storm would break'. 
His reports in late 1949 and early 1950 showed that Nkrumah's demands for 'Self 
Government Now' were gaining increasing support in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah's new 
party, the Convention People's Party (CPP) , with its slogan 'self government now', 
looked as though it would win the general election and in these circumstances, the 
question that London and Accra needed answering was the extent to which Nkrumah 
11 ' 99 was actua y a commurust. 
Drawing on all the information available to them, in Britain and the Gold 
Coast, from open and secret sources, MIS made an assessment of Nkrumah's political 
affiliations. Nkrumah was undoubtedly a Marxist, and he was clearly associated with a 
95 NA FO 371/80614-80617 'Political intelligence reports for Colonel Stephens, Security Liaison 
Officer Accra'. 
96 NA KV2/1915 'Kojo Botsio', s.8a 'Personality Note', (April, 1948). 
97 NA KV2/1848, s. 92a: 'Note on Nkrumah', (31 Jan., 1949). 
98 NA KV2/1848, s.99a: R. Stephens, SLO West Africa, to Director-General, (17 June, 1949). 
99 NA KV2/1848, s.100a: R. Stephens to Director-General, (17 June, 1949). 
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number of communist sympathisers. · However, MIS judged that Nkrumah was in no 
sense an orthodox communist. Instead, MIS considered that Nkrumah used 
communism expediendy-and only so f~r as it furthered his own ends. From MIS's 
perspective, Nkrumah was a 'nationalist' and an opportunist who was concerned, above 
all, with his own political advancement. As MIS's 'background note' on Nkrumah 
explained: 
His interest in Communism may well be prompted only by 
his desire to enlist aid in the furtherance of his own aims in 
West Africa .. . Although an undoubted nationalist, 
N'KRUMAH's aims are probably tainted by his wishes for 
his own personal advancement. 100 
From MIS's perspective, Nkrumah's commurusm was therefore not as 
threatening as it ostensibly appeared. Even Nkrumah's potentially most worrymg 
communist connection-his affiliation with George Padmore-was not as ominous as it 
first appeared. MIS established that, on closer inspection, Padmore was himself an 
unorthodox communist. Despite a promising early communist career, in which Moscow 
assured him opportunities unavailable under 'imperialist' British rule in Trinidad, by the 
early 1930s Padmore had become disillusioned with Moscow's commitment to colonial 
'independence' movements. 101 Padmore had dramatically fallen into Moscow's disfavour 
when he was expelled from the French Communist Party in 1934, after which Moscow 
denounced him as a 'Trotskyist'. From Moscow's perspective, the communism 
espoused by Nkrumah and Padmore was a heretical type. For these reasons, MIS 
concluded that Nkrumah was highly unlikely to receive, or would be prepared to receive, 
instructions from Moscow. Put simply, MIS judged that while Nkrumah certainly had 
100 NA KV2/1847, s.61b: 'Personality note', Oune 1948). 
101 James R. Hooker, Black Revolutionary: Ge01:ge Padmore's Path )rom Communism to Pan-A fricanism, 
(London, 1967). 
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communist connections, he was an unorthodox communist and it was unlikely that he 
was susceptible to Soviet subversion. MIS's assessment was despatched to the Colonial 
Office and, through their SLO, to the go~ernment in the Gold Coast. 102 In many ways, 
MIS's analysis of Nkrumah was remarkable given that we might expect MIS to have had 
a vested interest in exaggerating communist threats. MIS's analysis was also remarkable 
given that both Padrnore and Nkrumah displayed characteristics of Soviet agents: both 
had communist affiliations in their backgrounds, but both subsequently distanced 
themselves from the Party. The reason why MIS's analysis was sophisticated was 
because their sources, intercepted communications and bugging equipment, provided 
them with unique intelligence on Nkrumah. 
After their initial assessment of Nkrumah's political persuasions, MIS kept 
their appraisal updated with the latest information. MIS's assessment of Nkrumah 
naturally changed with political developments in the Gold Coast. The MIS files on 
Nkrumah reveal that as the Gold Coast moved towards independence, MIS provided 
British government departments with assessments of Nkrumah on three separate 
occasions: in March 1952, when Nkrumah was elected Prime Minster in the Gold Coast; 
in the summer of 1952, when Nluumah was devising constitutional changes for the Gold 
Coast; and in the summer of 1953, when Nkrumah was pushing those changes through 
parliament, preparing the road for Ghanaian independence. The information that MIS 
provided government departments with was unavailable from other sources. For 
colonial officials in London and Accra, MIS's intelligence was exceptionally useful. 
Historians have noted that London's flexibility in the transfer of power ill 
Ghana was based on a simple fact: that it made little difference to Britain's material 
interests whether the Gold Coast remained a colony, or whether it was an independent 
102 NA KV2/1847, s.61b: 'Personality note', Gune, 1948); KV2/1848, s.11Sa: 'Extract from SLO 
West Africa report on meeting with the new Governor of the Gold Coast', (13 Sept., 1949). 
299 
state within 'the British commonwealth. 103 But hitherto unacknowledged in the 
historiography is the fact that London was flexible in the transfer of power in Ghana for 
another reason: because London and Ac~ra were supplied with intelligence reports on 
Nkrumah. MIS provided the British government with intercepted communications 
passing between Nkrumah and his associates in Britain. Judging from MIS records, MIS 
appears to have established a wide net to intercept mail passing between Britain and 
colonies in Africa. Intercepted communications-codenamed sources CHEST, 
CUBIST and SWIFT in MIS reports-often revealed Nkrumah's secret aspirations and 
affiliations. MIS passed intercepted communications to the Colonial Office in London, 
and to the colonial administration in the Gold Coast. MIS's information placed London 
and Accra in an extraordinarily useful position during diplomatic consultations with 
Nkrumah. The interception of communications is, of course, an age-old tool of 
statecraft. As Lord Curzon noticed during negotiations with the French government in 
the 1920s, intercepted communications allow for the diplomatic equivalent of playing a 
game of poker and knowing an opponent's cards. 104 
Following Nkrumah's election as the 'Leader of Government Business' in the 
Gold Coast in February 19S1-the election was held while Nkrumah was imprisoned in 
the St. James Fort, Accra-the Colonial Office asked MIS for another assessment of 
him. MIS based their report on their earlier assessment, but combined it with the latest 
information from intercepted communications, source CHEST. Intercepted 
correspondence revealed that Nkrumah described himself as a Marxist and an 'African 
socialist', but as MIS explained to the Colonial Office, Nkrumah remained thoroughly 
103 Rathbone, 'Transfer of power in Ghana'; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation. The Retreat from 
Empire in the Post-War World, pp. 175-80. 
104 Andrew, 'Secret intelligence and British foreign policy', in Andrew and Noakes (eds.), 
Intelligence and International Relations, p. 16. 
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unorthodox m his communism. 105 MIS's bugging equipment m the CPGB's 
headquarters provided indisputable proof that the CPGB's leadership had become 
disillusioned with Nkrumah.106 As MIS's 'personality note' on Nkrumah explained: 
It would be unwise to base any too definite a conclusion 
about N'KRUMAH's evolution as a nationalist politician 
upon his early career. He has certainly received a thorough 
grounding in Marxism and has received moral support from 
the British Communist Party during its rise to power. He is 
politically immature, however, and there are indications of 
an individualism in him which may ultimately over-ride his 
communist training ... Source TABLE indicates that the 
British Communist Party are no longer confident that their 
protege will remain faithful to them. Source CHEST 
assures us that their fears are justified, since the c.P.P., in 
announcements made since its accession to power, has 
taken its line direct from the free-lance "Trotskyist", 
George PADMORE, in the UK.107 
The question of Padmore's influence in West African politics was a recurrmg 
concern for MIS and the Colonial Office between 1952 and 1953. In October 1952, MIS 
intercepted a pamphlet, entitled Our Challenge, which Nkrumah had written and sent to 
Padmore. The case illustrates how MIS dealt with sensitive correspondence passing 
between them. As Sillitoe explained to the new SLO in West Africa, P.M. Kirby Green: 
We are unable to say how far this may be public knowledge in the Gold Coast, but Sir 
John Shaw felt it to be wise to get copies out to you as soon as possible with the 
suggestion that you should show one to H.E.'.108 In other words, MIS was passing 
sensitive information gained from mail interception to their SLO, and then on to 
governor himself. This level of contact between MIS and the colonial administration in 
105 NA KV2/1849, s. 144a, 'Personality note', (March 1948), p. 2. 
106 NA KV2/1849, s. 160b: source TABLE, (11 June, 1951); Ibid., s.174c: source TABLE, (1 July, 
1951). 
107 NA KV2/1849, s. 144a: MI5 [name withheld] to Juxon Barton, Colonial Office, (20 March, 
1951); Ibid., s.146a: receipt for Top Secret document, Juxon Barton, (20 March, 1953). 
108 NA KV2/1849, s.194a: Director-General to SLO West Africa, (10 Oct., 1951). 
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Accra was not exceptional. On New Year's Eve 1951, Sir John Shaw sat up until 2am 
talking on the telephone with Sir Charles Arden-Clarke in the Gold Coast about the 
political situation in the colony. It is likely' that Shaw and Arden-Clarke knew each other 
from their colonial service in West Africa in the 1920s-Shaw had served in Accra , 
Arden-Clarke in Lagos. 109 On New Year's Day 1952, following his late night telephone 
discussion with Arden-Clarke, Shaw noted in MIS's file on Nkrumah that the future of 
the Gold Coast essentially depended on Arden-Clarke's ability to get on with 
Nkrumah. 11O 
The importance of Arden-Clarke's relationship with Nkrumah made it imperative 
to discover the precise nature of Nkrumah's ideological associations. The Colonial 
Office, for example, remained deeply suspicious of Nkrumah's relationship with 
Padmore. Their fears were magnified when Padmore made a trip to the Gold Coast in 
the summer of 1952, and Nkrumah subsequendy sent Padmore a draft of 'constitutional 
changes' he was proposing for the Gold Coast. III This sounded the klaxon, both in 
London and Accra. Nkrumah was asking Padmore for advice on how to reform the 
Gold Coast's constitution in preparation for independence. Sir John Shaw asked OS-
section for an assessment of what he termed 'the Nkrumah-Padmore axis'."2 OS-section 
made an appraisal of the situation, which was dispatched to the Colonial Office, and 
again, through their SLO, to Arden-Clarke. In MIS's judgement, there were several 
reasons why Nkrumah should not accept radical advice from Padmore. First, Nkrumah 
had always been 'an individualist, not a disciplined communist willing to take orders', and 
second, Nkrumah appeared to be passing from the 'ideological' to the 'empirical' stage of 
109 'Sir Charles Arden-Clarke', The Times, London: (18 Dec., 1962); 'Obituary: Sir John Shaw', The 
Times, London: (22 Jan., 1983). 
110 NA KV 2/1850, Minute 209: Sir John Shaw, (1 Jan., 1952). 
111 NA KV 2/1850, s.245a: SLO West Africa to Director-General, (24 Sept., 1952). 
112 NA KV2/1850, s.250a: SirJohn Shaw to H. Loftus-Brown, (20 Oct., 1952). 
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li · 113 A L f B f po tics. s 0 tus- rown 0 OS-Section explained in a letter to the Colonial Office 
on S Jwy 1952: 
... PADMORE has always been politically a doctrinaire. 
His influence over N'KRUMAH appeared to be greatest 
when N'KRUMAH, who had imbibed Marxism from his 
Communist contacts in England, was building up the 
Convention People's Party on Marxist ideological lines. 
Like many other politicians who have passed from 
opposition to government, N'KRUMAH may have found 
himself driven off his ideological course by the compulsion 
of party politics, and may experience increasing difficulty in 
reconciling his preconceived theories with the tactical 
manoeuvres necessary to keep himself in office. 114 
MIS believed that Nkrurnah would only accept advice from Padmore provided that it did 
not jeopardise his position of power. But even if Nkrurnah did seek inspiration from 
Padmore, MIS maintained that it would not be disastrous. As Loftus-Brown further 
explained: 
. . . [M]ay I repeat that there are good reasons to believe that 
PADMORE's early association with international 
Communist activity, which came to an end when he was 
expelled from the Party in France, in 1934, is genuinely 
dead. His Pan-African ambitions have brought him 
irrevocably into opposition to the Communists, who have 
long renounced him as a Trotskyist-which means no more 
than that he is a Marxist who is unresponsive to orthodox 
Communist discipline. I 15 
MIS was dispelling London and Accra's fears over the communist threat posed 
by Padmore. Certainly Padmore enjoyed influence over Nkrurnah, but as MIS pointed 
out, his communism was also unorthodox. Nkrurnah's overwhelming desire to maintain 
113 Cf. NA KV2/1850, s.184a: H. Loftus-Brown to SLO West Africa, (21 Aug., 1951). 
114 NA KV2/1850, s.226b: H. Loftus-Brown to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, (5 July, 1952). 
115 Ibid. 
303 
his own position of power, above all else, meant that he would be less willing to take 
advice from radicals. Undoubtedly this was reassuring news for colonial officials in 
London and Accra, given the number of radicals whom Nkrumah could turn to, if he 
desired. Nkrumah had been associated with reactionaries like Bankole Awooner-Renner 
since their time in London. By 1952 Renner was advocating independence for Ghana by 
any means, either constitutional or unconstitutional. Nkrumah, however, believed that a 
reactionary programme would end his political career, and thus distanced himself from 
Renner's radicalism. Despite their close personal friendship, Nkrumah opposed 
Renner's views and advocated independence through constitutional means.116 By 
January 1952, Sir John Shaw was drawing the same conclusions as Sir Charles Arden-
Clarke: Nkrumah's moderate politics meant there were reasons for 'quiet optimism' in 
the Gold Coast. 117 
Traditional interpretations have explained Britain's smooth transfer of power in 
Ghana through the main personalities involved. Arden-Clarke played a 'high stakes' 
game, but as several studies have shown, ultimately he was able to build a successful 
relationship with Nkrumah. The smooth transfer of power in Ghana is unimaginable 
without their relationship.118 Most studies have noted how remarkable, and fortunate, it 
was that Arden-Clarke took an optimistic view of Nkrumah's moderate politics.119 His 
trust in Nkrumah's moderate communism was indeed remarkable given the prevailing 
atmosphere in London and the Gold Coast. In many ways, it was a hallowed belief in 
Whitehall that Nkrumah and the CPP were communist-inspired, if not communist-run. 
In October 1950, the DailY Telegraph ran a story en tided 'Red Shadow over the Gold 
Coast', which claimed that the CPP was orchestrated from Moscow, 'using Ju Ju of 
116 NA KV2/1840 'Kweku Bankole Renner', s. 54a: 'Personality note', Oanuary,1949). 
117 NA KV 2/1850, Minute 209: Sir John Shaw, (1 Jan., 1952). 
118 Rathbone, 'Transfer of Power in Ghana'; David Rooney, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, (London, 
1982), p. 113. 
119 Rathbone, 'Political intelligence and policing in Ghana', p. 87. 
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darkest Afric~'.120 Arden-Clark paid little attention to these Views. But hitherto 
unacknowledged, either in official documentation or in the secondary literature, is the 
fact that Arden-Clarke received intelligence reports from MIS indicating Nkrumah's 
moderate communism. In many ways, the use that Arden-Clarke made of MIS's reports 
is a question of the chicken and egg: following his colonial service in Malaya after the 
Second World War, where he witnessed the violent rise of communism, Arden-Clarke 
arrived in the Gold Coast in 1949 convinced of the need to work with moderate 
politicians against extremist communism. 121 It is impossible to say what came first-
whether MIS reports actually altered Arden-Clarke's opinion of Nkrumah, or whether 
they confirmed what he already believed. The results, however, were the same: MIS 
reports calmed Arden-Clarke's fears concerning Nkrumah's communism. 
MIS's reports on Nkrumah, passed to Arden-Clarke through their SLOs, 
usually concerned Nkrumah's intercepted correspondence. Mail interception appears to 
have occurred both in Britain and locally in the Gold Coast. In fact, the question of local 
mail interception became awkward after Nkrumah's election as 'Leader of Government 
Business' (February 1951). Upon his election, Nkrumah asked Arden-Clarke to enquire 
whether the Accra Special Branch were opening his mail, which he felt certain they were. 
Arden-Clarke claimed ignorance, but promised that if he discovered it occurring, he 
would order it to cease. Despite Arden-Clarke's assurances, the Accra Special Branch 
continued to open Nkrumah's mail. As Loftus-Brown noted in an in-house MIS 
memorandum, mail interception in the Gold Coast was 'operated unofficially by the 
Special Branch, against the written orders of the Governor, who receives the product in a 
form which he is not obliged to recognise as the fruits of disobedience of his own 
120 Rooney, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, p. 113. 
121 David Birmingham, KJlJame Nkrumah. The Father of African Nationalism, (Athens Oh., 1998), pp. 
41-2. 
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orders'. 122 In this way, the Accra Special Branch continued to spy on Nkrumah-the 
democratically elected leader of the Gold Coast. From London and Accra's perspective, 
the information produced by intercepting Nkrumah's mail was too important for it to be 
discontinued, even if it meant doing so unofficially, on the nod. 123 
The most dramatic revelation produced by mail interception was in May 1953, 
during key parliamentary debates over the future constitutional arrangements of 
independent Ghana. Nkrumah wrote to Padmore asking him to help draft what he 
termed a 'revolutionary' and 'uncompromising' speech, which would 'become an 
historical document' in the Gold Coast. 124 MIS intercepted the letter and informed both 
the Colonial Office and Arden-Clarke. 125 Once again these developments appeared to be 
foreboding, but again MIS maintained that the situation was not as bad as it seemed. In 
MIS's judgement, Nkrumah's use of the word 'revolutionary' was not meant in the 
Marxist sense, but probably simply meant 'startling'. MIS argued that Nkrumah 
remained unlikely to accept radical advice from Padmore: 
Without trying to read too much into occasional reports by 
SWIFT [mail interception] we cannot go beyond the 
conclusion at which we have already arrived, that 
NKRUMAH will pursue his demand for self government 
by constitutional methods, at least for sometime to come, 
and that while he may listen to PADMORE's advice on 
political strategy, he may nevertheless turn a deaf ear to any 
d I 
. . 126 
encouragement to a opt revo utionary tactics. 
In the end, MIS's advice was proved correct. Far from making a 'revolutionary' 
speech, in June 1953 Nkrumah gave a moderate speech before parliament in which he 
122 NA KV2/1850, s.247a: 'Note for ftie', H. Loftus-Brown, (15 Oct., 1952). 
123 NA KV2/1850, Minute 261: Sir John Shaw, (1 Dec., 1952). 
124 NA KV2/1851, s.279a: H. Loftus-Brown to P.M. Kirby Green, (15 May, 1953). 
125 NA KV2/1851, s.286a: P.M. Kirby Green, SLO West Africa, to H. Loftus-Brown, (30 May, 
1953). 
126 NA KV2/1851, s.285a: H. Loftus-Brown to Juxon Barton, Colonial Office, (3 June, 1953). 
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advocated independence through constitutional means, and for Ghana to remain within 
the British commonwealth. The SLO in the Gold Coast, P.M. Kirby Green, was present 
during the speech and reported back to London on what he observed. His report 
optimistically noted that the parliament was in marked contrast to previous years, and 
there was 'a total absence of bitterness'. The SLO's report concluded with words that 
speak volumes for London's enterprise in the Gold Coast: 'Thus events are proceeding 
din I , 127 accor g to p an . By backing Nkrumah's moderate policies in the Gold Coast, 
London was orchestrating a smooth transfer of power. This is not to say that the 
exchange of power in the Gold Coast was not without complications. Between the 
general election in 1954 and independence in 1957, Nkrumah had to fight to keep the 
Gold Coast unified. 128 Before 1954, however, key political arrangements and personal 
relationships had been established in the Gold Coast which were essential for London's 
successful transfer of power. We can now see that MIS played a role in helping London 
and Accra establish these relationships. 
The MIS files on Kwame Nkrumah reveal that while a degree of confusion 
existed within Whitehall surrounding his communist views, there could be no confusion 
about his involvement in illegal profiteering. Like many West African politicians 
grappling with colonial emancipation in the early Cold War, Nkrumah was not above 
political corruption. In 1951 SIS and MIS discovered that Nkrumah was involved with 
diamond smuggling. Information acquired by SIS revealed that Nkrumah was 
attempting to use smuggled diamonds to buy political favours, either in America or the 
Soviet Union. In April 1951 Nkrumah attempted to recruit a British geologist to 
examine diamonds which he was illegally mining in West Africa. The man chosen by 
127 NA KV2/1851, s.291z: P.M. Kirby Green, SLO West Africa, to H. Loftus-Brown, (13 July, 
1953). 
128 Rathbone, Nkrumah and the Chiefs. The Politics ofi'hieJtainry in Ghana. 
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Nkrumah to find a suitable geologist reported his mission to an SIS contact. When MIS 
received this information from SIS, the Service's initial reaction was that MIS did not 
usually investigate illicit diamond buying (IDB) activities. 129 They were a matter of law 
and order, not of national security. However, the scale of Nkrumah's diamond 
smuggling activities-one SIS report mentioned 6,000 uncut stones-justified MIS's 
involvement, especially as MIS received this information following Nkrumah's election as 
government leader in the Gold Coast. 130 If Nkmmah succeeded in buying political 
favours with smuggled diamonds, especially in the Soviet Union, it would have clear 
implications for British national security. In fact, MIS had a long history of involvement 
in the figuratively 'grey area' between national security and law and order. The Service 
had been involved with investigating diamond smuggling during the Second World 
War.l3l During the war, MIS had likewise helped to investigate narcotics trafficking. \32 
And not co-incidentally, after his retirement as Director-General of MIS in 1953, Sir 
Percy Sillitoe worked for De Beers investigating diamond smuggling. 133 Sillitoe's 
subsequent career investigating international diamond smuggling even earned him a place 
in Ian Fleming's book, Diamonds are Forever. In fact, Sillitoe was one of the few real-life 
people to appear in a James Bond story. 134 
MIS decided not to inform Arden-Clarke immediately about Nkrumah's diamond 
smuggling activities. Their strategy was to wait to see if Nkrumah could be caught 
129 NA KV2/1849, s.175a: 'Note', O.S.3 [A. Kellar], (10 July, 1951). 
130 NA KV2/1849, s.176a: 'Note', H. Loftus-Brown, (13 July, 1951). 
131 NA KV4/196 'Liddell diaries', (5 March, 1945); Ibid., (1 June, 1945). 
132 NA KV 4/234 'Intelligence organisation in the Middle East (SIME) , s.33a: Minutes of the 
SIME annual conference held in Beirut, (2 April, 1944). 
133 Sillitoe, Cloak Ivithollt Dagger, pp.196-7; NA CO 544/795 'Supply of information to Sir Percy 
Sillitoe concerning illicit diamond buying in West Africa'. 
134 Cockerill, Sir Perry Sillitoe, p. 192. After his retirement from MI5 in 1953, and before he began 
working for De Beers, Sillitoe opened a sweet shop in Eastbourne, a business venture that rapidly 
failed (see Ibid). 
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attempting to buy political favours before informing the governor. 135 By March 1952, 
however, MIS and SIS's source reported that Nkrumah had ceased his IDB activities. 
MIS eventually informed Arden-Clarke of Nkrumah's involvement in diamond 
smuggling in July 1952, but assured the governor that by then his activities had ceased. l36 
The remarkable point, however, is that as early as 1951 MIS and SIS were aware of 
Nkrumah's involvement in political corruption. This was an early indication of what 
came after Ghanaian independence. After 1957 Nkrumah established what can only be 
described as a corrupt, dictatorial one-party state. In the early 19S0s, MIS had made an 
accurate and sophisticated judgement concerning Nkrumah's political affiliations, but 
what MIS could not have predicted was the extent to which Nkrumah's politics would 
radicalise after 1957. Nkrumah instigated in Ghana what he termed 'African socialism'. 
Although he persistendy differentiated 'African socialism' from Soviet-communism, 
Nkrumah nevertheless received support from the KGB.137 Buttressed with Soviet and 
Eastern Bloc security advisers, Nkrumah's regime in Ghana became increasingly 
authoritarian and intolerant of dissent. Nkrumah managed to wreck the Ghanaian 
economy, eventually leading to his overthrow and expulsion from Ghana in 1966.
138 
IV. MIS and J omo Kenyatta 
MIS's investigations into Jomo Kenyatta were similar to those into Kwame 
Nkrumah. Both leaders came to MIS's attention when they were studying in Britain-in 
135 NA KV2/1850, s.213a: Sir John Shaw for Director-General, to SLO West Africa, (30 Jan., 
1952); Ibid., H. Loftus-Brown to Juxon Barton, Colonial Office, (7 March, 1952). 
136 NA KV2/1850, s.232a: P.M. Kirby Green, SLO West Africa, to Director-General, (23 July, 
1952). 
137 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. II: The KGB and the World, pp. 428-435. 
138 Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Dcrys in Ghana, (London, 1968). 
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fact, both attended the LSE. 139 I d . . d S . 1 B ntercepte commullications an pecta ranch 
surveillance reports revealed that Nkrumah and Kenyatta were associated with many of 
the same communists in Britain. After the Second World War, Nkrumah and Kenyatta 
both left Britain for their countries of origin and upon their return to Africa, their former 
communist affiliations became equally important from a security perspective. As with 
Nkrumah, by 1952 MIS had voluminous records on Kenyatta on which to draw. These 
records offer an original perspective on how London responded to the threat presented 
by the Mau Mau emergency. Six months after Nkrumah became the elected leader of the 
Gold Coast, the Mau Mau insurgency erupted in Kenya. We can now see that as soon as 
the 'emergency' was declared, MIS provided the Colonial Office with a series of 
intelligence reports on whether Kenyatta was a communist, and whether the Mau Mau 
rebellion was a communist-supported insurgency. 
The MIS files on Jomo Kenyatta show that he was the object of MIS enquiries 
on three separate occasions during the 1930s and 1940s. On each occasion, MIS 
provided the Colonial Office and the Kenya administration with intelligence reports on 
his activities. When MIS was not actively investigating Kenyatta, the Service continued 
to gather information on him from other sources. Kenyatta's name first came to MIS's 
attention when he travelled to Britain in 1929, but at that time he was not the object of 
MIS's own enquiries. However, Kenyatta became the object of MIS enquiries between 
1932 and 1934, when he was again in Britain, and made a trip to the Soviet Union. The 
nature of Kenyatta's trip to the Soviet Union subsequently became a subject of 
controversy, in London, Nairobi-and Moscow. Between 1934 and 1939, MIS 
continued to receive reports on Kenyatta from other departments, but once more he was 
not a specific target for MIS. This changed with the outbreak of the Second World War: 
139 For Kenyatta's LSE diploma, see: NA KV2/1788 Jomo Kenyatta', s.286a: MIS to DSO 
Nairobi, (20 Dec., 1946). 
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MIS monitored Kenyatta's activities ill Britain periodically throughout the war, until he 
departed for Kenya in 1946. After the outbreak of the Mau Mau revolt in 1952, and 
Kenyatta's unjustified implication in it, MIS's background information on Kenyatta took 
on a new degree of importance. As with Nkrumah, MIS was able to provide the British 
government with unique intelligence on Kenyatta. When the Mau Mau rebellion 
erupted, MIS advised the Colonial Office that although he had cornmunist connections 
in his background, their sources indicated that by 1952 Kenyatta had become 
disillusioned with communism. As we shall see, MIS helped to correct misconceptions 
in the Colonial Office about the communist nature of the Mau Mau insurgency. 
Unlike Nkrumah, Kenyatta was a comparatively well-known political figure when 
he first arrived in Britain. In 1929 Kenyatta came to Britain as the leader of the Kikuyu 
(Gikuyu) Central Association. 14O Due to his importance in Kenya itself, Kenyatta's 
activities were monitored by the Special Branch in London, who compiled a 'large file' on 
him.141 Several Special Branch reports on Kenyatta were forwarded on to MIS. In 1930 
MIS then received a report from SIS stating that Kenyatta was due to leave Britain for 
Hamburg, where he was going to attend a 'negro [sic] conference,.142 At this point MIS 
opened a file on Kenyatta. It does not appear, however, that either MIS or the Special 
Branch was aware that Kenyatta made a trip to Moscow in 1929.143 Kenyatta next came 
to MIS's attention when he returned to Britain in 1932. Once again he was kept under 
Special Branch surveillance and several reports of his speeches, in London and 
Birmingham, were forwarded to MIS.I44 But in December 1933, MIS's interest in 
140 NA CO 533/384/9 'Visit to England of the general secretary of the Kikuyu central 
association, Johnstone Kenyatta', Oan. 1929-Feb. 1930). 
141 NA KV2/1787, s.2a: Johnstone Kenyatta', (11 Nov., 1931). 
142 NA KV2/1787, s.ly: MIS note [name illegible], reporting phone call from Valentine Vivian, 
SIS, passed to Captain Miller, MIS, (9 July, 1930). 
143 Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kef!Jatta, (London, 1972), pp. 163-71. 
144 NA KV2/1787, s.7a: Chief Constabulary Birmingham to MIS, (15 Nov., 1932); Ibid., s.8a: Sir 
Vernon Kell to M. Clauson, Colonial Office, (22 Nov., 1932). 
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Kenyatta took on a new sense of urgency: they received a report from a Special Branch 
informant stating that Kenyatta had made a trip to Moscow, where he 'studied' at the 
Lenin School, and where he received 'instructions' to become a COMINTERN agent. 145 
Kenyatta's trip to Moscow presumably had not been detected by MIS's port-control 
officers because he travelled there from Germany. As soon as MIS received news of 
Kenyatta's trip to Moscow, they informed the Colonial Office and the Kenya Special 
Branch. 146 At the same time MIS imposed an HOW on Kenyatta, who since had 
returned to Britain and was living at 9S Cambridge Street, London. 147 The HOW 
operated for seven months, but was not as successful as MIS hoped. On two occasions, 
Kenyatta complained to the Post Office that he believed his mail was being opened 
because there was a delay in receiving it. 148 (This, in itself, is a striking social commentary 
on the differences between British mail services then and today).149 Due to Kenyatta's 
suspicions, MIS suspended the HOW in July 1934.150 
Even after MIS ceased to investigate Kenyatta, they continued to receive 
information on him from other sources. The HOW on the CPGB's headquarters 
revealed that Kenyatta was communicating with leading Party members, such as Harry 
Pollitt. 151 In 1936 the head of the Kenya Special Branch CID visited MIS in London and 
warned: 'The Kenya Authorities view this person with a good deal of mistrust and feel 
that he is the sort of person whose affairs would well repay a certain amount of 
attention'. 152 In 1938 MIS made a review of their information on Kenyatta, and 
145 NA KV2/1787, s.19a: Special Branch to MIS, (6 Dec., 1933). 
146 NA KV2/1787, s.13a: Sir Vernon Kell to D.C.]. McSweeney, Colonial Office, (16 Dec., 1933); 
Ibid., Sir Vernon Kell to Commissioner of Police, Kenya, (18 Jan., 1934). 
147 NA KV2/1787, s. 23a: Home Office Warrant, (3 Jan., 1934). 
148 NA KV2/1787, s.27a: cross-reference (18 Jan., 1934). 
149 Point made by Professor Peter Hennessy in the sixth Hinsley memorial lecture, St. John'S 
College, Cambridge, (24 Oct., 2005). 
150 NA KV2/1787, Minute 60: Jane Archer, (17 July, 1934). 
151 NA KV2/1787, s. 3Sa: Harry Pollitt to Johnstone Kenyatta, (7 March, 1934). 
152 NA KV2/1787, s.96b: Jane Archer, (8 Jan., 1936). 
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despatched a report to the Colonial Office and Kenya police. MIS's report corrected 
previous oversights, noting that Kenyatta had made two trips to Moscow, in 1929 and 
1933, and stated that Kenyatta had joined' the CPGB in 1930, although it is unclear from 
where this information came. 153 After their assessment in 1938, MIS continued to 
receive Special Branch reports on Kenyatta.154 MIS's interest in Kenyatta, however, was 
transformed by the Second World War. At the request of the Kenya Special Branch, in 
August 1939 MIS imposed another HOW on Kenyatta, then residing in North 
London. 155 The HOW application was submitted by Roger Hollis, who noted that the 
Warrant would be of 'considerable interest to ourselves as well as to the Kenya 
authorities'. 156 
Intercepted communications revealed that Kenyatta was associated with the same 
group of West Indian 'African nationalists' as Nkrumah. This group included the 
ubiquitous George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and Paul Robeson-all of whom MIS was 
interested in for their communist connections, and on whom MIS had opened files. 157 
From MIS's perspective, Kenyatta's association with well-known communists had 
implications for his employment. In March 1940 MIS was responsible for vetting 
Kenyatta, and advised against his employment by the Gramophone Company, where he 
had found a position censoring and translating material from Kikuyu to English for the 
Ministry of Information. 158 Although MIS advised against Kenyatta's employment, F-
Division did allow him to lecture British troops in September 1943.159 For the rest of the 
war, MIS continued to make periodic enquiries into Kenyatta's activities, though from 
153 NA KV2/1787, s.137b: MIS personality note, Johnstone M. Kenyatta', (1938). 
154 NA KV2/1787, s.127a: Special Branch to MIS, (16 March, 1938). 
155 NA KV2/1787, 160a: [name illegible] Kenya Special Branch CID, to Sir Vernon Kell, (11 
Aug., 1939); Ibid., 161a: Home Office Warrant, (11 Aug., 1939). 
156 NA KV2/1787, Minute 161: Roger Hollis, (2S Aug., 1939). 
157 NA KV 2/1824 'C.L.R. James'; NA KV2/1829 'Paul Robeson'. 
158 NA KV2/1787, s.184a: Roger Hollis to A.H. Poynton, Colonial Office, (12 April, 1940). 
159 NA KV2/1788, Minute 229: Hilary Creedy, (9 Sept., 1943). 
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the flies it is unclear how long their HOW was imposed on him. When Kenyatta moved 
from London to Storrington (in Sussex) in 1940, MIS does not appear to have reapplied 
the HOW, but they did request the Chiche~ter police to monitor his activities. 16o Police 
surveillance reports revealed that Kenyatta drew little attention to himself in Storrington, 
and he did not appear to be politically active. In September 1944 Sir David Petrie sent 
an overall report on Kenyatta to the Director of Intelligence and Security (DIS) in 
Nairobi. Petrie explained that MIS had placed Kenyatta under prolonged observation at 
the start of the war, but this produced little of security interest: 
KENYAITA continues to live at "Highover", Heath 
Common, Storrington, Sussex, in a house in which several 
persons of extreme left wing or Trotskyist sympathies 
reside, but he does not attract attention in any way and can, 
I think, hardly be taking an active part in politicS. 161 
MIS's sources revealed that during the war Kenyatta distanced himself from the 
CPGB. The wartime HOW running on the Party's headquarters showed that Kenyatta 
was seldom in communication with the Party. Despite MIS's evidence that Kenyatta was 
distancing himself from the Party, his former communist connections continued to be a 
source of security controversy, especially his trips to Moscow. In November 1945 the 
Special Branch reported that, together with Nkrumah, Kenyatta was one of the leading 
speakers at the 'Pan African Congress' in Manchester. 162 MIS was interested in the 
Congress not because of its 'African nationalist' agenda, but rather because the CPGB 
openly supported it. 163 In the wake of the Congress, the Colonial Office asked MIS for 
information on Kenyatta and his communist connections. In a letter to the Colonial 
160 NA KV2/1788, s.188a: Sir Vernon Kell to P. Wilson, Chief Constabulary, Chichester, (23 
April, 1940). 
161 NA KV2/1788, s.233a: Sir David Petrie to A.W. Riggs, DIS Kenya, (13 Sept., 1944). 
162 NA KV2/1788, s. 240a: 'Pan African congress', Manchester City police report, (Nov., 1945). 
163 NA KV2/1788, s.247a: Hilary Creedy to MIS's RSLO [no name], Manchester, (7 May, 1945). 
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Office in December 1945, 0.]. Mason (who subsequently became MIS's SLO in East 
Africa) explained: 
During the last few years, KENYATTA appears to have led 
a fairly quiet and non-political life, but previously he had 
been known as something of an anti-British agitator. It is 
believed that he was at one time a Communist, but is 
thought to have quarrelled with that Party ... KENYATTA's 
present political outlook is probably nearer to that of the 
LL.P. [Independent Labour Party] than any other Party but 
he does not appear to have taken any very active interest in 
the political field for some years. 164 
As with Nkrumah, MIS placed Kenyatta on the Special Branch 'stop-list' at all 
British ports.165 But inexplicably, MIS was not alerted when Kenyatta left Britain in 
October 1946.166 This prompted a furious letter from MIS's new SLO in East Africa, 
0.]. Mason, who was supposed to inform the Kenya Special Branch of Kenyatta's 
departure.167 When Kenyatta duly arrived in Kenya, MIS provided the Special Branch 
with reports on his activities in Britain-just as they did with Nkrumah. MIS also 
forwarded on to the SLO Kenyatta's books, Facing Mount Kef!JIa and Kef!JIa: The land of 
Conflict, which Milicent Bagot had been studying for evidence of his communist 
sympathies. 168 Like their investigations into Nkrumah, MIS gained useful information on 
Kenyatta from mail interception between Britain and Kenya, sources SEAT and CHEST. 
Intercepted mail revealed who Kenyatta's closest associates were, both in Britain and 
Kenya. Judging from his correspondence, Kenyatta's main confidant in Britain was Peter 
Koinange. Although Koinange's MIS file has not been declassified, we know that MIS 
164 NA KV2/1788, s.248a: 0.]. Mason, MIS, to J.D. Bates, Colonial Office, (29 Dec., 1945). 
165 NA KV2/1788, Minute 249: B. Smith, (21 Jan., 1946). 
166 NA KV2/1788, s.271a: Milicent Bagot to Captain W.]. Hutchinson, chief constable, West 
Sussex, (8 Oct., 1946). 
167 NA KV2/1788, s.272b: 0.]. Mason, SLO East Africa, to Michael Serpell, (26 Sept., 1946). 
168 NA KV2/1788, Minute 260: Milicent Bagot, (28 Aug., 1946). 
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imposed an HOW on his address in North London in August 1947.169 We also know 
that the HOW revealed that Koinange, like Pacimore, was a 'Trotskyist'-meaning an 
unconventional communist from Moscow's ' perspective.170 Again, this was valuable 
information for MIS: Kenyatta's apparently closest collaborator in Britain was an 
unorthodox communist. 
After Kenyatta's return to Kenya in 1946, the evidence therefore available to MIS 
suggested that he was distancing himself from the Party, and was becoming dissatisfied 
with communism. This was confirmed in June 1951, when MIS received a report from 
their SLO in Central Africa, Basil Maurice 'Bob' de Quehen, based in Salisbury. The 
South African Police gave de Quehen information from a source who knew Kenyatta in 
London in 1938 stating that, although Kenyatta had been a committed communist before 
1932, his trip to the Soviet Union in that year had been a disillusioning experience. 171 
The source stated that during his trip to Moscow, Kenyatta had witnessed the death of a 
South African communist, Albert Nzula, and the suspicious manner of his death-Nzula 
was probably liquidated by the NKVD-caused a crisis of faith for Kenyatta. 172 We now 
know that the information MIS received from the South African police was precisely 
correct, although at the time MIS judged that due to the time period elapsed, the report 
was unreliable. 173 In reality, Kenyatta's trip to Moscow in 1932 had indeed produced a 
crisis of faith. Like many visitors to Moscow in the inter-war years, when Kenyatta was 
confronted with the reality of life in the Soviet Union, the myth-image of the world's first 
169 NA KV2/1788, s.299a: Geoffrey Patterson to Claude Burgess, Colonial Office, (20 Aug., 
1947). 
170 NA KV2/1788, Minute 297: J.L. Irvine, (22 July, 1947). 
171 John Lonsdale, 'Ornamental constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the two Queens', 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34, no. 1, (2006), p. 7. 
172 NA KV2/1788, s. 333b: B.M. de Quehen, SLO Central Africa, to Director-General MI5, (23 
July, 1951). 
173 NA KV2/1788, s.338a: SLO East Africa to MI5 London, copied to SLO Central Africa, SLO 
West Africa and SIME, (29 Aug., 1951); Ibid, s.339a: DG MI5 to SLO East Africa, copied to 
SLO Central Africa, SLO West Africa and SIME, (21 Sept., 1951). 
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worker-peasant st~te had been shattered. In fact, the information forward by the South 
African police to MIS in 1951 has been confirmed by the most recent research. Newly 
opened Russian archives reveal that during Kenyatta's trip to Moscow between 1932 and 
1933, Soviet officials had done their best to court him, but he left Moscow on bitter 
terms. 174 During his stay in Moscow, one of Kenyatta's African colleagues is reported to 
have accused him of being a 'petty-bourgeois'. To this, Kenyatta supposedly replied: 'I 
don't like this "petty" thing. Why don't you say I'm a big bourgeois?'. 175 
Based on the information available to them in the summer of 1951, MIS judged 
that despite Kenyatta's 'education' in Moscow in 1933, there was nothing positive to 
show that he remained an active communist. Instead MIS's sources, especially the HOW 
operating on the CPGB's headquarters, suggested that by 1951 Kenyatta had become 
disillusioned with communism: 'At most he may be described as a racially prejudiced 
African nationalist' .176 It was from this perspective, with evidence indicating that 
Kenyatta had become disheartened with orthodox communism, that MIS approached the 
outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion in October 1952. 
The historical literature on the Mau Mau revolt is now voluminous, and there are 
still sharply divergent opinions over what it represented, and how it ultimately affected 
Britain's end of empire in Kenya.177 Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the 
174 Andrei M. Pegushev, 'Afrikanski v komminterne', Vostok, 7, (1997), pp. 37-49; Andrei M. 
Pegushev, 'The Unknown Kenyatta', Egerton Journal, 2, (1996), pp. 172-198; D .l. Suchkov, 
'Dzhomo Keruata v Mosckve', Vostok, 4, (1993), pp. 106-121; Woodford McClellan, 'Africans 
and black Americans in the Comintern schools, 1925-1934', The International Journal if African 
Historical Studies, 26, no. 2, (1993), pp. 371-390. 
175 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. II: The KGB and the World, p. 4. 
176 NA KV2/1788, s.337a: H. Loftus-Brown to SLO Central Africa, Basil M. de Quehen, (21 
Aug., 1951). 
177 Lows Leakey, Defeating the Mau Mau, (London, 1954); F.D . Corfield, Historical SurlJry if the 
Origins and Growth qlMau Mau, (London, 1960); Carl G. Rosenberg and John Nottingham, The 
Myth if Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kef!)'a, (London, 1966); John Lonsdale, 'Mau Maus of the mind: 
making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya', Journal if African History, 31, no. 3, (1990), pp. 393-421; 
A.S. Cleary, 'The myth of the Mau Mau in its international context', African Affairs, 85, (1990), pp. 
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extraordinary levels of violence that British authorities deployed against Mau Mau 
insurgents during the eight-year 'emergency'. One study has recently claimed that 
through their forcible relocation of black African populations, British military forces 
established something akin to a 'Gulag system' in Kenya. 178 Although the Gulag analogy 
seems singularly inappropriate-Mau Mau detainees were not purposefully worked to 
death as Soviet prisoners were-nevertheless the number of forced-relocations in Kenya 
during the emergency is astonishing. 179 In April 1954, operation ANVIL involved the 
evacuation and 'resettlement' of 30,000 Kikuyu from Nairobi. 18o British authorities 
transferred counter-insurgency practices (particularly concerning forced-relocation) from 
Malaya to Kenya, though military authorities in Kenya expanded their scope to an 
unprecedented degree.181 When the new assistant commissioner of police, (Sir) Richard 
Catling, arrived in Kenya in 1954, he was shocked to find that a total of 64,000 black 
Africans had been detained by British authorities since the start of the emergency.182 
This was on a larger scale than either in Malaya or Palestine-and Catling had served as a 
high-ranking CID officer in both theatres. 183 During the entire emergency in Kenya, 
approximately sixty white settlers were killed by Mau Mau insurgents. By contrast, 
official figures state that 11,503 Mau Mau insurgents were killed, though in reality the 
227-245; Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, Unhappy Vallf!)'. Conflict in Ke'!)'a and A frica, (London, 
1992); Wunyabari O. Maloba, Mau Mau and Ke,!),a. A n Anajysis of a Peasant Revolt, (London, 1999). 
178 Caroline Elkins, Britain's Gulag. The Brutal End of Empire in Ke,!),a, (London, 2005). 
179 For Soviet Gulags, see the classic work by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-
1956: an Experiment in Literary Investigation, English trans.: (New York, 1974); Anne Applebaum, 
Gulag: a History of Soviet Camps, (London, 2003). 
180 NA WO 236/18 General Sir George Erskine, 'The Kenya emergency', pp. 19-20. 
181 NA CO 822/481: 'Protection of villages against Mau Mau attacks, Kenya'; CO 822/703 
'Rehabilitation ofMau Mau adherents in Kenya', (1953); CO 822/703 Sir Oliver Lyttelton to Maj. 
Gen. Sir Gerald Templar, (10 July, 1953). For the 'Briggs' Plan' of forced-relocation in Malaya, 
see: Hack, 'British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the ear of decolonisation', pp. 124--155. 
182 Heather, 'Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya', p. 71. 
183 Ibid.; NA WO 236/18 General Sir George Erskine, 'The Kenya emergency', p. 19. 
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figure was probably closer to 20,000.184 British authorities in Kenya resorted to capital 
punishment on a greater scale than in any other theatre in the history of British colonial 
rule. 185 In short, Britain's response to the Mau Mau revolt involved extraordinary levels 
of control, coercion and violence. During the emergency, Kenya effectively became a 
'police state,.186 
Although recent scholarship has substantially revised our understanding of 
Britain's violent response to the Mau Mau insurgency, intelligence remains the missing 
dimension of the history of the emergency. When the Mau Mau insurgency broke out, 
MIS performed an important role and, in some ways, helped to guide London's response 
to it. At the outset of the emergency, MIS provided the Colonial Office with intelligence 
on whether the insurgency was communist-inspired. Hitherto historians could tell that 
the Colonial Office referred to 'P.O. Box SOO'-MIS's address in London-but the 
details of what information passed between MIS and the Colonial Office were 
unavailable. 187 We can now see that as soon as the emergency was declared in Kenya on 
20 October 1952, the Colonial Office immediately sought advice from MIS and then, as 
the emergency escalated, OS-section liased closely with the African desk in the Colonial 
Office. Some officials in the Colonial Office were convinced that the Mau Mau rebellion 
was a communist plot, for after all, the 'leader' of the rebellion, Jomo Kenyatta, was 
himself a 'communist'. Following the insurgency in Malaya and subsequent 'communist 
riots' in Gold Coast, the emergency in Kenya could only be a communist-orchestrated 
conspiracy. These opinions were voiced most loudly in the Colonial Office by W.H. 
184 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged Britain's Dirty War in Ket!ya and the End of Empire, 
(London, 2005), p. 4. 
185 Ibid. 
186 It may be noted that disproportionate military violence in East Africa unfortunately had 
precedents. In their attempts to quell the so-called 'Maji Maji' revolt in German East Africa 
between 1905 and 1907, German imperial forces slaughtered, by their own estimate, 26,000 black 
Africans. During the revolt, just 15 white settlers were killed. See: Isabel Hull, A bsolute Destruction. 
Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial GermaJ'!Y, (Ithaca, 2005), pp. 147, 157. 
187 NA CO 968/261 'Communist influence in the African continent-Kenya', Minutes 5 and 11. 
319 
Ingrams, a colonial civil servant with long experience in the Middle East, but less in 
Africa, who in April 19S1 had been 'concerned' following discussions with Sir Percy 
Sillitoe 'in relation to Communist propaganda in the Colonies'.188 As soon as the state of 
emergency was declared in Kenya, Ingrams' colleague in the Colonial Office, Juxon 
Barton, sought advice from MIS-which Ingrams did not. 189 With twenty years' colonial 
service in Kenya, Barton was convinced that neither Kenyatta nor the rebellion had 
anything to do with communism. 190 The theories espoused by Ingrams were met with 
increasing levels of exasperation from both Barton and OS-Section. After a meeting on 
10 November at the Colonial Office with Ingrams and Barton, Loftus-Brown noted in 
an in-house MIS memorandum: 
I am anxious to put on record a statement of our basic 
views on racial unrest in Kenya, for the benefit of the 
Colonial Office, as soon as possible, so that the Colonial 
Office may not make representations to the Government of 
Kenya which are variance with information on our files .191 
Throughout November 19S2 a succeSSlon of meetings, telephone conversations and 
correspondence occurred between OS-section and the Colonial Office. On 22 
November Loftus-Brown set out MIS's opinion on Kenyatta, and the emergency in 
Kenya, in a letter to Barton: 
... We have seen nothing to suggest Communist 
intervention in Mau Mau activities . By virtue of its own 
theories, the international Communist movement is bound 
188 NA CO 885/119 'Record of the conference of colonial Commissioners of Police', p. 24; W.H. 
Ingrams, Arabia and these Isles, (London, 1942); W.H. Ingrams, Seven across the Sahara, (London, 
1949); 'Obituary: W.H. Ingrams', The Times, London: (12 Dec., 1973). 
189 NA KV2/1788, Minute 352: H. Loftus-Brown to Milicent Bagot, (10 Nov., 1952). 
190 NA CO 822/445 'Organisation of the intelligence service in Kenya', Minute: Juxon Barton, 
(22 Dec., 1952). Juxon Barton's writings include, 'Notes on the Turkana tribe of British East 
Africa', Journal of Royal African Socie!)" 20, (1921), pp. 204-211. 
191 NA KV2/1788, Minute 357: H. Loftus-Brown, (20 Nov., 1953). 
f -
to support any colonial group which can be fitted into the 
category of a "National Liberation movement", but during 
the present emergency in Kenya the only signs of 
intervention or support of Communists are to be found in 
their propaganda, and ' even that does not appear 
exceptionally well informed . . . There seems to be little 
doubt, however, that KENYATTA, himself, is concerned 
solely with the furthering of the cause of the Kikuyu tribe 
and that he has interested himself in the affairs of the 
Soviet Union and of international communist organisations 
abroad only so far as the communists are prepared to help 
him. 192 
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Barton used MIS's information to countermand the theories espoused by 
Ingrams in the Colonial Office. A parallel can be drawn here to the influence that MIS 
reports had on Sir Charles Arden-Clarke in the Gold Coast. It is impossible to say 
whether MIS's briefings actually altered Barton and Arden-Clarke's opinions, or whether 
they merely confirmed their pre-existing beliefs. In many ways, this encapsulates the 
extent to which intelligence is capable of influencing political decision-making. 
Government recipients of intelligence reports can chose to ignore such reports or 
alternatively use them to inform policy; likewise it seems to be possible for recipients 
sometimes to read into ambiguous intelligence reports what they want to see. Available 
records do not allow us to say whether MIS's briefings actually altered Barton and 
Arden-Clarke's opinions, or whether they simply galvanised their existing beliefs. The 
consequences, however, were the same: both in Accra and within the Colonial Office in 
London, MIS's reports performed a restraining influence on communist conspiracies. 
The subsequent exchanges between Barton, equipped with MIS's information, and 
Ingrams in the Colonial Office still make for hair-raising reading. 193 The centrepiece of 
Ingrams 'evidence' was the purported involvement of the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa 
192 NA KV2/1788, s.357b: H. Loftus-Brown to Juxon Barton, (22 Nov., 1952). 
193 NA CO 822/461 'Communist aspects of the Mau Mau situation in Kenya', Minute 2: Juxon 
Barton, (6 Nov., 1952); Ibid., Minute 4: W.H. Ingrams, (7 Nov., 1952); Ibid., Minute 8, Juxon 
Barton, (21 Dec., 1952). 
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·th th MM' 194 W1 e au au lllsurgency. The flames of this conspttacy were fanned by 
contemporary newspaper reports. Sir Percy Sillitoe was misquoted by the journalist 
Robert Ruark in Lift Magai!ne, stating th~t the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa was 
involved in the revolt. 195 However, as both MIS and Barton pointed out, the picture 
from the British embassy in Addis Ababa was completely different. In a secret despatch 
to the Foreign Office in London in December 19S2, one embassy official in Addis 
Ababa, D.L. Busk, complained that he had been plagued by the conspiracy theory that 
the Soviet embassy in Addis Ababa was involved with the Mau Mau revolt. From the 
British embassy's perspective in Addis Ababa, the story had no substance to it. Instead it 
appeared that 'communists' were being used as a convenient excuse for deeper, internal 
problems within Kenya: 'Of course, at places like the bar of the Muthaiga Club in 
Nairobi, no man could possibly admit that it is his fault, and, therefore, a scapegoat must 
be found'. As Busk noted: 
In these circumstances, may I urge that some sort of intel 
be sent out, not necessarily to all our posts but, at any 
rate, to those in the neighbourhood, giving the facts of 
the case. I hope that any such intel could also be 
distributed by the Colonial Office to neighbouring 
colonies, because it is there that a great deal of the trouble 
lies. Furthermore, I hope that steps can be taken by the 
Public Relations Officer in Nairobi and elsewhere to see 
that this story is knocked down, if only because as you 
will appreciate, it is giving some admirable publicity to the 
Russians here, who are acquiring a reputation for devilry 
without, in fact, doing anything about it. 196 
MIS successfully blocked the 'Intel' brief that Ingrams had drafted, which 
depicted Mau Mau as a communist-orchestrated conspiracy. OS-section drafted a new 
194 NA CO 822/461, Minute 4: W.H. Ingrams, (7 Nov., 1952). 
195 NA CO 822/461, s.7: Foreign Office telegram to British embassy Asmara, (26 Jan., 1953); 
Robert Ruark, 'Your guns go with you', Life Magazjne, (16 Feb., 1953). For communist 
involvement in Mau Mau, also see: Robert Ruark, Something oj Value, (London, 1955). 
196 NA CO 822/461, s.6: D.L. Busk, British embassy Addis Ababa to Roger Allen, Foreign 
Office, (19 Dec. 1952). 
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'Intel' brief on Kenyatta which ran on the same lines as Loftus-Brown's letter to Barton 
and, like it; was despatched on 22 November. MIS's report was circulated through 
Barton to the Colonial Office and simila~ly was forwarded, through their SLO, to the 
DIS in Kenya. Quashing the theory that Mau Mau was communist-inspired, MIS 
suggested that if anything, 'the activities of certain members of the Indian community are 
a more profitable subject for research,.197 We know that MIS had been concerned about 
Kenyatta's association with an Indian 'subversive', Isher Dass, from at least 1934.198 The 
available records, however, do not reveal what enquiries either MIS or the DIS in Kenya 
made into Indian involvement in the Mau Mau insurgency. 
As well as correcting myths arising in the Colonial Office about the Mau Mau 
revolt, MIS also successfully blocked a propaganda campaign that the IRD in the Foreign 
Office was proposing to launch, linking the Kenya emergency to world-wide 
communism. 199 Sir John Shaw wrote to the IRD on 22 December 1952 and explained 
that while communists certainly had taken advantage of the Mau Mau insurgency, MIS 
objected to any broader claims of communist involvement in the emergency. As Shaw 
argued, when 'policy for counter-propaganda in colonial territories is under 
consideration, we should all be in agreement upon our appreciation of such intelligence 
as is available'. Shaw's letter to the IRD encapsulates MIS's judgement on Kenyatta and, 
equally,Nkrumah: 
We have not seen anything to suggest that Mau Mau is in any 
way inspired by Communism, or that it should be viewed in the 
perspective of the Communist 'colonial liberation' 
campaign ... It is characteristic of those African "nationalist" 
politicians who have received some early training in orthodox 
197 NA KV2/1788, Minute 352: H. Loftus-Brown to Milicent Bagot, (10 Nov., 1952). 
198 NA KV2/1787, s.26a: Sir Vernon Kell to Commissioner of Police, Kenya, (18 Jan., 1934). 
199 For a useful survey of IRD and colonial propaganda, see: Susan L. Carruthers, Winning Hearts 
and Minds. British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-Insur;genry, (London, 1995). 
Communism that, when they return to their own territories, 
they adapt what they have learned to the needs of the local 
situation; while they may retain some Marxist principles, they 
can in no sense be called Communists, since they are not 
responsive to Party line. They are concerned with their own 
"nationalist" ambitions and are not instruments of international 
Communist strategy. Consequendy, their activities must be 
viewed against the background of the local political situation. 
There is no indication that Jomo KENYATTA, or other 
suspected leaders of Mau Mau, are exceptions to this 
principle.20o 
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In some respects, MIS therefore played a leading role in London's response to 
the emergency in Kenya. The dividends of MIS's activities in Kenya itself, however, are 
less clear. MIS had SLOs stationed in Kenya throughout the emergency and, as in the 
Gold Coast, they passed intelligence between London and the colonial administration. 
From the outset of the Mau Mau rebellion, the SLO in East Africa, C.R. Major, reported 
to London that in his opinion, the Kenya administration desired to prosecute Kenyatta 
simply as a matter of political expediency. The administration needed a culprit.201 Major 
stated that while he believed Kenyatta had indeed helped to organise Mau Mau incidents 
before October 1952, thereafter 'they had a snowball effect' and the insurgency went 
beyond Kenyatta's control-even if he desired to stop it.202 When Kenyatta was awaiting 
the verdict of his trial in February 1953, Major forwarded to London a curious report, 
originally from the SLO in West Africa, that Padmore had been attempting to contact 
Kenyatta, in jail, using 'underground radios'.203 OS-section in London was unsure what 
to make of these 'underground radios', but suggested that Kenyatta's lawyer, D.N. Pritt, 
was an obvious person who could be passing messages between Padmore and 
200 NA CO 968/261, s.la: Sir John Shaw to T.S. Tull, IRD, Foreign Office, copied to Juxon 
Barton, Colonial Office, (23 Dec., 1952). 
201 NA KV2/1788, s.357b: SLO East Africa Quarterly Review, (20 Oct., 1952); John Lonsdale, 
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Feb., 1953). 
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Kenyatta.204_ We do not know what action, if any, was taken on this suggestion. 
Unfortunately the declassified MIS files on Kenyatta only stretch to 1954. When the 
remaining files are declassified, it will b~ fascinating to see what information passed 
between MIS, their SLOs, and the Kenya administration in the years before Kenyatta's 
release from prison in 1961. Even though the available records do not stretch beyond 
1954, nevertheless we can see how MIS's information on Kenyatta fits into a broader 
picture now emerging. Recent studies have shown that London's policy was to establish 
moderate policies in Kenya before independence, and bolster the Kenyatta regime 
thereafter, with the aim of keeping Kenya, like the Gold Coast, in the western sphere of 
influence and in line with Britain's 'vital interests'.205 The continuation of security 
methods forged in the period before the transfer of power in Kenya in 1963 was 
embodied by Richard Catling, whom Kenyatta asked to remain as Inspector-General of 
police in Kenya after independence.206 Undoubtedly MIS and their SLOs also played a 
role in Britain's successful transfer of power in Kenya.207 
V. Post-script 
One of the success stories of British decolonisation is that Britain was able to 
maintain close connections with independent national governments. As several studies 
have demonstrated, Britain achieved this by building political, economic, military and 
204 NA KV2/1789, s.373a: Director-General to SLO West Africa and SLO East Africa, (1 March, 
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207 NA CAB 158/16 JIC (53) 76 (Final), 'Situation in East African colonies, (7 Aug., 1953); Ibid., 
JIC (53) 77 (Final), 'Situation in West African colonies', (7 Aug., 1953). 
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. 1 b d 'th . 1 208 sOCIa on s W1 new natlOna governments. The British Council, for instance, 
devised schemes to educate colonial and commonwealth students in Britain, thereby 
solidifying affiliations between Britain and new national governments. Commonwealth 
education schemes in Britain functioned-and still function-as precisely the opposite 
of Kenyatta's disillusioning experience in Moscow in the early 1930s. However, hitherto 
unacknowledged in the majority of historiography is the role performed by the British 
intelligence community in British decolonisation. In fact, it seems that the British 
intelligence community helped to transform the British empire into the commonwealth. 
This may seem like an exaggerated and dramatic statement, but judging from declassified 
records gradually entering the public domain, it was the case. As well as providing 
background briefings on national 'independence' leaders, MIS also devised schemes for 
training colonial security personnel in Britain. In doing so, MIS helped London to 
establish connections with new national governments extending beyond handover, and 
that were immune from erosion.209 Between 1954 and 1957, MIS presided over an 
unprecedented training scheme for colonial Special Branch personnel, which was led by 
MIS's security adviser in Kenya, A.M. MacDonald. In the three years between 1954 and 
1957, MacDonald made a staggering fifty-seven trips to twenty-seven different colonial 
countries. In the years 1955, 1956 and 1957 respectively, MIS helped to train 311, 315 
and 244 colonial police and security officials. Furthermore, MIS's training officers visited 
almost every British colonial territory. The overall success of this training scheme was 
summarised in a JIC report in November 1957, which described MIS's role in 
establishing permanent connections with commonwealth security agencies: 
208 Lows and Robinson, 'The imperialism of decolonisation'; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation. The 
Retreat from Empire in the Post-War Wodd. 
209 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 517-18. 
An experienced and efficient intelligence organisation, 
manned by officers of the requisite professional calibre and 
integrity, and with close ties with the Security Service [MIS], 
is a legacy of particular value to Colonies moving into 
independent status withln the Commonwealth, as well as a 
safeguard of H.M.G's long-term intelligence interests ... the 
aim is to build an indigenous intelligence service, able to 
stand on its own two feet when self-government is 
attained . . . The links thus formed have proved capable of 
surviving the transition to independence and are reinforced 
by Security Liaison Officers who continue to provide 
advice and a secure exchange of intelligence in the many 
Colonial and Commonwealth territories to which they are 
accredited.210 
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MIS records reveal that in the middle of the twentieth centw:y, a 'circular' 
development occurred in British security intelligence. In the first half of the twentieth 
century there was a direct connection between the British empire and the British 
intelligence community, with many leading MIS officers beginning their careers ill 
empire.211 Both the wartime and the post-war Director-Generals of MIS, Sir David 
Petrie and Sir Percy Sillitoe, had begun their careers as colonial policemen.212 MIS's 
official wartime historian, John Curry, was also a former colonial policeman, and several 
other examples could be cited of MIS officers before 1945 with colonial backgrounds. 
Likewise, two important counter-espionage officers in SIS in the first half of the 
twentieth centUl)', Valentine Vivian and Felix Cowgill, formerly served as colonial 
policemen in India.213 In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the reverse 
of this process occurred: British security intelligence personnel were posted to the empire 
and new commonwealth countries. To meet the needs of the Cold War and 
decolonisation, recruits to MIS in the 19S0s were told that they could expect to spend at 
210 NA CAB 158/30 JIC (57) 115 (Final) 'Intelligence organisation in the colonial territories', (8 
Nov., 1957), pp. 1,5, and p. 4 for numbers of officers trained. 
211 Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 30-34. 
212 'Sir David Petrie', Oxford Dictionary of National Biograpl?J, vol. 43, (Oxford, 2004), p. 919; Sillitoe, 
Cloak Jvithout dagger, pp. 1-47. 
21 3 'Valentine Vivian', Oxford Dictionary of National Biograpl?J, vol. 56, (Oxford, 2004), pp. 580-81. 
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least part of their careers stationed in the emplte or commonwealth.214 While a 
connection in personnel thus existed between empire and British security in the first half 
of the twentieth century, in the second half ~f the century the reverse occurred-security 
intelligence 'reverted' to the empire. From this perspective, it seems appropriate to speak 
of 'the empire strikes back'. One of the unwritten chapters of the history of the second 
half of the twentieth century is the role performed by MIS's representatives stationed 
abroad, SLOs, who were based in colonial and commonwealth countries throughout the 
Cold War. SLOs were stationed in every imperial country moving towards 
independence, and after independence, their activities were shared with, and ultimately 
taken over, by SIS officers. The activities of SLOs and SIS officers in newly independent 
commonwealth countries are missing from the existing historical literature. Studying 
them presents outstanding opportunities for future research, which will substantially 
revise our understanding of Britain's end of empire, and the history of the Cold War. 
214 Private information. 
Conclusion. 
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This dissertation has been written with an acute awareness that it cannot be 
comprehensive. It has given a survey of the changing threats to British national security 
between 1941 and 1951, from World War to Cold War, but due to the constraints of the 
80,000 word limit, the study has been forced to prioritise those subjects which newly 
available records make the greatest contribution towards. Due to a lack of 
documentation from SIS, the dissertation has not focused on British foreign intelligence 
gathering. Although some SIS documentation, as we have seen, is available in 
declassified MIS records, any attempt to evaluate SIS's performance in the early Cold 
War necessarily will be overshadowed by the forthcoming work of SIS's official 
historian. 1 The book hopefully resulting from this dissertation will provide a broader 
synthesis, drawing on MIS-and other archival-records which were unable to be used 
here. The happy problem with this project has been that, in many ways, it poses as many 
questions as it answers. For example, when the MIS files on the 'Cambridge spies' are 
declassified, it will be fascinating to discover exacdy what 'adverse information' MIS held 
on them. Likewise the dissertation's final chapter, on British intelligence and 
decolonisation in Africa, is an enormous subject, and this study has only been able to 
offer a preliminary investigation. Nevertheless, the subject of British intelligence and 
decolonisation in Africa seems sure to become a fruitful field for future research. 
This project has studied, in a broad framework, how Britain's intelligence services 
responded to the shift in national security priorities from World War to Cold War. It has 
shown that between 1941 and 1951 a 'cyclical' development occurred, by which Britain's 
intelligence services entered the Second World War knowing astonishingly litde about 
their enemies, proceeded to gain unprecedented successes over them, but then emerged 
from the war knowing remarkably litde about their 'new' Cold War enemy, the Soviet 
1 As discussed in the introduction, Professor Keith Jeffery is currently compiling the fIrst offIcial 
history of SIS, due for publication in 2010. 
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Union. Generally, the tenor of Britishsecurity intelligence between 1941 and 19S1 seems 
to have been one of moving from crisis to crisis, with little ability to turn in-house 
forward planning within MIS into op~rational effectiveness. On the one hand, 
throughout the approximate decade of the dissertation's time frame, MIS failed to 
adequately brace themselves to meet long-term threats, either Germany before the war or 
the Soviet Union after the war. On the other hand, MIS proved themselves remarkably 
successful in responding to crises once they occurred. Each time a significant security 
crisis arose between 1941 and 19 Sl, MIS was able to respond effectively to it. 
The 'Fifth Column' crisis in the summer of 1940 occurred essentially because 
Britain's intelligence services lacked positive intelligence on the German threat, and 
misunderstood its nature. The problem that MIS faced with German espionage in 
Britain between 1939 and 1940 was similar to the predicament recently expressed, albeit 
ineloquently, by the American Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld: they did not 
know what they did not know.2 With the little information they had indicating an 
efficient German espionage system in Britain, MIS was obliged to take a pessimistic view 
of the wartime German threat, and ultimately the Service's exaggerated assessment led to 
the mass-internment of 'enemy aliens' in Britain in June 1940. We have seen that 
following the 'Fifth Column' crisis in 1940, Britain's intelligence services recovered, and 
went on to gain unprecedented successes over their wartime enemies. Allied 
codebreakers at Bletchley Park produced more valuable SIGINT on the Axis powers 
than had ever been achieved on a wartime enemy and, similarly, through the Double 
Cross System, MIS thwarted and controlled all German wartime espionage activities in 
Britain. In many ways, the Second World War was the watershed event that established 
the British intelligence community, for during the war Britain's intelligence services 
2 For Donald Rumsfeld's formulation of 'known knowns' and 'unknown knowns', see: 'Political 
points', New York Times, (7 Dec., 2003). 
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cooperated more closely than they had previously, and Britain also acquired a leader, 
Winston Churchill, who valued intelligence more than previous British leaders.3 
One of the central themes recurr~g throughout this study is that between 1941 
and 19S1, MIS was obliged to prioritise immediate crises over long-term threats to 
national security-persistendy to the detriment of the latter. At the end of the Second 
World War, MIS's in-house historian, John Curry, noted that MIS had come 'full circle' 
and was placed in broadly the same position regarding the Soviet Union as the Service 
had been regarding the German threat in 1940. The wartime German threat distracted 
the British intelligence community from the longer-term, pre-war Soviet threat, and at 
the outset of the Cold War, MIS was faced with a bankruptcy of intelligence on their 
'new' enemy. To make matters worse for MIS and the rest of the British intelligence 
community in 1945, Soviet agents presented a more formidable, ideologically-based 
threat than the wartime agents employed by either the Third Reich or imperial Japan.4 
Despite the extraordinarily weak position in which they found themselves in 1945, 
unknowingly penetrated by Soviet agents, Britain's intelligence services were gradually 
able to respond to the Cold War challenge. We have seen that, following a series of 
catastrophic security failures in Britain in the late 1940s and early 19S0s, MIS helped the 
government to instigate successful security counter-measures. Positive vetting was 
introduced in 19S2 in response to the self-evident inadequacy of protective security in 
British government departments. Although positive vetting was not a perfect security 
mechanism, its introduction nonetheless illustrates the way that MIS was able to respond 
effectively to a crisis. 
3 Andrew, 'Churchill and intelligence'. 
4 For the only Double Cross agent run against the Japanese in Britain, see NA KV 2/2267-70 
'Selected Historical papers from the Josef case'. 
332 
As this dissertation has illustrated, declassified MIS records provide outstanding 
opportunities to study the 'missing dimension' of British history in the first half of the 
twentieth century. However, as this project has also suggested throughout, MIS records 
have more than historical significance: studying them can provide valuable lessons for 
governments and intelligence agencies today. This study has demonstrated that many of 
the national security issues facing governments at the start of the twenty-first century 
were, in fact, faced by the British intelligence community half a century ago. Among the 
range of issues discussed in the dissertation are 'internal enemies'; 'fifth column' threats; 
the permissibility of secret intelligence as evidence in court; the use of torture during 
interrogations; and terrorism emanating from the Middle East. The intention of the 
dissertation is not to impose today's issues anachronistically upon the past, for to do so 
would be to overlook the fundamentally new nature of many current national security 
threats in Britain. The events of September 11, 2001, mark a definite watershed in the 
history of (inter)national security: like intelligence agencies in several countries, Britain's 
intelligence services are currendy faced with unprecedented threats, such as suicide 
bombing in Britain. 5 However, 9/11 and the resulting 'war on terror' did not, as some 
have suggested, change the world so fundamentally as to somehow render history 
obsolete. In many ways, the Cold War can provide a useful paradigm for the so-called 
'war on terror' currendy being fought. Like the Cold War, the 'war on terror' perhaps 
can be understood most usefully not as a conventional military war, but rather as a 
'twilight war' between war and peace, and as a profound ideological struggle.
6 
With this 
in mind, this dissertation will conclude by suggesting that lessons can be learned, or at 
5 Report oj the Official Account oj the Bombings in London on 7 JulY 2005, (London, May 2006). 
6 Anatol Lieven, 'Fighting terrorism: lessons from the Cold War', Carnegie Endowment 
publication: (Washington DC, 2001); 'George Kennan's lessons for the war on terror', The Times, 
London: (19 March, 2005); James J. Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War: Lessons 
from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preseroing Freedom, (London, 2005). 
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least identified, from MIS's experiences half a century ago for the 'war on terror' at the 
start of the twenty-first century. 
I. Lessons to be learned, or at least identified 
The failures of Britain's intelligence services to monitor the wartime Soviet threat 
were the result of the pressing Axis threat, inadequate resources, rudimentary vetting 
procedures and antiquated recruitment policies. However, as we saw in the first chapter, 
the failures of the British intelligence community to guard against wartime Soviet 
espionage were not entirely failures of their own making. The Foreign Office ban on 
investigations into Soviet activities after June 1941 undermined the attempts by MIS, and 
apparendy SIS and GC&CS, to investigate the wartime Soviet threat thereafter. 
Defendants of the Foreign Office's honourable, but ultimately short-sighted, position 
presumably would argue that 'allies should not spy on allies'. In response to this 
position, it could be argued that if allies had spent more time 'spying on allies', Britain 
and America would not have emerged from the Second World War in such a weak 
position regarding the Soviet Union. MIS's attempts to deal with wartime Soviet 
espionage have parallels-and implications-for the way that intelligence agencies today 
respond to different, and often divergent, priorities at the same time. When intelligence 
services have an overwhelming threat to contend with, whether the Axis Powers during 
the Second World War or the current threat of trans-national terrorism, how do they 
balance their limited resources to meet other threats, which presumably have not 
diminished? At present, intelligence agencies across the world are responding to an 
overwhelming threat of Islamist terrorism, but other threats such as industrial and 
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econOlmc esplOnage have not decreased-and in fact may be increasing.7 This 
dissertation's research suggests that one of the best ways for intelligence services to 
respond to various threats at dle same ti.ffie is to operate in such a way that minority 
voices within intelligence communities-such as Roger Hollis' during the Second World 
War-can be heard and heeded. MIS's experiences half a century ago suggest that often 
it is minority voices proposing the most uncomfortable contemporary opinions which, in 
the long run, are proved to be correct. 
Addressing the failures of American intelligence before September 11, 2001, the 
'9/11 Commission' maintained that the CIA had taken its 'eyes off the ball' regarding the 
enemies of the United States.8 Applying dlls analogy to Britain's intelligence services 
during the Second World War, we can now see that MIS did not take their 'eyes off the 
ball' regarding the wartime threat of the Soviet Union. The establishment of F-Division 
after Britain's diplomatic alliance with the Soviet Union in June 1941 was a clear example 
of MIS's attempts to tackle the continued wartime Soviet threat. However, F-Division 
was prevented by internal restraints (manpower) and by external impediments (Foreign 
Office restrictions) from ever effectively investigating wartime Soviet espionage. Thus it 
may be concluded that, although MIS's Divisions did not take their 'eyes off the ball', the 
practical restrictions imposed on them meant they were prevented from ever 'playing the 
game' regarding wartime Soviet espionage. One of the lessons that observers outside of 
intelligence communities can usefully learn from dlls research, and which seems to be a 
persistent problem in British national security, is that even when intelligence services 
accurately discern emerging threats, their ability to respond to them can be constrained 
7 Both MI5 and the FBI are currently warning of increased Chinese and Korean espionage: 
http://w\'vw.mi5.gov.uk/output / Page19.htm;http://\V\vw.fbi.gov ! hg! ci! economic.htm 
(accessed 2 Aug., 2006); Hedieh Nasheri (ed.), Economic Espionage and Industrial Spying, (Cambridge, 
2005). 
8 http: //ctstudies .com!Document! 911 ConUTussionTenetTestlmon),. html(accessed 4 Sept., 
2006); Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History if American Counter-tenvrism, (New York and 
London, 2005). 
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by more urge~t priorities.9 As we saw in the second chapter of the dissertation, one of 
the first indications of the nature of the Cold War threat occurred with the defection of 
the Soviet cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko . . Astonishingly with hindsight, at the time of 
Gouzenko's defection, western intelligence agencies nearly overlooked his importance. 
A conclusion to be drawn from the Gouzenko affair is that walk-ins and defectors , 
whether from state or non-state groups, can be valuable assets, and intelligence services 
need to operate in such a way as to recognise them, and be able to receive them. 
This dissertation has shown that for British security intelligence, the transition 
from World War to Cold War was interrupted by the threat of Zionist terrorism. The 
MIS files on Zionist terrorism offer a new interpretation of the history of the early Cold 
War: in the crucial transition period from war to Cold War, MIS was concerned not just 
with counter-espionage, as we would expect, but also with counter-terrorism. The 
priority shown by MIS to Zionist terrorism is a dramatic example of the way that, as we 
can see with hindsight, MIS responded to immediate crises over long-term threats. As 
we discussed in chapter three, the subject of Zionist terrorism is fraught with 
controversy, not least because several leading politicians of the future state of Israel were 
involved in terrorist operations. Despite the subject's inherent controversy, MIS's 
experiences with Zionist terrorism nonetheless can offer lessons for counter-terrorist 
policies today. First, the experiences of MIS and British security forces in Palestine 
testify to the difficulties of penetrating close-knit terrorist 'cells'. Second, MIS's 
experiences with Zionist terrorism reveal that some of the most useful counter-terrorist 
intelligence can be obtained by establishing liaisons with moderate political and religious 
groups. To meet the threat of Zionist terrorism in Britain, MIS established a range of 
counter-terrorist measures, including 'personnel security' at ports, and the surveillance of 
9 For an analogous discussion, see: Report if the Official Account if the Bombings in London on 7 JulY 
2005, p. 11-12. 
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radical groups in Britain. While these were important preventative security measures, 
MIS's liaison with the Jewish Agency in London produced valuable positive intelligence, 
especially on terrorists entering and dep'arting from Palestine. MIS's experiences with 
Zionist terrorism attest to the value of establishing liaisons with moderate groups who 
are willing to provide intelligence on terrorist minorities. 
The dissertation has shown that 'protective security' became a key priority for 
MIS in the early Cold War. Protective security measures, involving 'physical security', 
'preventative security' and 'personnel security', were arguably the least glamorous aspects 
of counter-intelligence work, but they performed an essential role in British national 
security. This remains the case today, with physical security, for example, performing an 
important role in contingency planning for national emergencies. to As we have seen, 
personnel security and vetting measures functioned as the corollary to MIS's counter-
espionage investigations, and were crucial methods for safeguarding British government 
departments. Declassified MIS records, however, revise how we might assume that MIS 
approached vetting requirements in the early Cold War. MIS's vetting Divisions were 
acutely aware of their restricted resources and repeatedly expressed their concerns to the 
government about being overloaded with vetting-as they expressed during the war, 
during the establishment of Atdee's 'purge procedure' in 1947, and during the 
introduction of positive vetting in 19S2. It might be assumed that when it came to 
vetting, MIS would have been the driving force behind enhanced vetting procedures in 
British government departments. In reality, MIS's management feared that too many 
vetting obligations would divert the Service's manpower from other requirements. Far 
from being a 'secret police' pushing for comprehensive background checks on 
government employees, MIS repeatedly requested that advanced vetting measures should 
10 See the 'protective security' section of MIS's website: www.miS.gov.uk. 
~. -----
337 
be applied only to the most 'sensitive' government posts. As we discussed in chapters 
four and five, it was often the GEN 183 committee and other government departments 
that pushed for expanded vetting, not MIS. One of the lessons that outside authorities 
can usefully learn from this research is that, even when governments in liberal 
democracies desire intelligence services to undertake an expanded role, their ability to do 
so inevitably will be restricted by finite resources. 
Another recurring theme throughout this dissertation has been the role 
performed by MIS's legal advisers. Between 1941 and 19S1 MIS was often placed in the 
position of having evidence of an individual's guilt, but being unable to use that evidence 
in court. This was true both for Alan Nunn May and for Soviet agents identified by 
VENONA, such as Klaus Fuchs. In the cases of Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs, MIS 
had to rely on the skills of their exceptional interrogator, William Skardon, to obtain a 
confession. The problems that MIS experienced half a century ago regarding the 
permissibility of intelligence as evidence are still tormenting Whitehall departments 
today. Since the outset of the 'war on terror', the British government has been debating 
whether intercept material should be made permissible in court.!! However, as we saw in 
chapter four, the legal issues of British security between 1941 and 19 S1 led to 
predicaments other than the permissibility of intelligence as evidence: they also led to the 
question of what legal rights should be applied to interrogation detainees. MIS's 
astonishingly successful wartime interrogation centre in Britain, Camp 020, operated 
outside of domestic and international law. During the war, several captured Axis agents 
were brought from different parts of the empire to Camp 020 for interrogation, in effect 
a form of 'rendition'. The legal issues of transferring foreign nationals to Camp 020 were 
as difficult then, eventually being sanctioned through 'ad hoc' legislation passed through 
11 'Prosecuting terrorism: the legal challenge', NYU RcviclV rifLaw and Scctlriry, special issue: (April, 
2006). 
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wartime Defence Regulations, as presumably 'rendition' policies are today.12 After the 
war, when MIS was making contingency plans for the internment of communists in 
Britain, MIS's legal advisers recommend~d that international law again should not be 
applied to detainees. This was not for an ominous reason-Camp 020 had been 
conducted humanely-but because MIS considered that international law would afford 
detainees so many rights that gathering intelligence from them would be rendered 
impossible. In 1947 Sir Percy Sillitoe wrote to the Prime Minister urging that if all the 
clauses of the Geneva Conventions were applied to detainees in Britain, MIS would be 
unable to guarantee British national security. The question of how to balance the 
requirements of international law with intelligence gathering from detainees was neither 
solved then, nor has it been solved now.13 
MIS's experiences with interrogations during the Second World War and early 
Cold War provide practical lessons for governments and intelligence services today. 
MIS's wartime interrogation centre in Britain, Camp 020, had the hallmarks of an 
ominous secret interrogation facility, exempt from Red Cross inspections, and governed 
by a commandant who had an extraordinary ability to 'break' prisoners. Nonetheless, 
contrary to what we might assume, Robert Stephens ran the camp according to a strict 
rule of non-violence during interrogations. Stephens applied this rule because, in his 
opinion, 'physical pressure' (torture) during interrogations produced poor intelligence-a 
conclusion confirmed by the historical experiences of other countries. 14 Although 
Stephens ran Camp 020 according to a rule of non-violence, as we discovered in chapter 
four, he lost control of interrogations at the post-war British interrogation facility 
12 NA KV4/132 'Powers of detention, interrogation and deportation to UK of Enemy Aliens 
and Alien suspects apprehended in the Dominions and Colonies', Minute 11: D.G. White, (9 
June, 1942); KV2/1722 'Osmar Helmuth', Minute 18: H.L.A. Hart, (20 Oct., 1943). The author 
will publish research on MIS and 'rendition' during the Second World War in a forthcoming 
article. 
13 'Crime versus war: Guantanamo', NYU Review of Law and Security, no. 2, (Spring, 2004). 
14 Richard Vinen, 'Electric Koran', London Review of Books, r June, 2001). 
339 
established at Bad Nenndorf. The scandal that erupted at Bad Nenndorf in 1947 was an 
example of what can happen when secrecy in an interrogation centre is combined with 
poorly trained interrogators. London's ' response to Bad Nenndorf, however, is 
noteworthy: following the scandal, Whitehall established oversight mechanisms-such as 
independent inspections-for British interrogation centres in occupied Germany, so that 
interrogations could be conducted in necessary conditions of secrecy, but equally the 
humane treatment of detainees could be guaranteed. The response by the British 
government to Bad Nenndorf provides a striking lesson for one of the most burning 
issues in national security at present: how to extract intelligence from detainees in an 
effective manner, without jeopardising their humane treatment. MIS's experiences half a 
century ago suggest that for intelligence gathering from detainees to be effective, and for 
detainees' rights to be guaranteed, interrogation centres can be run in secrecy so long as a 
rule of non-violence is enforced (like Camp 020), but when there is a possibility that such 
a rule cannot be enforced, oversight procedures need to be established (as after Bad 
Nenndorf). The recipe for disaster seems to be when no restraining influences are in 
operation, either internally in the camp or externally from outside authorities. 
British counter-espionage efforts in the early Cold War offer lessons for counter-
terrorist policies today. On the one hand, the fundamentally different nature of the 
Soviet state-based threat in the Cold War from the present diffuse terrorist threat means 
that comparisons should not be exaggerated. On the other hand, the Cold War threat of 
Soviet agents and the present terrorist threat are not so dissimilar from a security 
perspective as to rule out comparison-especially when a comparison provides warnings. 
Like the current threat of trans-national terrorism, Soviet agents were ideologically 
motivated 'internal enemies', whose principal allegiance lay outside of the laws of the 
country where they were residing. MIS's counter-espionage efforts in the early Cold War 
provide a clear warning about the difficulties of detecting 'internal enemies' who 
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purposefully disguise themselves from their ideological sympathies-as some evidence 
suggests Islamist 'cells' are doing today. IS One of the lessons that can be drawn from 
MIS's experiences in the early Cold War ' is the value of well-placed human agents 
(HUMINT) when detecting ideological 'internal enemies'. As Maxwell Knight in B-
Division predicted during the Second World War, an overwhelming problem facing the 
British intelligence community after the war was that they lacked valuable human agents, 
either in the British Communist Party, or in Moscow. At the start of the twenty-first 
century, both the British and American intelligence communities appear to have shown a 
similar disregard towards human intelligence, increasingly relying on technical 
intelligence. MIS's experiences in the early Cold War attest to the security problems 
arising from the neglect of well-placed human agents. 
This dissertation has furthermore suggested that intelligence is the nussmg 
dimension of the history of British decolonisation. We have seen that, although is it 
missing from almost all the existing historical literature, MIS played a role in Britain's 
response to decolonisation, both in West and East Africa. One of the reasons why MIS 
had such accurate, and useful, intelligence on leaders of African 'national liberation' 
movements was because they had undertaken prophylactic security measures on such 
individuals, and opened files on them almost as soon as they arrived in Britain. MIS 
opened files on individuals residing in Britain who potentialfy held ideological sympathies 
detrimental to British national security. While it is not the objective here to advocate 
pervasive record keeping on residents in liberal democracies, nevertheless it is striking 
that MIS's prophylactic measures placed them in an extraordinarily useful position when 
confronted with the question of 'communist' emergencies in Africa. The MIS files on 
African national leaders like Nkrumah and Kenyatta illustrate the benefits that 
IS 'The secret war: the European connection', The Observet; London: (30 Sept. , 2001); Final Report 
if the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, pp. 162, 167. 
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intelligence can offer its government consumers, providing government departments 
with 'value added' information, unavailable from other sources. In broader terms, this 
dissertation's research suggests that one of · the roles of intelligence services in liberal 
democracies may be to provide a 'calming', stabilising influence on government 
departments, as MIS did when confronted with 'communist-inspired' decolonisation 
movements in Africa. 
As we discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, intelligence history has 
become not only a new field of academic research, but also a subject of burgeoning 
interest within intelligence communities. As both intelligence communities and outside 
observers are recognising, the best way to prevent intelligence failures occurring in the 
future is to learn from failures in the past. With this in mind, the research for this 
dissertation points to conclusions of both pessimism and optimism. Pessimistically, it 
may be concluded that national security will always playa role in government because 
unfortunately it is the case that in every society, there will always be a minority of people 
who wish to inflict harm on others. Even more pessimistically, it may be concluded that 
it actually lies within human nature to inflict harm. 16 Furthermore, it must be concluded 
that 'intelligence failures' will inevitably occur because intelligence gathering is an 
imperfect science. These gloomy conclusions, however, can be offset by a note of 
optimism. In the past intelligence agencies have successfully overcome apparently 
insurmountable challenges, and there is no reason to suppose that they will be incapable 
of doing so again. Britain's intelligence agencies arguably knew as little about the Axis 
Powers at the outbreak of the Second World War and the Soviet Union at the outset of 
the Cold War, as they appeared to know at the start of the twenty-first century about the 
threat of global Islamist terrorism. If history is to judge, it seems likely that intelligence 
16 A penetrating analysis of which was made by Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 and the FinalS olution in Poland, (New York and London, 1992). 
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services in liberal democracies will again be able to adjust to, and successfully meet, the 
threats they currendy face. However, before intelligence services can begin to 
understand the present, let alone predict the future, they will have to learn from the past. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
Archival Sources 
Churchill College. Cambridge 
Sir Alexander Cadogan 
National Archives, Kew, London 
AB Records of the UK Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessors 
CAB Records of the Cabinet Office 
CO Records of the Colonial Office 
EF Records of the Health and Safety Commission and Executive 
FO Records of the Foreign Office 
HW Records created and inherited by GC&CS and GCHQ 
KV Records of the Security Service (MIS) 
PREM Records of the Prime Minister's Office 
WO Records of the War Office 
Conferences: 
British International History Group Conference, University of Nottingham, (11-13 
Sept., 2003). 
'Conference on the Gouzenko Affair: The Beginning of Canadian Counter-Espionage 
and Cold War Intelligence History', (Carleton University, Ottawa, 14-15 April, 2004). 
Interviews: 
Sir Alistair Horne, (14 December, 2004) 
Dr. Adrian Hollis, Keble College, Oxford, (22 March, 2005) 
Lady Cynthia Postan, Cambridge, (28 January, 2006) 
344 
On-line resources: 
'BBC .news' 
'Digital dissertations' 
'Historical Abstracts on the web' 
'Lexis-Nexis' 
The Times digital archive 
Website of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office: www.fco.gov.uk 
Website of the Central Intelligence Agency: www.cia.gov 
Website of the Government Communications Headquarters: www.gchq.gov.uk 
Website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: www.fbi.gov 
Website of the National Security Agency: www.nsa.gov. 
Website of The Secret Intelligence Service: www.sis.gov.uk 
Website of the Security Service: www.mi5.gov.uk 
Reference: 
H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biograpf?y, new 
edition, 61 volwnes: (Oxford, 2004). 
Published documents, contemporary accounts and memoirs: 
Begin, Menachem, The Revolt, English translation: (London, 1951). 
Bentsur, Eytan, and Kolokolov, Boris L., (eds.), Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-
1953, (portland Ore. and London, 2000). 
Best, S. Payne, The Venlo Incident, (London, 1950). 
Blake, George, No Other Choice. An Autobiograpf?y, (London, 1990). 
Bothwell, Robert, and Granatstem, J.L., (eds.), The Gouzenko Transcripts. The Evidence 
presented to the Kellock-Taschereau Rqyal Commission of 1946, (Ottawa, 1982). 
British Documents on the End of Empire, 13 volwnes:(London, 1992-2004). 
Briscoe, Robert, For the Life of Me, (Dublin and London, 1959). 
345 
Burt, Leonard, Commander Burt of Scotland Yard, (London, 1959). 
Cohen, Geulah, Woman of Violence. Memoirs of a Young Tert'01ist, 1943-1948, (London, 
1966). 
Curry, John c., The Security Service, 1908-1945. The Official History, with an introduction by 
Christopher Andrew: (London, 1999). 
De Wolf Smyth, Henry, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. The oJIicial Report on the 
Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945, 
(princeton, 1946). 
Gouzenko, Igor, This was My Choice, (London, 1948). 
Gouzenko, Igor, The Fall of a Titan, English translation: (London, 1954). 
Harris, Tomas, Garbo: The Spy who Saved D-Dqy, with an introduction by Mark Seaman: 
(London, 2000). 
Herzog, Chaim, Living History. A Memoir, (London, 1997). 
Hesketh, Roger, Fortitude: The D-Dqy Deception Campaign, (London, 1999). 
Kalugin, Oleg, Spymaster: My 32 years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, (London, 
1994) 
Khosla, Gopal das, Stern Reckoning: A Survry of Events Leading up to and Following the Partition 
of India, (New Delhi, 1948). 
Kirkpatrick, Ivone, TheInner Circle, (London, 1959). 
Koestler, Arthur, Thieves in the Night. Chronicle of an Experiment, (London, 1945). 
Koestler, Arthur, (et a~, The God that Failed: Six Studies in Communism, (London, 1950). 
Kollek, Teddy, For Jerusalem. A Life fry Tedcfy Kollek, (London and Jerusalem, 1978) 
Kravchenko, Victor, I Chose Freedom. The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official, (New 
York, 1946). 
Lunan, Gordon, The Making of a Spy. A PoliticalOcfyssry, (Montreal, 1995). 
Macmillan, W.M., WarningJrom the West Indies. A Tract for AJrica and the Empire, (London, 
1946). 
Masterman, John c., The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, (London, 1979). 
Meridor, Ya'acov, Long is the Road to Freedom, English translation: Gohannesburg, 1955). 
Moclin, Yuri, My Five Cambridge Friends, English translation: (London, 1994). 
346 
Nkrumah, Kwame, The Autobiograpf?y ofKwame Nkrumah, (London, 1959). 
Nkrumah, Kwame, Dark Dqys in Ghana, (London, 1968). 
Operation Epsilon: the Farm Hall Transcnpts, with an introduction by Sir Charles Frank: 
(Bristol and Philadelphia, 1993). 
Philby, H.A.R., My Silent War. The Autobiograpf?y of a Spy, 1st edition: (London, 1968); new 
paperback edition: (London, 2003). 
Putlitz, Wolfgang zu, The Put/itZ Dossiet; (London, 1957). 
Ram, Bhagat, The Talwars of Pathan Land and Subhas Chandra's Great Escape, (New Delhi, 
1976). 
Shamir, Yitzhak, Summing Up. An Autobiograpf?y, (London, 1994) 
Sillitoe, Percy, Cloak without Dagger, (London, 1955). 
[Stephens, Robert], Camp 020: MI5 and the Nail Spies, with an introduction by Oliver 
Hoare: (London, 2000). 
Stephenson, William, B,itish S ecunry Coordination. The S eeret History of British Intelligence in the 
Americas 1940-1945, with an introduction by Nigel West: (New York and London, 1998). 
U.K Parliament, Hansard. The Parliamentary Debates, (London, 1909-). 
Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error. The Autobiograpf?y ofCbaim Weizmann, (London, 1949). 
Wright, Peter, Spycatcher. The Candid Autobiograpf?y of a Senior Intelligence Officer, (Victoria, 
1987). 
Official enquiries and reports: 
Buder of Brockwell, Lord, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London, 
2004). 
RepOlt of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 J ufy 2005, (London, May 2006). 
The 9/11 Commission: Final Rep01t of the National Commission on the Terronst Attacks upon the 
United States, (Washington D.C., 2003). 
Secondary Literature: 
Abrahams, Peter, A Wreath for Udomo, (London, 1956). 
Adi, Hakim, West Africans in Britain, 1900-1960. Nationalism, Pan-Africanism and 
Communism, (London, 1998). 
347 
Aldrich, Richard J., (ed.), British Intelligence, Strate!!J and the Cold War 1945-51, (London, 
1991). 
Aldrich, Richard J., The Hidden Hand. Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, 
(London, 2001). 
Aldrich, Richard J., 'GCHQ and sigint in the early Cold War, 1945-70', in Matthew M. 
Aid and Cees Wiebes, Secrets of Signals Intelligence during the Cold War and Bryond, (London, 
2001), pp. 67-96. 
Anderson, David, Histories of the Hanged. Britain j- Ditry War in Kef!Ja and the End of Empire, 
(London, 2005). 
Andrew, Christopher, Secret Service. The Making of the British Intelligence Communiry, (London, 
1985). 
Andrew, Christopher, and Noakes, Jeremy, (eds.), Intelligence and International Relations, 
1900-1945, (Exeter, 1987). 
Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Oleg, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations 
from Lenin to Gorbachev, (London, 1991). 
Andrew, Christopher, For the President's Eyes OnlY: Secret Intelligence and the American 
Presidenry from Washington to Bush, (London, 1996). 
Andrew, Christopher, and Mitrokhin, Vasili, The Mitrokhin Archive, volume I: The KGB in 
Europe and the West, (London, 1999); volume II: The KGB and the World, (London, 2005). 
Andrew, Christopher, 'The Venona Secret', in K. G. Robertson (ed.), War, Resistance and 
Intelligence: Collected Esscrys in Honour of M.RD. Foot, (London, 1999), pp. 203-225. 
Andrew, Christopher, 'Intelligence in the Cold War: lessons and learning', in Harold 
Schuckman (ed.), Agents for Change. Intelligence Services in the 21'1 Century, (London, 2000), 
pp.1-22. 
Andrew, Christopher, and Walton, Calder, 'The Gouzenko case and British secret 
intelligence', in J.L. Black and Martin Rudner (eds.), The Gouzenko Affair. Canada and the 
Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage, (London and Toronto, 2006), pp. 38-56. 
Bar-Zohar, Michael, Yaacov Herzog. A Biograpf?y, English translation: (London, 2005). 
Beckett, Francis, Enemy Within. The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Patry, (London, 
1995). 
Bell, Bowyer, J., Terror out of Zion. ltgun Zvai Leumi, Lehi and the Palestine Undetground, 1929-
1949, (London and New York, 1977). 
Bennett, Gill, 'A Most Extraordinary and Mysterious Incident:· the Zinoviev Letter of 1924, 
(London, 1999). 
348 
Bennett, Ralph, Behind the Battle: Intelligence and the War with GermaJ!)" 1939-1945, (London, 
1999). 
Benson, Harry, Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel, (London and Westport Con., 
1997). 
Berman, Bruce, and Lonsdale, John, Unhappy Vall~y. Conflict in Ke1?Ja and Africa, 2 
volumes: (London, 1992). 
Best, Anthony, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941, (Basingstoke, 
2002). 
Bethell, Nicholas, The Palestine Triangle. The Struggle between the British, the Jews and the Arabs, 
1935-48, (London, 1979). 
Birmingham, David, Kwame Nkrumah. The Father of African Nationalism, (Athens Oh., 
1998). 
Black, Ian, and Morris, Benny, Israel's Secret Wars. The History of Israel's Intelligence Services, 
(London, 1991). 
Borovik, Genrikh, The Philry Files: the Secret Life of the KGB Mastersp~KGB Archives 
Revealed, (London, 1994). 
Bower, Tom, Klaus Barbie: Butcher of Lyons, (London, 1985). 
Bower, Tom, The Peifect English Spy. Sir Dick White and the Secret War, 1935-90, (London, 
1995). 
Boyle, Andrew, The Climate of Treason. Five Spies who Spied for Russia, (London, 1979). 
Bozeman, Adda, (ed.), Strategic Intelligence and Statecrqft: Selected Essqys, (New York, 1992). 
Brent, Jonathan, and Naumov, Vladimir P., Stalin's Last Crime. The Doctors' Plot, English 
translation: (London, 2003). 
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, The Storm Petrels. The First Soviet Defectors, 1928-1938, (London, 
1977). 
Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, The Storm Birds. Soviet Post-War Defectors, (London, 1988). 
Brown, Judith M., and Louis, William Roger and Low, Alaine M. (eds.), The Oxford History 
of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, (Oxford, 2001). 
Browning, Christopher, Ordinary Men: Resel'lJe Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in 
Poland, (N ew York and London, 1992). 
Budiansky, Stephen, Her Majesty's Spy: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of 
Modern Espionage, (London, 2005). 
Bullock, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, 3 volumes: (London, 1960-1983). 
349 
Butler, Ewan, Mason-Mac. The Life if Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Mason-Magarlane, (London, 
1972). 
Calder, Angus, The People's Waf: Britain 1939-1945, new paperback edition: (London, 
1992). 
Carafano, James J., and Rosenzweig, Paul, Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War 
for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom, (London, 2005). 
Carr, Matthew, Unknown Soldiers: How Terrorism Transformed the Modern World, (London, 
2006). 
Carruthers, Susan L., Winning Hearts and Minds. British Governments, the Media and Colonial 
Counter-Insurgenry 1944-1960, (London, 1995). 
Carter, Miranda, Anthof!Y Blunt. His Lives, (London, 2001). 
Cathcart, Brian, The FlY in the Cathedral: How a Small Group if Cambridge Scientists won the 
International Race to Split the Atom, (London, 2004). 
Cecil, Robert, 'The Cambridge Comintern', in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks 
(eds.), The Missing Dimension. Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, 
(London, 1984), pp. 169-198. 
Cecil, Robert, A Divided Life. A Biograpf?y if Donald Maclean, (London, 1988). 
Central Intelligence Agency, The Rote Kapelle: the CIA's History if Soviet Intelligence and 
Espionage Networks in Western Europe, 1936-1945, (Washington D.C., 1979). 
Charters, David A., The British Army and Jewish Insurgenry in Palestine, 1945-47, 
(Basingstoke, 1989). 
Clark, Ian, Nuclear Diplomary and the Special Relationship. Britain's Deterrent and America, 
1957-1962, (London and Oxford, Clarendon, 1994). 
Clarke, Peter, The Cripps Version: The Life if SirStcifford Cripps, 1889-1952, (London, 2002) . 
Clarke, Peter, Hope and Glory. Britain 1900-2000, paperback revised edition: (London, 
2004). 
Clarke, Thurston, By Blood and Fire. The Attack on the King David Hotel, (London, 1981). 
Cockerill, A.W., Sir Perry Sillitoe, (London, 1975). 
Cohen, Michael]., Palestine, Retreat fi'Om the Mandate: the Making if British Poliry, 1936-45, 
(London, 1978). 
Cookridge, E.H., Gehlen: Spy if the Century, (London, 1972). 
350 
Craddock, Percy, Know Your Enemy: H01JJ the Joint Intelligence Committee saw the World, 
(London, 2002). 
Dandeker, Christopher, Surveillance, Power and Moderni!J. Bureaucrary and Discipline from 1700 
to the Present Dqy,(Cambridge, 1990). ' 
Darby, Phillip, British Defence Poliry East of Sue:v 1947-1968, (Oxford, 1973). 
Darwin, John, Britain and Decolonisation. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, 
(Basingstoke, 1988). 
Dear, I.e., and Foot, M.R.D., (eds.), O:xfOrd Companion to the Second World Wat~ new 
edition: (Oxford, 2005). 
Eksteins, Modris, Rites of Spring: the Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, (Boston, 
1989). 
Elkins, Caroline, Britain's Gulag. The Brutal End of Empire in Kef!)la, (London, 2005). 
Eshed, Haggai, Reuven S hiloah: the Man behind the Mossad. S emt Diplomary in the Creation of 
Israel, English translation: (London and Portland Ore., 1997). 
Fanon, Frantz, Wretched of the Earth, English translation: (London, 1965). 
Farran, Roy, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service, (London, 1988). 
Farcy, Jean-Claude, Les camps de concentration franrais de la premiere guerre mondiale, (paris, 
1995); 
Fischer, Gerhard, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homifront Experience in Australia, 1914-
1920, (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1989). 
Flicke, W.F., Rote Kapelle, Spionage und Wider stand: die Geschichte der grossten Spionage-und 
Sabotageorganisation, (Augsburg, 1990). 
Folly, Martin, Churchill, Whitehall and the Soviet Union, 1940-45, (Basingstoke, 2000). 
Foot, M.RD., S.O.E. in France: An Account of the British Special Operations Executive, 1940-
1944, (London, 1966). 
Foot, M.R.D., SOE in the Low Countries, (London, 2001). 
Foot, M.RD., Foreign Fields: the Story of an SOE Operative, (London, 2002). 
Fromkin, David, A Peace to End All Peace. Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922, 
(London, 1989). 
Fussell, Paul, The Great War and Modern Memory, (New York, 1975). 
Gaddis, John Lewis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (London, 1997). 
351 
Gaddis, John LeMs, The Cold War; (London, 2006). 
George, Roger Z., and Klein, Robert D., (ed.), Intelligence and the National Securiry Strategist: 
Enduring ISSlles and Challenges, (New York, 2005). 
Gilbert, Martin, and Churchill, Randolph, Winston S. Churchill, 8 volumes plus companion 
volumes: (London, 1966-1988). 
Gillman, Peter and Leni, 'Collar the Llt~· How Btitain Interned and Expelled its Wartime 
Refugees, (London, 1980). 
Glees, Anthony, The Secrets of the S ermce. British Intelligence and Communist Subversion, 1939-
1951, (London, 1987). 
Gowing, Margaret, Independence and Deterrence. Britain and Atomic Enn;gy, 1945-1952, 2 
volumes: (London, 1974). 
Granatstein, J.L., and Stafford, David, Spy Wars. Espionage in Canada from Gouzenko to 
Glasnost, (Toronto, 1990). 
Guterson, David, Snow falling on Cedars, (New York and London, 1995). 
Halper, Timothy N., The End of Empire and the Making ofMalqya, (Cambridge, 1998). 
Hastings, Max, The Second Wodd War: a Wodd in Flames, (London, 2004). 
Haynes, John Earl, and Klehr, Harvey, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, (New 
York and London, 1999). 
Heller, Joseph, The Stern Gang. Ideolo!!), Politics and Terror, 1940--49, (London, 1995). 
Helm, Sarah,A lift in Secrets: Vera Atkins and the Lost Agents of SOE, (London, 2005). 
Hennessy, Peter, Never Again: Britain 1945-1951, (London, 1993). 
Hennessy, Peter, The Prime Minister. The Office and Its Holders Since 1945, (London, 2000). 
Hennessy, Peter, The Semt State. Whitehall and the Cold War; (London, 2002). 
Hinsley, F.H ., British Intelligence in the Second Wodd War; vols. 1-3: Its Influence on Strate!!) and 
Operations, (London, 1979-1988); F.H. Hinsley with C.A.G. Simkins, British Intelligence in 
the Second Wodd War; vol. IV: Securiry and Counter-Intelligence, (London, 1990); Michael 
Howard, British Intelligence in the Second Wodd War, vol. V: Strategic Deception, (London, 
1992). 
Hinsley, F.H., British Intelligence in the Second Wodd War; Abridged edition: (London, 1993). 
Hinsley, F.H., and S tripp , Alan, (eds.), Codebreakers. The Inside Story of Bletchlry Park, 
(Oxford, 1993). 
352 
Hinsley, F.H., 'British intelligence and Barbarossa', in John Erickson and David Dilks 
(eds.), Barbarossa; theAxis and the Allies, (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 43-75. 
Hodson, Henry V., The Great Divide: Britain, Indiq, Pakistan, (London, 1969). 
Hoffman, Bruce, The Failure of British Military Strate!!y within Palestine, 1939-1947, 
Gerusalem, 1983). 
Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism, (London, 1998). 
Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, (London and New Haven, 1983). 
Holloway, David, Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Enet;gy 1939-1956, (New 
Haven, 1994). 
Hooker, James R., Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-
Africanism, (London, 1967). 
Hooper, David, Official Secrets: the Use andAbuse of the Act, (London, 1987). 
Hull, Isabel, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial GermaJry, 
(Ithaca, 2005) . 
Hutchinson, Martha c., Revolutionary Terrorism: the FIN in Algeria, 1954-1962, (Stanford 
Ca., 1974); 
Hyam, Ronald, Britain's Declining Empire: the Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968, (Cambridge, 
2006) . 
Hyde, H. Montgomery, The Atom Bomb Spies, (London, 1980). 
Jackson, Peter, France and the Nazj Menal'e: Intelligence and Poliry Making, 1933-1939, 
(Oxford, 2000). 
Keogh, Dermot, Jews in Twentieth Century Ireland. Refugees, Anti-Semitism and the Holol'atlst, 
(Cork, 1998). 
Kershaw, Ian, Nazj Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, (London, 1985). 
Kitchen, Martin, Blitish Poliry towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War, 
(Basingstoke, 1986). 
Knight, Amy, How the Cold War Began: the Igor Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies, 
(N ew York, 2006) . 
Knight, Amy, 'Soviet intelligence and the Gouzenko case', J.L. Black and Martin Rudner 
(eds.), The Gouzenko Affail: Canada and the Beginnings of Cold War Counter-Espionage, (London 
and Toronto, 2006), pp. 25-38. 
Knighdey, Philip, Phill?J: The Life and Views of the KGB Masterspy, (London, 1988) 
353 
Lane, Ann, and Temperley, Howard, (eds.), The Rise and Fall of the Gra11dAlfiance, 1941-
1945, (Basingstoke, 1995). 
Lapping, Brian, End of Empire, (London, 1985) . . 
Lewis, Julian, Changing Direction. British Military Plan11ingfor Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-
1947, (London, 1988); 2nd edition: (London, 2002). 
Lieven, Anatol, 'Fighting terrorism: lessons from the Cold War', Carnegie Endowment 
publication: (Washington D.C., 2001). 
Lewin-Epstein, Noah, Ro'i, Yaacov, and Ritterband, Paul, (eds.), Russian Jews on Three 
Continents: Migration and Resettlement, (London, 1997). 
Lonsdale, John, 'Kenyatta's trials: breaking and making of an African nationalist', in Peter 
Cross (ed.), The Moral World of the Law, (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 196-239. 
Louis, William Roger, The End of British Imperialism: the Scramble for Empire, Suez and 
Decolonisation, (London, 2006). 
Lustgarten, Laurence, and Leigh, Ian, In From the Cold. National S eC/l1iry and Parliamentary 
Democrary, (Oxford, 1994). 
Macdonald, Bill, The True Intrepid: Sir William Stephenson and the unknown Agents, 2nd 
edition, with a foreword by Thomas F. Troy: (Vancouver, 2001). 
Maddrell, Paul, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germa/ry, 1945-1962, 
(London, 2006). 
Mangold, Tom, Cold Warrior.· James Jesus Angleton. The CIA's Master Spy Hunter, (New York, 
1991). 
Maran, Rita, Torture: the Role of Ideology in the French-Aigelian War, (New York and London, 
1989). 
Marrus, Michael, The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through Cold Wa/; 
(New York and Oxford, 1985); new edition: (philadelphia and London, 2002). 
Mardand, Peter, Lord Haw Haw: the English Voice ofNazj Germat!Y, (London, 2003). 
Marton, Kati, A Death in Jerusalem, (London, 1994). 
Massu, Jacques, La vrai battalie d'aiger, (pIon, 1971). 
Masters, Anthony, The Man who was M: The Life of Maxwell Knight, (Oxford, 1986). 
May, Ernest R., (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies. Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wa/J, 
(princeton and Guilford, 1984). 
Mommsen, Wolfgang, The Age of Bureaucrary. Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max 
Weber, (Oxford, 1974). 
354 
Moorehead, Alan, The Traitors. The Double Life qfFuchs, PontecorlJo, and Nunn Mcry, (London, 
1952). . . 
Morris, Benny, The Bilth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, (Cambridge, 1987); 
revised edition: (Cambridge, 2004) . 
Moss, Norman, Klaus Fuchs. The Man who Stole the Atom Bomb, (London, 1987). 
Murray-Brown;Jeremy, Ketryatta, (London, 1972). 
Naftali, Timothy, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counter-terrorism, (New York and 
London, 2005) . 
Nagler, Jorg, 'Victims of the Home Front: aliens in the United States during the First 
World War', in Panikos Panayi (ed.), Minorities in Wartime. National and Racial Groupings in 
Europe, Nonh Ametica and Australia during the Two World Wars, (Oxford, 1993), pp. 191-
215. 
Nasheri, Hedieh, (ed.), Economic Espionage and Industrial Spying, (Cambridge, 2005). 
Nelson, Keith, and McKercher, B.J.C., (eds.), Go Spy the Land: Military Intelligence in History, 
(Westport Conn., 1992) . 
O'Halpin, Eunan, MI5 and Ireland 1939-1945: the Official History, with a foreword by 
Christopher Andrew: (London, 2003). 
Osborn, Patrick R., Operation Pike. Britain versus tbe Soviet Union, 1939-1941, (Westport and 
London, 2000). 
Ovendale, Ritchie, Britain, the United States and the end of the Palestine Mandate, 1942-1948, 
(London, 1989). 
Overy, Richard, W~ the Allies Won, (London, 1995). 
Overy, Richard, Interrogations. The Nail Elite in Allied Hands, 1945, (London, 2001). 
Panayi, Panikos, The Enemy in our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War, (New 
York, 1991). 
Pearce, Robert, The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial PoliO', 1938-1948, (London, 
1982). 
Pedahzur, Ami, The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence: Defending DemocraO', 
(Manchester, 2002). 
Percox, David A., 'Mau Mau & the arming of the state', in E.S. Atieno Odhiambo and 
John Lonsdale, Mau Malt & Nationhood. Arms, Authoriry and & Narration, (Oxford, 2003), 
pp. 121-154. 
355 
Percox, David A., Britain, Kelrya and the Cold War:' Impelial Defence, Colonial Securiry and 
Decolonisation, (London, 2004). 
Perkins, Anne, A Very British Strike. The General S[rike 1926, (London, 2006). 
Perutz, Max F., Is Science Necessary? Essqys on Science and Scientists, (London and New York, 
1989). 
Pincher, Chapman, Their Trade is Treachery. The Full, Unexput;gated Truth about the Russian 
Penetration of the Free World's Secret Defences, (London, 1981). 
Pinkus, Benjamin, and Frankel, Jonathan, The Soviet Government and the Jews, 1948-1967: A 
Documented Stutjy, (Cambridge, 1984). 
Poidevin Raymond (ed.), Histoire des debuts de la construction europeenne, mars 1948-mai 1950, 
(Brussels, 1986). 
Porter, A.N., and Stockwell, A.]., Blitish Impelial PoliO' and Decolonisation, 1938-64, 2 
volumes: (Basingstoke, 1987). 
Posner, Richard A., Uncertain Shield: the U.S. Inte//igence System in the Throes ofRiform, (New 
York and London, 2006). 
Posner, Richard A., Not a Suicide Pact: the Constitution in a Time of National EmergenO', (New 
York and Oxford, 2006). 
Pujol, Juan, with West, Nigel, Garbo, (London, 1985). 
Rathbone, Richard, 'Political intelligence and policing in Ghana in the late 1940s and 
1950s', in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds.), Policing and Decolonisation. 
Nationalism and the Police, 1917-1965, (Manchester, 1992), pp. 84-104. 
Rathbone, Richard, Nkrtlmah and the Chiefs. The Politics of ChieftainO' in Ghana, 1951-60, 
(Oxford, 1999). 
Richard Rathbone, 'Peter Abraham's A Wreath for Udomo', in Margaret Jean Hay (ed.), 
Aflican Novels in the Classroom, (London, 2000), pp. 11-24. 
Reynolds, David, (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War in Europe. International Perspectives, (New 
Haven and London, 1994). 
Reynolds, David, (et al eds.), A//ies at War: the Soviet, American and Blitish Expelience, 1939-
1945, (London, 1994). 
Reynolds, David, Blitannia Overruled. Blitish PoliO' and World Power in the 2010 Century, 2nd 
edition: (London, 2000). 
Reynolds, David, In Command of History: Churchi// Fighting and Winning the Second World War, 
paperback edition: (London, 2005). 
356 
Reynolds, David, From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International 
History of the 1940s, (London, 2006). 
Richelson, Jeffrey T., Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Naif Germa'!Y to 
Iran and North Korea, (New York and London, 2006). 
Robinson, Greg, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans, 
(Cambridge Ma., 2001). 
Rooney, David, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, (London, 1982). 
Rothwell, Victor, War Aims in the Second World War.' the War Aims of the Mqjor Belligerents, 
(Edinburgh, 2005). 
Sherwood, Marika, Nkrumah. The Years Abroad, (Legon, 1996). 
Shils, Edward A., The Torment of Secrery. The Background and Consequences of American Securiry 
Policies, (London, 1956). 
Short, Anthony, The Communist Insurrection in Malqya, (London, 1975). 
Smith, Bradley F., Sharing Secrets with Stalin. How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945, 
(Lawrence Kan., 1996). 
Smith, Michael, Folry. The Spy Who Saved 10,000 Jews, (London, 1999). 
Smith, Michael, The Spying Game. The Secret History of British Espionage, paperback edition: 
(London, 2003). 
Spiropulos, Jean, Ausweisung und Internierungfeindlicher Staatsangehiitiger, (Leipzig, 1922). 
Sprinzak, Ehud, Brother against Brother. Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena 
to the Rabin Assassination, (New York, 1999). 
Stammers, Neil, Civil Liberties in Britain during the Lid World War. A Political Stucjy, (London, 
1957). 
Stevenson, William, A Man called Intrepid' the Secret War; (London, 1976). 
Throup, David, 'Crime, politics and the police in colonial Kenya, 1939-63', in David M. 
Anderson and David Killingray (eds.), Policing and Decolonisation. Nationalism and the Police, 
1917-1965, (Manchester, 1992), pp. 149-154. 
Errol Trzebinski, The Life and Death of Lord Errol/. The Truth behind the Happy Vallry Murder, 
(London, 2000). 
Trotter, William R., The Winter War: the Russo-Finnish War of 1939- 1940, (London, 2002). 
Troy, Thomas F., Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson and the origin of the CIA, 
(London, 1996). 
357 
Ustinov, Nadia, Klop and the Ustinov FamilY, (London, 1973). 
Walzer, Michael, Just and U,!just Wars. A Moral Atgument with Historical Illustrations, 3rd 
edition: (London and New York, 2000). 
Wark, Wesley K., The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and NaiJ· Germmry 1933-1939, 
(Ithaca, 1986). 
Weinstein, Allen, PerJury: The Hiss-Chambers Case, (New York and London, 1978). 
West, Nigel,AMatterifTrust:MI51945-72, (London, 1982). 
West, Nigel, Mask: MI5's Penetration if the Communist Patry if Great Britain, (London, 2005). 
West, Nigel and Tsarev, Oleg, The Crown Jewels. The British Secrets at the Heart if the KGB 
Archives, (London, 1998). 
West, Nigel, Venona. The Greatest Secret if the Cold War, (London, 1999). 
Williams, David, Not in the Public Interest: the Problem if Securi!)' in Democrary, (London, 
1965). 
Williams, Robert c., Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy, (Cambridge Ma. and London, 1987). 
Winter, J.M., Sites if Memory, Sites if Mourning: the Great War in European Cultural History, 
(Cambridge, 1995). 
Winterbotham, Frederick, The Ultra Secret, (London, 1975) 
Dissertations: 
Chavkin, Jonathan, 'The secret imperial hand: British influence in the emergence of the 
Israeli and Australian intelligence communities', (M.Phil. dissertation, Cambridge 
University, 2006). 
Craig, Alex, 'The J oint Intelligence Committee and British intelligence assessment, 1945-
56', (ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge, 1999). 
Hoffman, Bruce R., 'Jewish terrorist activities and the British government in Palestine, 
1939-1947', (D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1985). 
Lohr, Eric, 'Enemy alien politics within the Russian empire during World War 1', (ph.D. 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1999). 
Maddrell, Paul, 'Britain's exploitation of occupied Germany for scientific and technical 
intelligence on the Soviet Union', (ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1998). 
McMahon, Paul, 'British intelligence and the Irish 'Fifth Column", (ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Cambridge, 2003). 
358 
Mohs, Paula, 'British intelligence and the Arab revolt in the Hejaz, 1914--1917', (phD. 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2004). 
Rathbone, Richard J., 'The transfer of power in Ghana, 1945-57', (ph.D. dissertation, 
University of London, 1968). . 
Shelley, Adam, 'British intelligence and the Middle East, 1939-1946', (M.Phil. 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2006). 
Sherman, Daniel, 'Learning from Past Mistakes? Planning for Internment of subversives 
during a transition to war 1948-1964', (M.A. dissertation, University of London, 2005). 
Smith, Charles, 'Two revolts in Palestine. An examination of the British response to Arab 
and Jewish rebellion, 1936 to 1948', (ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1990). 
Walton, Calder, 'Colonial rule and occupation policies: German colonial rule in 
Southwest Africa and German occupation policies in the East during the First World 
War', (M.Phil. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003). 
Wilson, Emily, 'The war in the dark: the Security Service and the Abwehr, 1940-1944', 
(phD. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003). 
Wood, Angus, 'Construction of parliamentary accountability for the British intelligence 
community, 1971-2002', (M.Phil. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2003). 
Journal articles: 
Aid, Matthew M., "Stella Polaris': secret code batde in post-war Europe', Intelligence and 
National Security, 17, no. 3, (2002), pp. 17-86. 
Aldrich, Richard J., 'Soviet intelligence, British security and the end of the Red Orchestra: 
the fate of Alexander Rado', Intelligence and National Security, 6, no. 1, (1991), pp. 196-217. 
Aldrich, Richard J., 'GCHQ and SIGINT during the early Cold War, 1945-1970', 
Intelligence and National Security, 16, no. 1, (2001), pp. 67-96. 
Aldrich, Richard ]., 'Policing the past: official history, secrecy and British intelligence 
since 1945', English Historical Review, 119, (2004), pp. 922-953 
Andrew, Christopher, 'Whitehall, Washington and the Intelligence Services', International 
Affairs, 53, no. 3, (1977), pp. 390-404. 
Andrew, Christopher, 'Codebreaking and signals intelligence', Intelligence and National 
Security, 1, no.l, (1986), pp.1-5. 
Andrew, Christopher, 'Churchill and intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 3, no. 3, 
(1988), pp. 181-193. 
359 
Andrew, Christopher, 'The growth of the Australian intelligence community and the 
Anglo-American connection', Intelligence and National Secunry, 4, no. 2, (1989), pp. 213-
256. 
Andrew, Christopher, 'Intelligence and international relations in the early Cold War', 
Review if International Studies, 24, (1998), pp. 321-330. 
Bell, J. Bowyer, 'Contemporary revolutionary organizations', International Organization: 
Transnational Relations and World Politics, 25, no. 3, (1971), pp. 503-518. 
Bell, J. Bowyer, 'Assassination in international politics. Lord Moyne, Count Bernadotte, 
and the Lehi', International Studies, 16, no. 1, (1972), pp. 59-82. 
Budiansky, Stephen, 'Truth extraction', The Atlantic MonthlY, 295, Gune, 2005), pp. 32-35. 
Cecil, Robert, 'Five of Six at war: Section V of MI6', Intelligence and National Securiry, 9, no. 
2, (1994), pp. 345-353. 
Cell, John W., 'On the eve of decolonisation: the Colonial Office's plans for the transfer 
of power in Africa', Journal if Imperial and Commonwealth History, 8, no. 3, (May 1980), pp. 
235-57. 
Charters, David A., 'British intelligence in the Palestine campaign, 1945-47', Intelligence and 
National Sectltiry, 6, no. 1, (1991), pp. 115-40. 
Cleary, A.S., 'The myth of Mau Mau in its international context', African Affairs, 85, 
(1990), pp. 227-245. 
Cohen, Michael J., 'Appeasement in the Middle East: the British White Paper on 
Palestine, May 1939', The Historical Journal, 16, no. 3, (1973), pp. 571-596. 
Cohen, Michael J., 'The British White Paper on Palestine, May 1939. Part II: the Testing 
of a Policy, 1942-1945', The Historical Journal, 19, no. 3, (1976), pp. 727-758. 
Cohen, Michael J., 'The Moyne assassination, November 1944: a political assessment', 
Middle Eastern Studies, 15, no. 3 (1979), pp. 358-73. 
Creech-Jones, Arthur, 'British colonial policy with particular reference to Africa', 
InternationalAffairs, 27 (April, 1951), pp. 176-183. 
'Crime versus war: Guantanamo', NYU Review if Law and Secutiry, no. 2, (Spring, 2004). 
Cunningham, Alan, 'Palestine-the last days of the Mandate', International Affairs, 24, no. 
4, (1948), pp. 481-90. 
DeGraaff, Bob, 'The stranded Baron and the upstart at the crossroads: Wolfgang zu 
Putlitz and Otto John', Intelligence and National Securiry, 6, no. 4, (1991), pp. 669-700. 
Eshel, David, 'Sharon, the setders, and the threat of radical Jewish terrorism in Israel', 
Jane's International Securiry News, Guly, 2003). 
360 
Gill, Peter, 'Reasserting control: recent changes in the oversight of the UK intelligence 
community', Intelligence and National Security, 11, no. 2, (1996), pp. 313-331 
Ginzburg, Carlo, 'Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: clues and the scientific method' 
, ' 
History Workshop, 9, (1980), pp. 5-36 
Goodman, Michael S., 'British intelligence and the Soviet atomic bomb, 1945-1950', The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, 26, no. 2, (2003), pp. 120-151. 
Goodman, Michael S., 'Who is trying to keep what secrets from whom and why? MI5-
FBI relations on the Klaus Fuchs case', Journal of Cold War Studies, 7, no. 3, (2005), pp. 
124--146. 
Hack, Karl, 'British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of decolonisation: the 
example of Malaya', Intelligence and National Secunry, 14, no. 2, (1999), pp. 124--155. 
Hayden, Robert M., 'Schindler's fate: genocide, ethnic cleansing and population 
transfers', Slavic Review, 55, no. 4, (winter, 1996), pp. 727-48. 
Heather, Randall W., 'Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56', Intelligence 
and National Security, 5, no. 3, (1990), p. 57-83. 
Hennessy, Peter, and Brownfeld, Gail, 'Britain's Cold War security purge: the origins of 
positive vetting', The Historical Journal, 25, no. 4, (1982), pp. 965-74. 
Hiley, Nicholas, 'The failure of British counter-espionage against Germany, 1907-1914', 
Historical Journal, 28, no. 4, (1985), pp. 835-862. 
Hiley, Nicholas, 'Entering the lists: MI5's great spy round-up of August 1914', Intelligence 
and National Secutity, 21, no. 1, (2006), pp. 46-76. 
Holquist, Peter, "'Information is the Alpha and the Omega of our work": Bolshevik 
surveillance in its pan-European context', Journal of Modern History, 69, no. 3, (1997), pp. 
415-450. 
Howard, Michael, 'What's in a name?', Foreign Affairs, 81, no. 1, Gan.-Feb., 2002), pp. 8-
13. 
Hyam, Ronald, 'Africa and the Labour government', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 16, no. 3, (May 1988), pp. 148-72. 
Jervis, Robert, 'The impact of the Korean War on the Cold War', Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 24, (1980), pp. 563-92. 
Kerr, Sheila, 'Roger Hollis and the dangers of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942', Intelligence 
and National Security, 5, no. 3, (1990), pp. 148-57. 
Lander, Stephen, 'British intelligence in the twentieth century', Intelligence and National 
Secutity, 17, no. 1, (2002), pp. 7-20. 
361 
Laqueur, Walter, 'Interpretations of terrorism: fact, fiction and political science', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 12, (1977), pp. 1-42. -
Lonsdale, John, 'Mau Maus of the mind: making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya', Journal 
of Afiican History, 31, no. 3, (1990), pp. 393-421. 
Lonsdale, John, 'Ornamental constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the two Queens', 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 34, no. 1, (2006), pp. 87-103. 
Louis, William Roger, and Robinson, Ronald, 'The imperialism of decolonisation', Journal 
ofImpetial and Commonwealth History, 22, no.3 (1994), pp. 462-511 . 
Madeira, Victor, 'Moscow's interwar infiltration of British intelligence, 1919-1929', 
Historical Journal, 46, no. 4, (2003), pp. 915-933. 
Madeira, Victor, ''Because I don't trust him we are friends: signals intelligence and the 
reluctant Anglo-Soviet embrace, 1917-1924', Intelligence and National Security, 19, no. 1, 
(2004), pp. 29-51. 
McClellan, Woodford, 'Africans and black Americans in the Comintern schools, 1925-
1934', The International Journal of Afiican Histolical Studies, 26, no. 2, (1993), pp. 371-390. 
Merrick, Ray, 'The Russia committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War, 
1946-7', Journal of Contemporary History, 20, no. 3, (1985), pp. 453-68. 
Murphy, Philip, 'Creating a commonwealth intelligence culture: the view from central 
Africa, 1945-1965', Intelligence and National Security, 17, no. 3, (2002), pp. 131-162. 
Pegushev, Andrei M., 'The Unknown Kenyatta', Egerton Journal, 2, (1996), pp. 172-198. 
Pegushev, Andrei M., 'Afrikanski v komminterne', Vostok, 7, (1997), pp. 37-49. 
'Prosecuting terrorism: the legal challenge', NYU Review of Law and Security, special issue: 
(April, 2006). 
Raeff, Marc, 'The well ordered police state and the development of modernity in 
seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Europe: an attempt at a comparative approach', 
Ametican Historical Review, 80, no. 5, (1975), pp. 1221-43. 
Thurlow, Richard c., 'Soviet spies and British counter-intelligence in the 1930s: 
espionage in the Woolwich Arsenal and the Foreign Office communications 
Department, Intelligence and National Security, 19, no. 4, (2004), pp. 610-631. 
Schoenberg, David, 'Kapitza: fact and fiction', Intelligence and National Security, 3, no.4, 
(1988), pp. 49-61. 
Scott, Len, 'Espionage and the Cold War: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban missile crisis', 
Intelligence and National Security, 14, no. 3, (1999), pp. 23-47. 
Shatz, Adam, 'The torture of Algiers', The New York Review of Books, 49, no. 18, (Nov., 
2002). 
r 
I 
362 
Shlaim, Avi, 'Britain, the Berlin blockade and the Cold War', International Affairs, 60, 
(1984), pp. 1-14. 
Suchkov, D.l., 'Dzhomo Keniata v Mosckve', Vostok, 4, (1993), pp. 106-121. 
Turchetti, Simone, 'Atomic secrets and government lies: nuclear science, politics and 
security in the Pontecorvo case', British Journal for the History of Science, 36, (Dec. 2003), pp. 
389-415. 
Vinen, Richard, 'Electric Koran', London Review of Books, (7 June, 2001). 
Walton, Calder, 'British intelligence, the Mandate of Palestine and threats to national 
security immediately after the Second World War', Intelligence and National Security, 
(forthcoming) . 
Wark, Wesley K., 'In Never-Never Land? The British archives on intelligence', The 
Historical Journal, 35, no. 1, (1992), pp. 195-203. 
Watt, D.C. Cameron, 'Francis [sic] Herbert King: a spy in the Foreign Office', Intelligence 
and National Security, 3, no. 4, (1988), pp. 62-82. 
363 
Appendix. 
363 
Appendix. 
NA co 733/457/14 
. I 
/" 
Telephone No •. 
BIllGENT 6060: 
WBITElHA'Lj:; 6789 • 
. \_.:' 
PARL·IJl.l!IIENT STREET B.a., 
LONDON, S."1III" . .1.. 
TOP SEGRET • 
... ... .0. F.85-22/DB 
~"1 '.~ 
2 \ 
'~, 
19th April, 1 945. 
. , 
We hftve received an urgent signal from S. r. ~,f. E. 
informing us that there. ' is reason tq Burnose that. 'V-nay in 
Euro?e ina,·; be regarded .as D-!lay by' the Irgun Zwi I,eumi and 
stern Group, the ' two terrorist organisations' in Palestine. 
This information has been derived fro~ yacov 
~IERIDOR, the I.Z.L. leader, who, as you knQw, is at present 
unc1er interrogatiQ'n in Cairo. ]..!F;RID1R hap been cultivating 
the friendship of a 'British warder through whom he hopex to 
establish contact with the Irgun and to make arrangements for 
his eventual escape. This warder has reported that !'<ERIDOR 
made the following remarks to him in oonversatiQn: "I must 
be in Palestine by V-Day. It will be the greatest da,v in 
Palestine's history. You will then see what a g r eat leaner 
of men I am. " 
Although it is impossible t Q obtain absolute 
confirmatL)n of the accuracy of this rel)ort, the fallowing 
Gansiderations add to its Credibility: 
' -'IT- The warder has shown himself in the past to ·be a 
. tVut~ul reporter. He is an unL~aginative man, he has 
'. , : " . ,no m~tive fo r 'eXaggeration and he is unaware of the 
APR ;,]45 'imp0lta1ice of., his statement. 
': :: ~.. ~IOOR is by nature a boastful man. There is 
--...-.-.... ~_IiW:'l'efore 'hothing inherentl,Y- improliabie in nis making 
such an important disolosure to an outsider. Further-
more he has recently shown sufficient oonfidence in the' 
warder to entrust him with five letters for dehvery in 
.Terusalem. 
/1f.ERIDOR has 
'-', 
1~OR has stated under interrogation that in 
the initial stages of operations the underground .u.rru.es' in 
Palestine will attack dumps and the p~peline. 
The Authorities in the },!iddle East feel , that ..aJliMJ 
this infoI'l1lation should be given its full value anil are in ~ 
,consequence intensifying their security precautions ' to proteot 
, these vulnerable points. S. I. M. E. have pointed out, however, 
that it would be of very substantial advantage to them in 
completing their preparations if the,'! oould be given 4B hours' 
notice of the impending declaration of V-Day. 
We have been in touch with the ':far Oabinet Offices 
on the matter and they have agreed to g i ve us as much fore-
warning of V-Da.V as possible though it is unlikely to be as much 
as 4B hours. When we get this information we shall signal it 
to Brigadier Roberts, Head of S. I. M. E. , but in the meantime we 
propose to impress upon him the necessity of using it in such 
r a , way as to avoid the risk of a premature disclosure in ).Iid-
c: )Vast of the ' ileclaration 'of V-Day. ' 
As Roberts is ' almost certainly keeping in the 
closest touch with both the Oommander-in-Ohief and the Hi g h 
COllnnissivner, I thin1c we can take it that he will wish to pas~ 
the advance ' infarmatian we give hi"l about V-Day to Sir Bernard 
Paget and Lord Gort, although I imagine both the lat ter ',n),l 
in any case be receiving si~lar advance knowledge roun~ a bvut 
the same time from other official svurces. 
I am writing in similar terms to the D.H.r. 
O. G. Eastwoc>d Esq., 
Oolonial Office. 
Yours <).""",. v_".~ 
",.---,,/ - ~ 
~ ,V-" 
/' 
NAKV3/41 
.' :':"- :.:, 
JrisENli~ri '~ Je..i~h }.gencrY' I'<1pres~~tativti :Ui Cairo and a Jok,derate ; ': 
Mfl. "Zee:v', SIIAlUP., - Agim6y Security ]j,lIison offi.o.er ,,,ith D.S.O. in,,-;:- " 
.Tentea,iem ,,., have just' reported to our lQcal representative: - ' ,,:,, ' 
, " 
(i) Fiero'. , STERN ' Gr~up reaetilm inevitable, if ' 18 . are . executed. . . , . 
(li) ' Ret~ati~~' win be of order ' of 100 outragei,fop 18ey.ec~ted. ,' " 
(Hi) !ridie';iJriiJi.a~e' ~lio6ting ofBri ti~h ' offi~el'~andsolciier80;' 
,str""ts in .-Pales'tino mus,t be expecfed.. ' " " ," 
, (iVY A~s"";Sination of selected V;I.Ps will bea:ttemPtedo~tSid~' 
Palestine ai1din: following coUntries::' U.K., E&YP"(;', 
'and ',the' Levant.Stitta,s. (our representative points, out ,that 
Cyprus should no" ,possibly, be added). 
.. ./ 
,In 'our' r epresentative's vi ..... , the .Agency ere ,not ,merely ,crying;:', 
~"o1f.·" , jilSEt'jS'I.'ATr is hiliu.elf very ' disturbed and the Agency haVe ' ' 
concentrated 'three' of "their former oO\U1ttlr-terrorist persomel in ', ( J,',I..11'o.;""" 
'Th~Jig9ncy: sp(,a'i'fiaally r'lquested that this Wannation' Should be ' ' 
pruised: to the , 'U.K~ + ' .-
'A.ct:ton.1ake';;" Pollee" together with Colonial, 'War and Foreign OffiO,,',j:" , 
(b) 
' informed. " ,: :' 
Seaurity Precautions , for detection ,af Jewieh terrorists att i"'+~iD8:/):i,::':,' 
to visit',U;K. 
(i) Vis..". , All ' applicationa for U.K. visas by Jews ill' "liddle ' Ea:~t' ,: :" ,:\ : , 
;;:Z;;;-Sorutinia ed by lo,cal Security 8llthorities. 
On the Continent P .... sport Control omcers have iriatntcti6ils' 'ti,'" 
refer baok to the , ":ppropriate 1!iddl~ East Consul (woo' iD', tUrn":; 
copBul1;s , locaJ. sec)lrity) any applications' 'i'or U.K. 'visa.; 'f':rooj ':: ',: 
JeWs ,of Middle East origin' ,or baCkground. ' " ' , 
, " 
(ii') Prec811tions at U.K., ports. Immigration officers ' l\t 
repOrt 'to, HOl!!e Offic~, Special Branch and !.! ~ I.5 the '[)BcM:.1011.l.A>'A 
0.1' al:L ,Jews (l,noluding , seamen), arriving i'rillD ' the '::'L':~"i~~;~i{~j;;<~:: 
"whose: nalifes , are the'n' ohecke'd agaiilst 'J,[.I.5' ri, OJ 
01; ,doubt ' iilso ag~t those: of the, security aU.IlJor:l.:U>'LJ,n",,,".:J..-l':O; ; , 
, BD,l" Jer>i"alam. , Any adverse rfl.cor:d is at 'once 
:to",Special ilranch~ , ' 
. ' . : .' " . "" ":. ".':'( -: . . " 
' j' '" ~"ToP S,,';"et' sources ad:m reveal that the Hagana are contemplating 
furtMr sabotage aotivity. The G.H.Q. of the Hagana in Tel Aviv have 
sent"mines , e,q,loeives and delBO' time fuses to one of the principal 
Hagana saboteurs in Haifa - the same man as was respons i ble for the 
op~ration ' ..gains t the "l9npire Rival". 
. .: 
III. POSSlBL:E A'ITE.lPl'S TO RKLEAsE KEY 'JEWI SH PERSONNEL NOVi DETAINED IN 
~. 
It is the custom for the ,Captains and cra..s of boats captured with 
illegal immigrants ' to mil: with the latter to ,avoid detention. This is 
also done ,by "escorts" "ho are picked Hagana 'personnel plying backwards 
and forwards' from ,Palestine and the vario\ls ports from which these boats , 
set sail. 
Top SeCret sources reveal ,that the Hagana may plan to attack the 
detention ,camps in CYPrus to effect the release of these crews and escorts. 
OUr ~pre8entati~ in Cyprus is being warned of this. 
0".,' 
IV. 
, Palestine had fore"arning, through Top Secret sources , ' that a "limpet'''' 
attack' on an wl1dentified boat (or boats) lying in Haifa was probable and 
imminent . Measures taken; as in safeguarding the King David, -were not, 
ho'i'ever, comprehensive enough and, .as is mown , the Empire Rival was 
holed. 
It is understood from prelimiilary sOWldings already made by the Office 
that expert technical advice would be "eloaned by the local Military and 
Police. To this end, the Office , provided the Palestine Authorities agree, 
is hoping 't o find a cOWlter-salXitage expert "ho will shortly be sent to 
Palestine for this special purpose. He will aim during his stay to make a 
general survey of existing security me.asures "ith a view to havilig them, 
strengthened and to train a team of counter-sabotage officers. 
v. lLLEGAL IMMIGRA 1'ION 
(a) Future scale of illegal immigration. Zeev SHARIF, Security officer 
o~ the Jewish Agenoy 'in Jerusalem , has informed our representative 
that the British authorities would do well to prepare camps in Cyprus 
sufficient to accommodate within three monthe as many as 50,000 
Jm,is!l immigrante. '!he ships and the organisation, he added, "ere in 
, existence for conveying illegal ilImigrants to Palestine on ,this 
increased Beale. 
l;t haa been learned' lately from Top Secret sources that the , ,,', 
Revisi~nists ' (who represent the extreme Right Wing in Zionist politica) .-
are, noVi engaged on their own in the organisation of illegal immigration. ' 
' This is of, interest as indicating, the, presence on the Continent of . : ", ' 
, EUrope', cif ' a Revisionist network, aimil'ar to that IOlown to eXist under:" 
, 'the, , ausp~ce,~ .. of the Jewish Agency, ,in which connection the 'l,'<lcerit .', '. 
!<ppeara,nqe', :i,n' Paris ' and Sal~burg of I1"8un Zvai Leumi pamphlets i~ ' riOte-
',wort~~ ,, ' . ' " 
"; -" . 
" ,"-.3 -::~~, t;~;ic:; ~d ' other Jewish clandestine activities , as will assist , 
1;1.>e~,:a';tYlQri'ties ,in ,tl:!a B\ll>pression of , such activities, Where , suitable 
' the]'!,},5"()&,i(l6r will, advise regarding ' .ui table counter measures, 
' (c) ]l~d~noe '-afR~\''i'';' :complici ty ' in illegal ' ~ration arid in subversi VB 
'·'e.etrVi:W ';lfC'Pilestine, ' 
(i) ,Reports have ,been increa.sing that the Ruesians are encouraging 
the :movement af Russian Jews through Poland en route to Palestine, ' 
One such report', fur"exwnple, from a souroe believed reliable, 
states that the 'moVlm1ent of Jews from Russia through Poland to 
Bavaria, and, the ,departure of Polish Jews from Poland are ,being 
faoilitated by the Russian authorities, According to the Brune 
'souro. the Russian Inteliigence Service l1as recently been playing 
,a part in' bringing pressure to bear on Jews in the Soviet Union 
to emigrate. 
,(ii) !.laports have been frequent - but usually indefinite - that the 
Russians are mak:i.ng 1J.Be of this illegal imnigration traffic for 
the purpose of infiltrating agents into the Middle East. The 
source quoted in (i) above, for , example, has reoently s ta ted that 
a "very 'oonaiderable number" of Russian propaganda and military 
ini;elligenoe agents have been able to reach Palestine by this 
mesne; " This is borne o'ut 'by a report from the Britieh M.A. in 
Warsaw, d,at~d August 12th, stating that - '-according to a ' source 
,of 'f~ reliability' - 'a "large number" of Jews prooeeding to 
Pale,stine, :from fonner Polish territory no\'! in U.S.S.R., are 
, Russiim 'agents., ' A hitherto untried sOUroe has also lately reported 
tiiat -the ' Russians are '.'training Jews in sebotage and 'in Oonmunist ' 
,and , anti' ;'British propaganda in Bulgaria, with the intention of 
ultimately ,send±Og them ' to Palestine. 
(iii) Evidenoe of Russian enoouragement of illegal inmigration is provided 
by the reoent increase in ths number of ships 'oarrying illegal 
immigrants to Pal'estine from Balkan ' ports. 
(iv) 
It is known, for example, that the vessel "Agia Anastasia", is 
preparing to depart frorn Constimza with illegal immigrants, and 
in this conneotion a ' fup Secret ,source ,indioated on Augus,t 2nd 
that the Jewish illegal inmigration organisers in Rumania had 
nreceived permission' from the Russians" . for her to sail. ;It 
may be ,eignificant that a representative of the British Legation 
, in Bu9hsreet, who visited Russian H.Q. in Oonstanza on August 16th 
to discuss the matter of the "Agia Anastasia", met a Zionist 
'delegate there hOlding lists of the persons aboard the ship - a 
meeting which apparently embarrassed the Russians, who were 
'unable to explain the presence of the Zionist representative. 
Particularly intaresting is a recent statement by EISENSTATl' 
(the Jewish Agency's contact with Our C~ representative) to 
the effect that SHVEDOV, first Secretary of the Soviet Legation 
in Oairo" recently asked that a representative of the Agency 
should seoretly visit Moscow and offered transport from Egypt in 
'a military aircraft for this purpose. " 
VI; ,ARAB AFFAIRS • 
.-.ca) Turkish and 'Egyptian Security Authorities on Communist 
~l~"~~. , ahd TUrkish, security representatives disoussed in Alexandria 
mea61llr<'B ,', ' Turkey :agaiiwi comnuni'am in attempt ,to evolve , , 
, !4griiricant closing ' of" the , rimke of 'Middle~ 
'Russian activity. Our D.S.O. may learn , ,,' 
, his , intimate contact' with the' 
~,~~\~,i~iDir,~,*!r::-Gj>,liBl:'al ,of P\lbUo S'eouri ty. 
~I 
( 
: ... . 
:'.' .. 
' ri';gO'tiatio~5 may ,lead to ' U;cr~ase in 'Arab terroria~' 
,', Our , ' stres'ses that terrorists are regarded as national" , ,,)j 
heros's - rather than 'as oriminale. Many of those responsible for ' recent 
outrag,ep ,.sre yo;wg men"of good femily with influential support whose' ", ';':1 
position , via-a-vis Egyptians ' analagOUB to that of Jewish terrorist's iil 1 
eyes or Jewish population 'in Palestine. ' 
(0 )A~tivi tiee of the Mufti. 
The Mufti movsd into 'a private villa near'Alexandria at the end ,of 
Jul.y and has become increasingly active. Reoent visitors have included:-
JAMAL HUSSEINI ' ) 
HUSSEIN KHALIDI ) 
AHMED IIIIMI ) 
ABDEL RAlI!.IAN AZZAM -
MARUF DAY/ALIBI ) 
ISlIAQ DARWISH ) 
Members of Arab Higher Committee. 
Se=etary General of .Arab League. 
Arab renegades recent~ in Paris 
who assisted the Mufti iIi his escape. 
(d) Arab attitude to forthcO!Iling Palestine Conference. 
According to reliable source, Jamal lIUSSEINI, Chairman of the Areb 
Higher 'Coomittee, has said Arabs had no hopes regarding London 
conference, but were attending so that disagreement could be registered 
before the case was referred to U.N.O. 
--~ooOoo---
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Copy in PP.70224 
l'P. J9,5J7/o~i3/E'..n. 5 July, 1952. 
Yc:; t:"iU ''Qoolil>ot that .)'Y>U di s"""Md, ""oog a".her things, at 
Tour !r.OOt1Q(; 'od.tb l:oll!U', last 1Yo000edD,y, the nlatioowp bot ...... n 
1I:1<'nI'<O }''}:llt'lli'Ji ~"" the G<>ld Oae.st and r,(torut' )'.'IlWJIIZ in Loruloo. 
~-------
2. !(eUnr b.s..s !!l1Imd lJl't tl') ~ntl ,V'Otl t\ not~ on -thIs sub,1C!ct. 
}. ~lhere h4~ ~n D !l1Jtleeebl('t t~l.l:'~n,:~cff: n.~ Kt!llar :>b,r..."Z7'14, 
i(J Z'C:;::'J:!:'t!!. fl~ O'.U" ~ruroe.g e."\):JI)t l"r\j);~O!rRI E· oont~ ..nth !:lY.Jt~ I~i,\H D.ll.l! 
oti.ar" l""liti.:iMs in tlut Colo Coast. We ha .... no re,,~o. h<7mncr, to 
~ that Pii1l4.0.iis..;; i& !.anne a DM' .o;,".)~ uocl:t8('.oVll:U~ ohar'l :,ol crt 0CIKt1U0.1,,-
oatic<l. ~ tniao the ~...11!:!e 1!:! inj'e>nmt:1on rathar to indicate that he 
iz nci.tIIer of'far'..D[' ... nor oo1ng .. "'«3d 1'=, too !'Q,,;ular polii;icru. gLliibnco 
-.hich :-;'llil\UfJi fa=arly ''''''''i .... 'd t'rtml lilio. 
4. !!1ttt'O 1!JI1y lft.Il1 '"015 a TU!\'!>iXlBbl!! oxplnna:.:io·,i !"or th1:s !Jttl.tu of 
al'f&ira. l'ilD'>lOW. ha:; alml]' o b een ro1it:ionlly a d.cct.rln.,1r". Hie 
i.atlllt.HlC('J over :~ ·KRU;~I.'i ~ ::·;:etl:n'tQ :';0 be greatest -me NIXJ1!JH':' H, 17M bad 
i!4td.lvtd ~.ta:r:ti~ j '.!'I2!. }-\.is Goosll.Uli.~~ I.:.,mnct,. J.n :Rr.glnnd, YI\1; builll.i.ng 
up ~ Cc~'VCnti~o .: .::~o;;ltl' ''' J"aI'~.~! 1):; : .:l:r;rirl ienolr.;gio:t.l linc~l, 
~. L.li"..e ;U8LY a4-...hc:r r..ol i1;:lc.1..nnfl who M?UI'~::-;'f.e6. t·.m:~, Oi<:-)')~· :'tioo to 
.;..)vcrtJJ!l!1nt, ~{ ' 1.·. ~.i:j :\lf ~'~y h!lve fnt\l.'; ?-:.i>llf.4?lf' dr-ivc:c oi'~ h.i.~ i..CJ:Jelo . ..:inr'.l 
cou·:-:.o 1',1 ~, ,:~ ~:-:-r.::) !.!..1:'"~ icr. r:f' :'flxty poli~insJ !.md ;lr.,y :':AlX~!"icmcc 
iQOr .. ~n;,dJl l: ni':'.N.ct..:l t :! .1r. raqonciling i::U:!' Tlr'flconGeiveU. thecr1ci; \:Jith the 
tbui; :i.col :.;."·10t;-J7rC :: ~lt~:~~ ... n..I".;' to i:{}("I:;" l-j,i;:f"",';lf :.., o;Yicc" 
G. ?!: (1C (I;ro riGht i.e (,;;,rppcd.n.s th.~.t !':'t~.:-::'JJ; t.' ~t-.!l pB6t:&, tl""\D 
tho iil&ological i ;CI tho <x"piJ.·ioel stuge of politk s, thon i t "'-~J ",,11 
be tll2..t ha fitxl s 1·'.'JY.'::Cil'.:·s rigid politi031 m1id'1r.co nt)t only l,;~j=O!litej 
a..tirrltntin,g. 
7. i":\1Uom~ 1A4¥ also havo ocne to De sOilIOthin.:;:; of ar. GQba.-rasnneat 
to !il1\H~AH through hav1n£ netod ,'1S hi~ s,gJct i:'i t1:.:: ncgot1ntic:'u~ nth 
ti1.e Dutoh fim ot ::;.c:;~~..rON tor tho aupply of pre-f'abricnted nauseQ, 
about certain u.peoh of ..utah, WI! WlUarstand, a"'~ 'l"""tiooa e= 
being amed in the Gold Gua.;. 
S. \7e lll'Q, of OOUraB j zaep:in.g OIJ.l"!I.elV\~5 ~~ ol(')ooljr informOO. of 
P.JUl·~ O!lf:: 18 aot1rlt.ie1l as our present DOlU"OeS allow, anulPO are now 
conudoriDg whether thoro :l.B al\l' poBSib111ty of inorea.ung the &COp" of 
our po.itive knowl"ila> at' him. IUs chid' interest., .. t the Illr.mant. 
otrtsido hi. Journalistic 1iOrk. 8pp<>&.r to 12 related to the proe<>ed:U1gs 
o.! too ~()ngt"tJBS of Peoplu.!: AUu.in:lt lnporiali~l, in l7hich ;,tr. Feru::;er 
)3R(}<]\W.b..Y, )~L' 1.1., is too pri.mc! mover. 
/appous. •••••• 
" ... ~ u-.vv.·. 
A-o--_'<lnd1x:.. 
~E 
I 
I 
I 
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&ppe3r8 to have lost his eothu~iaQill for it. lie i& reported, for axomple, 
to ~ abnn<lo' .... t e"y th~"!lht 01' oreaniains the proJected .\U-J.£rl.ea. 
Oocferoooo in co.,junctioo with the G0!li;I'Ces, a& ""'. ori;;inaU)' pl.Olloe.l. 
fu sBibLj" the . ·~: O::L~ .l~ I.l di~ll failure to ~TJ j:t~ ,e.randios.e ::uhGi:ll!8 
:tnto PrD.·.::t.l.oal ti11.'et:t nat. o.iJtJnau !~'!':'t\"':J.!tUl' ~ oytJu to i'..~ ~ , i.ljl't","K,ni U&::1 tuJd 
has c~Javi.pced h.ir:l tnu';' !..~ ""uta. .. lD oJUttcr to w~~ OLlt. pl •. me. f ot' tl:::!6 
".j 
~:~c~o->"""~n~~~~:::~:·~:~7 ~r.:,,::~:~::,::,~:~ ~::!:::~·':t~.'n<. to b~licvn .th.~t 2 n : j);C " CWo" i .,..wi"tiof> with io~ ... 'nn-:.i,-_l ";<nrlm1ot .~ 
~:::ti·:i"';7J: .... hlcl1 C~~ t~ au rind ,..·l~n hn U"~\S !').."J.~llea i:l'(';\'"! !.he l ;'ll::-'ty 1.'1 
:reJleo, in 1934. 13 genu:!nel.)· cloud. Hi.. l'e.o-:\i'rican ".lblti"n~ "",W 
1;.rouaht hlJa irrc'';:Jccl:;ly in'!;;) o''p.;".:.i~l ,:u to t:x. (: ~·t~,' ;:':Jn !.. ::ro., .,;;~.~ f~;;.v,::,: 1;10:;' 
:;:.inc\! j.·a·rNU~ hL-l (;0 i.l :;\-L~t("~.1~iJt - v!".ci.ch LtlOl1Jlt: uo r.:,o;:c "!;UtJ.Q that. !101) in 
u l-'..ar;d.=t ~':'.:J i:l Ull.:'o;::.x>n:.tiv,... tt, ");1;~ Go.':SUU1)i ~,~ ~scipl1.oo. jlU 
r~oo '" c·.,nvinoed. ~ ::· r.:.~!:;t-'(,t) nir.;i:ttt J ;~t :.~ t).'"UC, nr.J ::'n th:t", he} i. ": in 
D..CQor;J 'With numh tM.t the Uongro~" f)f Foopln8 "\ee1n ~t :!J,tx~rtfl.llEi''': ":::IT.'Qa.ct-..:ea, 
b.lt tt...orc i i;; nothing to ~lU.Gi;:fi~t t ~ \Qt ho, or l;bo CQI\.;".rcoO- , wvul" :.:.0 !.~Oly, 
G"Von if ~=:J.IJ \~rt.: ii,iwil thi.l o:.?pol"'tuoit:; , ttl t.nll~""t.orr.:.·"::j- "Gi .. ,;t (J .r:; !"i ~)o.o."\ 
C,=.al!lis;t •• 
Your~ ~nct'l'e1y, 
ll. Loftu. Jlro'ml. 
'?rr~orcl ~ill\ith ; ,3:"£., C.:.:. ·::-,... J 
Oolor.i8l. Offioe. 
"" , 1" 
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PF.J<£)?ll.!/O. s. 3/HLB 
CopYl . 0'.830 
vfiJ.e 
~B. 
f] It 
2. '!!'..'tiOl.i!3 report~! [-.::or: reli!iliJ.e 3OUrc~ e.greel. as ! sci.c, 'that KENYATTA.. 
10IU Sd3 fro::: mgl.!md rrom Eave.<~ber 1932 until Sopt>:Mbar 1933. end that for aome 
period. in the int!W'1al., ~1;ainly by tu. bagimrlng of ~ 1~.33, he \VaS stuOying 
at the Ltm111 &:00;,,1 in !'.of>'~.. . 
. . <") I UL'I yholJ,y in agl'esoont 'i1itll you that thie mi'Ol1ll8.tion aOOul.d not be 
1::'., ,,: "" ":.A4 in wah a. vta3 83 to lsnd. colour to any auggestiOll8, whi.oh mB¥ have been made, ~>'), ~h&,t UlU"8at !n KEIll3l1. in· J:tr'ec;te'l or1.!",GpJ.l'ed by OO\1'Nt',"listc. 
It.. rye han OO'!:l l1l)t~d .. "la to suggest corrmmist intervention in 1iau Me.u aQ-
t1v1tiee. By virtue of its O\m tbelor1es, too fntematiorull Ooommist movemant 
111 botmd to ISUppOrt rm:; oola:'-.i31 group whiot O&"l ~ fitted in~ the oa.teG'P~r of Il 
"National Ltbet'at:l.Crl ~.IV'e!lI(tlt", ll'.:It <brlng '~':,e pres(''nt em:;:-g~llCY in KeIn,ya, tm 
only lI~a ()! :tr..terve-.~~i~ Qr 8'lF;?O..-t by ==i:;t~:l.;'''C to 00 !,,,u:Jd in thsu-
propagan4a., ruld ' s-le;~ tru:.t Cb83 !lQ~ OPPear' to bet a:::03pti=WJ.y ;1.'Gll intorw;.i. 
.5. Seine 'l!1te!'l(li:;t in t:'.~ qu<!:$tic~. of' "!e1:d :.;~~~" :.:.u. been diispla,yfJd b,y / 
tile 4r1oultural al"'.u ];';'>t"8s':;r,y ;\'o:".rere· T. ij. 3.: . (.~ tro.!ile ~-tlet!nt Oct the l1orld ' 
:tederat1ao of 'l'%'a!W 1bi'JO::O) as 3. result o! pu:;,Uoi'ty given in ths pre81S to the 
v1alt of Peter KO:t'f/MGE to the ~ Assembly of t!le Unit"d H(l.tians mld in 
Paris in 1951. It irs believed that at t!;e 1!\:.l!!JCD.t S.!".:.\!. ?>lbli~tiOna london 
are enga80d i!l r.:r'lluoing a j?al'Jflhl.~~ 0:'1 th~ pre:3mt :!lituntion in K~ 
6. There eeetM! Httlc t'e.:lOO'1 ~.) &lubt, i:=rever, that't3'!YNYl'/,. himself, 
. ;.~ oonoeme-:l ~ldly 1tUb tM i'u:rtho}Ci'lg of t~ Otluse of the K.iloJ3u tribe end 
<C ./. / ! ' . !..at be bats intereatod himself in the o.1'foira 01' the Soviet thion and of inter-
D&t1ccal OQ!UIml1at orgsniaat10l\Q ubro<ul ~ in 00 far fj,J3 the oonrmmiata are 
. , 
" , 
~\l'ed to help hl.m< (n -eho same flpirit he 9.~\ai fo): and a.~/lpt:5 assistanoo 
how other ~W'B 800h as .tn-, OorlgntSl!! of P8Qples ~t I!llpetiRJ.i= (COP.ll). 
7. OOP.'II, aa you ialO'.W, took sllll,pC ,in 1948 as .9. MS!Jlt ot a meeting bald 
at l11teaux, outa1.de PArla, wh10h woo e.tt.:nc1sd 'by N)?resentativea of SooisJ.ist 
&ld ~t org=1sati.OIlII thro~t the world, partiQularly Indian organisa-
t1mu:I. 
a. lDdien Socialists have al1l'lloY8 belen concerned about the welfare of 
ptlUmta in oolan1.s.l countriea. Just bafore tbatfomation of COPfu, Sooialiats 
in /laia under tha leadel"llh1!' of Dr. WHIt.. took S'tIfPS to re.ise this illsue an an 
1ntematiooal lonel. It 1:J t.bel...t'bre not surprising, part10ularly in v111'it' of 
thD rnaber of l'nd18nB of the lcNe1"-C!l1Mle olaas wolirlng in Kan.,vtt} that &OllIS 
Ind1an aupport for KFNYATTA in the form ot propasRnda has been torthcom1ng. 
'!'boN i.e noth1n8, bowvVer, to SlJ88Sit that Indian enooure.,gement ofiU"rioan 
p:al1t1oal aoUT1tiea 111 K~ has been inspired by the Government ot India. 
O.J.J.T. Barton. r-:&q., C. M.G., O.B.E., 
Colonial Ortl00. 
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